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Abstract 
 
The last several years have seen an increased interest in self-represented 
litigants in the civil courts, known in Scotland as “party litigants.” Following 
legal aid reforms in England and Wales, the number of self-representing litigants 
in that jurisdiction has risen significantly, and many believe that the number of 
party litigants in Scotland is increasing as well. Views on self-representing 
litigants can be divisive: some are deeply concerned for their access to justice in 
a system of courts primarily designed for lawyers, while others view them as a 
nuisance causing unnecessary delay and expense. On both sides of this spectrum, 
indications of an increase in the number of party litigants in the courts is cause 
for concern. However, although an entire chapter of the report of the Scottish 
Civil Courts Review was devoted to party litigants, there has been a lack of 
research and little is known about self-representation in Scotland. 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the knowledge in this area by 
offering a survey of Scots law as it relates to the party litigant and an insight 
into how the law functions in practice. Traditional legal research was conducted 
to establish what the law and rules of court say (and do not say) to assist or 
regulate party litigants in the civil court process, as well as how judges exercise 
their discretion in relation to party litigants. Empirical research was also carried 
out in the form of interviews with judges, solicitors and court staff, as well as 
court observation, and the thesis considers how the law and rules are applied in 
practice and both how the civil court process challenges party litigants and how 
party litigants can disrupt the typical operation of the process. Other aspects of 
self-representation, including the role of the judge and the adversarial nature of 
the process, along with the potential impact of self-representation on 
represented parties involved in cases with party litigants, are also discussed. 
Finally, a number of conclusions are offered as to the present state of self-
representation in the civil courts and the relationship between the law in 
principle and the law in practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3	  
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................. 2	  
TABLE OF CASES ..................................................................................... 8	  
TABLE OF STATUTES AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS ...................................... 13	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................. 15	  
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ......................................................................... 16	  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 17	  
1.2 SELF-REPRESENTATION IN SCOTLAND: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT POLICY ..... 19	  
1.3 DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY ........................................................... 21	  
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ........................................................... 22	  
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 METHODOLOGY: INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 24	  
2.2 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH CONTEXT ................................................. 25	  
2.3 THE “LAW IN BOOKS”: DOCTRINAL RESEARCH .......................................... 32	  
2.3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW	  .....................................................................................................................................	  32	  
2.3.2 “LIBRARY” RESEARCH	  ..................................................................................................................................	  33	  
2.4 THE “LAW IN ACTION”: FIELDWORK ....................................................... 37	  
2.4.1 FOCUS AND RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH DESIGN	  ..................................................................................	  37	  
2.4.2 RESEARCH METHODS	  .....................................................................................................................................	  41	  
2.4.2.1 Interviews: Judges	  ...........................................................................................................................	  41	  
2.4.2.2 Interviews: Solicitors	  .....................................................................................................................	  43	  
2.4.2.3 Focus Groups: Court Staff	  ...........................................................................................................	  44	  
2.4.2.4 Court Observation	  ............................................................................................................................	  46	  
2.4.3 INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA	  ......................................................................................................	  49	  
2.4.4 RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONCERNS	  ..........................................................	  50	  
2.4.4.1 Reliability and Validity	  .................................................................................................................	  50	  
2.4.4.2 Limitations	  ............................................................................................................................................	  51	  
2.4.4.3 Ethical Concerns	  ................................................................................................................................	  53	  
 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 55	  
3.2 CIVIL JUSTICE AND SELF-REPRESENTATION .............................................. 57	  
3.2.1 THE FUNCTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS AND THE NATURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS	  ................	  57	  
3.2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY ON SELF-REPRESENTATION IN CIVIL MATTERS	  ..................	  61	  
3.3 SRLS: WHO, WHY, AND WHAT HAPPENS? ................................................. 64	  
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  64	  
3.3.2 WHO ARE SRLS IN THE CIVIL COURTS?	  .....................................................................................................	  67	  
3.3.3 WHY DO SRLS SELF-REPRESENT?	  ...............................................................................................................	  69	  
3.3.4 NAVIGATING THE CIVIL COURT PROCESS AS AN SRL	  .............................................................................	  72	  
3.3.4.1 INTRODUCTION	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  72	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4	  
3.3.4.2 Framing the Dispute	  .......................................................................................................................	  73	  
3.3.4.3 Complying with Court Procedures	  .........................................................................................	  74	  
3.3.4.4 Court Forms and Written Pleadings	  ......................................................................................	  75	  
3.3.4.5 Evidential Matters	  ............................................................................................................................	  76	  
3.3.4.6 Settlement	  ............................................................................................................................................	  77	  
3.3.5 CONCEPTUALISING THE SRL	  ........................................................................................................................	  78	  
3.3.5.1 Introduction	  .........................................................................................................................................	  78	  
3.3.5.2 SRLs: Angels or Demons?	  ..............................................................................................................	  79	  
3.3.5.3 Typologies of SRLs	  ............................................................................................................................	  82	  
3.3.6 THE EFFECT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION ON THE SRL	  ...........................................................................	  84	  
3.3.6.1 The SRL’s Feelings about the Process	  ..................................................................................	  84	  
3.3.6.2 The Wider Impact of Self-Representation	  ........................................................................	  88	  
3.3.7 DOES SELF-REPRESENTATION AFFECT LITIGANT OUTCOMES?	  .............................................................	  90	  
3.4 THE NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS ............................................................... 94	  
3.4.1 THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENT	  ................................................................................................................	  94	  
3.4.2 THE ROLE OF LAWYERS	  ................................................................................................................................	  97	  
3.5 SRLS: THE WAY FORWARD? ............................................................... 101	  
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................................................................................	  101	  
3.5.2 SELF HELP, INFORMATION AND LAY ASSISTANCE	  .................................................................................	  102	  
3.5.2.1 “In Court” Advice Services	  .......................................................................................................	  102	  
3.5.2.2 Self-Help, Guidance and Information	  ...............................................................................	  103	  
3.5.2.3 “Unbundled” Services	  .................................................................................................................	  106	  
3.5.2.4 Lay Representation	  .......................................................................................................................	  108	  
3.5.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE	  ............................................................................................................................	  110	  
3.5.3.1 Simplification of Procedures and Plain Language	  .....................................................	  110	  
3.5.3.2 Adversarial, Inquisitorial, Interventionist: Judging SRLs	  .....................................	  112	  
3.6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 115	  
 
CHAPTER 4: THE LAW RELATING TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IN SCOTLAND 
4.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 119	  
4.2 THE RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION ................................................. 119	  
4.2.1 THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENT	  ....................................................................................	  119	  
4.2.2 LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENT	  ...............................................................................	  120	  
4.3 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS .................................... 123	  
4.4 LAY SUPPORT AND LAY REPRESENTATION ............................................. 124	  
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................................................................................	  124	  
4.4.2 LAY ASSISTANCE/LAY SUPPORT	  ..............................................................................................................	  126	  
4.4.3 LAY REPRESENTATION	  ................................................................................................................................	  128	  
4.4.4 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  130	  
4.5 REGULATION OF THE PARTY LITIGANT IN THE COURT PROCESS ................... 131	  
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................................................................................	  131	  
4.5.2 THE SIMPLE PROCEDURE	  ...........................................................................................................................	  132	  
4.5.3 ORDINARY PROCEDURE	  ..............................................................................................................................	  134	  
4.5.4 EXPENSES	  ......................................................................................................................................................	  137	  
4.5.5 FAMILY ACTIONS	  .........................................................................................................................................	  139	  
4.5.6 PERSONAL INJURY	  .......................................................................................................................................	  141	  
4.5.7 GUIDANCE AND “SOFT LAW”	  ...................................................................................................................	  142	  
4.5.8 DISCUSSION: POLICY AND PROCEDURE	  ...................................................................................................	  143	  
4.6 VEXATIOUS LITIGATION .................................................................... 145	  
4.7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 148	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5	  
CHAPTER 5: THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 150	  
5.2 PARTY LITIGANTS: THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES ......................................... 151	  
5.2.1 LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE	  ..................................................................................................	  151	  
5.2.2 THE STANDARD OF LEGAL RELEVANCE	  ...................................................................................................	  152	  
5.3 LATITUDE, ALLOWANCE AND ASSISTANCE .............................................. 153	  
5.3.1 “MOORE” LATITUDE	  ..................................................................................................................................	  153	  
5.3.2 PROCEDURAL LATITUDE AND ASSISTANCE	  .............................................................................................	  156	  
5.3.2.1 Introduction	  ......................................................................................................................................	  156	  
5.3.2.2 Procedural Latitude	  .....................................................................................................................	  156	  
5.3.2.3 Procedural Assistance	  .................................................................................................................	  159	  
5.3.3 LATITUDE IN LAW AND RELEVANCE	  .........................................................................................................	  160	  
5.3.3.1 Introduction	  ......................................................................................................................................	  161	  
5.3.3.2 General Considerations and the ETBB	  ..............................................................................	  161	  
5.3.3.3 Assistance, Allowance and the “Latent Case”	  ............................................................	  163	  
5.3.3.4 Discussion	  ............................................................................................................................................	  166	  
5.3.4 RULES OF EVIDENCE	  ...................................................................................................................................	  167	  
5.3.5 LATITUDE AND ASSISTANCE: DISCUSSION	  ..............................................................................................	  169	  
5.4 ADJOURNMENTS AND DELAY .............................................................. 170	  
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................................................................................	  170	  
5.4.2 LEGAL ADVICE	  .............................................................................................................................................	  171	  
5.4.3 MEDICAL DELAY	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  173	  
5.4.4 DELIBERATE DELAY?	  ...................................................................................................................................	  176	  
5.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 176	  
 
CHAPTER 6: PARTY LITIGANTS: PERCEPTIONS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 178	  
6.2 UNDERSTANDING THE PARTY LITIGANT ................................................. 179	  
6.2.1 WHAT TYPES OF CASES DO PARTY LITIGANTS APPEAR IN AND WHY?	  .............................................	  179	  
6.2.2 GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY LITIGANTS AND SELF-REPRESENTATION	  ...................................	  181	  
6.2.3 VEXATIOUS AND DISRUPTIVE PARTY LITIGANTS	  ...................................................................................	  183	  
6.2.4 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  188	  
6.3 THE JUDGES’ ROLE AND DECISION MAKING ............................................ 190	  
6.3.1 ACTIVE/PASSIVE MODELS	  .........................................................................................................................	  190	  
6.3.2 STANDARDS	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  192	  
6.3.3 GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING	  ...............................................	  195	  
6.3.4 MANAGING EMOTION	  ..................................................................................................................................	  198	  
6.3.5 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  203	  
6.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 205	  
 
CHAPTER 7: NAVIGATING THE COURT PROCESS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 207	  
7.2 COURT PROCEDURES ....................................................................... 207	  
7.2.1 HOW WELL DO PARTY LITIGANTS COPE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS?	  ..............................	  207	  
7.2.3 PROCEDURAL VS SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS	  ...............................................................................................	  210	  
7.2.4 PARTICIPATION IN PROCEDURAL MATTERS	  ............................................................................................	  211	  
7.2.5 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  212	  
7.3 SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL MATTERS AND MERITS ........................................... 212	  
7.3.1 PLEADINGS AND COURT DOCUMENTS	  .....................................................................................................	  212	  
7.3.2 KNOWING AND UNDERSTANDING THE LAW	  ............................................................................................	  215	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6	  
7.3.3 GATEKEEPING	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  218	  
7.3.4 ASSESSING AND DEALING WITH THE CASE	  .............................................................................................	  220	  
7.3.5 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  222	  
7.4 EVIDENCE ..................................................................................... 224	  
7.4.1 EVIDENCE:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE	  ............................................................................	  224	  
7.4.2 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES	  ...................................................................................................................	  227	  
7.4.3 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  231	  
7.5 EXPENSES ..................................................................................... 232	  
7.5.1 THE INDEMNITY SYSTEM	  ............................................................................................................................	  232	  
7.5.2 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  235	  
7.6 APPEALS ....................................................................................... 236	  
7.6.1 THE APPEALS PROCESS	  ..............................................................................................................................	  236	  
7.6.2 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  237	  
7.7 COURT STAFF AND THE ADVICE AVAILABLE FROM THE COURT .................... 238	  
7.7.1 THE ROLE OF COURT STAFF AND THE LEGAL/PROCEDURAL DIVIDE	  ...............................................	  238	  
7.7.2 PARTY LITIGANTS’ EXPECTATIONS VS REALITY	  ....................................................................................	  241	  
7.7.3 WRITTEN GUIDANCE AND REFERRAL	  .......................................................................................................	  244	  
7.7.4 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  246	  
7.8 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 247	  
 
CHAPTER 8: ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR PARTY LITIGANTS AND THEIR OPPONENTS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 249	  
8.2 THE “CAPACITY GAP” ...................................................................... 249	  
8.2.1 THE ISSUE OF CAPACITY	  ............................................................................................................................	  249	  
8.2.2 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  251	  
8.3 THE EFFECT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION ................................................ 251	  
8.3.1 MEASURING SUCCESS	  .................................................................................................................................	  251	  
8.3.2 HOW WELL DO PARTY LITIGANTS PRESENT OR DEFEND THEIR CASES?	  ...........................................	  252	  
8.3.3 THE IMPACT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION ON THE PARTY LITIGANT’S OPPONENT	  ..........................	  254	  
8.3.4 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  256	  
8.4 PARTY LITIGANTS: IMPROVING ACCESS AND PREVENTING DISRUPTION .......... 257	  
8.4.1 INTRODUCTION	  ............................................................................................................................................	  257	  
8.4.2 “MORE LAWYERS”	  ......................................................................................................................................	  258	  
8.4.3 OTHER SOURCES OF ADVICE AND LAY REPRESENTATION	  ...................................................................	  259	  
8.4.4 SELF HELP: SIMPLIFYING PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE/EDUCATION	  ..............................................	  260	  
8.4.5 OTHER SUGGESTIONS	  .................................................................................................................................	  262	  
8.4.6 DISCUSSION	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  262	  
8.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 264	  
 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 265	  
9.2 THE “LAW IN BOOKS” ...................................................................... 267	  9.2.1	  THE	  SUBSTANTIVE	  LAW	  .............................................................................................................................	  267	  9.2.2	  THE	  “CASE	  LAW”	  .........................................................................................................................................	  268	  
9.3 THE “LAW IN ACTION” ..................................................................... 270	  
9.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 272	  
 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................... 275	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7	  APPENDIX	  A:	  COURT	  OBSERVATION	  PRO	  FORMA	  .............................................................................................	  275	  APPENDIX	  B:	  COURT	  OBSERVATION	  LOG	  ...........................................................................................................	  276	  APPENDIX	  C:	  SHERIFF	  INTERVIEW	  QUESTIONS	  ................................................................................................	  279	  APPENDIX	  D:	  COURT	  STAFF	  FOCUS	  GROUP	  QUESTIONS	  .................................................................................	  283	  APPENDIX	  E:	  SOLICITOR	  INTERVIEW	  QUESTIONS	  ............................................................................................	  285	  APPENDIX	  F:	  ETHICS	  COMMITTEE	  APPROVAL	  FORM	  ......................................................................................	  287	  APPENDIX	  G:	  CONSENT	  FORM	  FOR	  INTERVIEWEES	  .........................................................................................	  288	  APPENDIX	  H:	  PARTICIPANT	  INFORMATION	  SHEET	  ..........................................................................................	  289	  APPENDIX	  I:	  INTERVIEW	  CODING	  ........................................................................................................................	  291	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 293	  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   8	  
 
Table of Cases 	  
A Ltd and ors v F [2014] CSOH 169 
 
AB v CD [2015] CSOH 24 
 
The Advocate General for Scotland v Shepherd, unreported, Court of Session 
(Outer House) 10 July 2001 
 
Airey v Ireland [1979-1980] 2 EHRR 305 
 
Anderson, petitioner [2008] SCLR 59 
 
Anderson v United Kingdom, Application No. 19859/04 
 
Apollo Engineering Ltd (in liquidation) v James Scott Ltd [2012] SC 282 
 
Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 761 
 
Bank of Scotland plc v Forbes [2012] CSIH 76 
 
Bank of Scotland v Mitchell [2002] SLT (Sh Ct) 55 
 
Bargeport Ltd v Adam, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 15 February 1985 
 
Baretdji v Baretdji [2000] SLT 1419 
 
Bennett v The Scottish Down’s Syndrome Association, unreported, Aberdeen 
Sheriff Court, 4 November 2003 
 
Boyd v Fortune [2014] CSIH 93 
 
Boyle and anr v Wilson and ors, unreported, Court of Session (Outer House) 12 
March 1999 
 
Bremer Vulcan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp 
[1981] AC 909 
 
Cairns v Torq Partnership Limited, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 23 March 
2000 
 
Campbell v Lindsays [2017] SAC Civ 23 
 
Campbell v The University of Edinburgh, unreported, Court of Session (Outer 
House) 14 May 2004 
 
Canmore Housing Association v Scott [2003] SLT (Sh Ct) 68 
 
Carew-Reid v Lloyds Banking Group [2013] CSOH 5 
CEC v MM [2017] CSIH 50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   9	  
 
Children's Rights Alliance for England v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] 
EWCA Civ 34 
 
Clark Advertising Ltd v Scottish Enterprise Dunbartonshire [2004] SLT (Sh Ct) 85 
 
Clark v Hope and anr [2006] SCLR 98 
 
CMEC v David Roy (2013) CSIH 105 
 
Collier v Hicks [1831] 2 B & Ad 663 
 
Connolly v Connolly [2005] CSIH 78 
 
CR or D v ARD [2005] CSOH 88 
 
Crooks v Haddow [2000] SCLR 755 
 
Cultural and Educational Development Association of Scotland v Glasgow City 
Council [2008] SC 439 
 
Dana Ltd v Stevenson [1989] SLT (Sh Ct) 43 
 
Duff v George Wimpey West of Scotland Ltd [2012] WL 3062548  
 
Duff v Merrick Homes Limited, unreported, Court of Session (Outer House) 18 
March 2003 
 
Duncan v Duncan, unreported, Court of Session (Outer House) 7 June 2000 
 
Dunn v Roxburgh [2013] CSOH 42 
 
East Lothian Council v Crane, unreported, Haddington Sheriff Court, 23 
December 2003 
 
East Lothian Council v Martin [2014] SC EDIN 42 
 
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc v Whitehouse-Grant-Christ [2015] CSOH 23 
 
Equity and Law Life Assurance Society v Tritonia Ltd [1943] SC (HL) 88 
 
Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484 
 
Fitchie v Worsnop, unreported, Court of Session (Inner House) 23 January 2004 
 
F v H [2014] GWD 26-515 
 
Forrest v Fleming Buildings Limited and Others [2014] CSOH 258 
 
Francis v Pertemps Recruitment Ltd [2012] CSIH 25 
 
Fraser Trading Company and ors v Bank of Scotland, unreported, 1 December 
2000, Court of Session (Inner House) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  
 
Frost v Unity Bank plc, unreported, Court of Session, 2 February 1999 
 
Frost v Unity Trust Bank plc [2000] SLT 952 
 
Frost and Parkes v Cintec International Limited [2005] CSOH 119 
 
Gemmell v Marleybone Warwick and Balfour Group Plc [2012] CSIH 57 
 
General All Purpose Plastics Ltd v Young [2017] SAC (Civ) 30 
 
Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 [1963] 
 
Golder v United Kingdom [1979-1980] 1 EHRR 524 
 
The petition of Gordon Graham to the nobile officium [2015] CSIH 51 
 
Gordon v Nakeski-Cumming [1924] SC 939 
 
Green v The Lord Advocate, unreported, Court of Session (Inner House) 27 June 
2003 
 
Hamilton v Glasgow Community and Safety Services [2016] SLT (Sh Ct) 367 
 
Hamilton v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2009] GWD 9-144 
 
Henderson v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2011] CSIH 71 
 
Houston, petitioner [2007] CSOH 44 
 
HM Advocate v James Duff [2013] CSIH 50 
 
HM Advocate v Frost [2007] SLT 345 
 
Hunter v Hanley [1955] SC 200 
 
JD v Lothian Health Board [2017] CSIH 27 
 
Kaur or Singh v Singh, unreported, Court of Session (Outer House) 22 July 2005 
 
Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board [1986] SLT 435 
 
Kenneil v Kenneil [2006] SLT 449 
 
Kiani v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2013] CSOH 121 
 
Krajciova v Feroz, [2014] SCABE 40 
 
Kreuz v Poland [2001] 11 BHRC 456 
 
Laudanska v The University of Abertay, unreported, 4 November 2003, Dundee 
Sheriff Court 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   11	  
Levison v The Jewish Chronicle Limited [1924] SLT 755 
 
Libby Dale v Lets Glasgow Ltd, [2007] Civ PB 73(Feb) 8 
 
Lindsays WS v Senior-Milne [2011] GWD 28-625 
 
Lord Advocate v Cooney [1984] SLT 434 
 
Lord Advocate v Gracie [1951] SLT 116 
 
Lord Advocate v McNamara [2009] CSIH 45 
 
Lord Advocate v Rizza [1962] SLT (Notes) 8 
 
M v S [2011] SLT 912 
 
MacKay v Scottish and Southern Energy, unreported, Perth Sheriff Court, 13 
March 2000 
 
Mazur v Primrose and Gordon [2015] CSIH 8 
 
McClure Naismith v Stephen, unreported, Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 21 October 
2011 
 
McGeever v Nicol [2012] CSOH 115 
 
McGregor v Alpha Airports Group plc, [2011] CSOH 81 
 
McKechnie v Murray [2016] CSIH 4 
 
McKenzie v McKenzie [1971] P 33 
 
McLeod v Tayside Health Board [2014] CSOH 141 
 
McWilliams v Russell [2017] SC GLA 64 
 
Miloslavsky v United Kingdom [1995] 20 EHRR 442 
 
Mitchell v Somerville and anr [2017] CSIH 4 
 
Moberly v Strathclyde Regional Council [1992] SLT 799 
 
Moore v Secretary of State for Scotland [1985] SLT 38 
 
Mullan v Les Brodie Transport Limited [2005] CSIH 9 
 
Mushtaq v Secretary of State for The Home Department [2006] SLT 476 
 
Newman Shopfitters Ltd v MJ Gleeson Group Plc [2003] SLT (Sh Ct) 83 
 
Paragon Finance plc v Noueiri (Practice Note), [2001] 1 WLR 2357 
 
Percy v Govan Initiative Limited [2012] CSIH 22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12	  
 
Pompey’s Trustees v The Magistrates of Edinburgh [1942] SC 119 
 
Practice Note (Sen Cts: McKenzie Friends: Civil and Family Courts) 1 WLR 1881 
 
Prentice v Sandeman [2012] SCLR 451 
 
Q v Q [2014] EWFC 31 
 
R v Bow County Court Ex p Barrow [1991] 2 QB 260 
 
R v Leicester City Justices and Another [1991] QB 260 
 
R (On application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] 3 WLR 409 
 
RK, Petitioner [2007] CSOH 104 
 
Re: H (McKenzie Friend: Pretrial Determination) [2001] EWCA Civ 1444 
 
The Right Honourable Dame Elish Angioloini QC v Green [2013] CSOH 196 
 
The Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Hill [2012] CSOH 110 
 
Rush v Fife Regional Council [1984] SLT 391 
 
S v S [2003] SCLR 261 
 
Scottish Gas Board v Alexander [1963] SLT (Sh Ct) 27 
 
The Scottish Ministers v Smith [2010] SLT 1100 
 
Scottish Ministers v Stirton and Anderson [2014] SC 218 
 
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v UK 
Bankruptcy Ltd [2011] SC 115 
 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Brown, unreported, 21 January 2004, 
Court of Session (Outer House) 
 
Service Temps Inc v Macleod and anr, [2013] CSOH 162 
 
Singh v Biotechnology Sciences Research Council, The Roslin Institute [2013] 
CSIH 2 
 
Singh v Brian Napier QC, unreported, Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 29 July 2011 
 
Smith v The International Development Company (Aberdeen) Limited, 
unreported, 26 May 2006, Aberdeen Sheriff Court 
 
Smith v The Braer Corporation and ors, unreported, 26 May 1999, Court of 
Session (Outer House) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13	  
Sovfracht (V/O) Appellants; v Van Udens Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maatschappij 
(N.V. Gebr.) Respondents [1943] AC 203 
 
Steel v United Kingdom (2005) EMLR 15 
 
Stewart-Brady v United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 38; 
 
Strathclyde RC v Sheriff Clerk, Glasgow [1992] SLT (Sh Ct) 79 
 
Taylor v Taylor [2000] SLT 1419 
 
Thomson v Edinburgh Tramway Co Ltd [1901] 8 SLT 352 
 
Thomson v Harris and anr, unreported, Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 2 September 
2011 
 
Thomson v Rush, unreported, Court of Session (Outer House), 12 May 2000 
 
Todd v Scottish Qualification Authority unreported, Court of Session (Inner 
House) 29 June 2001 
 
Tonner v Reiach and Hall [2008] SC 1 
 
Unity Trust Bank v Frost and anr, unreported, Court of Session (Inner House) 6 
February 2011 
 
Van Overwaele, Petitioner [2009] CSOH 164 
 
Walls v Santander UK plc, unreported, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 12 July 2010 
 
Wilkie v Direct Line Insurance plc [2009] CSIH 70 
 
Wilson v North Lanarkshire Council [2014] CSIH 26 
 
Young, Petitioner [2007] CSOH 194 
Table of Statutes and Statutory Instruments 
 
 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 asp 4 
 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 asp 3 
 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 c36 
 
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 c 35 
 
Court of Session Act 1988 c 36 
 
Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 asp 18 
 
Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 c 39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   14	  
 
Heritable Securities (Scotland) Act 1894 c 44 
 
Home Owner and Debtor Protection (Scotland) Act 2010 asp 6 
 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 c 40 
 
Scots Acts 1532/1537  
 
Scottish Civil Justice Council and Criminal Legal Assistance Act 2013 asp 3 
 
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 c 58 
 
Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 c 46 
 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 c 23 
 
Act of Sederunt (Expenses of Party Litigants) 1976/1606 
 
Act of Sederunt (Expenses of Party Litigants) (Amendment) 1983/1438 
 
Act of Sederunt (Lay Representation for Non-Natural Persons) 2016/243 
 
Act of Sederunt (Ordinary Cause Rules, Sheriff Court) 1983/747 
 
Act of Sederunt (Rules of the Court of Session Amendment No.4) (Miscellaneous) 
2010/205 
 
Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Rules) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) 
2010/416 
 
Act of Sederunt (Simple Procedure) 2016 (SSI 2016/200) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   15	  
Acknowledgments  
 
There are many people to thank for their part in this thesis. Firstly I would like 
to thank my supervisors, Professor Tom Mullen and Dr Stephen Bogle, for all of 
their expertise, kindness, support and enthusiasm.  
 
This research would not have been possible without the participation of the 
Sheriffs, solicitors and court staff who so kindly gave up their own time to be 
interviewed, as well as court staff who assisted with court observation. I am 
very appreciative of their generosity in sharing their invaluable knowledge, 
experience and insight with me.  
 
I would also like to thank the Clark Foundation for Legal Education for their 
contribution to the funding of this thesis.  
 
Finally, I owe thanks to my two lovely children, Julia and Ella, for their patience 
with me over these last three years, and to my husband Jesse, for being my 
partner in this and everything else. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   16	  
Author’s Declaration 
 
 
 
I declare that, except where specific reference is made to the contributions of 
others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been 
submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other 
institution. 
 
Printed Name: ______________________________________________ 
 
Signature: __________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   17	  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
	  
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Scottish civil court system has remained largely unchanged for centuries.1 As 
Lord Gill observes, “The practitioners of 100 years ago would have little 
difficulty in picking up the threads of today’s system.”2 Efforts to modernise the 
courts and create a more fair and efficient civil justice system are currently in 
progress, most notably in the form of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. 
Many believe, however, that it is not only the courts that are changing, but the 
litigants, as more and more “party litigants”3 forgo legal representation in 
favour of conducting their own case. Recession and governmental policy mean 
that many cannot afford a lawyer or fall through the cracks of the legal aid 
system, while improved access to information may lead others simply to choose 
to self-represent. For these litigants, a lack of qualified legal representation 
may create a significant obstacle to access to justice.4 At the same time, the 
party litigant’s ignorance of court procedures and the law itself causes otherwise 
unnecessary delay and expense for their opponents,5 in some cases resulting in 
five- or even six-figure legal bills.6 Party litigants are also thought to demand a 
disproportionate share of public resources from a justice system already strained 
by budgetary pressures, cutbacks and numerous court closures. However, to 
date there has been very little research in Scotland on the topic of party 
litigants. Thus, this thesis provides the first modern in-depth study regarding 
both the law which applies to party litigants in Scotland and its application in 
practice by Scottish courts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Civil	  Court	  Review	  2009,	  hereafter	  the	  “SCCR”.	  2	  Ibid,	  page	  iii.	  3	  As	  noted	  in	  section	  2.4.1	  the	  exact	  number	  of	  party	  litigants	  in	  Scotland	  is	  unknown,	  but	  most	  agree	  that	  their	  numbers	  are	  increasing.	  4	  See,	  for	  example,	  Scottish	  Civil	  Justice	  Council,	  “Access	  to	  Justice	  Literature	  Review:	  Party	  Litigants,	  and	  the	  support	  available	  to	  them,”	  December	  2014	  at	  page	  3	  and	  McGroarty,	  J,	  “Access	  to	  Justice,	  McKenzie	  friends	  and	  Party	  litigants”	  (2007)	  SCOLAG	  361	  Supp	  (Paths	  to	  Justice?)	  14.	  5	  See,	  for	  example,	  Civil	  Practice	  Bulletin	  Editorial,	  “The	  Scourge	  of	  the	  Party	  Litigant”	  (1997)	  Civ.	  P.B.	  17(Sep),	  1-­‐2.	  6	  See,	  for	  example,	  Leask	  D,	  “A-­‐courting	  We	  Will	  go”	  Herald	  Scotland	  9	  June	  2012	  http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-­‐news/a-­‐courting-­‐we-­‐will-­‐go.17769385.	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Amongst other things, this thesis observes a paradox at the heart of the civil 
justice system of Scotland in relation to party litigants; on the one hand, it is 
underpinned by an open-door principle and right to self-representation thus 
allowing relatively unfettered access to Scottish courts; while, on the other 
hand, it is evident that the system, including the law, procedures and practise of 
the courts is not designed to be used by party litigants. This thesis observes and 
argues that there is a significant knowledge gap therefore created, which is 
generally filled by judges who feel obligated to assist the party litigant by a 
sense of “fairness” or in the “interests of justice” but also, importantly, by a 
regard for party litigant’s perceptions of the court and their emotions. 
Additionally, and relatedly, this thesis establishes that, from the perceptive of 
judges and solicitors, party litigants have high expectations of the court, 
contrary to the nature and ethos of the system, assuming they will be active in 
the processing, progression and resolving of their disputes. This is accompanied 
by a lack of responsibility, in the eyes of the rules and law, on behalf of the 
party litigant. These factors together mean judges tend to lower the standard 
expected, exercise discretion without much reference to authority or precedent 
and fill the knowledge gap created by the nature and system of civil litigation in 
Scotland where possible. It is concluded therefore that because the law says so 
little about the party litigant, efforts occur on the fringes of the process and 
thus go unseen. This thesis, however, brings to light that judges, courts staff and 
in some instances opposition lawyers make efforts beyond their prescribed remit 
in order to accommodate party litigants with the system and the party litigants 
too are asked, by the rules and system, to extend beyond what is reasonable or 
possible to expect of them. In shedding light on these issues, this thesis 
contributes to finding ways to move forward and to address these tensions. 
Additionally, it observes where the Scottish experience is unique to the context, 
system and law of Scotland but draws upon and confirms in places existing 
research into PLs and the law which applies to them within a civil justice 
system. 
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1.2 Self-representation in Scotland: Background and 
Current Policy 
 
There is very little if any existing literature on the development of the law in 
Scotland in relation to self-representation or how it relates to wider social policy 
aims in relation to access to civil justice. First, to date there has been no 
research conducted or work undertaken that collates the various laws, rules and 
common law principles relating to party litigants. As a result, the law in this 
area can appear fragmented, ambiguous or difficult to readily access. Hence, 
one of the aims of this project is to fill this gap in our basic knowledge of what 
the civil procedural rules are in Scotland with regard to party litigants. 
Additionally, through analysis of these rules, this thesis helps develop our 
understanding of how the law approaches party litigants in Scotland or in fact to 
what extent the law addresses them at all.  
 
Secondly, informed by a sense of law in action, this thesis investigates and 
observes, as much as is possible within a study of this nature, how the judges, 
solicitors and court staff deal with party litigants in practice. An initial starting 
point is therefore the report of the SCCR, which provides some clarity as to the 
view of SRLs and how this is driving the current state of policy and reform in 
respect of self-representation. The report states that party litigants can cause 
“considerable trouble, delays and unnecessary expense” either through 
ignorance of the law and process or deliberately.7 The report also states that 
“there is a need for change to court practices and procedures so that people 
who do not have legal representation are able to navigate their way through the 
court process effectively.”8 The difficult task facing the courts is thus to enable 
party litigants to use the courts effectively while also protecting the courts and 
other parties from the “trouble” they can cause.  
 
The report also notes that access to the courts for party litigants is “particularly 
relevant for cases of low monetary value where the cost of legal representation 
is disproportionate.”9 There is little mention of making other forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  SCCR	  Vol	  2	  at	  page	  8.	  8	  Ibid.	  9	  Ibid.	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procedure, such as the ordinary cause and family actions, more accessible to self 
represented litigants—potentially attracting more litigants who wish to self-
represent. Reform for party litigants in these areas has been slow to occur. 
While the SCCR thus does recognise a need for some procedures to be accessible 
to party litigants, there is no suggestion that the traditional role of the lawyer at 
the centre of most procedures should be supplanted by an SRL-friendly model. 
As noted above, the SCCR appears to place value on efficiency rather than 
“consumer focus.”10 For party litigants, this translates into an emphasis on 
judicial case management and discretion in dealing with their cases rather than 
measures that empower party litigants directly. The current policy in Scotland 
can be said to reflect two “tracks”—one, the simple procedure where self-
representation is encouraged by familiar methods such as simplified procedures 
and proactive judging; and another where lawyers remain central and party 
litigants are to be “case managed” individually. Clearly the role of the judge is 
pivotal in both examples. 
 
As set out in more detail in Chapter 2, this thesis examines the operation of 
Scots law and civil procedure as it relates to self-representation in the civil 
courts. In a system designed for lawyers, the party litigant can represent a 
“spanner in the works” that disrupts the usual function of the process for the 
court and his opponent, while the party litigant in turn may find it difficult to 
navigate through the process effectively. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine how the law and rules of court address party litigants and how the law 
operates in practice. The role of the judge, as noted above, is key and as 
research progressed it became apparent that much of the operation of the law 
and court process hinged on judicial discretion. The question of how judges 
make decisions about party litigants and their cases therefore became an 
important facet of the research.  
 
The issue of access to justice is inevitably at the heart of any discussion of self-
represented litigants. For purposes of this thesis, “access to justice” is 
considered through the lens of access to the courts: to what extent do the court 
processes and procedures accommodate party litigants? What aspects of the 
process, if any, create barriers for party litigants? How do the courts address any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  section	  3.2.1	  below.	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barriers or difficulties created by the party litigant’s lack of legal experience 
and knowledge, both in law and in practice? While the effects of self-
representation and limitations on access to justice more generally can extend 
far beyond the courtroom,11 this thesis intends not to look at the wider 
experience of the party litigant as such but rather at the law and the court 
process. 
 
1.3 Definitions and Terminology 
 
What exactly is a party litigant? “Party litigant” is a uniquely Scottish term to 
describe a litigant who acts in a civil case on his or her own behalf. This is the 
term generally used to describe these litigants in Scotland, although it is not 
itself defined where it appears in rules of court.12 Accordingly, this thesis uses 
the term “party litigant” when referring to Scottish litigants who are engaged in 
a civil court action without a lawyer.13 In the wider world, however, there are 
many terms that could apply. In some jurisdictions, including England and Wales, 
the term “litigant in person” appears most often, while in the United States the 
litigant is described as being “pro se.” Other terms are more loaded. While used 
by some, others consider that “unrepresented” litigant suggests that something 
is missing or lacking, preferring instead “self represented litigant” or “SRL”. Still 
others note that a person cannot “represent” himself; representation by its 
nature involves another person. When referring to litigants without lawyers 
generally and outside the confines of the Scottish courts, this thesis uses both 
“SRL” and “unrepresented litigant,” both without any negative connotation. 
 
There are multiple terms to be clarified for a handful of other matters that will 
be discussed. Civil matters are heard by “judges” in the Court of Session, and by 
“sheriffs” in the lower Sheriff Court, although both are of course judicial roles. 
For the most part, this thesis refers collectively to “judges,” although the more 
precise titles are used when referring to particular procedures or when judges or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  section	  3.3.6.	  12	  See,	  for	  example,	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Expenses	  of	  Party	  Litigants)	  1976/1606.	  13	  This	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  litigants	  who	  enter	  the	  court	  process	  without	  a	  lawyer,	  but	  not	  those	  who	  may	  be,	  for	  example,	  the	  defender	  in	  a	  civil	  case	  who	  does	  not	  enter	  appearance.	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sheriffs are named or discussed in relation to specific cases. As this thesis was in 
progress, changes were being made to the procedures in place to deal with low-
value cases, currently those under £5,000. These procedures are important to 
the thesis as they are designed for, and thus accommodate a higher proportion 
of, party litigants. At the outset of the research these were dealt with under 
either the small claims or summary cause procedures, with the simple procedure 
then being introduced in 2016. At the time of writing, the last of the small 
claims and summary cause cases are still progressing through the courts.14 To 
avoid confusion, these procedures are referred to collectively as “low value” 
claims, or by individual name when only the specific procedure in question is 
addressed. 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The orientation and methodology of the thesis are presented in Chapter 2, along 
with the ethical considerations and limitations of the empirical research in 
particular. Chapter 3 is a review of the existing literature in Scotland and 
analogous jurisdictions. Because, as noted above, self-representation raises a 
wide range of issues, Chapter 3 covers many related areas to provide a solid 
foundation for the rest of the thesis. This includes the background of civil justice 
and its purposes, the current state of empirical research into self-representing 
litigants as well as how self-representing litigants are currently conceptualised, 
a look at the normative dimensions of self-representation, and a summary of 
current and proposed methods of addressing the issues arising around self-
representation. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 then examine the legal aspects of self-representation in 
Scotland as disclosed. Chapter 4 is concerned with how the law in the form of 
statute, case law, and court rules and procedure regulate, restrict, or assist 
party litigants in the civil courts, directly and indirectly. This includes 
fundamental matters such as the basis of the right of self-representation in the 
Scottish civil courts and its limitations as well as less readily apparent factors, 
such as the party litigant “friendly” design of certain court procedures. Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  Simple	  Procedure	  (Special	  Claims)	  Rules	  are	  also	  not	  yet	  in	  force.	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5 then looks more closely at the case law and what it discloses about the 
exercise of judicial discretion in relation to party litigants, particularly in 
respect of the question of how much latitude, allowance and assistance courts 
can, should, or do extend to party litigants. 
 
With the legal position of party litigants thus established, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
then examine the empirical data gathered for the thesis to address the question 
of how the law operates in practice. Chapter 6 is concerned with preliminary 
issues regarding how party litigants are perceived and understood, as well as the 
role of the judge and the general principles judges use when making decisions 
both big and small about party litigants and their cases. This provides 
background to the next two chapters. Chapter 7 is the most substantial in this 
section, considering in detail how party litigants navigate and engage with 
various aspects of the civil court process, such as the procedural, legal, and 
evidential elements, as well as how their unrepresented status affects their 
opponents. This chapter also looks at the role of court staff as party litigants’ 
cases progress through a civil procedure. Chapter 8 offers some conclusions on 
the matters raised in the previous two chapters, summarising views on how well 
party litigants are able to present or defend an action in the system as it 
currently functions. Along with the question of party litigants’ access to the 
courts, the question of the how their opponents’ access to the courts can be 
affected is also addressed. Finally, Chapter 9 offers some additional conclusions 
and suggestions for future lines of inquiry or thought on party litigants and 
future research is suggested. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1 Methodology: Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis, at its most fundamental, is an attempt to understand 
how Scots law and the Scottish courts approach the position of the 
unrepresented litigant in the civil courts. First, the project asks how the existing 
law and legal rules address and approach party litigants in the civil courts—how 
are they assisted, or constrained, as compared to their legally represented 
counterparts? Thereafter, the thesis looks at how these laws and rules are 
applied in the “real world” and how the law and civil court processes interact 
with party litigants, their opponents, and the courts. More specifically, the 
thesis asks: 
 
1. In a system designed for lawyers, what is the effect of the provision, or lack 
of provision, in the process for party litigants? How are various aspects of the 
process, such as the procedural, legal and evidential elements of a civil action, 
affected by the presence party litigants in the court? 
 
2. How is the adversarial nature of the process affected by party litigants? What 
additional decisions, particularly relating to the question of latitude and 
assistance for party litigants, are judges called upon to make as a result of the 
challenges party litigants both face and present? How do judges make these 
decisions, and what legal principles or factors do they consider?  
 
3.  How do all of these issues around party litigants impact on the court and 
their opponents? 
 
For reasons that will be discussed below, the study is viewed primarily through 
the eyes of the other actors in the legal world, rather than the party litigants 
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themselves. By looking through the eyes of judges dealing with party litigants, 
for example, this work will seek to discover what issues are commonly 
encountered in the courts, how judges deal with these problems, and how they 
apply the rules or exercise their discretion. Moreover, there is the perhaps 
equally important question of how judges perceive party litigants—what can be 
learned about the party litigants they routinely encounter, and if or how these 
attitudes influence the decisions that judges make. 
2.2 Background and Research Context 
 
While traditional doctrinal methods are used, this project is primarily intended 
to be located within the field of socio legal studies, examining the law in a wider 
social context through the lens of—and with many empirical methods adopted 
from—the social sciences such as sociology, psychology and anthropology.15 
Unlike traditional doctrinal methods of legal scholarship, which focus on the 
internal coherence of statutory law and (typically appellate) cases, a socio legal 
approach suggests that a better understanding of social context can only 
improve legal scholarship.16 The practice of “socio legal” research is varied and 
gives rise to many different approaches and research focuses.17 As will be 
discussed below, this project draws on research methodologies pioneered in the 
social sciences to examine the workings of the legal processes related to party 
litigants. While the main intention is to look at how the law operates, the topic 
of unrepresented litigants inevitably intersects with larger issues in society such 
as inequalities in access to justice and the impact of civil justice more generally. 
Self-representation also raises more personal issues, such as the emotional 
motivations and impact of the experience on the litigant, which—as will be 
discussed—are closely and often intricately linked to the traditionally “legal” 
issues. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See,	  for	  example,	  Harris	  DR	  “The	  Development	  of	  Socio-­‐legal	  studies	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom”	  (1983)	  3	  Legal	  Stud	  315.	  16	  Baldwin	  J	  and	  Gwynn	  D	  “Empirical	  Research	  in	  Law”	  in	  M	  Tushnet	  	  and	  P	  Cane	  (eds)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2005).	  17	  Different	  jurisdictions	  tend	  to	  adopt	  their	  own	  focus	  in	  socio	  legal	  studies;	  see	  for	  example	  Nelken	  D	  “Law	  in	  Other	  Contexts:	  A	  New	  initiative	  for	  the	  Journal”	  (2012)	  Int	  JLC	  8(1)	  133.	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The project is oriented within the interpretivist tradition of social science, 
which regards social reality as subjective.18 Like a number of other projects that 
have investigated self-representation, this research used qualitative research 
methodology, primarily in the form of interview data. The implications of the 
qualitative nature of the project are considered throughout this chapter, but the 
theoretical underpinning and epistemological orientation of the project is first 
described here briefly. Denzin and Lincoln define qualitative research as a 
collection of practices that “make the world visible” by studying and recording 
data in its natural setting and “attempting to make sense of, or interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.”19 Qualitative 
research is designed to acknowledge the subjectivity of social reality,20 as 
compared to quantitative data, which focuses on measurable, testable facts and 
objectivity.21  
 
For the purposes of this project, quantitative research design could not provide 
the desired depth of understanding.22 Within the interpretivist framework, 
quantitative data would have provided only information on, for example, the 
volume of party litigant cases, but would not explore the experience, perception 
and social context that party litigants enter. This is not to say that the project 
could not have been enhanced by quantitative data, particularly as a means of 
assessing the numbers of party litigants and thus the scale of the issue. 
However, consultation with the Scottish Court and Tribunal Service (“SCTS”) 
early in the research design process made it clear that no figures are held or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	  for	  example	  Bryman	  A,	  Social	  Research	  Methods	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  19-­‐20	  and	  Merz	  E	  “A	  New	  Social	  Constructionism	  for	  Sociolegal	  Studies,”	  (1994)	  Law	  and	  Society	  Review	  28.5	  (January)	  1243.	  19	  Denzin	  N	  and	  Lincoln	  Y	  (eds)	  The	  SAGE	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research	  (2nd	  ed,	  Sage	  Publications	  2005)	  3.	  20	  The	  researcher	  must	  thus	  interpret	  people’s	  actions	  from	  their	  point	  of	  view;	  see	  Bryman	  A,	  Social	  Research	  Methods	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  13—18.	  21	  See,	  for	  example,	  Webley	  L,	  “Qualitative	  Approaches	  to	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research”	  in	  P	  Cane	  and	  H	  Kritzer	  	  (eds)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  930.	  22	  The	  reliability	  of	  court-­‐generated	  data	  in	  particular	  is	  addressed	  in	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  P	  and	  Mott	  N,	  “Research	  on	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants:	  Preliminary	  Results	  and	  Methodological	  Considerations”	  	  (2003)	  The	  Justice	  System	  Journal	  Vol	  24,	  Number	  2,	  163	  (hereafter	  “Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott”).	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could be collected on party litigants and their cases.23 Analysis of court 
documents on the scale necessary to constitute a valid sample was also not 
possible, both because permission from all parties would be required and 
because there is no way for the SCTS to identify relevant cases and thus each of 
the thousands of court processes would have to be perused. Civil justice 
statistics, for example, indicate that 77,721 civil cases were initiated throughout 
Scotland in 2015—2016.24 Studies that have made use of court records have used 
a team of researchers;25 this study has only a single researcher and examining a 
meaningful sample in the tens of thousands of cases in Scotland is not feasible. 
 
Socio legal scholarship26 has many of its roots in the legal realist tradition.27 
Legal realism is often described as rejecting purely doctrinal or black letter 
approaches to law and suggesting that it is necessary to understand both the 
“law in books” and the “law in action”.28 It is often divided into “old” and 
“new” categorisations, with “old” realism particularly interested in judicial 
decision-making.29 More recently, “new” realism takes a broader interest in the 
law and legal processes from the “bottom up”30 and the effect of the law on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	  is	  due	  primarily	  to	  the	  functionality	  of	  the	  SCTS’s	  Case	  Management	  System,	  which	  is	  unable	  to	  “data	  mine”	  such	  figures.	  	  	  24	  Scottish	  Government	  Civil	  Justice	  Statistics:	  http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-­‐Justice/TrendCivil.	  25	  Moorhead,	  R	  and	  Sefton,	  M	  2005.	  Litigants	  in	  person:	  unrepresented	  litigants	  in	  first	  
instance	  proceedings.	  [Discussion	  Paper].	  DCA	  Research	  Series	  2/05,	  Department	  for	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  (hereafter	  “Moorhead	  and	  Sefton”) 26	  A	  useful	  summary	  of	  the	  realist	  adoption	  of	  social	  science	  in	  its	  various	  forms	  is	  provided	  in	  De	  Been	  W,	  Legal	  Realism	  Regained:	  Saving	  Realism	  from	  Critical	  Acclaim	  (Stanford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  Chapter	  4.	  	  27	  This	  notion	  in	  “old”	  realism	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  Karl	  Lllwelyn;	  see	  Llewelyn	  K,	  “A	  Realistic	  Jurisprudence—The	  Next	  Step”	  (1930)	  30	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  431.	  28	  I	  have	  used	  the	  term	  “law	  in	  action”	  here	  as	  it	  is	  now	  most	  commonly	  applied	  (in	  contrast	  with	  “law	  in	  books”)	  but	  note	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  more	  complex	  constructions	  of	  “law	  in	  action”	  and	  “living	  law”,	  as	  outlined	  by	  Nelken	  D,	  “Law	  in	  Action	  or	  Living	  Law?	  Back	  to	  the	  Beginning	  in	  Sociology	  of	  Law”	  (1984)	  4	  Legal	  Stud.	  157.	  29	  Although	  this	  interest	  has	  certainly	  not	  been	  abandoned	  in	  “new”	  incarnations;	  see,	  for	  example,	  George	  T,	  et	  al,	  “The	  New	  Old	  Legal	  Realism”	  Northwestern	  University	  of	  Law	  Review	  (2011)	  Vol	  10	  No	  2,	  689	  and	  Miles	  T	  et	  al,	  “The	  New	  Legal	  Realism”	  (2008)	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Law	  Review	  Vol	  75,	  No	  2,	  831.	  The	  latter	  characterizes	  new	  legal	  realists	  as	  viewing	  judicial	  decisions	  as	  quantifiable	  and	  as	  “hypotheses	  which	  can	  and	  should	  be	  tested”	  (page	  836).	  30	  See,	  for	  example,	  Macaulay	  S,	  “The	  New	  Versus	  the	  Old	  Legal	  Realism:	  Things	  Ain’t	  What	  They	  Used	  to	  Be”	  (2005)	  Wisconsin	  Law	  Review	  Issue	  2,	  365	  at	  page	  390.	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lives of individuals. “New” legal realism in particular does not lend itself easily 
to precise definitions.31 Katherine Kruse observes that “Scholars who explicitly 
lay claim to a legal realist legacy are engaged in a variety of endeavours with 
arguably little in common, and surprisingly, ‘have generally failed to even 
acknowledge each other’s existence’”.32 Arthur McEvoy argues in a similar vein 
that new legal realism is a “style or kinship” rather than a “substantive 
movement”.33 New realism has a “characteristic approach to socio legal 
questions” with an “emphasis on situation and context, a postmodern approach 
to the relationship between the abstract and the particular, and an emphasis on 
recursion and reciprocal constitution in relationships between formal law, 
experience and culture.”34 This thesis adopts this view and a pragmatic vein of 
“new” legal realism35 employing the methodology best suited to the issue at 
hand.36 Contrary to common criticisms of legal realism, this view acknowledges 
that it is necessary to understand both legal doctrine and rules and the “real 
world” application of these rules in order to properly understand the law as a 
whole.37 The realist view also extends to the legal procedures and procedural 
decision making that forms a large part of the focus of the work.38 This project 
has proceeded on this assumption that “law in books” alone cannot provide a 
full picture of the subject matter and, as suggested above, that the law itself 
and the implementation of the law in practice are part of the same process and 
equally necessary to understand the position of party litigants. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  lack	  of	  coherence	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  “legal	  realism”	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  its	  “accidental”	  and	  “haphazard	  origins”;	  see	  Tamanaha	  B,	  “Understanding	  Legal	  Realism”	  (2009)	  Texas	  Law	  Review,	  Vol	  87,	  731.	  32	  Kruse	  K,	  “Getting	  Real	  about	  Legal	  Realism,	  New	  Legal	  Realism	  and	  Clinical	  Legal	  Education,”	  New	  York	  Law	  School	  Review	  (2011/12)	  Volume	  56,	  295	  at	  page	  313,	  quoting	  Frank	  J,	  Law	  and	  the	  Modern	  Mind	  at	  page	  76	  (Transaction	  Publishers	  2009)	  (1930).	  33	  McEvoy	  A,	  “A	  New	  Realism	  for	  Legal	  studies”	  (2005)	  Wisconsin	  Law	  Review	  433,	  at	  page	  434.	  34	  Ibid	  at	  page	  454.	  35	  See	  Erlanger	  H	  et	  al,	  “Is	  it	  Time	  for	  a	  New	  Legal	  Realism?”	  (2005)	  Wisconsin	  Law	  Review,	  No	  2,	  335	  at	  345.	  36	  Suchman	  M	  and	  Mertz	  E,	  “	  Towards	  a	  New	  Legal	  Empiricism:	  Empirical	  Legal	  Studies	  and	  New	  Legal	  Realism”	  (2010)	  Annu.	  Rev	  Law	  Soc	  Sci	  6:555	  at	  page	  562.	  	  37	  See	  Dagan	  H,	  “Doctrinal	  Categories,	  legal	  realism,	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law”	  (2015)	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  Review	  163.7,	  1889.	  	  38	  The	  realist	  perspective	  here	  contradicts	  the	  view	  that	  legal	  procedures	  are	  “neutral”	  rather	  than	  ideological:	  Cross	  F,	  “	  Legal	  Process,	  Legal	  Realism	  and	  the	  Strategic	  Political	  Effects	  of	  Procedural	  Pules”	  (2005)	  The	  University	  of	  Texas	  School	  of	  Law,	  Law	  and	  Economics	  Working	  Paper	  No	  065,	  October.	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The need for empirical research to fully understand the subject matter of this 
project was clear. Part of this was practical; the “law in books” simply could not 
answer all the questions that I wished to set. As noted above, methods drawn 
from the social sciences, and particularly empirical research, are often 
associated with socio legal studies.39 The development of legal realism is also 
associated with increased interest in empirical legal research,40 although early 
legal realists were considered by some to promote the idea of empirical research 
more than they actually undertook empirical work. “New” legal realism has also 
developed alongside increasing calls for empirical legal research.41 Empirical 
study is attractive because, unlike more insular formalist approaches, it allows 
the researcher to engage with larger issues in social science and law in 
practice.42 However, the use of empirical methods has only begun to be 
recognised relatively recently as a distinct area of scholarship.43 It has been 
suggested that the development of empirical legal scholarship has been hindered 
by a lack of literature in the United Kingdom in particular,44 an issue often 
linked to a “capacity” deficit—the relatively small numbers of those willing and 
able to carry out empirical legal research.45 Empirical legal research thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Harris,	  supra	  note	  15	  at	  page	  320—321.	  40	  See	  for	  example	  Heise	  M,	  “The	  Past,	  Present	  and	  Future	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Scholarship:	  Judicial	  Decision	  Making	  and	  the	  New	  Empiricism”	  (2002)	  U	  Ill	  L	  Rev	  819	  from	  page	  822	  and	  Kritzer	  H,	  “The	  (Nearly)	  Forgotten	  Early	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research”	  (Chapter	  36)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  Cane	  P	  et	  al	  eds	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  41	  In	  the	  UK,	  this	  has	  manifested	  perhaps	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  report	  of	  Genn	  H	  et	  al,	  “Law	  in	  the	  Real	  World:	  Improving	  our	  Understanding	  of	  How	  Law	  Works”	  The	  Nuffield	  Enquiry	  on	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  November	  2006.	  42	  Fortney	  S,	  “Taking	  Empirical	  Research	  Seriously”	  (2009)	  22	  Geo	  J	  Legal	  Ethics	  1473.	  43	  See,	  for	  example,	  Heise	  M	  “An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Scholarship	  production,	  1990-­‐2009”	  (2011)	  U	  Ill	  L	  Rev	  1739.	  44	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  Cane	  P	  and	  Kritzer	  H,	  eds	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  at	  page	  3.	  45	  Genn	  et	  al	  “Law	  in	  the	  Real	  World:	  Improving	  our	  Understanding	  of	  How	  Law	  Works”	  The	  Nuffield	  Enquiry	  on	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  November	  2006	  from	  para	  37;	  the	  problem	  is	  said	  to	  be	  particularly	  acute	  in	  the	  area	  of	  civil	  justice.	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incorporates many research methods from the social sciences,46 but some social 
scientists question the rigour of its methodology.47   
 
It is also worth noting that socio legal scholarship and legal empiricism are also 
associated with the process of law reform.48 While traditional doctrinal research 
shapes legal reasoning, it has less to offer to improve policy and practice.49 
Empirical research, and particularly qualitative research, can be more accessible 
and offer a flexible and contextual approach.50 Hensler offers a well-balanced 
view of empirical research, suggesting that it can “help us to more accurately 
measure legal knowledge, attitudes and needs, and to better understand legal 
behaviour and legal outcomes”51 while adding that it is equally necessary to be 
“modest about the promise of policy-oriented research.”52 Sarat and Sibley 
describe the potential pitfall of the “pull of policy,”53 the danger that directing 
research at policymakers may undermine objectivity. However, while this 
project has been carried out against the backdrop of on-going civil court reform 
in Scotland,54 some of which is directly concerned with party litigants, and it is 
hoped that the study could inform discussions about policy and practice in 
relation to party litigants, the impetus for the research has been the 
researcher’s own interest in the subject rather than responding to the concerns 
of policy makers and the research questions addressed have been those which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Law	  is	  often	  itself	  classed	  as	  a	  social	  science,	  but	  does	  not	  sit	  entirely	  comfortably	  with	  other	  categories	  of	  social	  science.	  47	  See,	  for	  example,	  Epstein	  L	  and	  King	  G,	  “The	  Rules	  of	  Inference”	  (2002)	  69	  U	  Chi	  L	  Rev	  1,15	  and	  Revesz,	  “A	  Defence	  of	  Empirical	  Legal	  Scholarship”	  (2002)	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Law	  Review,	  Vol	  69	  no	  1	  (Winter)	  pp	  169	  for	  a	  spirited	  rebuttal.	  48	  As	  has	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  realism;	  see	  as	  noted	  in	  Kritzer	  H,	  “The	  (Nearly)	  Forgotten	  Early	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research”	  (Chapter	  36)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  Cane	  P	  et	  al	  eds	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  at	  page	  879.	  49	  Genn	  H	  et	  al,	  “Law	  in	  the	  Real	  World:	  Improving	  our	  Understanding	  of	  How	  Law	  Works”	  The	  Nuffield	  Enquiry	  on	  Empirical	  Legal	  Research,	  November	  2006	  at	  para	  96.	  50	  Sallee	  M	  and	  Food	  J,	  “Using	  Qualitative	  Research	  to	  Bridge	  Research,	  Policy,	  and	  Practice”	  (2002)	  Theory	  Into	  Practice:	  51,137.	  51	  Henser	  D,	  “Reflections	  on	  the	  use	  of	  Empirical	  Research	  in	  Legal	  Policy	  Reform”	  (2003-­‐2004)	  7	  Newcastle	  L	  Rev	  1	  at	  page	  12.	  52	  Ibid	  at	  page	  12.	  One	  particularly	  interesting	  limitation	  Hensler	  observes	  is	  that	  data	  cannot	  “counteract	  the	  power	  of	  social	  legends,”	  such	  as	  the	  fallacy	  that	  Americans	  are	  “over	  litigious”.	  53	  Sarat	  A	  and	  Silbey	  S,	  “The	  Pull	  of	  the	  Policy	  Audience”	  (1988)	  10	  Law	  and	  Policy	  97.	  54	  The	  Courts	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2014,	  which	  was	  passed	  and	  implemented	  in	  stages	  as	  the	  research	  was	  carried	  out.	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seem most important in advancing knowledge of the phenomenon of self-
representation.  
 
 
The specific research methods within the project, while not ethnographic in 
nature, are broadly inspired by previous work in the legal ethnographic field. 
Like qualitative research as a whole, ethnography is not related to a singular 
form of data collection but rather to a holistic, open-ended and dynamic 
approach.55  Nouse and Shaffer describe the strand of legal realism incorporating 
ethnographic methods as “contextualism.”56  This model rejects statistical 
studies for “sympathetic engagement”57 with the issue at hand, often focused on 
institutions: 58  
 
“What stands out in much of the work under this variety of legal realism is 
the combination of empirical engagement with recursivity: scholars study a 
real problem in the real world (they do not start with a theory or normative 
agenda), and as they encounter the problem, scholars emerge with 
different ideas and new strategies, learning from those who must deal with 
the problem (“the legal subjects”). In the view of many scholars who take 
this approach (including ourselves) the measure of the success of many 
studies is not “prediction” and verification…Rather, the measure is 
discovery.”59 
 
An approach focused on “discovery” is particularly relevant in this work because 
so little research, and even less empirical research, has been conducted on the 
subject to date. In other words, there is very little upon which to gain a 
theoretical or even practical foothold in relation to the Scottish courts. It is thus 
most useful to adopt an approach that is open to possibilities and which can be 
adjusted as fieldwork progresses.60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  See,	  for	  example,	  Stewart	  A,	  The	  Ethnographic	  Method,	  Qualitative	  Research	  Methods	  Series	  46	  	  (SAGE	  1998)	  6.	  	  56	  Nouse	  V	  and	  Shaffer	  G,	  “Varieties	  of	  New	  Legal	  Realism:	  Can	  a	  New	  World	  Order	  Prompt	  a	  New	  Legal	  Theory?”	  (2009-­‐2010)	  95	  Cornell	  L	  Rev	  61	  from	  page	  79.	  57	  Ibid	  at	  page	  79.	  58	  Ibid	  at	  81.	  59	  Ibid,	  page	  85;	  this	  is	  echoed	  by	  Conley	  J	  and	  O’Barr	  W,	  “Legal	  Anthropology	  Comes	  Home:	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  the	  Ethnographic	  Study	  of	  Law”	  (1993-­‐1994)	  27	  Ly	  L	  A	  L	  Rev	  41	  at	  page	  63.	  60	  Yngvesson	  and	  Coutin	  compare	  ethnography’s	  “unfolding	  potentialities”	  to	  the	  thought	  experiment	  of	  Schrodinger’s	  Cat;	  Yngvesson	  B	  and	  Coutin	  S	  “Schrodinger’s	  Cat	  and	  the	  Ethnography	  of	  Law”	  (2008)	  Political	  and	  Anthropology	  review	  Vol	  31	  Issue	  1,	  May.	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The ethnographic approach is particularly attractive for the subject matter of 
party litigants because as Conley and O’Barr note, it “examine[s] law as a 
culture unto itself, and also as a constituent of a much broader cultural 
milieu.”61 Viewing the law and legal institutions as a culture (or subculture) is 
particularly useful as a lens through which to view the party litigant as an 
“outsider” navigating the system. This is reflected in Conley and O’Barr’s work62 
as well and other studies that address lay people interacting directly with legal 
institutions63 and the role legal professionals and their practices play in shaping 
legal processes.64 This project, as described in more detail below, draws upon 
the open-ended, mixed methods approach of legal ethnographic studies, as 
adapted to the subject matter and practical concerns. 
2.3 The “Law in Books”: Doctrinal Research 
 
Although this chapter has focused much on the empirical element of the project, 
the doctrinal element is equally important and should be considered before 
discussing the fieldwork in more detail. As there was no pre-existing 
comprehensive or systematic survey of law governing and regulating self-
representation in Scotland,65 the doctrinal element and the “law in books” 
serves two purposes here. It is first intended to fill in gaps in the existing 
literature by tying together the various disparate threads of the law and placing 
them in the larger context of the legal processes and function of the courts. 
Second, the doctrinal research provides a foundation for the empirical work.  
2.3.1 Literature Review 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Conley	  J	  and	  O’Barr	  W,	  supra	  note	  23.	  62	  See,	  for	  example,	  Conley	  J	  and	  O’Barr	  W,	  “Litigant	  Satisfaction	  Versus	  Legal	  Adequacy	  in	  Small	  Claims	  Court	  Narratives”	  (1985)	  19	  Law	  and	  Society	  Rev	  661;	  	  O’Barr	  Wand	  Conley	  J	  “Lay	  Expectations	  of	  the	  Civil	  Justice	  System”	  (1988)	  22	  Law	  and	  Society	  Rev	  137.	  63	  See,	  for	  example,	  Bezdek	  B,	  “Silence	  in	  the	  Court:	  Participation	  and	  Subordination	  of	  Poor	  Tenants’	  Voices	  in	  Legal	  Process”	  (1991-­‐1992)	  20	  Hofstra	  L	  Rev	  533.	  64	  See,	  for	  example,	  Zammit	  D	  “Maltese	  Court	  Delays	  and	  the	  Ethnography	  of	  Legal	  Practice”(2011)	  4	  J	  Civ	  L	  Stud	  539;	  Zieger	  K,	  “The	  Day	  in	  Court:	  Legal	  Education	  as	  Sociolegal	  Research	  Practice	  in	  the	  Form	  of	  an	  Ethnographic	  study”	  (1990-­‐1991)	  2	  Legal	  Educ	  Rev	  59.	  65	  The	  state	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  Scotland	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   33	  
The first element of the project is a literature review, primarily intended to 
outline and analyse the existing literature in respect of the conceptual issues 
around self-representation and self represented litigants. The body of empirical 
work on self-represented litigants, their experiences and the experiences of 
legal professionals dealing with them—as well as the wider impact of self-
representation—are also considered. As discussed in the literature review, there 
is very little Scottish literature in this area. Literature from other common law 
and English-speaking jurisdictions that relates to the larger issues relating to 
self-representation is also considered. 
 2.3.2 “Library” Research 
 
The subject of this project is somewhat unusual in that, unlike most other areas 
of law, there is no concrete definition of “party litigant” law. For the purposes 
of this project, a relatively broad approach was taken. The legal basis for the 
right to self-represent in Scotland and its limitations are the first and perhaps 
most fundamental matter to be considered. Thereafter, the parameters of the 
research were roughly as follows: 
 
1. Provisions that relate directly to the regulation of party litigants; for 
example, those that allow or forbid party litigants to have lay assistance or 
representation. 
 
2. Court rules or procedures that regulate or affect party litigants and the 
presentation of their cases, either directly or indirectly. For example, the small 
claims procedure is designed to be accessible to party litigants and the rules 
contain provisions for the court to assist party litigants by serving documents on 
their behalf. Conversely, the Ordinary cause procedures place an emphasis on 
legal relevance and written pleadings that, while applied equally to legal 
professionals and party litigants alike, presents a far greater challenge for the 
untrained party litigant to negotiate. 
 
3. Case law illustrating principles applied to party litigants, particularly in the 
area of latitude or assistance that may be extended by the court due to the 
party litigant’s unrepresented status.  
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4. Official guidance or policy, such as the Law Society of Scotland’s rules 
relating to the treatment of party litigants. Although not law as such, these are 
noted for their impact on how party litigants are treated in the courts.  
 
While determining whether provisions relate directly to party litigants is 
straightforward, there is of course some subjectivity involved in discussing 
indirect impact on party litigants. These are provisions or rules which are likely 
to have a disproportionate impact on party litigants as compared to represented 
litigants. The determinative factors used are drawn from the existing literature 
on party litigants,66 although it is perhaps also fair to say that many could be 
considered common knowledge. It is safe to take for granted, for example, that 
most party litigants are not familiar with court practice and procedure or aware 
of how to draft legal pleadings. Thus where provisions that affect the party 
litigant indirectly are included, the underlying reasoning for this is explained. 
 
The doctrinal element of the project began as a search for rules and dicta 
relating to party litigants in the Scottish civil courts. However, it quickly became 
apparent that there are few firm pronouncements on self-representation in the 
Scottish jurisprudence. Some of the fundamental research questions may have 
been expected to be answered in the rules or case law—for example, what are 
the “rights” of party litigants, or should party litigants be afforded a larger 
degree of latitude based on their unrepresented status alone—but these answers 
did not readily appear. Where there was authority for a particular proposition, it 
was often contradicted in numerous examples within the case law. As noted 
later, for example, it has been held that courts are essentially entitled to hold 
party litigants to the same standards as lawyers, but the body of cases involving 
party litigants suggested that this rarely, if ever, occurs.67 Thus, the research 
did not focus primarily on the most authoritative cases—which, due to a 
hesitance on the part of courts to make binding pronouncements on party 
litigants,68 are arguably not traditionally “authoritative”. While those cases are 
of course a part of the project, the aim was instead to examine all available 
cases involving party litigants. This approach both provided an alternative 
method to begin to address the research questions relating to the issues arising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  As	  set	  out	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  67	  See	  Chapter	  5.	  68	  Section	  4.7.	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in courts when party litigants are involved and, to answer another aspect of 
these questions, looked for patterns in how judges dealt with these issues.  
 
Many of these cases, while most often not authoritative or binding, provided an 
example of the issues that arise in cases involving party litigants and how the 
court approached and ruled on these issues. Because such cases were generally 
not authoritative (or indeed notable for other reasons) many were unreported. 
Instead of traditional law reports, material for much of this portion of the 
project was found in judgments published directly on the Scottish Court Service 
website.69 Most were found using a number of keyword searches using terms 
including “party litigant”, “unrepresented”, “lay representative”,  “in person”, 
and “personally present” (the latter two as these terms are often used on 
interlocutors to indicate that a litigant was present in court and appeared on his 
own behalf). Thereafter new judgments published by SCTS were monitored for 
those involving unrepresented litigants. A total of over 220 cases were 
ultimately reviewed.  
 
The subject matter and nature these of cases naturally varied, but each example 
was read for issues relating to the party litigant’s unrepresented status either 
directly or indirectly rather than the substantive law per se. Categories such as 
procedural issues, relevance and delay emerged from the body of cases and 
those which were relevant were labelled with one or more of these terms, as 
well as any other notable issues. A handful of cases did not disclose any issues 
related to the unrepresented status of one or both litigants, but, perhaps 
notably, these were the exception rather than the rule. Ideally, it would have 
been better to have a more definitive and subject-specific method of obtaining 
case examples. It is difficult to say how representative the cases are, as there is 
no way of knowing how many other cases have been decided and how they might 
vary. Unfortunately, the project had to be limited to what was publically 
available. After discussions with SCTS, it was clear that there was no way to 
search for decisions relating to party litigants in case files, or indeed for certain 
types of cases. There was also the issue of confidentiality, and I was told that I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  A	  handful	  were	  obtained	  elsewhere.	  For	  example,	  one	  case	  had	  been	  noted	  in	  newspapers	  but	  not	  published	  on	  the	  SCTS	  website,	  but	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  judgment	  had	  been	  made	  available	  online	  by	  a	  firm	  of	  solicitors.	  Another	  was	  obtained,	  with	  appropriate	  permissions,	  directly	  from	  the	  relevant	  sheriff	  court.	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could not access judgments that have not been made public without permission 
from all parties even if they could be found70. Seeking to obtain permission for 
any number of cases would have been impractical and potentially invasive or 
distressing for the individuals concerned.  
 
However, the judgments that were publically available did encompass a 
significant breadth of case types and issues, as well as appearing from all courts 
and areas of Scotland. The information provided is also, of course, limited in 
scope and represents only the judge’s point of view and the information that the 
judge (or the person reporting the case) sees fit to include. This was taken into 
account when considering the cases.  Another limitation that must be considered 
is that, due to lack of authority and the difficulties in obtaining cases discussed 
above, this portion of the project cannot ultimately be said to have definitively 
answered the research questions that it was originally intended, or expected, to 
address. However, the case law does paint a useful picture of the patterns that 
emerge in party litigants’ cases. It also provided valuable background and 
direction for the empirical aspect of the project and ideas about the issues and 
patterns could then be tested in interviews with judges and solicitors. The cases 
were also important for what was not to be found within the judgments. There 
was a lack of reference to legal authority in decisions made regarding areas such 
as latitude or discretion for party litigants. As touched on above, even on points 
where such authority was available, judges rarely if ever referenced or followed 
these points. This does not, of course, lead to any sort of conclusive 
determination, but again, these observations provided ideas to explore in the 
empirical aspect of the project. It is worthwhile to note that this aspect of the 
methodology did raise many of the points that were ultimately borne out and 
corroborated by the empirical element of the thesis. For example, the issue of 
unmet expectations of the process on the part of party litigants detected in the 
case law71 was found to be an important theme in the empirical research as 
well.72  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Minute	  of	  telephone	  meeting	  with	  Ian	  Clark	  of	  SCTS,	  28	  September	  2015,	  held	  on	  file	  with	  author.	  71	  Section	  5.3.5.	  72	  Section	  7.7.2.	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2.4 The “Law in Action”: Fieldwork  
 
2.4.1 Focus and Restrictions on Research Design 
 
 
The empirical element of the project consisted of interviews and court 
observation as detailed below. The Scottish civil courts essentially have two 
tiers, the Court of Session and the Sheriff Courts. With limited time and 
resources within the scope of a PhD project, a choice had to be made about 
which courts to study.  Between the Court of Session and the Sheriff Courts, the 
choice was relatively easy as the Sheriff Court hears far more cases. According 
to the Scottish Government’s 2015—2016 Civil Justice Statistics, 93% of civil law 
cases were raised in the Sheriff Court that year.73 The Courts Reform Act 2014 
raised the privative jurisdiction of the Court to Session to £100,000, making it 
even more unlikely that a large amount of party litigant cases will be heard 
there. Also following the Courts Reform Act, appeals that would previously have 
been heard within the Sheriff Courts, or, for some, at the Court of Session, were 
diverted to the newly created Sheriff Appeal Court. Although party litigants are 
often thought to be over-represented as compared to parties with lawyers in the 
appeals process, much of the study is thus focused on cases at first instance. 
Judges and court staff interviewed were nonetheless dealing with the initial 
processes involved with appeals, although the appeals were now heard 
elsewhere. An additional interview was also undertaken with a member of staff 
dealing with appeals in the Sheriff Appeals Court to provide some additional 
insight. 
 
Early in the project, the empirical aspect was intended to be narrowed further 
to focus on ordinary cause procedure74 in the Sheriff Courts. Ordinary procedure, 
unlike small claims processes, was not designed with party litigants in mind and 
has more complex procedural and legal requirements. More straightforward 
small claims procedures seemed less likely to cause difficulties for party 
litigants. However, as the empirical work progressed, it became apparent that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Civil	  Justice	  Statistics	  2015—2016	  http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/03/5915/0.	  74	  In	  the	  broad	  sense,	  this	  includes	  actions	  such	  as	  sequestrations	  and	  summary	  applications.	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distinctions between the procedures were not as clear-cut as originally 
envisaged. In early interviews, judges in particular had much to say about small 
claims cases and made few distinctions between these and ordinary cause cases. 
While strictly procedural elements are more straightforward in small claims 
processes, there was much in common between the different procedures in the 
legal, evidential and practical issues encountered. For this reason, small claims 
cases were not excluded and interviews were adjusted to allow for gathering 
data on these cases as well. 
 
The research methods used are discussed in detail below. Restrictions on the 
research design and execution of the design are often noted. In addition to the 
time and resource limitations of a PhD project, there were a number of other 
limitations that required adjustment to the design. Unsurprisingly, the same 
restrictions discussed above in relation to case judgments also applied to court 
processes and papers in general. With access and a great deal of time, 
examination of court processes75 involving party litigants could have allowed for 
tracking of the procedural and legal progress of cases and thus hopefully could 
have identified common issues. Perhaps even more importantly, this would have 
allowed for some form of analyses of paperwork and pleadings submitted by 
party litigants, allowing for evaluation of how successfully parties meet 
substantive and procedural hurdles. Without knowing the terms of access it is 
difficult to say exactly what form such analyses would take, but the extent that 
pleadings meet procedural requirements and a comparison of pleadings as 
submitted with the progress of the action as it developed in court would 
certainly be key issues.  
 
Answering the research questions also required access to judges and court staff, 
as detailed below. This in turn entailed gaining institutional access via the SCTS 
centrally and in the individual courts.76 Again the “ideal” research design was 
reshaped after discussions with SCTS.77 It was clear that time constraints would 
be an important factor, as the operational considerations for the courts were 
naturally a priority. The access sought had to be very specific from the outset, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  “Process”	  here	  refers	  to	  the	  court’s	  administrative	  file	  for	  each	  case.	  76	  Again	  this	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  77	  Minute	  of	  telephone	  meeting	  with	  Ian	  Clark	  of	  SCTS,	  28	  September	  2015,	  held	  on	  file	  with	  author.	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which further narrowed the methods that could be used. For example, in the 
hope of gathering as much information as possible, an early hope was to submit 
a questionnaire to all the sheriffs in several courts, to be completed by those 
who were willing to do so, with the offer of a follow up interview with those 
who were interested. Any sort of mixed methodology such as this was not 
available, however, as I was told I would have to identify the number of judges 
from certain courts I was seeking in advance, and that I would have to approach 
them with a single request, such as an interview, at the outset. The design was 
thus modified to a single hour-long interview.  
 
Perhaps the biggest modification to the potential research design was the 
elimination of gathering data from party litigants themselves. While this was 
considered as part the earliest design of the project, as the project progressed a 
number of considerations led to the decision not to include party litigants 
personally. Some of these were practical, even as practical as a lack of available 
accommodation in an appropriate venue, such as a court, for interviews. 
Another concern, however, was the ethical aspect—party litigants are inevitably 
in a vulnerable position when their cases are on-going, and for many discussing 
the case after the fact may bring up negative memories. Such a discussion is also 
likely to bring up sensitive or confidential information. By contrast, judges and 
lawyers are accustomed to discussing their professional lives (the distinction 
between personal and professional being particularly important here) and are 
well versed in identifying what information is confidential and appropriate for 
disclosure in a particular setting. There was thus far less risk with the latter that 
sensitive information above and beyond what was relevant would be disclosed in 
their interviews. 
 
Identifying and recruiting party litigants would also be prohibitively 
complicated. Approaching party litigants directly could be intrusive and 
potentially aggravating for them at a vulnerable time. Even if successful in 
recruitment, the time and resources needed to interview78 the number of party 
litigants required for a valid sample size in addition to the other interviews is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  A	  quicker	  option	  may	  have	  been	  surveys	  of	  party	  litigants,	  but	  this	  method	  does	  not	  fit	  well	  with	  the	  overall	  orientation	  of	  the	  project	  as	  an	  interpretive	  and	  qualitative	  study;	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  responses	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  and	  would	  not	  align	  well	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  interview	  data.	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likely to exceed the limitations of a PhD project conducted by a single 
researcher.  
 
The lived experiences and feelings of party litigants are by no means 
unimportant or irrelevant to the issues, but the primary focus of this thesis is on 
the legal aspects of self-representation and its impact on the court process—
questions that judges and solicitors, for example, are more readily and 
accurately able to answer. This approach also helps to therefore frame our 
understanding of how the law and court system engages with and views the 
party litigant and their needs. Hence, it would, for example, be fruitless to ask a 
party litigant technical questions about the procedures or questions to draw out 
how the process was adapted for him as opposed to a solicitor, when he has no 
knowledge of how the process is typically intended to operate. Equally the party 
litigant would not be able to provide insight into the judicial decision making 
process, or other issues that would effectively amount to asking him what he 
does not know. Interviews with party litigants would thus not address the 
particular research questions set for this thesis to a meaningful extent. 
Perhaps most importantly, there are limitations on the extent to which 
interviews with party litigants could address the research questions. As is 
sometimes suggested in the existing literature,79 unrepresented litigants are not 
always able to report their experiences with the law and court processes in legal 
terms with a great deal of accuracy, due a lack of understanding of the law 
involved. Their view may also be coloured by the emotional aspects of the 
underlying issues bringing them to court in the first place.80 Nevertheless, while 
data did not come directly from party litigants, other parts of the method are 
designed to compensate for this as much as possible; for example, the inclusion 
of court observation and interviews with multiple categories of professionals, 
including court staff, to provide varying perspectives. While individual party 
litigants can only speak to their own individual experience, legal professionals 
encountering party litigants every day are able to identify the patterns and 
reoccurring issues that are at the heart of the questions this project seeks to 
answer. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  See	  for	  example	  section	  3.3.6.	  80	  See	  section	  3.3.6.1.	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2.4.2 Research Methods  
 
2.4.2.1 Interviews: Judges   
 
To better understand the challenges that party litigants both pose and face in 
the courts, a key aspect of the data was interviews with the judiciary. This was 
particularly important because there was so little statutory or common law 
authority to be found relating to the type of issues frequently encountered by 
courts dealing with party litigants. Because so many matters are left to judicial 
discretion, understanding the party litigant’s journey through the civil court 
process requires an understanding of how and why judges make decisions about 
questions such as how latitude is extended to these litigants. The question thus 
became not what the legal rules could tell us, but rather what was happening in 
the courts on a day to day basis and why. Judges are able to offer insights on 
this, as well as their observations about the behaviour of party litigants and the 
issues that they encounter in the conduct of their cases. A research request was 
submitted in line with the SCTS research access policy,81 which was ultimately 
approved, as required, by the Lord President and the Sheriff Principal of each 
sheriffdom involved. In terms of the policy, as a researcher I was not permitted 
to approach individual sheriffs, but rather was supplied with names of those 
willing to participate in the project. 
 
A total of 10 sheriffs were interviewed as set out in the table below. Courts A 
and B are large (more than 10 permanent sheriffs) urban courts located in two 
different sheriffdoms in the central belt. Courts C and D are mid-sized (fewer 
than 5 permanent sheriffs) courts both located in a third central belt 
sheriffdom. Each interview lasted around one hour. 
 
 
Court      Sheriffs Interviewed 
Court A 3 
Court B 4 
Court C 2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	  request	  asked	  for	  interviews	  with	  5	  sheriffs	  each	  in	  the	  sheriffdoms	  noted	  in	  the	  table.	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Court D 1 
 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured and open-ended82 style, in 
consideration of the additional issues involved in “elite” interviews, where open-
ended questions are generally considered desirable.83 Thus while an interview 
guide was used with set questions that had been prepared in advance, the guide 
was designed to allow for follow-up questions or additional questions as issues 
arose.84 As each interview proceeded at its own pace, I marked questions that I 
wanted to ensure were asked at each interview in bold, leaving additional 
questions to ask as time allowed. Each interview was adjusted as it progressed 
to some extent, either to account for the sheriff’s stated experience85 or when 
questions were anticipated and answered before I had a chance to ask them. 
Each judge was assigned a number for anonymity and the interviews are referred 
to in this thesis as J 1-10.  
 
The judicial interview data is, of course, limited to the judge’s perspective. 
Subjectivity in their responses was inevitable, and I was aware that some judges 
seemed to have an overarching view of party litigants (whether positive or 
negative, or at least wishing to appear positive of negative, about the presence 
of party litigants in the courts) that may have influenced how they wished to 
respond to questions. Other judges may have been concerned about appearing 
unduly hard or too easy on party litigants. It is also worth noting that judges may 
be more likely to remember and recount the more problematic party litigants 
and cases—such as serial and vexatious litigants86--which may not reflect their 
experiences with party litigants as whole. Anything that might suggest this was 
carefully noted as much as possible in a study of this nature. However, this data 
as a whole provided important insights into how the law operates in practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Although	  often	  accepted	  as	  the	  norm	  in	  “elite”	  interviewing,	  open	  ended	  questions	  may	  raise	  additional	  issues	  of	  validity;	  Berry	  J,	  “Validity	  and	  Reliability	  Issues	  in	  Elite	  Interviewing”	  (2002)	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics,	  Vol	  35	  No	  4	  (Dec)	  679.	  83	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mikecz	  R,	  “Interviewing	  Elites:	  Addressing	  Methodical	  Issues”	  (2012)	  Qualitative	  Enquiry	  18(6)	  482;	  Rice	  G,	  “Reflections	  on	  interviewing	  elites”	  (2010)	  Area	  Vol	  42	  No	  1	  March	  70.	  84	  Appendix	  C.	  85	  For	  example,	  a	  handful	  of	  questions	  related	  directly	  to	  ordinary	  cause	  procedure	  only	  were	  omitted	  if	  the	  sheriff	  advised	  that	  he	  had	  seen	  few	  party	  litigants	  in	  this	  type	  of	  case.	  86	  See	  section	  3.3.5.3.	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While the decisions and orders that judges make in respect of party litigants and 
why they make them was a key research question, the interview data quickly 
revealed that there was much to learn about the judge’s role in cases involving 
party litigants in court more generally, such as taking on a more active role and 
deliberately altering their demeanour. The views that judges had of party 
litigants, while of course subjective, are also important in their own right in 
understanding the decision making process and the treatment that the party 
litigant received in court. 
 
2.4.2.2 Interviews: Solicitors 
 
Interviews with solicitors formed another facet of the research methods. This 
served several purposes: first, it was a research aim in itself to gather the 
perspective of legal professionals acting as opponents of party litigants, both in 
terms of their own approach and strategy and what they observed about the 
effect that party litigants had on the solicitor’s clients (for example, in terms of 
costs) and the courts. While all the solicitors were able to tell me about their 
own dealings with party litigants, many were also able to recount even more 
anecdotal observations of other party litigants and sheriffs dealing with party 
litigants based on hours sitting in court waiting for their own cases to call. 
Another aspect of the solicitor interviews was to examine how their experiences 
and views aligned with the other data that had been gathered, either to 
reinforce that data or illustrate where disparities emerged. This was particularly 
important in considering how the reflections of solicitors and judges, as legal 
professionals on the “inside” of the process, corroborated or contradicted each 
other. However, it is equally important to note that solicitors are likely to have 
a particular—and often negative—point of view in relation to party litigants, 
experiencing them as they do as a representative for their opponent. As with the 
judicial interviews, I was aware of the potential for solicitors to attempt to 
portray their dealings with party litigants in a particular light. A solicitor would, 
for example, likely be hesitant to report if he or she attempted to take 
advantage of party litigants’ lack of legal knowledge, even anonymously. That 
this was not reported in the interviews thus does not mean that it does not 
potentially occur. Insofar as possible in a study of this nature, I was watchful in 
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the analyses of the interviews and the subsequent transcripts for any signs of 
this or other hints of bias. 
 
In practical terms, the considerations for the solicitor interviews were much the 
same as the judicial interviews as discussed above, with the exception of the 
recruitment of subjects for interview. This proved more difficult than expected. 
Because party litigants are known to be a potentially troublesome part of the 
job for solicitors, recruiting by advertisement more generally—such as by 
advertisement in the court or with the law society—seemed likely to produce an 
unbalanced sample and subjects perhaps predisposed to a negative view of party 
litigants or an “axe to grind.” Initially the plan was instead to identify solicitors 
via court observation87 and approach those who had been seen to have 
experience with party litigants. However, although half a dozen were 
approached, only one subject for interview was ultimately recruited in this way. 
The remaining seven solicitors interviewed were identified through University of 
Glasgow contacts (such as those working as tutors) either directly or by 
recommending other solicitors known to work with party litigants. The solicitors 
who were interviewed all focused on litigation as their primary practice area, 
and although they had different specialities with that area, all were experienced 
in court work and had encountered numerous party litigants. They also 
represented different types of law firm in the central belt, with most from 
larger commercial firms and others from smaller firms. If time and resources had 
allowed (and willing subjects could be found) a larger and more diverse body of 
interviewees would have produced a more reliable body of data. The solicitors 
are referred to here as S1-8. 
 
2.4.2.3 Focus Groups: Court Staff 
 
Court staff assist party litigants at public counters as well as acting as the clerk 
in civil proceedings. As such, they are part of the party litigant’s experience and 
are able to offer valuable insights into the issues that party litigants encounter 
(and cause) both in and out of the court, sometimes where lawyers and judges 
are not present. Like sheriffs, it is their role to be “neutral” in the process, but 
unlike sheriffs their experiences with party litigants are not limited to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  See	  section	  2.4.2.4.	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formal constraints of the courtroom setting. Court staff, like solicitors, had their 
own observations about how party litigants behave in the conduct of their cases 
and how judges and solicitors approach them. Because part of their remit is to 
assist party litigants on practical matters and provide procedural advice, court 
staff were also able to provide data addressing questions of what information is 
available to party litigants and to what extent this assists them. The perspective 
of court staff was also of great interest because, although they are familiar with 
the workings of the court in their profession, they are, like party litigants, lay 
people and not formally legally trained. Moreover, Macfarlane found in their 
study that court staff were able to identify the concerns and issues encountered 
by party litigants with a high degree of accuracy; the comments of court staff 
and unrepresented litigants often mirrored each other.88 As party litigants were 
not interviewed for this project, the insights of court staff on their experiences 
were particularly important in providing another view of the party litigant’s 
experience. 
 
A research request submitted to the SCTS sought interviews in the form of focus 
groups of up to five members of staff at each court, each lasting up to 30 
minutes. As with the sheriff interviews, I was not involved in the recruitment of 
participants. The composition of the focus groups was ultimately as follows: 
 
 
Court      Number of participants in group 
A 5 
B 6 
C 4 
D 289  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Macfarlane	  J	  (2013)	  The	  National	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants	  Project:	  Identifying	  and	  
Meeting	  the	  Needs	  of	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants	  Final	  Report.	  May	  2013	  (hereafter	  “Macfarlane	  2013”)	  www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/.../Self-­‐represented_project.pdf;	  Knowlton	  N	  et	  al,	  “Cases	  without	  Counsel:	  Research	  on	  Experiences	  of	  Self-­‐Representation	  in	  US	  Family	  Court”	  IAALS	  May	  2016	  (hereafter	  “Knowlton	  et	  al”)	  at	  page	  1.	  89	  Four	  members	  of	  staff	  had	  volunteered	  for	  this	  group,	  but	  due	  to	  absences	  only	  two	  were	  available	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  group.	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A focus group format was chosen for the staff interviews, with the exception of 
one interview that was carried out individually. Focus groups provide a means of 
gathering data quickly, which was particularly important in light of the 
operational needs of the courts here as the sessions were conducted during the 
working day. Preliminary enquiries with SCTS suggested that access was unlikely 
to be granted if staff were taken away from their duties for too long. A focus 
group format was also desirable to place less pressure on each member of staff 
and make the process more comfortable for them, as they could be expected to 
be less accustomed than judges to discussing their professional experiences. The 
format also allowed staff to build on the comments of their colleagues and their 
own experiences, adding depth the conversation.90 It also provided a quick 
means of evaluating issues as they came up—for example, if one member of staff 
noted a common behaviour in party litigants, this could quickly be put to other 
members of staff to determine if they agreed. Although these were not “elite” 
interviews as the term is sometimes applied (suggesting a power differential) 
from a methodological standpoint these interviews fall to be considered as elite 
in that participants were chosen based their experience and profession, and thus 
roughly the same principles discussed above were applied to composing an 
interview guide. The focus groups are referred to as FG1-4 and each participant 
in the groups has been assigned a set of initials, for example AB, CD and so on. 
An additional interview conducted with a single member of court staff is 
referred to as CS1. 
 
2.4.2.4 Court Observation 
 
A number of studies have demonstrated the utility of court observation in 
relation to unrepresented litigants.91 Court observation is particularly well 
established for the evaluation of judicial behaviour.92 The court observation 
element of this project was intended to provide a view of the court’s approach 
to party litigants not filtered through the perspective of the judge, court staff or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  See,	  for	  example,	  Macfarlane	  2013.	  91	  See,	  for	  example,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton.	  92	  Mileski	  M,	  “Courtroom	  Encounters:	  An	  Observation	  Study	  of	  a	  Lower	  Criminal	  Court”	  (1971)	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review	  Vol	  5,	  No	  4	  May	  473;	  Conley	  	  J	  and	  O'Barr	  W,	  
Rules	  Versus	  Relationships:	  The	  Ethnography	  of	  Legal	  Discourse	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  I990)	  I	  II.	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others “in the know.” Observing the procedural and legal issues arising in the 
court observation also provided an opportunity, within a limited scope, to either 
corroborate or contradict the interview data. The aim was not to assess the 
progress or success of individuals or their cases—this does not form part of the 
research questions, not least of all because with the available data it would not 
be possible to do so with any degree of integrity. Instead, I was most concerned 
with the operation of the law and the rules and the interactions between the 
party litigant and the sheriff as well as how closely and consistently court rules 
and procedures were applied to party litigants.93 What party litigants and their 
opponents asked the court for, and the orders ultimately granted, were also of 
particular interest. 
 
The “ordinary” procedural sitting94 of a large central belt court was selected for 
observation. This was chosen for many reasons. First, it was desirable to view 
ordinary cause cases, rather than low-value claims, as this allowed for 
observation of more procedurally complex cases likely to present greater 
challenges to party litigants. The subject matter of cases in the low-value courts 
tends to be more limited95 (with most cases concerned with either payment or 
eviction due to rent arrears), while ordinary cause matters offer considerably 
more diversity in the subject matter, including all ordinary cases, summary 
applications, and sequestrations.96  I examined the court rolls to assess the total 
number of hearings each day, the type of hearings, and how many cases 
appeared to involve party litigants.97 I then determined that the ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  I	  wished	  to	  observe	  both	  whether	  rules	  were	  “bent”	  or	  adjusted	  to	  provide	  latitude	  or	  assistance	  to	  party	  litigants,	  and	  how	  aware	  presiding	  sheriffs	  were	  of	  rules	  pertaining	  directly	  to	  party	  litigants;	  see	  Zahle	  J,	  “Practical	  knowledge	  and	  Participant	  Observation”	  (2012)	  Inquiry	  Vol	  55,	  No	  1	  February	  50.	  94	  These	  courts	  are	  open	  to	  the	  public	  and	  did	  not	  require	  any	  special	  permission	  to	  access.	  95	  Although	  cases	  with	  certain	  types	  of	  more	  complex	  subject	  matter	  are	  not	  necessarily	  excluded	  by	  the	  rules,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  remitted	  to	  ordinary	  cause	  procedure.	  	  96	  Family	  cases,	  although	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  ordinary	  cause	  matters,	  are	  held	  in	  private	  and	  could	  not	  be	  observed.	  97	  Court	  rolls	  are	  available	  online	  at	  www.scotcourts.gov.uk	  and	  list	  hearings	  and	  hearing	  types	  for	  all	  Sheriff	  courts.	  The	  rolls	  generally	  list	  what	  solicitor,	  if	  any,	  is	  representing	  each	  party.	  During	  my	  preliminary	  court	  observation	  I	  referred	  to	  the	  rolls	  to	  see	  how	  accurately	  they	  corresponded	  to	  whether	  parties	  appeared	  with	  lawyers	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  they	  might	  be	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  data,	  but	  it	  was	  quickly	  apparent	  that	  they	  were	  useful	  only	  as	  a	  guide.	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procedural court offered the highest volume of party litigants and would allow 
for the observation of several party litigant hearings per sitting. Because this 
was a larger court and duties for the ordinary court are shared amongst a 
number of sheriffs, I was able to observe the approach of nine sheriffs in total. 
 
It is worth noting that, although such “ordinary courts” are generally 
characterised as procedural rather than substantive, certain matters (such as 
sequestrations and time to pay applications) are often determined at these 
hearings. Final determinations such as the granting of decree or dismissal were 
not uncommon. While it would be desirable to observe purely substantive and 
evidential sittings as well, it was clear from a review of the rolls over a period of 
time that proof and debate hearings involving party litigants were not common 
enough to produce a valid body of data over the duration of the research 
period.98 I observed the ordinary court for a total of 16 sittings over 9 weeks.99 
Because I was interested in the conduct of individual hearings and not the 
progress of cases overall, I observed each hearing as a separate “event” to be 
recorded and analysed, although I did cross reference cases that appeared 
multiple times and recorded the results of relevant continuations wherever 
possible.  
 
The methodology was loosely modelled on similar studies.100 Before commencing 
the formal research period, I observed the court on an informal basis and 
developed a pro forma to guide and ultimately record the data gathered.101 The 
pro forma recorded relevant information about the case itself, such as the 
nature of the action and that day’s hearing, which parties were represented or 
unrepresented, the motions made by each party, the outcome of the hearing, 
and any other relevant information, such as discussion from the sheriff or 
parties. During observation I took extensive notes. I recorded what each party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  These	  hearings	  are	  also	  unpredictable	  and	  frequently	  cancelled	  at	  short	  notice.	  99	  See	  Appendix	  B.	  100	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mack	  K	  and	  Anleu	  S,	  “Performing	  Impartiality:	  Judicial	  Demeanor	  and	  Legitimacy”	  (2010)	  Law	  and	  Social	  Inquiry	  Vol	  35,	  Issue	  1	  Winter	  137.	  Audio	  recording	  of	  hearings	  is	  generally	  part	  of	  the	  methodology,	  but	  this	  is	  forbidden	  in	  the	  Scottish	  civil	  courts.	  101	  Appendix	  A.	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said as closely as possible.102 I was able to note information that was not clear 
during the hearing (such as confirming case types or future calling dates) from 
the court rolls.103 The limitations of the court observation data are clear and it 
did not provide a complete picture of any party litigant’s case or information 
outside an individual hearing, but this was not the intention of the observation 
as a whole. Instead it provided insight into how a relatively high volume of party 
litigants dealt with court procedures and the difficulties they encountered, as 
well as an opportunity to note how judges and solicitors dealt with these issues 
and how this could be contrasted with their approach to represented parties. 
Again, this data was also fed back into the interviews and provided a starting 
point that helped to shape some of the questions asked. 
 
2.4.3 Interpretation of Empirical Data 
 
In respect of the court observation, I transcribed the details of each hearing 
onto the pro forma along with a summary104 of each hearing involving at least 
one party litigant. Each hearing note was assigned one or two keyword codes at 
this time. Codes were developed and adjusted as necessary as observation 
progressed.105 There were several cases that had multiple hearings during the 
observation period and these were cross-referenced on each hearing form with a 
note of the results of previous hearings. The body of data at the time 
observation was completed consisted of my handwritten notes of each court in 
date order, hearing forms grouped by each court in date order stored 
electronically, and the same hearing forms grouped together by keyword code. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  I	  attempted	  to	  record	  these	  notes	  in	  the	  language	  each	  party	  used	  as	  closely	  as	  possible;	  thus	  technical	  or	  legal	  terminology	  was	  recorded	  where	  appropriate;	  See	  Spalding	  J,	  Participant	  Observation	  (Holt	  Rhinehart	  and	  Winston	  1980).	  103	  “Court	  sheets”	  are	  available	  to	  solicitors	  and	  the	  public	  on	  the	  day	  of	  each	  sitting	  and	  note	  full	  case	  names,	  reference	  numbers,	  and	  the	  form	  of	  procedure	  and	  crave	  (eg	  payment,	  delivery)	  of	  most	  actions.	  These	  provide	  more	  detail	  than	  the	  online	  rolls	  of	  court,	  which	  note	  only	  case	  name,	  reference	  and	  hearing	  type.	  104	  These	  were	  closest	  to	  what	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “condensed	  account”	  (see	  Spalding	  J,	  
Participant	  Observation,	  Holt	  Rhinehart	  and	  Winston	  1980	  at	  page	  69)	  but	  I	  also	  retained	  my	  more	  detailed	  original	  notes	  to	  consult	  as	  necessary.	  105	  Appendix	  I.	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All of the interviews and focus groups, with one exception,106 were audio 
recorded and thereafter transcribed. The interpretation of both the interview 
and observation data was not drawn on any single method of analysis, but was 
influenced by principles set out by Silverman107 and Lichtmans’s description of 
developing data into codes, categories, and finally concepts. 108 The 
development of the codes and categories was influenced in part by the doctrinal 
research undertaken—for example, the categories of procedural, legal, and 
evidential latitude were suggested by the existing literature and case law, and 
enquiry about these areas was built in to the questioning of interview subjects. 
While some categories were thus readily apparent in the interviews based on the 
questioning—because subjects were asked about these matters, such as latitude 
for party litigants, directly—others emerged after interviews were complete and 
the transcripts were examined as a whole.  
 
2.4.4 Reliability, Validity, Limitations and Ethical Concerns  
 
2.4.4.1 Reliability and Validity 
 
Perhaps the most prevalent criticism of qualitative research is that it is merely 
anecdotal, subjective, or unscientific.109 However, most qualitative scholars 
consider that objective and positivist measures of reliability110 and validity 
cannot be applied to qualitative research.111 Methods derived from ethnographic 
studies are concerned more with the process of discovery, rather than validity as 
it is traditionally defined.112 Reflexivity—the researcher’s awareness of their 
impact on the subject matter studied, and in turn the impact of the study on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  One	  interview	  was	  not	  recorded	  at	  the	  subject’s	  request.	  For	  this	  interview	  notes	  were	  taken	  summarizing	  the	  subject’s	  responses	  and	  quoting	  verbatim	  where	  possible.	  107	  Silverman	  D,	  Interpreting	  Qualitative	  Data:	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Qualitative	  
Research	  (4th	  ed,	  SAGE	  2011)	  58.	  108	  Lichtman	  M,	  Qualitative	  Research	  for	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  (SAGE	  2014)	  328.	  	  This	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “generic	  style”	  (page	  336).	  109	  Denzin	  N	  and	  Lincoln	  Y,	  eds,	  The	  SAGE	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research	  (2nd	  ed,	  Sage	  Publications	  2005)	  8.	  110	  Reliability	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  research	  can	  be	  “generalized”	  beyond	  the	  sample	  studied,	  while	  validity	  refers	  to	  the	  accuracy	  or	  “truth”	  of	  the	  research.	  	  	  111	  But	  see,	  for	  example,	  Onwuegbuzie	  A	  and	  Leech	  N,	  “Validity	  and	  Qualitative	  Research:	  An	  Oxymoron?”	  (2007)	  Quality	  and	  Quantity	  41:233.	  112	  Flood	  J,	  “Socio-­‐Legal	  Ethnography”	  in	  Banakar	  R	  and	  Travers	  M,	  eds,	  Theory	  and	  Method	  in	  Socio-­‐legal	  Research	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2005).	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researcher—is generally considered essential to address the problem of the 
inherent subjectivity of qualitative research.113 The outcome of qualitative 
research should be regarded as constructed by the choices made by the 
researcher during the process rather than “existing realities”.114 
 
For purposes of this project, a reflexive stance is reflected in several aspects. I 
considered that, given the “constructed” nature of the empirical element in 
particular, transparency in my own consideration and reporting of the data was 
particularly important. In other words, it was necessary to constantly 
interrogate precisely how the data should be read and, more importantly, 
framed to avoid making any unwarranted claims about its reliability. Extensive 
documentation and note-taking was another method used to maximise the 
integrity of the research. This was particularly necessary as the court 
observation was taking place, and each sitting was recorded in great detail and 
in parties’ own words to minimise the potential for my own bias or interest to 
enter into the recording process. Notes and comments were also recorded after 
each interview and observation period and as the project evolved.115  
 
As has been discussed above, the research design also employed a mixed 
methodology and variety of subject types to verify or “triangulate”116 the data 
as much as possible. Although subject to the limitations discussed below, the 
observation data in particular was, as noted above, intended to provide an 
“unfiltered” view of the process that allowed the process to be viewed through 
the eyes of the party litigant, as well as the legal professionals and court staff 
present.  
 
2.4.4.2 Limitations 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  See,	  for	  example	  Lichtman	  M,	  Qualitative	  Research	  for	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  SAGE	  2014)	  Chapter	  2.	  114	  Mruck	  	  K	  and	  Breuer	  F	  “Subjectivity	  and	  Reflexivity	  in	  Qualitative	  Research”	  (2003)	  Historical	  Social	  Research	  Vol	  28	  No	  3,	  189	  at	  page	  192.	  115	  Documentation	  of	  the	  process	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  an	  ethnographic	  context;	  see	  Kirk	  J	  and	  Miller	  M	  Reliability	  and	  Validity	  in	  Qualitative	  Research,	  Qualitative	  Research	  Methods	  Vol	  1	  (SAGE	  1986).	  116	  The	  now-­‐commonplace	  conception	  of	  “triangulation”	  is	  originally	  attributed	  to	  Campbell	  D	  and	  Fiske	  D,	  “Convergent	  and	  Discriminant	  Validity	  by	  the	  Multi-­‐trait,	  Multi-­‐method	  Matrix”	  (1959)	  Psychological	  Bulletin	  56,	  81.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   52	  
The general limitations applicable to any qualitative research have been 
discussed above. In addition, the research had a number of other limitations. 
Access to interview subjects was perhaps the most prominent of these, and both 
the research design and more practical matters had to be tailored to some 
extent to conform to SCTS requirements. This is perhaps most regrettable in 
relation to limited access to judges and being thus unable to canvass more 
responses or to use the mixed methodology described above. Equally, more time 
with court staff would have been desirable, but was not possible due to the 
court’s operational pressures on the focus groups. The number of interviewees 
overall is small, reflecting the limitations of this as a PhD project with a single 
researcher. Due to the SCTS research policy discussed above, in which the 
researcher is not able to contact interviewees directly and interview subjects 
are designated by the SCTS and the individual courts, it is also possible that 
judges or court staff with a particular point of view about party litigants were 
put forward for interview. As both judges and court staff can only be accessed 
through this procedure, there was little potential to mitigate that concern. As 
noted above, most solicitors were approached for interview through connections 
with the University of Glasgow, which may also have influenced their experience 
and viewpoint. Most, although by no means all, for example, worked in larger 
commercial firms. This approach to recruitment was also not ideal but, as noted 
above, earlier efforts to recruit solicitors observed to have frequent court 
experience with party litigants had proved unsuccessful. 
 
The size of the courts and their geographic locations, all in the central belt, can 
be said to lack diversity. Smaller, more remote courts are particularly likely to 
be under-represented by the study, as these courts may have different customs 
and practices as well as less availability of relevant services such as mediation 
and in-court advice from organisations such as Citizen’s Advice Bureau. Due to 
these factors, smaller courts may have offered quite different perspectives than 
the larger courts, although more litigants pass through the larger courts and the 
data gathered is thus more likely to reflect the experiences of a larger number 
of party litigants.  
 
The court observation data was also limited by taking place at a single court 
over a relatively short timescale. As noted above, I was able to observe a variety 
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of cases and several different sheriffs. A handful of the cases were observed at 
multiple hearings and some reached a substantive outcome. However, the court 
observation data does not, and is not intended to, offer statistical or 
demographic information about party litigants or their cases. Instead it is 
intended to provide a “snapshot” of the court and the issues emerging in party 
litigant cases. The examples observed highlight the possibilities and provide only 
starting point to consider how these particular examples were addressed. 
 
2.4.4.3 Ethical Concerns 
 
As required of any research involving human subjects, an application outlining 
the research was submitted to and approved by the University of Glasgow 
College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee.117 Had party litigants been 
interviewed, the most pressing ethical concern would have been proper handling 
of the interviews, ensuring that they did not cause distress and that proper 
support was in place if necessary. However, as noted above, this was much less 
likely to occur in the interviews conducted with professionals only. Instead the 
primary ethical concern for the project overall was ensuring both the anonymity 
of the participants as well as any third party (for example, in the course of a 
sheriff describing a case he presided over.) Due to the relative ease with which 
judicial office holders in particular could be identified, transcripts were all 
anonymised and special care has been taken to ensure that no identifying details 
(including, for example, reference to particular courts, cases or experience) 
appear. SCTS policy requires researchers to submit notes or transcripts to 
interview subjects to ensure accuracy. In addition to this step, an additional 
term was included in the interview information to ensure that direct quotations 
would not be used from interviews without the interviewee’s approval. This was 
intended both to ensure that the subjects were satisfied with the level of 
confidentiality, and to ensure that they felt comfortable being candid in the 
interviews. 
 
All interviewees received a prescribed Participant Information Sheet118 and 
signed a consent form.119 In relation to the court observation element, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Appendix	  F.	  118	  Appendix	  H.	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only proceedings open to the public were observed and consent from those in 
the court was not sought. Due to the number of litigants, solicitors and others in 
these courts, it was not practicable to obtain consent. This practice conformed 
to the UK Socio-Legal Studies Association’s Statement of Principles for Ethical 
Research Practice.120 This policy states that where there is no expectation of 
privacy in public proceedings, consent from subjects is not required to observe 
in the courts. Only proceedings that would be considered public knowledge and 
where there was no expectation of privacy were observed. However, names and 
any identifying details from cases observed have been treated as confidential. 
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  Appendix	  G.	  120http://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%20_final_%5B1%5D.pdf	  at	  7.1.3.	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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Although the Scottish Civil Courts Review highlighted a perceived growth in the 
number of party litigants potentially causing added pressure on the courts and 
concerns about access to justice,121 to date there remains little literature 
relating to party litigants, and even less empirically grounded research, in 
Scotland. A literature review, focused primarily on the legal provisions in 
Scotland and ancillary matters such as lay representation, published by the 
Scottish Civil Justice Council in late 2014122, relies in many areas on research 
and publications from other jurisdictions.123 Rules relating to party litigants and 
self-representation are also mentioned briefly in some works on Scottish civil 
procedure.124 The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland also occasionally 
publishes pieces on party litigants or updates on cases involving party litigants. 
These articles are typically, as can be expected, from the legal practitioner’s 
point of view.125 
 
This literature review will be focused more on self-representation itself and the 
experiences of SRLs, but will take a similar approach to the Scottish Civil Justice 
Council’s literature review by considering relevant work from analogous English-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  SCCR	  Ch	  11.	  	  122	  Scottish	  Civil	  Justice	  Council,	  “Access	  to	  Justice	  Literature	  Review:	  Party	  Litigants,	  and	  the	  support	  available	  to	  them,”	  December	  2014	  (hereafter	  “Access	  to	  Justice	  Literature	  Review”	  http://www.scottishciviljusticecouncil.gov.uk/docs/librariesprovider4/scjc-­‐pubilcations/literature-­‐review-­‐on-­‐party-­‐litigants-­‐and-­‐the-­‐support-­‐available-­‐to-­‐them.pdf?sfvrsn=2.	  123	  Although	  a	  lack	  of	  data	  in	  many	  of	  these	  other	  jurisdictions	  has	  in	  turn	  been	  noted;	  on	  the	  United	  States	  see	  Landsman	  S,	  “Pro	  Se	  Litigation”	  (2012)	  8(1)	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Science	  231	  (hereafter	  “Landsman	  2012”);	  on	  England	  and	  Wales	  see	  Williams	  K,	  “Litigants	  in	  Person:	  A	  Literature	  Review”	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  2011	  (hereafter	  “Williams	  2011”).	  124	  See	  Welsh	  T	  (ed)	  MacPhail’s	  Sheriff	  Court	  Practice	  (3rd	  ed,	  W.	  Green	  2006)	  (hereafter	  “MacPhail”)	  and	  Hennessy	  C,	  Civil	  Procedure	  and	  Practice	  (4th	  ed,	  W.	  Green	  2014).	  125	  See	  for	  example	  Mackenzie	  R,	  “Party	  Time”	  (2009)	  JLSS	  54(2)	  18.	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speaking jurisdictions as well. Literature from England and Wales is likely to be 
the most relevant to the position in Scotland, as, in addition to the geographical 
proximity and links, the legal system is also adversarial and allows for self-
representation.126 While there have now been two significant studies relating to 
self-represented litigants in England and Wales,127 much of both the empirical 
data and other literature on the topic originates in America, Canada and 
Australia.128 The bulk of the theoretical literature in particular originates in the 
United States, with a significant portion of this focused on the role of the judge 
in cases when one or more parties is unrepresented.129  
 
The issues arising around self-representation are far-reaching, encompassing 
wider societal and policy issues such as the needs of vulnerable populations and 
legal aid provision. Although these are all relevant issues, this chapter will 
primarily focus on the self represented litigant within the civil court process, in 
alignment with the aims of the thesis as a whole. Also as with the rest of this 
thesis, the focus will remain on what are sometimes referred to as “active” or 
participant SRLs130 who engage to at least some extent with the court process. 
This thus excludes unrepresented litigants who are served an action but never 
enter the process, although these individuals may, for example, take steps to 
settle the case without coming to court.  Other potential litigants experiencing 
legal problems may not take any action at all.131 This chapter will instead 
address the issues most relevant to the topic of this thesis. The first section will 
provide context to the purpose of the civil courts as a whole, as well as some of 
the issues related to the delivery of civil justice as a public service. It will then 
go on to consider how social policy has developed around self-representation in 
the civil courts, and then how this has been translated into law in Scotland in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Although	  historically	  the	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  legal	  aid	  and	  the	  funding	  of	  litigation	  has	  also	  been	  similar	  throughout	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  this	  has	  changed	  in	  recent	  years	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below.	  127	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  and	  Trinder,	  L	  et	  al	  (2014)	  “Litigants	  in	  Person	  in	  Private	  Family	  Law	  Cases”	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (hereafter	  “Trinder	  et	  al”)	  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/litigants-­‐in-­‐person-­‐in-­‐private-­‐family-­‐law-­‐cases. 128	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  3.	  	  129	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.5.3.2.	  130	  See,	  for	  example,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  117.	  131	  Genn	  H	  et	  al,	  Paths	  to	  Justice	  Scotland:	  What	  People	  Think	  and	  Do	  About	  Going	  to	  
the	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2001)	  (Hereafter	  “Genn	  Paths	  to	  Justice	  Scotland”).	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particular. The next section will examine the literature concerned with the 
SRL’s journey through the civil court process: how SRLs navigate the system, 
how others (such as legal professionals) view them, and how self-representation 
impacts the SRL as an individual. The normative questions around the right of 
self-representation and its alternative, the role of lawyers in the courts, are 
then considered. Finally, the last section of the chapter looks at current and 
proposed measures to address the presence of SRLs in the courts. 
3.2 Civil Justice and Self-Representation 
 
3.2.1 The Function of the Civil Courts and the Nature of Civil Justice 
Problems 
 
Consideration of the position of self-represented litigants in the civil courts 
requires consideration of the civil justice system itself, its purpose, and how 
problems and circumstances in the lives of individuals become civil justice 
issues. Because this thesis is intended to examine party litigants in the Scottish 
civil courts, it is necessary to first consider the nature of civil justice itself. As 
discussed below, the civil justice system exists to serve both individuals and a 
wider purpose in society at large. There are a handful of competing views on the 
nature of civil justice, which in turn inform ideas about access to the courts and 
access to justice. 
 
An early and essential conception of the civil courts was to provide a forum for 
individuals to assert their rights instead of taking matters into their own hands. 
The existence of civil courts as an alternate route for solving problems thus 
justified restrictions on forms of “self help”.132 Today, of course, the landscape 
of civil justice and the motivations of individuals coming to court are 
considerably more complex. A significant strand of the literature on civil justice 
addresses the latter point of how and when individuals turn to the civil courts to 
resolve problems they experience in their lives. Genn conceptualises the types 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  In	  Scotland,	  this	  view	  is	  echoed	  by	  Erksine;	  see	  the	  Stair	  Memorial	  Encyclopedia	  
Civil	  Procedure	  (Reissue):	  Right	  of	  action	  (1,1,3).	  Cairns	  summarises	  theories	  about	  the	  transition	  between	  private	  and	  amateur	  “feuding”	  in	  sixteenth	  century	  Scotland	  and	  the	  public	  and	  professional	  world	  of	  courts	  and	  lawyers	  that	  dominate	  today;	  Cairns	  J	  “Academic	  Feud,	  Bloodfeud,	  and	  William	  Welwood:	  Legal	  Education	  in	  St	  Andrews,	  1560-­‐1611:	  Part	  2”	  (1998)	  Edin	  LR	  2(3)	  255	  at	  pages	  281—285.	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of issues that may (or may not) lead individuals to pursue a matter in civil court 
as “justiciable problems.” Justiciable problems are "a matter experienced by a 
respondent which raised legal issues, whether or not it was recognized by the 
respondent as being 'legal' and whether or not any action taken by the 
respondent to deal with the event involved the use of any part of the civil 
justice system.”133 Felstiner et al offer the similar framework “injurious 
experiences.” An individual may be unaware that he has suffered an unperceived 
injurious experience, such as exposure to radiation that may cause cancer.134 If 
he becomes aware, Felstiner et al describe this process as naming and it 
becomes a “perceived injurious experience” (PIE) which can transform into a 
grievance, then into a claim and (if this claim is rejected) a dispute.135 It is 
important to note that the civil courts are just one possible forum for justiciable 
problems or PIEs—many will be dealt with using other means, such as self-help, 
or the individual will choose not to pursue the issue at all. 
 
When the individual does chose to bring the dispute to the courts, one purpose 
of the civil justice system is of course to adjudicate and deliver an opinion that 
decides the dispute. Much of the narrative relating to the civil courts in recent 
years has focused on the civil courts as a means of dispute resolution.136 
However, Zuckerman argues that emphasising dispute resolution, and thus the 
assertion of private rights, obscures the wider role the courts play in supporting 
the rule of law: “Court adjudication is the process which provides citizens with 
remedies for wrongs that they have suffered. Without remedies there are no 
rights and without enforceable rights there is no rule of law.”137 While the public 
conception of the civil courts is perhaps most often associated with private law 
disputes, it is important not to overlook the underlying constitutional role played 
by the civil courts. Leitch suggests that courts “perform a distinctly political 
process within a democracy—namely rule-making and rule-administering, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Genn,	  Paths	  to	  Justice	  Scotland	  at	  page	  12.	  134	  Felstiner	  W	  et	  al,	  “The	  Emergence	  and	  Transformation	  of	  Disputes:	  Naming,	  Blaming,	  Claiming	  “	  (1980)	  Law	  and	  Society	  Review	  15(3)	  631.	  135	  Ibid.	  136	  Zuckerman	  A,	  Zuckerman	  on	  Civil	  Procedure:	  Principles	  of	  Practice	  (3rd	  ed,	  Sweet	  and	  Maxwell	  2013)	  at	  1.5.	  137	  Ibid;	  see	  also	  Genn	  H,	  Judging	  Civil	  Justice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2009).	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whether it be in a private, public or constitutional law context.”138 Meaningful 
access to the courts (which is often difficult for SRLs) is therefore a necessary 
component of democratic participation.139 Leitch also suggests that litigant 
satisfaction with the process—which is said to occur most often when the litigant 
feels they have been heard and listened to—legitimizes the system and may 
encourage other forms of democratic participation.140  
 
Another strand of thought relating to conceptions of modern civil justice (and 
one quite relevant to the question of self-representation) relates to the question 
of how best to deliver, or even ration, civil justice to the public.141 The courts 
are clearly unable to spend an infinite amount of time and money to resolve or 
find the “truth” in each case. Instead the notion of proportionality has 
increasingly shaped how the courts approach the delivery of civil justice—the 
time and money spent on a case should reflect the value of the action and its 
importance to the parties involved.142 Furthermore, there is the question of 
whether the cost of litigation in the civil courts should be borne by the public, or 
by the parties bringing their cases to court in the form of court and lawyer’s 
fees.143 Essentially many of these questions boil down to a choice of offering 
imperfect justice to many, or very high quality justice only to the few who can 
afford it.144  
 
Until relatively recently, it has been suggested, quality of justice has been 
paramount, but this is being displaced by an increased emphasis on efficiency in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Leitch	  J,	  “Having	  a	  say:	  ‘access	  to	  justice’	  as	  democratic	  participation”	  (2015)	  UCL	  JL	  and	  J	  4(1)	  76.	  139	  Ibid.	  140	  Ibid.	  141	  See	  Adler	  M,	  “The	  Idea	  of	  Proportionality	  in	  Dispute	  Resolution”	  (2008)	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  and	  Family	  Law	  30:4	  309	  and	  Zuckerman	  A	  “Reform	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Lawyers’	  Interests”	  in	  Zuckerman	  A	  et	  al	  eds	  Reform	  of	  Civil	  Procedure:	  Essays	  on	  
“Access	  to	  Justice”	  (Oxford,	  1995).	  142	  Adler	  M,	  supra	  at	  note	  141.	  143	  The	  question	  of	  court	  fees	  that	  meet	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  litigation	  has	  been	  raised	  recently	  in	  both	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  Scotland,	  with	  the	  former	  seeing	  considerable	  rises	  in	  the	  fees	  required	  to	  pursue	  an	  action.	  144	  Zuckerman	  A,	  supra	  at	  note	  146.	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the courts.145 Hanycz argues that recent years have seen an “obsession” with 
efficiency. In fact, efficiency has become conflated with access to justice, as 
seen in the Woolf Report’s “assumption, maintained to this day, that enhancing 
efficiency results in enhanced access to justice.”146 Hanycz acknowledges that 
proposals for quicker, less expensive processes would seem to improve access to 
the courts, but suggests that the issue of whether streamlined procedures can 
still result in just and accurate outcomes has not been properly addressed.147 
Thomas argues that processes should be designed around litigants rather than 
the court’s objectives. Because litigants are typically involuntary users of the 
civil justice system (which have a monopoly on the function they provide), there 
is an onus on the courts to identify and deliver the services litigants expect.148 
Courts should be run in a way that both provides the best access possible and 
caters to litigants’ needs.149 This is in stark contrast to the opposing view, which 
often appears to prevail today,150 that the civil courts are a public service like 
any other and subject to budget constraints. The court has a duty to be efficient 
and litigants are not entitled to “demand the best possible law enforcement 
process regardless of cost, any more than they are entitled to demand unlimited 
health support or boundless educational facilities.”151  
 
In Scotland, the Report of the SCCR embraces efficiency and proportionality as a 
means to enhance access to justice: “The theme of this report is that the legal 
system is a public service and that in the allocation of the resources available to 
it the public interest is of vital importance. Since resources are limited, the 
excellence that the system cannot at present achieve must be pursued in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  See,	  for	  example,	  Menkel-­‐Meadow,	  C,	  “Pursuing	  Settlement	  in	  an	  Adversary	  Culture:	  Tale	  of	  Innovation	  Co-­‐Opted	  or	  The	  Law	  of	  ADR”	  (1991)	  Florida	  State	  
University	  Law	  Review	  19(1)	  1.	  146	  Hanycz	  C,	  “More	  Access	  to	  Less	  Justice:	  Efficiency,	  Proportionality	  and	  Costs	  in	  Canadian	  Civil	  Justice	  Reform”	  (2008)	  CJQ	  27(1)	  98.	  147	  Ibid.	  148	  Ibid	  at	  page	  51.	  149	  Thomas	  R,	  “Civil	  Justice	  Review—Treating	  Litigants	  as	  Consumers”	  (1990)	  CJQ	  (9)	  Jan	  51;	  see	  also	  Crompton	  G,	  “Making	  Civil	  Justice	  Work	  for	  Consumers:	  The	  Consumer	  Perspective	  on	  Making	  the	  Civil	  Justice	  System	  in	  Scotland	  Fit	  for	  the	  21st	  century”	  (2010)	  Consumer	  Focus	  Scotland.	  150	  At	  least	  among	  those	  responsible	  for	  civil	  justice	  reform;	  see	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Woolf	  Review	  and	  the	  SCCR	  below.	  151	  Editorial,	  (2007)	  “Civil	  Litigation:	  a	  Public	  Service	  for	  the	  Enforcement	  of	  Civil	  Rights”	  (2007)	  CJQ	  26(Jan)	  1.	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most cost-effective way.”152 Lord Gill also rejects the idea that court processes 
should be litigant or “consumer” led: “We consider that in this public service it 
is not for the user to decide what use he shall make of it, nor in what manner he 
shall do so. It is for the legislature to decide which level of adjudication and 
which modes of procedure are proportionate and appropriate for the type of 
dispute in question…and when a dispute goes to litigation, control of the 
progress of the action should be in the hands of the court and not of the parties. 
In this way, public resources can be deployed to best effect.”153 The varying 
views of the role of civil courts often come sharply into focus when considered 
alongside the issue of self-representation. SRLs are often thought to require 
more resources and time than their represented counterparts154 and are thus 
problematic within a model that prioritises efficiency. Those advocating for 
litigant-focused courts, on the other hand, are more likely to consider that the 
courts should be more responsive to SRLs’ additional needs.155 
 
3.2.2 The Development of Social Policy on Self-Representation in Civil 
Matters 
 
While the question of how best to deliver the civil justice system to the public at 
large raises a number of issues, refining these ideas into the development of 
social policy for those who choose to or must self-represent in the courts raises 
still more. For the most part, courts have been the domain of lawyers and other 
legal professionals; processes and procedures are designed with legal 
professionals in mind. In the United Kingdom, the solution for those who cannot 
afford the services of a lawyer has traditionally not been for the individual to 
represent himself, but rather for a lawyer to be provided at no or little cost via 
the legal aid system. A relatively robust provision of legal aid in place--with 
lawyers thus available even to those without the means to pay--is thought by 
some to perpetuate the idea that courts are primarily for lawyers and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  SCCR,	  page	  i.	  153	  Ibid	  at	  pages	  i-­‐ii.	  Much	  of	  the	  SCCR	  is	  focused	  on	  ensuring	  that	  litigation	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  most	  appropriate	  “level”	  of	  forum.	  Raising	  the	  privative	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session—and	  thus	  removing	  the	  choice	  of	  litigants	  to	  raise	  lower	  value	  cases	  there	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  Sheriff	  Courts—was	  one	  of	  key	  reforms	  proposed	  and	  implemented.	  154	  Section	  3.3.5.	  155	  See	  section	  3.5.3.1	  below.	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attendant complexity in the court processes that this entails.156 It has been 
suggested that the legal aid system serves the needs of lawyers and their 
professional interests rather than the needs of the public it is intended to serve. 
In this view, the legal aid model narrows the focus from access to justice in the 
broader sense to access to legal services.157 This can be problematic because 
many legal (or potentially legal) problems could be better-solved outwith the 
confines of formal court processes.158 
 
The provision of legal aid is, of course, subject to changing budgetary and policy 
factors. The effect of reductions in legal aid funding, and the resulting impact 
on policy relating to self-representation, has been highlighted following the 
passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(“LASPO”) in England and Wales. Where previously Scotland and England and 
Wales were broadly in line with each other in terms of the availability of legal 
aid, LASPO eliminated legal aid in a number of areas, including family actions. 
This has resulted in an increasing divergence in the jurisdictions’ policies 
relating to self-representation, as those in England and Wales who cannot afford 
lawyers must go to court on their own—and the courts there must in turn adjust 
to a large increase in the number of SRLs.159 In Scotland, legal aid is still more 
widely available and more lower income people with legal problems are able to 
be represented. While the relatively small number of party litigants in Scotland 
creates a less pressing need for a coherent approach to self-representation, 
there have been increasing calls south of the border for the courts to address 
the new reality that many courts there now have more SRLs than represented 
litigants.160 
 
Alongside the development of the legal aid system, there have also been 
attempts to make some forms of adjudication more “user-friendly” and 
therefore more accessible to SRLs. One example is the tribunal system, where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  See,	  for	  example,	  Flood	  J	  and	  Whyte	  A,	  “What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Legal	  Aid?	  Lessons	  From	  Outside	  the	  UK”	  (2006)	  CJQ	  25	  (Jan)	  80.	  157	  Cousins	  M,	  “The	  politics	  of	  legal	  aid—a	  solution	  in	  search	  of	  a	  problem?”	  (1994)	  CJQ	  13	  (April)	  111.	  158	  Ibid.	  159	  Genn	  H,	  “Do	  it	  Yourself	  Law:	  Access	  to	  Justice	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Self-­‐Representation”	  (2013)	  CJQ	  32(4)	  411	  (hereafter	  “Genn	  2013”);	  Trinder	  et	  al.	  160	  See,	  for	  example,	  Trinder	  et	  al.	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subject-specific disputes are heard, usually by specialist panels often including 
laypeople as well as legally trained judges. Many tribunals adjudicate disputes 
and appeals between individuals and state bodies, on matters such as 
immigration, social security benefits, and mental health, although the 
employment tribunals deal primarily with disputes between individual parties. 
While the tribunals bear some similarities to the courts, they are marked by a 
number of distinctive features, some of which are intended to facilitate self-
representation. Tribunals generally have relatively straightforward processes for 
initiating claims and procedural steps are minimised and simplified, with relaxed 
rules of evidence and more proactive decision-makers and judges.161 Costs are 
usually not awarded, discouraging legal representation.162 While the tribunal 
system is distinct from the civil courts, it has been suggested that, despite the 
intention to keep proceedings simple and user-friendly, some tribunals are 
becoming more complex and more like the civil courts over time.163 
 
Small claims and other low-value claims regimes have also been introduced to 
facilitate self-representation within the traditional court structure itself. As the 
name suggests, small claims are generally disputes of low monetary value.164 
Small claims procedures are designed with SRLs in mind, allowing individuals to 
pursue matters when the cost of representation would be disproportionate in 
relation to the value of the action—in other words, actions where the sum sought 
would be exceeded by the cost of a lawyer, whether funded by the litigant 
himself or legal aid. The characteristics of small claims procedures bear a 
number of similarities to the tribunal processes described above. Because the 
process is intended for lay people, the procedures are intended to be relaxed 
and informal, including a flexible approach to the giving of evidence. Again the 
judge is given a more proactive role and has greater latitude in determining how 
to approach the hearing and resolve the dispute.165  Representation by a lawyer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  See	  for	  example	  Genn	  H	  et	  al	  “Tribunals	  for	  diverse	  users”	  DCA	  Research	  Series	  1/06	  January	  2006	  at	  page	  3.	  162	  Ibid.	  163	  See	  for	  example	  Corby	  S	  and	  Latrelle	  P,	  “Employment	  Tribunals	  and	  the	  Courts:	  Isomorphism	  Explained”	  (2012)	  ILJ	  41(4)	  387.	  164	  Currently	  under	  £5,000	  in	  Scotland.	  165	  Baldwin	  J,	  “Is	  there	  a	  Limit	  to	  the	  Expansion	  of	  Small	  Claims?”	  (2003)	  Current	  Legal	  Problems	  Vol	  56	  Issue	  1,	  313	  at	  pages	  317—318.	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is allowed in the small claims courts in the United Kingdom166 but, as in 
tribunals, parties are not typically able to recover their legal costs and use of a 
lawyer is thus discouraged. In Scotland, the small claims procedure was first 
introduced in 1986 to create a simple and inexpensive process for low-value 
claims.167 More recently, however, concerns from the Scottish Civil Courts 
Review that the existing small claims procedures were still too complicated and 
insufficiently “user friendly”168 led to the introduction of the simple 
procedure.169 The simple procedure shares many of its basic elements with the 
small claims procedure it replaces, but features a set of rules drafted in plain 
language with straightforward wording, set out in a “question and answer” 
format.170  
3.3 SRLs: Who, Why, and What Happens? 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
As noted above, there is a distinct lack of data in Scotland relating to party 
litigants, both in terms of demographics and the roles they play in the civil 
courts—for example, whether they are most commonly pursuers or defenders, or 
what types of case they are most likely to be involved in. This is particularly 
problematic because any attempt to understand SRLs and how the law operates 
in relation to SRLs—much of the purpose of this thesis—should be informed by 
knowledge of who SRLs are and how they experience the civil court process. At 
present, these questions in relation to party litigants in Scotland remain 
unanswered. To provide background to this project, it is thus necessary to look 
to the literature and data from other jurisdictions. However, some of the 
information about SRLs in other jurisdictions cannot be applied too readily to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  In	  some	  jurisdictions,	  representation	  in	  this	  type	  of	  court	  is	  forbidden;	  see	  Baldwin,	  ibid,	  at	  page	  317.	  167	  See	  Ervine	  W,	  “Small	  Claims:	  Recent	  developments	  in	  Scotland”	  (1986)	  Journal	  of	  Consumer	  Policy	  191	  on	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  and	  introducing	  the	  new	  procedure.	  168	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  SCCR	  Vol	  1at	  pages	  131—132.	  169	  In	  the	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Simple	  Procedure)	  2016	  (SSI	  2016/200).	  170	  While	  still	  relatively	  new,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  unusual	  format	  of	  the	  rules	  may	  lead	  to	  difficulties	  interpreting	  the	  provisions;	  see	  Editorial,	  “Simple	  Rules	  for	  Simple	  People”	  (2016)	  Civ	  PB	  2016	  131,1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   65	  
party litigants in Scotland. Demographics of SRLs elsewhere are especially likely 
to vary from those in Scotland. The reasons SRLs have for self-representing are 
likely to be particularly variable and sensitive to the social policy and economic 
policy of the jurisdiction in question. For example, while legal aid in family 
actions is still relatively well provided for in Scotland, in other jurisdictions 
there is little or no provision. In the latter jurisdictions, self-representation in 
family courts is common and family actions are thus a major focus of a number 
of the existing empirical studies. These SRLs are likely to have a unique set of 
motivations and goals to be achieved in court, as well as an especially fraught 
emotional experience due to the subject matter. In Scotland the pool of party 
litigants is likely to contain fewer litigants involved in family actions, and 
litigants involved in different forms of action, such as debt, will have their own 
differing motivations and experiences.  
 
This project also looks quite closely at the particular rules, practices and 
procedures of the Scottish courts—the procedures in other jurisdictions may vary 
considerably, making the experiences of SRLs there very different from those of 
their Scottish counterparts. This is true both in terms of how readily the SRL is 
able to navigate the court processes (for example, in jurisdictions or forms of 
action with simplified procedures) and in turn how they feel about the process 
and any perceived barriers they encountered. However, there is much from the 
data that can be generalised, in broad strokes, to party litigants in Scotland. 
Data from the US and Canada171 has looked quite closely at the emotional impact 
of self-representation on SRLs and the often negative feelings that appearing in 
court on their own can invoke; there is little reason to think that that litigants in 
Scotland in the same types of situations do not experience similar feelings. 
There is also little reason to think that party litigants in Scotland are not 
susceptible to some of the pitfalls that their counterparts abroad come across, 
again in general terms. For example, the cognitive difficulties that SRLs 
encounter in giving evidence172 in other jurisdictions inform the issues that party 
litigants may encounter in Scotland. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Discussed	  in	  section	  3.3.6.	  172	  See	  section	  3.3.4.5.	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There are also a number of similarities and difference to be noted in the 
methodology of the empirical research that is the subject of much of this 
section. All of the studies discussed have used a qualitative approach for at least 
a portion of the data. Interviews, typically with both SRLs and legal professionals 
(including judges) are a key element in all of the work.173 Some studies have 
included more ethnographic methods such as participant observation.174 
Qualitative methods, of course, have limitations. There is an element of 
subjectivity to all qualitative research. Interviews are further complicated by 
the self-reported nature of the data, which is subject to the accuracy of the 
interviewee’s ability to report their own viewpoint and experience accurately 
and honestly. This is perhaps even more true when dealing with SRLs—SRLs 
themselves may not have the legal knowledge to convey what is happening in 
their case correctly, while legal professionals may find it difficult to divorce 
perceptions and stereotypes about SRLs from their actual lived experiences. At 
times, however, the underlying views revealed in interview data may be telling 
regardless of the accuracy of the information. For example, when an SRL reports 
feeling that a judge was biased against him and the process was unfair, the fact 
that he feels this way is important—and suggests a need for further enquiry—
regardless of whether or not it is true. Equally, qualitative methods have the 
potential to provide a depth of information that would be lacking in purely 
quantitative studies. Self-representation is a complicated and multifaceted 
experience that cannot be readily distilled into facts and figures. The existing 
qualitative data also provides a starting point that tells us what further 
questions should be asked. 
 
In addition to qualitative methods, some work has also adopted a mixed 
methodology incorporating quantitative data as well. It is worth noting that 
many of the studies are slightly different in orientation as compared to this 
thesis in that they are not academic work per se but rather government-funded 
studies, many with relatively large teams of researchers. The larger studies are 
thus able to use more varied and sophisticated methodology than would be 
available for a PhD thesis. Perhaps the best example is the Moorhead and Sefton 
study, which incorporates qualitative interview and focus group data seen in 	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  Macfarlane	  2013,	  Knowlton	  et	  al,	  Trinder	  et	  al,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  and	  the	  Australian	  studies	  discussed	  below	  all	  use	  qualitative	  interview	  methods.	  174	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton,	  Trinder	  et	  al.	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most studies with quantitative methods. This study is arguably the most 
comprehensive work on SRLs to date. Moorhead and Sefton had access to case 
databases for courts in England, allowing for data mining, as well as case files. 
This allowed for an objective and relatively detailed analysis, for example, of 
errors made by SRLs in their cases as compared to lawyers.175 It would not be 
possible to carry out such a credible analysis using qualitative methods alone. 
Research using quantitative and “scientific” methods,176 however, is still more 
the exception rather than the rule in this area. While qualitative work has been 
invaluable in establishing the issues arising around self-representation, 
complementary quantitative work, currently in short supply, has the potential to 
prove equally valuable. 
 
3.3.2 Who are SRLs in the Civil Courts? 
 
Even with those caveats in mind, a handful of themes relating to common 
characteristics in SRLs emerge in the literature. The perception that the number 
of SRLs in the civil courts in the UK is on the rise is generally accepted.177 In at 
least some types of case they can even be considered common.178 A party’s 
status as a self-representing litigant may also fluctuate as the case progresses. A 
litigant, or their opponent, may be represented at the beginning or at any other 
point in the case, and then self-represent at another stage. These forms of 
“partial representation” appear to be relatively common.179 This is particularly 
significant because partial representation may act as a “reality check” for 
litigants, as the SRL receives at least some assistance on the framing of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  See	  section	  3.3.4.3.	  176	  See,	  however,	  the	  studies	  on	  litigant	  outcomes	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.3.7	  below.	  177	  See,	  for	  example,	  Marfarlane	  2013.	  While	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  expressed	  some	  uncertainty	  on	  this	  point,	  their	  study	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  LAPSO	  reforms	  and	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  numbers,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  in	  family	  actions,	  have	  risen	  since	  then;	  see	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  2.	  178	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton.	  179	  See	  Macfarlane	  	  J	  et	  a,l	  “Tracking	  the	  Continuing	  Trends	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigant	  Phenomenon”	  (2016)	  https://representingyourselfcanada.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2017/02/Intake-­‐Report-­‐2015-­‐2016-­‐FINAL1.pdf	  at	  page	  4	  and	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  8;	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  44	  and	  Hunter	  R	  et	  al,	  “The	  changing	  face	  of	  litigation:	  Unrepresented	  Litigants	  in	  the	  Family	  Court	  of	  Australia”	  (2002)	  Sydney:	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Foundation	  of	  NSW	  (hereafter	  “Hunter	  2002”),	  Chapter	  6.	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case and what to expect.180  While SRLs can be of any age or background, most 
data indicates that SRLs as a group tend to be younger, less educated and on a 
lower income than represented litigants.181 There is some indication that SRLs in 
family actions are more likely to be male.182 In Trinder et al’s study of the 
family courts, men were more likely to initiate the court action as an SRL, while 
female SRLs were “less likely to be in court by choice.”183 Overall, there is 
conflicting data on whether SRLs are more likely to be the initiators, or pursuers 
in their cases, or whether they are more likely to have been brought to court as 
defenders or respondents. While some studies have found that SRLs are most 
often respondents,184 others have found that SRLs are more likely to be the 
petitioner in their case.185 These differences may well be accounted for by 
differing legal issues and forms of procedure, as SRLs will inevitably be less 
likely to initiate more complex legal processes without the aid of a lawyer, while 
simpler processes such as small claims are intended to be accessible to self-
representing litigants who wish to pursue a claim.  
 
It is worth noting that there is a lack of consistency in the data on the question 
of how frequently court actions involve unrepresented litigants on both (or all) 
sides of the case. This is an important question because, as will be discussed, 
judges often report relying on the solicitors of represented opponents in cases 
involving SRLs. 186  Cases in which none of the litigants is represented may thus 
present particular challenges to the judge and to the court. Macfarlane’s most 
recent data found low rates of fully unrepresented cases, with 90% of SRLs 
facing opponents who were represented at least some point in the 
proceedings.187 Knowlton et al found significantly higher rates of SRLs involved 
in cases with opponents who were themselves self-representing; in this study, 
47.6% of opponents were unrepresented for the entirety of the case, while only 
29.8% were represented throughout.188 Perhaps most tellingly, Moorhead and 
Sefton noted in 2005 that in most cases SRLs had represented opponents and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  36.	  181	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  4.	  182	  Hunter	  et	  al	  2002	  at	  page	  50;	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  67.	  183	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  12.	  184	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  67;	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  12.	  185	  Macfarlane	  2016	  at	  page	  4,	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  8.	  	  186	  See	  for	  example	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  181.	  187	  Macfarlane	  2016	  at	  page	  4.	  188	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  8.	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that cases in which both parties self-represented were “rare”.189 However, in 
2014 (post-LASPO) Trinder et al found that many of the cases studied involved 
fully unrepresented litigants, with only 25% of the cases observed having full 
representation for both parties and 23% having no representation at all.190 Cases 
involving only self-representing litigants and cases where both litigants are only 
partially represented appear to be relatively common, and perhaps increasingly 
common, in at least some courts. 
 
3.3.3 Why do SRLS self-represent? 
 
It is often noted that, for many SRLs, self-representation is not a “choice” but a 
necessity. Many SRLs end up self-representing because they simply cannot afford 
to pay a lawyer and are not eligible for legal aid.191 The latter problem, lack of 
access to legal aid has, unsurprisingly, itself been linked to increased rates of 
self-representation.192 In other cases, when the services of a lawyer are not 
entirely out of reach financially for the litigant, cost or financial reasons are still 
often considered to the foremost deciding factor in whether to hire a lawyer or 
self-represent.193 It has been suggested that few litigants would chose to self-
represent if the cost of a lawyer was not a factor.194 However, even those driven 
primarily by a desire to avoid the expense of representation have differing 
motivations in choosing to self-represent. The literature notes a range of reasons 
for those who could afford to pay a lawyer but choose not to do so, although 
these (often subtle) distinctions are not quantified. Some litigants may be 
disinclined to pay for a lawyer in principle, for example because they feel that 
the legal issue is not their fault and they therefore should not have to incur the 
expense.195 The litigant may simply feel that the services of a lawyer are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Under	  10%;	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  1.	  190	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  4.	  	  191	  Macfarlane	  at	  page	  41,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  20	  and	  21;	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  15.	  192	  Hunter	  et	  al	  2002.	  193	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  39;	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  13;	  Dewar	  J	  et	  al,	  “Litigants	  in	  Person	  in	  the	  Family	  Court	  of	  Australia”	  (2000)	  Family	  Court	  of	  Australia	  Research	  Report	  No.	  20	  “Dewar	  2000”).	  at	  page	  33.	  194	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  16.	  195	  Ipsos	  Mori	  “The	  Views	  and	  Experiences	  of	  Civil	  Sheriff	  Court	  Users”	  Findings	  Report,	  July	  2009	  (hereafter	  “Ipsos	  Mori	  2009”)	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overpriced or otherwise too expensive.196 Equally the SRL may have other 
financial priorities and consider that the money is better spent elsewhere, for 
example wishing to spend the money they save on their children rather than on a 
costly family court battle.197 Moorhead and Sefton also describe litigants 
performing a “cost/benefit” analysis of the situation, ultimately resulting in a 
decision to self-represent.198  
 
On a similar note, some litigants perceive that the case is straightforward and 
does not justify the involvement and attendant expense of a lawyer.199 In fact, 
some litigants report that they were advised that their case was straightforward 
and that they did not require a lawyer.200 For others, the motivation may be a 
belief that not only is a lawyer not necessary for their case, but in fact that they 
can do a better job with their case than a lawyer. Some litigants report that 
they believed that they should self-represent because a lawyer would not be as 
familiar with the case as they were themselves.201 Others seem to have a strong 
desire to “have their say” in court and believe that a lawyer might hinder their 
ability to do so; they thus choose self-representation so they can “assert their 
position without constraint”.202 However, it is worth noting that for at least 
some SRLs, the belief that a lawyer is not necessary is not always well-founded. 
Trinder et al found that many SRLs had an “exaggerated sense of their own 
competence” and were in fact unable to comply properly with court 
requirements.203 As will be discussed later,204 SRLs also often find their 
confidence in their ability to handle a court action on their own diminishes as 
they navigate the process, with those who are able to do so sometimes opting to 
hire a lawyer at this later stage.205 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.slab.org.uk/export/sites/default/common/documents/about_us/research/stakeholders/FinalIpsosMORIreportFINALconsumerfocus.pdf	  at	  page	  17.	  196	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott	  at	  page	  173.	  197	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  15.	  198	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  21.	  199	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott	  at	  page	  173;	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  4.	  200	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  17;	  unfortunately	  this	  report	  does	  not	  state	  who	  had	  provided	  this	  advice	  to	  the	  litigant.	  201	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  252.	  202	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  16;	  see	  also	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  49.	  203	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  24.	  204	  Section	  3.3.6.1.	  205	  Hunter	  et	  al	  2002.	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Rates of self-representation have been linked not only to individual 
circumstances, but also to wider social trends. Landsman (2009) suggests that 
self-representation is increasingly common because the population of the United 
States is relatively literate and well educated.206 A prevailing “do-it yourself” or 
“DIY” mentality207 is also often cited as driving interest in self-representation, as 
individuals wish to retain control and self-sufficiency over their own problems or 
legal issues. This is closely related to the idea of “disintermediation,” the desire 
to cut “middlemen” out of one’s affairs208 and the idea that it is the litigant, 
rather than a lawyer, who is best placed to handle his case. The increased 
ability of individuals to access information, particularly online, is also said to 
contribute to the idea that “the noble amateur can do just about anything as 
well as the expert.”209 There is some suggestion that increasing rates of self-
representing, and the resulting need to accommodate SRLs in the courts, may 
itself contribute to rising rates of self-representation in the courts. Mather has 
noted210 that institutional change in the form of simplified procedures in some 
courts make self-representation a more attractive option. In other words, courts 
that are more accessible to lay people may not only serve existing SRLs, but also 
motivate other litigants to choose self-representation.  
 
Dissatisfaction with a lawyer or a distrust of the legal profession more generally 
may also contribute to the decision to self-represent. Macfarlane notes that 
litigants may choose to become unrepresented later in the process due to 
dissatisfaction with their lawyer. SRLs cited a number of reasons for shifting 
from legal representation to self-representation, including a feeling that their 
lawyer was “doing nothing”, that they did not listen or explain matters properly, 
or that they were incompetent and made mistakes.211  As Macfarlane notes, it is 
important to understand that this view reflects only the SRL’s perceptions of 
their lawyer’s performance, and not the extent to which those concerns were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  Landsman	  S,	  “The	  Growing	  Challenge	  of	  Pro	  Se	  Litigation”	  (2009)	  Lewis	  &	  Clark	  Law	  Review,	  vol	  13	  	  no.	  2,	  439	  at	  page	  445	  (hereafter	  “Landsman	  2009”).	  207	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  page	  445	  and	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  20;	  in	  the	  United	  States	  this	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Home	  Depot”	  mentality.	  208	  	  Greacen	  J,	  “No	  Legal	  Advice	  from	  Court	  Personnel:	  What	  Does	  That	  Mean?”	  (1995)	  34	  Judges'	  Journal	  10	  (Winter)	  2	  (hereafter	  “Greacen	  1995”).	  209	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  page	  445.	  210	  	  Mather	  L,	  “Changing	  Patterns	  of	  Legal	  Representation	  in	  Divorce:	  from	  Lawyers	  to	  
Pro	  Se”	  (2003)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society,	  Volume	  30,	  Number	  1	  at	  page	  145.	  211	  Macfarlane	  2013	  pages	  44-­‐47.	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justified. Distrust of lawyers as a profession is sometimes cited as a reason to 
choose self-representation.212 For example, litigants may be put off hiring a 
lawyer by stereotypes of lawyers as dishonest.213 On a related note, litigants 
may also perceive that the presence of a lawyer may make the process more 
hostile or adversarial. In family matters particularly, litigants report choosing 
not to engage a representative fearing that the presence of a lawyer would 
make it less likely that parties would be able to work things out themselves or 
remain “amicable”.214  
 
3.3.4 Navigating the Civil Court Process as an SRL 
 
3.3.4.1 Introduction 
 
There is little dispute that most court processes and procedures are primarily 
used by, and are designed for, legal professionals. The demands of an 
adversarial system on litigants to frame and present their case are particularly 
high and rules are often complex.215 It is therefore unsurprising that SRLs 
encounter a number of difficulties when attempting to act on their own behalf, 
without the extensive legal training and qualification lawyers must receive. It 
seems fair to say that SRLs may encounter problems with virtually any element 
of the of the civil court process. There has been a great deal written about the 
areas of difficulty that SRLs encounter—a key theme in this thesis—but there is a 
lack of specification as to exactly where the problems are encountered within 
these areas and how these problems can be fixed. This is one of the areas that 
this project is intended to address, providing a closer look at the problems party 
litigants encounter with court rules and procedures and how the courts address 
these problems. While it does not relate directly to Scottish court practices, the 
existing literature provides a background to the most common areas of difficulty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  20.	  213	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  pages	  446-­‐447.	  214	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  18.	  	  215	  See	  for	  example	  Landsman	  2012	  at	  page	  232-­‐233	  and	  Greacen	  J,	  “Resources	  to	  Assist	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants:	  A	  Fifty-­‐State	  Review	  of	  the	  “State	  of	  the	  Art”	  	  	  Greacen	  Associates	  Report,	  June	  2011	  (hereafter	  “Greacen	  2011”)	  https://www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/Greacen50StateReviewReportNationalEdition2011.pdf	  at	  page	  6.	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for SRLs: framing the dispute, complying with court procedures, court forms and 
written pleadings, evidential matters and settlement. 
 
3.3.4.2 Framing the Dispute 
 
An adversarial process requires litigants to state and present their case in law to 
the court.216 However, SRLs often struggle to identify the legal basis for and 
issues involved in their case.217 This may be due to fundamental conceptual 
misunderstandings. It has been suggested that they may conflate the law with 
broader moral ideas of “justice”218 and thus do not understand the need for a 
relevant case in law. Problems with relevance also extend to the SRL’s 
understanding of what facts and legal arguments are relevant to their case (and 
which are not).219 This can lead SRLs to present far too much information and 
evidence to the court, or far too little. The SRL’s emotional attachment to the 
matter plays a role in their conception of “relevance” as well. What is important 
to the SRL personally may not be relevant to the case in law,220 but the SRL may 
nonetheless have the desire to “have their say” in court.221 Because they are not 
legally trained, SRLs can also be more likely to have a claim or defence that is 
fundamentally misconceived in law,222 or to seek a remedy that is misconceived 
or outwith the court’s ability to grant.223 Although relevance is one of the most 
fundamental difficulties facing SRLs, it is one of the most problematic to 
quantify or qualify; as noted below in the discussion of outcomes, it is very hard 
in practice to assess the relative merits of an SRL’s case and thus assess the 
impact of the SRL’s understanding (or lack thereof) of the law. As such the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  The	  adversarial	  nature	  of	  common	  law	  legal	  systems	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  217	  ETBB	  at	  12.5;	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  36.	  218	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  256.	  219	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  Judiciary	  “The	  Judicial	  Working	  Group	  on	  Litigants	  in	  Person:	  Report,”	  July	  2013	  https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/judicial-­‐working-­‐group-­‐lip-­‐report/	  at	  3.12;	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  139.	  220	  See	  for	  example	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  35.	  	  221	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  pages	  71—72.	  222	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  154.	  223	  Ibid	  at	  page	  155.	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existing literature is not able to go much farther than identifying this issue and 
speculating on its causes.224 
 
3.3.4.3 Complying with Court Procedures 
 
SRLs, unlike lawyers, generally do not begin the court process with procedural 
knowledge. Court procedure and practice is often complex and difficult to 
comprehend. SRLs may thus encounter difficulty understanding and complying 
with court procedures, or may not be able to meet court deadlines or comply 
timeously.225 SRLs may also confuse procedures and not choose the appropriate 
procedure for the circumstances.226 These procedural difficulties can in turn 
have a substantive effect on the SRL’s case and its eventual outcome. Hunter et 
al identifies as a distinct category the “procedurally challenged” litigant. These 
SRLs suffer disadvantage as a result of their lack of procedural knowledge in the 
conduct of their case.227 Moorhead and Sefton’s research on procedural and 
administrative errors in SRLs’ cases seems to support the view that SRLs are 
more likely to make mistakes in their cases and that these mistakes can 
potentially produce substantive consequences. SRLs were found to be not only 
more likely to make more errors than solicitors, but also more likely to make 
serious errors.228 These serious errors in turn caused additional expense or delay, 
or even appeared to affect the outcome of the case.229 The procedural problems 
that SRLs encounter are also said to be compounded by a lack of available 
procedural advice or assistance. Although assistance on procedure is ostensibly 
available from court staff, court staff are able to provide procedural advice 
only, and not legal advice. The “legal/procedural” distinction is uncertain in 
nature and fear of overstepping and providing legal advice (and potentially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  By	  comparison,	  as	  discussed	  below,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  were	  able	  to	  measure	  the	  number	  of	  procedural	  errors	  SRLs	  made	  in	  their	  cases,	  but	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  case	  is	  far	  more	  difficult	  to	  measure.	  225	  The	  Judicial	  Working	  Group	  on	  Litigants	  in	  Person:	  Report,	  July	  2013	  at	  3.12.	  226	  Bell	  E,	  “Judges,	  Fairness	  and	  Litigants	  in	  Person”	  (2010)	  Judicial	  Studies	  Institute	  Journal	  1	  at	  page	  2.	  227	  Hunter	  2002	  at	  pages	  105-­‐106.	  228	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton,	  Chapter	  6.	  229	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  130.	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facing repercussions) may leave court staff hesitant to provide anything but the 
most basic procedural advice.230 
 
3.3.4.4 Court Forms and Written Pleadings 
 
SRLs are typically also required to submit court documents, forms, and pleadings 
to the court as their case progresses. Some SRLs are able to produce clear and 
comprehensible pleadings, but generally the paperwork submitted by SRLs is 
thought to be lengthier and more difficult for the court to understand (at times 
because it is handwritten) than pleadings drafted by lawyers.231 Again there 
appears to be a disconnect between the perceptions of SRLs and the view of 
legal professionals, as SRLs often indicate that the paperwork they were 
required to complete seemed straightforward,232 but lawyers tend to view their 
efforts as poorly executed. The completion of court forms (as opposed to 
written pleadings which must be drafted entirely by the litigant233) requires less 
legal knowledge and skill and may be thought to be easier for SRLs. However, 
SRLs still encounter challenges completing court forms and documents. Even 
identifying the correct form234 can present difficulties, and once the form is 
found SRLs may struggle to provide the correct (and complete) information 
required.235 Perhaps as a result, SRLs often report feeling that court paperwork 
is overwhelming and excessively time-consuming to complete.236 This may be 
because court forms are not always sufficiently straightforward for SRLs and 
often still use technical and legal language.237 Tkacukova argues, using as an 
example court forms for family actions in England, that court forms are often 
not suitable for SRLs. Far from being accessible for a layperson, the forms 
Tkacukova evaluated were found to contain ambiguities and sentence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Greacen	  1995,	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  69,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton,	  Chapter	  10.	  231	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  pages	  138—141.	  232	  Ibid	  at	  page	  138.	  233	  The	  use	  of	  court	  forms	  is	  less	  common	  in	  Scotland	  than	  in	  most	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Forms	  are	  used	  in	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  Scottish	  civil	  procedures	  (most	  notably	  the	  Simple	  Procedure	  and	  Simplified	  Divorce).	  In	  most	  other	  forms	  of	  action,	  including	  all	  other	  types	  of	  family	  action,	  litigants	  must	  draft	  pleadings.	  234	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  59.	  235	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  33.	  236	  Ibid	  at	  page	  32.	  237	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  61.	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construction “on the level of very advanced language users.”238 Difficulties in 
completing court documents can lead not only to frustration for the SRL, but 
also delay and increased work for the court. Court staff report that SRLs make 
frequent and even repeated mistakes on documents, leading to staff having to 
return forms to the SRL for correction--a cycle described as “filing, review, 
rejection, and return.”239 
 
3.3.4.5 Evidential Matters  
 
The presentation of evidence and the examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses are particularly challenging for SRLs.240 In court proceedings, evidence 
is given in accordance with the rules (albeit more relaxed rules in civil than in 
criminal proceedings) and is restricted to what is relevant to the litigant’s case 
in law. There is much that the SRL has to know and understand to comply with 
the requirements that may be both procedural and substantive in nature. Due to 
the complexity of the procedures, the potential pitfalls are numerous: SRLs may 
be unaware of how to ask questions of witnesses or may instead make 
statements.241 They also tend to fail to identify relevant evidence, fail to enter 
the correct documents into evidence (or simply forget to bring them to court) or 
fail to see the need to provide witnesses in support of their pleadings (or, again, 
to bring their witnesses to court).242 Cross examining witnesses is often 
identified as both one of the most challenging aspects of the process for SRLs as 
well as one of the most important.243 Trinder et al describe cross-examination as 
task that SRLs “simply could not perform effectively, if at all.”244 Where expert 
witnesses are needed, this gives rise to a plethora of new challenges for SRLs, 
both in seeing the need for experts245 and identifying and arranging payment for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  Tkacukova	  T,	  “Communication	  in	  the	  Family	  court:	  Financial	  Remedy	  Proceedings	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  Litigants	  in	  Person”	  (2016)	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  and	  Family	  Law	  38:4	  430	  at	  page	  441.	  239	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  33.	  240	  See	  for	  example	  Bell,	  supra	  at	  note	  226	  at	  pages	  22-­‐28.	  241	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  page	  35;	  the	  ETBB	  at	  12.5;	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  158.	  242	  Ibid.	  243	  See,	  for	  example,	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  35.	  244	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  70.	  245	  Equal	  Treatment	  Bench	  Book,	  3rd	  edition,	  May	  2014,	  http://www.scotland-­‐judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/EqualTreatmentBenchBookMay2014.pdf.	  (the	  “ETBB”)	  at	  12.5.	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experts.246 The SRL may also not have the knowledge required to properly 
instruct an expert witness and ensure that they are aware of all relevant 
information.247 
 
The evidential difficulties that SRLs experience cannot entirely be attributed to 
the procedural elements of evidence, but relate to larger conceptual and 
cognitive issues. O’Barr and Conley suggest that, even in the relatively informal 
format of the small claims courts, laypeople are typically unable to deliver 
“legally adequate” narratives. In other words, the SRL’s evidence is not framed 
in the manner that judges are accustomed to hearing from lawyers in the 
court.248 The SRL is unaware of the “highly specific” narrative requirements of 
the court and thus delivers their story as a “common sense” or everyday 
narrative. As a result the SRL’s narrative, and their evidence, are insufficient 
from the judge’s point of view.249 More recent research echoed O’Barr and 
Conley’s conclusion, finding that the SRLs were unable to properly adduce 
evidence in conformance with the court’s requirements, resulting in detriment 
to the SRL’s case. Again this occurred even in small claims court, where rules 
and the presentation of evidence are already somewhat relaxed.250  Tkacukova 
notes that the nature of court proceedings itself causes challenges for SRLs. The 
procedure combines written and spoken communication, a less natural form of 
communication that makes it more difficult for SRLs to develop narratives in 
relation to their cases.251 
 
 3.3.4.6 Settlement 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  158.	  247	  Solon	  M,	  “LIP	  Service”	  (2015)	  165	  NLJ	  7665,	  25.	  248	  O’Barr	  W	  and	  Conley	  J,	  “Litigant	  Satisfaction	  Versus	  Legal	  Adequacy	  in	  Small	  claims	  Court	  Narratives”	  (1985)	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review	  Vol	  19	  No	  4,	  661.	  249	  Ibid	  at	  page	  698	  and	  page	  685.	  250	  Lewis	  P,	  “Litigants	  in	  Person	  and	  their	  Difficulties	  in	  Adducing	  Evidence:	  a	  Study	  of	  Small	  Claims	  in	  an	  English	  County	  Court”	  (2007)	  International	  Journal	  of	  Evidence	  and	  Proof	  2007	  11(1)	  24.	  251	  Tkacukova	  T,	  “Communication	  in	  the	  Family	  court:	  financial	  remedy	  proceedings	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  litigants	  in	  person”(2016)	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  and	  Family	  Law	  38:4,	  430	  at	  page	  442.	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Moorhead and Sefton found that SRLs were less likely to attempt to settle their 
cases.252 The reasons for this posited by their interview subjects were 
particularly interesting: SRLs tended to suggest that this was because they 
thought settlement was prohibited or because they were afraid of being 
exploited by their opponent’s solicitor, while legal professionals and court staff 
tended to think that the SRLs had “something to hide” or wanted their day in 
court.253 Toy-Cronin found that SRLs in New Zealand were also potentially less 
likely to settle because they had difficulty viewing the case strategically, 
because the opponent’s lawyer may be wary of entering into negotiations for 
fear that they could become “heated” or that the SRL would disclose discussions 
to the court.254 There are also pitfalls for SRLs that do wish to settle their case. 
Because SRLs are less familiar with the law and the legal position in their case, 
there is a danger that they will not be able to negotiate a settlement on equal 
terms with a represented opponent, or that they could even be intimidated into 
an unfavourable settlement.255 
 
3.3.5 Conceptualising the SRL 
 
3.3.5.1 Introduction 
 
While the matters in the previous section of this chapter have been examined 
primarily through the lens of the SRL, this section will view SRLs from the 
perspective of legal professionals, judges and other “insiders” in the legal 
system. In his report on civil court reform in England and Wales, Lord Woolf 
famously observes: 
 
Only too often the litigant in person is regarded as a problem for judges 
and for the court system rather than the person for whom the system of 
civil justice exists. The true problem is the court system and its procedures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  257;	  see	  also	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  52.	  	  253	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  257.	  254	  Toy-­‐Cronin	  B,	  “Keeping	  Up	  Appearances:	  Accessing	  New	  Zealand’s	  Civil	  Courts	  as	  a	  Litigant	  in	  Person”	  (2015)	  (Thesis,	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy)	  University	  of	  Otago	  at	  pages	  165-­‐169	  (hereafter	  “Toy	  Cronin”).	  255	  See,	  for	  example,	  Engler	  R,	  “Access	  to	  Justice	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Private	  Practitioner”	  (2014)	  24	  Kan	  JL	  &Pub	  Pol’y	  554	  at	  page	  562	  (“Engler	  2014”)	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which are still too often inaccessible and incomprehensible to ordinary 
people.256 
 
Lord Woolf’s view addresses the two most common bodies of thought on the 
presence of SRLs in the civil court system: for some, they are viewed as 
interlopers in a domain reserved for legal professionals; to others, like Lord 
Woolf, the purpose of the civil justice system and the courts is to serve all 
individuals, not just lawyers. As the discussion below will demonstrate, much of 
the thinking on self-representation and SRLs in general can be related back to 
one of these two essential points of view. Indeed, the conception of party 
litigants reflected in the SCCR—as discussed above—reflects both of these 
competing ideas about SRLs.  
 
3.3.5.2 SRLs: Angels or Demons? 
 
In addition to views about the role of self-representation within the wider 
landscape of civil justice, there are a wide variety of perceptions of SRLs as a 
group. Again the competing ideas of SRLs suggested by Lord Woolf are apparent, 
summarised aptly here by Moorhead:  “Litigants in person inspire a fascinating 
mix of sympathy and hostility.”257 Broadly, negative views about SRLs stem from 
two related complaints: the first is that they are “pests” or “nuts.”258 A number 
of negative motivations and traits are attributed to SRLs by those with this view, 
not least of all that they selfishly choose to “file rambling, illogical lawsuits to 
settle personal vendettas and advance [their] own social and political 
agenda.”259 There is the suggestion that these SRLs may be cynically 
manipulating the system, opting deliberately to self-represent not out of 
necessity but as a means of gaining an advantage over their opponent by gaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256	  Lord	  Woolf	  (1995)	  “Access	  to	  Justice:	  Interim	  Report	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  on	  the	  Civil	  Justice	  System	  in	  England	  and	  Wales”	  Chapter	  17	  at	  paragraph	  2.	  257	  Moorhead	  R,	  “Access	  or	  Aggravation?	  Litigants	  in	  Person,	  McKenzie	  Friends	  and	  Lay	  Representation”	  (2003)	  CJQ	  22(Mar)	  133	  at	  page	  133.	  258	  See	  for	  example	  Rosenbloom	  J,	  "Exploring	  Methods	  to	  Improve	  Management	  and	  Fairness	  in	  Pro	  Se	  cases:	  a	  Study	  of	  the	  Pro	  Se	  Docket	  in	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York."	  (2002)	  Fordham	  Urban	  Law	  Journal	  305.	  259	  Swank	  D,	  “The	  Pro	  Se	  Phenomenon”	  (2005)	  BYU	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Law	  19(2)	  373	  at	  page	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the sympathy of the court while flouting the court’s practices and procedures.260 
Even the public at large may have developed a negative view of SRLs. It has 
been suggested that the often-repeated adage “one who is his own lawyer has a 
fool for a client” may contribute to a public perception that those who 
represent themselves in court are underprivileged, uneducated and incapable.261 
 
A second complaint often repeated about SRLs is that even those who may be 
well intentioned slow the process due to their inexperience or “clog up” the 
running of the courts.262 Zuckerman describes SRLs as creating an “efficiency 
deficit”: “Since lay persons are not familiar with the substantive law and court 
procedure, they have difficulty to prepare adequately and to comply with rules 
and court orders, with the result that the court is forced to devote 
disproportionate time and effort to cases”.263 It may be perceived that the cases 
of SRLs are more likely to be without merit, but equally even those that do have 
a foundation in law may be regarded as more onerous for the court because it 
takes more time for the court to evaluate a case set out in layman’s terms 
rather than by lawyers.264 The impact of SRLs on the courts is often said to be 
detrimental to their opponents and society at large, placing even more pressure 
on courts that are already overpopulated and underfunded.265   
 
Many, however, reject these undesirable images of the SRL, and argue that it is 
either unsupported or disproven by the available evidence.266 Swank sums a 
compassionate image of the SRL as “the poor person who cannot afford counsel 
and is therefore unable to participate in the hyper-technical procedural maze of 
the modern judicial system.”267 Graecen argues that negative views of SRLs as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	  Van	  Wormer	  N,	  “Help	  at	  Your	  Fingertips:	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Response	  to	  the	  
Pro	  Se	  Phenomenon”	  (2007)	  Vanderbilt	  Law	  Review	  60(3),	  983	  at	  page	  996.	  261	  Ibid.	  262	  Goldschmidt	  J,	  Meeting	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Pro	  Se	  Litigation:	  a	  Report	  and	  Guidebook	  
for	  Judges	  and	  Court	  Managers	  (National	  Center	  for	  State	  Courts	  1998)	  121.	  263	  Zuckerman	  A,	  “No	  Justice	  Without	  Lawyers	  -­‐	  the	  Myth	  of	  an	  Inquisitorial	  Solution”	  (2014)	  CJ	  33(4)	  355	  at	  355.	  264	  Schneider	  R,	  “Illiberal	  Construction	  of	  Pro	  Se	  Pleadings”(2010)	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  Review	  159,	  585	  at	  page	  598.	  265	  This	  view	  appears	  to	  be	  particularly	  common	  in	  the	  legal	  profession;	  see	  for	  example	  the	  colourfully	  titled	  Editorial,	  “The	  Scourge	  of	  the	  Party	  Litigant”	  (1997)	  Civ.	  P.B.	  17(Sep),	  1-­‐2	  and	  Mackenzie	  R,	  “Party	  Time”	  (2009)	  JLSS	  54(2)	  18.	  266	  See	  for	  example	  Schneider	  R,	  supra	  at	  note	  264	  at	  page	  597.	  267	  Swank	  D,	  supra	  note	  259	  at	  page	  385.	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pests or nuts amount to “institutional prejudice” against SRLs and that these 
“attitudes are based on factual misconceptions…and represent a perversion of 
the legal system's commitment to justice for all.”268 On a similar note, Toy 
Cronin suggests that, rather than acknowledging that there are limits to capacity 
of courts to hear all disputes, which could undermine the legitimacy of the 
system, barriers are instead put in place to discourage SRLs. Legal professionals 
then “personalize LiPs’ failures,” so that “…the illusion that the courts are 
accessible is maintained, while the failure is blamed on the individual, not on 
systemic factors that few LiPs, if any, can overcome. This focus on individuals’ 
failings then easily elides into thinking of LiPs as persistent and vexatious 
litigants.”269  
 
Engler also notes an “institutional bias” against SRLs in the courts.270 He suggests 
an entirely different, and more sympathetic, lens through which the behavior of 
SRLs should be viewed: they are not, as is often assumed, pests who choose to 
self-represent, but are effectively compelled to. Moreover, their actions 
throughout the process “such as whether to settle or go to trial, what witnesses 
and evidence to produce or on what terms to settle are ‘voluntary’ if they are 
understood and not the product of coercion…we should use a standard akin to 
‘informed consent’ accepting as voluntary only the choices made by litigants 
who are aware of their options and advantages and disadvantages of those 
options.”271 Far from other views that assume that SRLs are ill-intentioned, 
Engler suggests that most of their actions can instead by considered involuntary. 
This of course begs the question, discussed below, of whether they should be 
permitted to self-represent, and thus take actions for which they are unable to 
give informed consent, in the first place.272 
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  “Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants,	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  Courts,	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  (2014)	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  Court	  Review,	  52:	  662	  at	  pages	  663-­‐664.	  269	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  page	  253.	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  Engler	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  Unrepresented	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  (1999)	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  Review	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  1987	  at	  page	  1997.	  271	  	  Engler	  R,	  (2011)	  “The	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  Unrepresented	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  (2011)	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  Section	  3.4.1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   82	  
 
3.3.5.3 Typologies of SRLs 
 
 
In addition to more general views of SRLs, a handful of classifications of 
different types have also been proposed. It is notable that the “persistent” or 
“vexatious” litigant tends to figure prominently in many of these, although the 
actual number of truly problematic litigants is generally acknowledged to be 
low.273 Genn differentiates “vexatious or querulous” litigants from “one-off” 
SRLs. The repeated attempts of the former to conduct “repeated and relentless” 
meritless274 litigation may be related to mental health difficulties or other 
vulnerabilities,275 but regardless of their reasons, they “place a strain on judicial 
and court resources.”276 Genn’s description of “one-off” litigants, who are said 
to be “the category of main concern in this discussion,” is “someone involved in 
a legal problem or dispute which requires judicial determination in court or 
tribunal and for which they cannot access or afford legal advice and 
representation…The matter is important enough for them to take the step of 
appearing in legal proceedings without legal support.”277 There seems to be an 
emphasis on the idea that “one-off” SRLs, unlike with the more problematic 
vexatious litigants, do not choose to self-represent and do so only when it is the 
only option. Moorhead and Sefton also differentiate “difficult and obsessive” 
litigant from the body of SRLs as a whole.278 These litigants who tended to 
pursue meritless, misconceived or even “wild” claims,279 make repeated or 
harassing claims of the same type or involving the same individual,280 or conduct 
themselves in an abusive or obstructive manner.281 It is noted that they are not 
common, but the characteristics of this sub-group of SRLs are “often taken to be 
the paradigm for unrepresented litigants generally.”282 
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  page	  427.	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  Ibid	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  page	  428—429.	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  Ibid	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  page	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  Ibid.	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  Chapter	  4.	  279	  Ibid	  at	  pages	  83—84.	  280	  Ibid	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  page	  84.	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  Ibid	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  page	  86.	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  page	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Some typologies of SRLs are more nuanced. As noted above, one category 
identified by Hunter et al was the “procedurally challenged” SRL. In addition to 
the procedurally challenged, Hunter’s study also divided SRLs into groups as 
“vanquished” litigants and “serial appellants”.283 Vanquished litigants are those 
who cannot afford legal representation and are “overwhelmed” or “defeated” 
by the system, typically resulting in abandonment or early disposal of their 
case.284 Serial appellants are far more persistent, as these litigants “…brought 
multiple appeal applications before the Court [and] created significant 
difficulties for the Court, as they had a tendency to appeal every 
decision…abused the assistance of Appeals Registrars, and often based their 
multiple grounds for appeal on a belief that their personal rights had been 
infringed.”285 This description echoes Moorhead and Sefton’s view of “difficult 
and obsessive” litigants and Hunter et al also associate serial appeals with 
vexatious litigants, although those in their study had not formally been declared 
as such.286 Trinder et al suggest a further category to be added to Hunter’s 
typology, “legally challenged” SRLs.287 “Legally challenged” SRLs are those with 
complex cases in law who find themselves out of their depth. 
 
Trinder et al formulate their own typology as well. Rather than focusing entirely 
on the features of self-representing litigants, their typology is developed around 
the characteristics of the court hearings involving SRLs. There are four types of 
“working” and four types of “not working” hearings involving SRLs.288 “Working” 
hearings, for example, were found to include those that feature a fully 
inquisitorial judge.289 “Not working” hearings include chaotic “hot potato” 
hearings were the judge fails to control the proceedings and must adjourn.290 It 
is interesting to note that Trinder’s typology of hearing reveals within it, 
amongst other factors,291 a further typology of the SRLs involved. In the 
“working” hearing category are “holding their own” litigants in person, who 	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  page	  103.	  	  284	  Ibid	  at	  pages	  103-­‐104.	  285	  Ibid	  at	  page	  104.	  286	  Ibid.	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  avoid	  the	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  of	  the	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  in	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  a	  true	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  litigant	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  court	  order	  to	  that	  effect.	  287	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  25.	  288	  Ibid	  at	  Chapter	  4.4.	  	  289	  Ibid	  at	  page	  62.	  290	  Ibid	  at	  page	  64.	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  and	  opponent	  solicitor.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   84	  
have experience of previous hearings and co-operate with their opponent’s 
lawyer.292 Hearings that did not work were populated with “over confident” 
litigants in person who tended to be well prepared but possessed of only limited 
understanding of the law and procedure.293  “Out of their depth” litigants in 
person were those who made errors and were incapable of understanding the 
court’s requirements.294  
 
3.3.6 The Effect of Self-Representation on the SRL 
 
3.3.6.1 The SRL’s Feelings about the Process 
 
The experience of self-representing in the civil courts affects SRLs in a number 
of different ways. Despite the difficulties discussed above, not all SRLs are 
ultimately left with a negative view of the process. Some do report being 
satisfied with their experience in court,295 or have a favourable view of the 
treatment they received from the judge296 or court staff.297 Others reported 
feeling a sense of accomplishment or empowerment for handling their case on 
their own.298 One study noted that one or two litigants interviewed even seemed 
to “enjoy” the experience.299 However, the experiences of many SRLs are far 
less positive. An overarching theme in the literature is that the experience of 
self-representing causes a great deal of stress and anxiety for the SRL. Often 
SRLs are intimidated by the prospect of self-representing from the outset and 
feel vulnerable or hopeless.300 Trinder et al report that SRLs commonly found 
self-representing in their case difficult, experiencing fear, bewilderment, 
confusion and the feeling that they were being marginalised.301 Many SRLs are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  292	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  et	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  at	  page	  63.	  293	  Ibid	  at	  page	  64;	  these	  SRLs	  also	  appeared	  most	  interested	  in	  “beating”	  their	  opponent’s	  lawyers	  rather	  than	  settling	  their	  case.	  294	  Ibid	  at	  page	  65.	  Trinder	  also	  notes	  the	  presence	  of	  “unprotected”	  litigants	  who	  are	  not	  given	  the	  chance	  to	  explain	  their	  case	  in	  the	  hearings	  and	  relates	  these	  to	  Hunter’s	  “vanquished”	  litigants.	  295	  See,	  for	  example,	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  105.	  296	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  15.	  297	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  20-­‐21.	  298	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  47.	  299	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  15.	  300	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  47.	  301	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  80-­‐82.	  Trinder	  also	  notes	  that	  SRLs	  with	  self-­‐belief	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unhappy with the length of the process, and feel that the court process itself is 
too time-consuming and slow.302 Some SRLs feel the absence of support from a 
lawyer keenly, desiring the distance of an emotional “buffer” or the feeling that 
someone is “in their corner”.303 
 
Another theme emerging in the literature is that the SRL’s feelings about the 
self-representation often change as the reality of the situation sinks in. SRLs who 
report feeling confident at the beginning of the court process very often see 
their confidence diminish as the action progresses.304 Moorhead and Sefton note 
that the SRL’s confidence is often “fragile” and can be diminished by something 
as simple as being asked to speak in court.305 This may be due in part to the 
SRL’s expectations of the process. Some SRLs appear to underestimate the 
complexity of the law and court procedures and overestimate how much help 
they will receive, for example thinking that court staff will take a more active 
role in advising them of future hearings and steps they need to take.306 Related 
to this, as touched upon in the previous section, is the suggestion that the SRL’s 
perception of how complicated the court process is and how able they will be to 
get through it unassisted does not always line up with the reality of the 
situation.307 Although SRLs may feel that the case, or the procedural 
requirements of the case, are “straightforward,” judges and lawyers often view 
the SRL as being out of their depth or as making an inadequate effort.308 This 
suggests that, in the absence of legal advice or guidance, at least some SRLs are 
not able to make an informed or realistic decision to self-represent. 
 
It is also common for SRLs to report feeling like an “outsider” in the court 
process.309 This idea of the SRL as being on the “outside,” while lawyers and 
judges are “insiders,” can be exacerbated by a number of factors. One of these 
is the tendency of lawyers and judges to use legal and technical terms that SRLs 	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  page	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  page	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  (at	  page	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  that	  a	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  of	  SRLs	  in	  their	  study	  began	  their	  cases	  intending	  to	  act	  for	  themselves,	  but	  later	  realized	  their	  need	  for	  a	  lawyer	  and	  obtained	  representation.	  	  305	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton.	  306	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  21.	  307	  Trinder,	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  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  163.	  308	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  page	  138.	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  See,	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  2013	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  page	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  page	  43.	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do not understand, shutting out the SRL and making it difficult for the SRL to 
follow what is happening.310 (However, some SRLs do report judges making a 
concerted effort to use layman’s terms.311) Often judges and lawyers are already 
familiar with each other and have established relationships or rapport, which 
can further contribute to the SRL feeling like an “outsider.”312 Unlike SRLs, legal 
professionals are also experienced in the court’s formalities and other practical 
matters. Lack of knowledge of court etiquette is a common cause of concern for 
SRLs, who may be left feeling confused or embarrassed for not knowing, for 
example, where to stand in court or how to address the judge.313 Even the 
physical environment of the courthouse itself may be intimidating to the SRL or 
cause additional anxiety.314 The feeling of being an “outsider” thus seems to 
relate in large part to the formality of the court process, which is foreign to 
most SRLs. Unsurprisingly, Baldwin notes that, at least in the small claims 
context, reducing the formality of the process had an impact on litigant 
satisfaction and litigants were happier with less formal court procedures.315  
 
The SRL’s perception of the court process is also dependent on how fair it 
appears. SRLs are often positive generally about the fairness of the court and 
the judge.316 When SRLs feel that the process is unfair, this often relates to a 
sense that the court is biased in favour of lawyers—again hinting at the theme of 
the SRL as an outsider. For example, SRLs may perceive attempts by the judge 
to curtail their submissions (often by not allowing the SRL to address the court 
on minor points or matters irrelevant to their case) as unfair or biased towards 
their opponent’s lawyer, who understands the requirements of legal relevance 
and is thus less likely to be cut off by judge in the same way.317 The view that 
judges may be biased in favour of lawyers and their clients, or that they have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  97.	  311	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  15.	  312	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  44.	  	  313	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  18;	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  98.	  314	  Citizen’s	  Advice	  “Standing	  Alone:	  Going	  to	  Family	  Court	  without	  a	  Lawyer”	  June	  2006	  https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-­‐us/policy/policy-­‐research-­‐topics/justice-­‐policy-­‐research/access-­‐to-­‐justice-­‐policy-­‐research-­‐and-­‐consultation-­‐responses/access-­‐to-­‐justice-­‐consultation-­‐responses/standing-­‐alone-­‐going-­‐to-­‐the-­‐family-­‐court-­‐without-­‐a-­‐lawyer/	  at	  page	  34.	  315	  Baldwin	  J,	  “Litigants’	  Experiences	  of	  Adjudication	  in	  the	  County	  Courts”	  (1999)	  CJQ	  18	  (Jan)	  12	  at	  pages	  39—40.	  316	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  189,	  Ipsos	  Mori	  2009	  at	  page	  15.	  	  317	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  189;	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  101.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   87	  
negative views of self-representation or SRLs, appears relatively commonly 
among litigants. For this reason, some SRLs feel pressured by the judge not to 
self-represent and to get a lawyer.318 Others feel that the judge was not 
interested in what the SRL had to say and was more concerned with hearing 
from their opponent’s lawyer.319 This latter belief is perhaps not entirely 
unfounded, as judges do report relying on opponent solicitors to keep cases 
involving SRLs moving forward. The judge may ask the represented party to 
speak first or explain the legal issues in the case before hearing from the SRL, 
possibly leading the SRL to feel excluded.320 Other SRLs report experiencing 
more overt hostility or a sense of moral judgement from judges, or that the 
judge is prejudiced against them and expects their case to fail because they 
were self-representing.321 While an SRL’s perception of judicial bias and hostility 
is important in itself, again it is difficult to verify the extent to which this 
reflects the reality of the situation. It is possible that some judges may look 
unfavourably towards SRLs, but at the same time SRL perceptions of the process 
must be considered in context. 
 
Although government policy on tribunals has in general assumed that ordinary 
people will be able to represent themselves,322 a number of similar themes 
appear in the literature suggesting that SRLs often experience negative feelings 
about the tribunal process as well. Echoing the experiences of SRLs noted above, 
Adler suggests that SRLs in tribunals can regret the decision to self-represent, 
finding that the process is more complicated than they had expected.323 Genn 
and Genn argue that SRLs in tribunals often do not understand the proceedings, 
the role of the tribunal, and their own role and thus are still “disadvantaged” by 
their lack of representation.324 A recent study of the employment tribunal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  at	  page	  43.	  319	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  101.	  320	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  181.	  	  321	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  pages	  101-­‐104.	  322	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Administrative	  Tribunals	  and	  Enquiries,	  Cmnd	  218	  (1957);	  Sir	  Andrew	  Leggatt,	  Tribunals	  for	  Users:	  One	  System,	  One	  Service	  (The	  Stationery	  Office,	  2001);	  Transforming	  Public	  Services:	  Complaints,	  Redress	  and	  Tribunals	  Cm	  6243	  (2004).	  323	  Adler	  M	  and	  Gulland	  J	  “The	  Experiences,	  Perceptions	  and	  Expectations	  of	  Tribunal	  Users”	  (2003)	  Council	  on	  Tribunals.	  324	  Genn,	  H	  and	  Genn	  Y,	  “The	  Effectiveness	  of	  Representation	  at	  Tribunals”	  (1989)	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Department	  (“Genn	  and	  Genn	  1989”)	  at	  page	  237.	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presented a similar picture, finding that SRLs there, like many SRLs in the civil 
courts, often considered the process “bewildering, time consuming and 
stressful” and experienced “high levels of anxiety…including the fear of 
failure…and the lack of knowledge of how to negotiate a settlement, prepare a 
case and self-represent at the [employment tribunal].”325 The experience of 
employment tribunal litigants are particularly relevant to the civil courts, as, 
like the civil courts but unlike most other tribunals, they are involved in “party 
vs party” rather than “party vs state” disputes. 
 
3.3.6.2 The Wider Impact of Self-Representation  
 
Involvement in the types of legal issues decided in the civil courts can have a 
negative impact on the lives of those involved, including those who are legally 
represented. Individuals experiencing civil justice problems can experience 
alienation,326 worry, loss of confidence, and even mental or physical health 
problems as a result.327 It is thus worth keeping in mind that the impact of 
navigating the court process as an SRL rather than a represented litigant may 
not always be easy to untangle from the impact of the problem that brought the 
litigant to court in the first place. However, it is significant that many SRLs feel 
they have negative effects following their experience in court. In a small-scale 
study by Citizen’s Advice,328 SRLs reported wide-ranging consequences from their 
experience self-representing, with 9 in 10 indicating that their experience 
affected at least one other area of their life, such as their work, health, or 
finances.329 7 in 10 Citizen’s Advice advisors felt that going to family court as an 
SRL makes existing mental health problems worse,330 and 69% said that it can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  325	  Busby	  N,	  “Experiences	  and	  Perceptions	  of	  Claimants	  to	  the	  Employment	  Tribunal”	  (2017)	  Emp	  LB	  137,	  2.	  326	  Genn	  H	  et	  al,	  Paths	  to	  Justice	  Scotland	  at	  page	  264.	  327	  Pleasance	  P	  et	  al,	  Causes	  of	  Action:	  Civil	  Law	  and	  Social	  Justice	  (TSO	  2006)	  at	  pages	  60	  and	  149—50.	  328	  Citizen’s	  Advice	  “Standing	  Alone:	  Going	  to	  Family	  Court	  without	  a	  Lawyer”	  (2015)	  https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-­‐us/policy/policy-­‐research-­‐topics/justice-­‐policy-­‐research/access-­‐to-­‐justice-­‐policy-­‐research-­‐and-­‐consultation-­‐responses/access-­‐to-­‐justice-­‐consultation-­‐responses/standing-­‐alone-­‐going-­‐to-­‐the-­‐family-­‐court-­‐without-­‐a-­‐lawyer/	  (hereafter	  “Citizen’s	  Advice	  2015”).	  329	  Citizen’s	  Advice	  2015	  at	  page	  15.	  330	  Ibid	  at	  page	  16.	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cause the SRL’s physical health to suffer.331 Much of this correlates with 
Macfarlane’s finding that some SRLs are left with depression and other physical 
ailments.332 Intriguingly, even SRLs who were themselves lawyers described the 
experience of self-representation with terms such as “traumatizing”.333 SRLs also 
indicated often-significant financial detriment, including some having to take 
time off work for court hearings or due to late nights researching. Others even 
reported giving work up entirely to concentrate on their case.334 SRLs also felt 
they had become “fixated” on their experience to an extent that it begins to 
isolate them socially from family and friends.335 There is, again, some concern 
about the self-reported nature of these issues and the extent of their causation 
by the experience of self-representation. For example, while it can safely be 
said that there is evidence that some SRLs perceive that they have to give up 
work in order to pursue their case, the available evidence cannot be considered 
conclusive on the question of whether this is true and that leaving a job was 
truly necessary. 
 
On the other side of the emotional spectrum, SRLs may also leave the court 
process feeling angry about their experience. While it is often stated that the 
process distresses SRLs, it is less clear how often this leads to more serious 
aggressive or even violent behaviour. Such behaviour will, of course, have its 
own impact on the SRL and others. Landsman suggests that the experience of 
self-representation can lead to frustration and distrust of the court and, in turn, 
increased anger, volatility and potential violence.336 It is not clear whether 
aggressive SRLs are common—or any more prevalent than represented parties 
who become aggressive—or whether anecdotal evidence of the hostile SRL 
prevails because they are simply more likely to be remembered and discussed by 
the judges and lawyers who encounter them. Trinder et al found that, while 
many of the lawyers interviewed for their study had “stories” of abusive SRLs, 
including those who had been physically violent, only a few SRLs that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  331	  Ibid	  at	  page	  17.	  332	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  108.	  	  333	  Ibid	  at	  page	  109.	  334	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  109-­‐110;	  Knowlton	  et	  al	  reports	  that	  their	  results	  on	  consequences	  for	  SRLs	  were	  consistent	  with	  Macfarlane’s	  findings	  (at	  page	  50).	  335	  Ibid	  at	  page	  110.	  336	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  pages	  451-­‐452,	  citing	  an	  unpublished	  manuscript	  by	  Tyler	  T	  and	  Zimerman	  N,	  “The	  Psychological	  Challenges	  of	  Pro	  Se	  Litigation”	  (2008).	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observed could be characterised as aggressive.337 This was not unique to the 
self-representing litigants, as some represented parties observed were 
considered to be aggressive or disruptive as well.338 Again there is also the 
difficulty isolating the effect of the experience of self-representing from other 
factors that could lead a litigant to become aggressive or violent. The aggression 
from SRLs that was observed could also potentially be attributed to mental 
health issues or vulnerabilities and not necessarily the experience of self-
representation itself.339  
 
3.3.7 Does Self-Representation Affect Litigant Outcomes? 
 
The extent to which self-representation affects case outcome for party litigants 
has not been studied at all in Scotland. This is perhaps not surprising as, even in 
relation to all of the other matters discussed in this chapter, the question of 
how self-representation affects the outcome of a litigant’s case is particularly 
fraught. Assessing case outcomes of SRLs and comparing them to their 
represented counterparts is a far more difficult task than it may initially 
appear.340 While it may seem a forgone conclusion that litigants without lawyers 
are less likely to be successful, it is far from simple to establish the impact of 
self-representation in a way that is empirically sound. Landsman suggests that 
this is due to the complexity of the problem, arguing that few studies have been 
able to isolate the effect of legal representation effectively341 due to 
“cofounding variables and selection effects”.342 To get an accurate comparison 
between represented and unrepresented litigants, both the population the 
litigants are drawn from and the strength of their cases (itself not entirely 
straightforward to assess) must be comparable.343 Engler identifies a further 
series of variables that may impact outcome, of which the presence of 
representation for a party is just one: the complexity of the procedures, the 
individual practices of the judge, and the typical operation of the court (which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  337	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  32.	  	  338	  Ibid	  at	  page	  32.	  339	  Ibid	  at	  page	  32	  and	  33.	  340	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott	  at	  page	  180.	  341	  Landsman	  2012	  at	  page	  241.	  342	  Ibid.	  343	  Ibid.	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may, for example, have a presumption in favour of claimants).344 Perhaps most 
tellingly, Engler also includes the substantive law as one of these variables. 
While the law should be the most determinative element, Engler argues, SRLs 
experience poor outcomes even when the law seems to be “on their side.”345 If 
this is correct, even overcoming the problem of accurately assessing the relative 
merits of SRLs’ cases will not necessarily allow for an accurate evaluation of 
their outcome. 
 
Another complication is the question of how success itself is to be measured. 
Hannaford-Agor and Mott note one particularly fundamental issue: is success 
measured in objective terms (by what happened in the case) or subjective 
terms—did the litigant receive a fair and just outcome?346 Hannaford-Agor and 
Mott’s study chose to address the former, but notes that the latter question is 
perhaps the most important of all in relation to access to justice (as well as 
being even more difficult to set criteria for).347 The outcome of civil court 
matters is often not as simple as  “winning” or “losing”. Many cases ultimately 
settle. Often this could be considered a favourable outcome, but not if the SRL 
felt pressured into settling or into agreeing to terms they are unhappy with, or 
just felt they were unable to carry on with the case due to the difficulty 
involved in self-representing.348 There is also evidence that the cases of SRLs are 
more likely to end in dismissal, withdrawal or default judgment349 rather than 
having a full hearing and being decided on the substantive merits. Again, this 
could be either a favourable or unfavourable outcome for the SRL. If the case is 
meritless it is ultimately better to have it disposed of more quickly, but it is 
clearly a poor outcome to have a valid case dismissed or to be forced to give up 
on it.350 The question of measuring success can be complicated by the type of 
case being assessed as well. For example, in an action for divorce, decree is 
almost always granted. On a similar note, if a landlord will almost always prevail 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  344	  Engler	  R,	  “Connecting	  Self-­‐representation	  to	  Civil	  Gideon:	  What	  Existing	  Data	  reveal	  about	  when	  Counsel	  is	  Most	  Needed”	  (2010)	  Fordham	  Urban	  Law	  Journal,	  37(1)	  at	  section	  IV.	  345	  Ibid	  at	  section	  IV	  A.1.	  346	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott	  at	  page	  178.	  347	  Ibid.	  348	  See	  Engler’s	  “informed	  consent”	  model	  in	  section	  	  3.3.4.2.	  349	  Hunter	  et	  al	  2002	  at	  page	  88;	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott	  at	  page	  171.	  350	  Ibid.	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in housing matters,351 how can the effect of self-representation be measured in 
these cases?  
 
With all of this said, a review of the literature reveals at least some consensus 
that outcomes are unfavourably affected by self-representation.352 Two studies 
addressing SRL outcome particularly are worth noting, both in terms of their 
methodology and the quality353 of the data. Seron et al354 recruited 
unrepresented participants waiting in line to attend a New York housing court. 
Around half of the subjects were then assigned a lawyer, while the other half 
remained unrepresented.355 The subjects who were represented had significantly 
better outcomes than those who were not, and were more likely to receive 
favourable orders from the court, such as rent abatements or repairs.356 
Judgments were made against only 32% of the represented participants, as 
compared to 52% of the unrepresented subjects.357 Sandefur358 measures the 
impact of representation by performing a “meta-analyses”359 on the existing 
data from other studies. This analysis revealed that lawyers did increase the 
litigant’s chances of success considerably.360 Perhaps surprisingly, the study 
suggested that the impact of lawyers was higher in procedurally complex case, 
but lower in cases where the substantive law was more complex.361 Overall, 
Sandefur suggests, lawyers do influence outcomes for litigants, but this “comes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  351	  Landsman	  2012	  at	  page	  241.	  352	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  6.	  See	  also	  Trinder	  et	  al,	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton,	  and	  Hannaford-­‐Agor	  and	  Mott;	  in	  respect	  of	  tribunal	  cases,	  see	  Genn	  and	  Genn	  1989.	  353	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  6.	  354	  Seron	  C	  et	  al,	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Legal	  Counsel	  on	  Outcomes	  for	  Poor	  Tenants	  in	  New	  York	  City's	  Housing	  Court:	  Results	  of	  a	  Randomized	  Experiment”	  (2001)	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review,	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  2,	  419	  (“Seron	  et	  al”).	  355	  The	  experiment	  was	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  number	  of	  controls;	  for	  example,	  the	  lawyers	  (who	  were	  also	  representing	  other	  litigants	  pro	  bono)	  and	  judges	  did	  not	  know	  which	  litigants	  were	  part	  of	  the	  experiment.	  356	  Seron	  et	  al	  at	  page	  429.	  	  357	  Ibid	  at	  page	  426.	  358	  Sandefur	  R,	  “Elements	  of	  Professional	  Expertise:	  Understanding	  Relational	  and	  Substantive	  Expertise	  Through	  Lawyers’	  Impact”	  (2015)	  American	  Sociological	  Review	  Vol	  80(5)	  909.	  359	  See	  ibid	  pages	  912-­‐920	  for	  the	  details	  of	  Sandefur’s	  (very	  complex)	  methodology.	  	  360	  Ibid	  at	  page	  921.	  361	  Ibid.	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more from managing relatively simple legal procedures than from deploying the 
complex legal theories that are the stuff of formal legal education.”362  
 
It is worth considering the impact of self-representation within the tribunal 
model as well—do SRLs achieve better outcomes in these less formal, more 
“user-friendly” environments? Genn and Genn found that representation, and 
particularly specialist representation (including lay representation), improved 
outcomes for SRLs.363 This is consistent with the data from the civil courts as 
discussed above. However, more recently Adler found that SRLs in most tribunals 
who had received pre-hearing advice tended to achieve outcomes almost as good 
as those who had representation.364 Adler attributes this to the proactive, 
enabling approach taken by many tribunals.365 While Adler’s findings suggest 
potential for this approach to assist SRLs in the civil courts, there are a number 
of important caveats that must be applied. Adler’s finding that SRLs fared nearly 
as well as represented litigants did not apply to litigants in the employment 
tribunal (which, again, hear “party vs party” disputes similar to those in the civil 
courts). Adler suggests that tribunals may take a more adversarial approach to 
“party vs party” cases, tempering the enabling approach that seems to benefit 
SRLs.366 It is also worth noting that while comparing data on tribunal outcomes 
and civil court outcomes is instructive, many tribunals hear cases on narrow and 
specialist subject matter, and this may make it easier for them to take a more 
inquisitorial approach, while the matters heard in civil courts are far more 
diverse.  
 
 While all of this data provides a useful starting point to consider the impact of 
self-representation on litigant outcomes, more data is needed. The existing 
state of knowledge lacks precision as to how SRLs fare in different jurisdictions 
and types of cases, what factors influence their outcomes, and how (or if) 
measures to assist SRLs influence outcomes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  362	  Ibid	  at	  page	  926.	  363	  Genn	  and	  Genn	  1989.	  364	  See	  for	  example	  Adler	  M,	  “Can	  tribunals	  deliver	  justice	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  representation?”	  (2008) https://s3-­‐eu-­‐west-­‐1.amazonaws.com/esrc-­‐files/.../meUsgZhp1UazQ-­‐k4cX6F_w.pdf	  at	  page	  24.	  365	  Ibid	  at	  page	  25.	  366	  Ibid.	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3.4 The Normative Dimensions 
 
3.4.1 The Right to Self-Represent 
 
In the United Kingdom, as well as a number of other common law systems, the 
right to self-represent has been largely taken for granted and has been subject 
to little consideration or examination. Genn suggests that this is because the 
right to self-represent is taken as “axiomatic.”367 While self-representation is 
typically viewed alongside the larger issue of access to justice, there are 
conflicting views as to the relationship between the two.  One view can be 
described as a principled approach stemming from the right of the individual to 
self-determination. Of the right to self-represent, Genn observes “if forced to 
say why such a right exists, we might argue that it manifests a commitment to 
the principle of autonomy and self-determination.”368 Self-representation 
promotes autonomy by allowing the individual who the matter is concerned with 
to conduct the case himself, without requiring an intermediary. In this context, 
the rights enforceable in the civil courts are personal and it must be possible for 
the individual to enforce them directly. Landsman suggests that the right to self-
represent in the United States was in turn fueled by England’s “growing espousal 
of the principles of self-reliance and individualism.”369 Cerruti suggests that self-
representation is often viewed as “a portrait of direct democracy at work, a 
self-represented individual throwing off the formal trappings of the state and its 
lawyers to present an unmediated narrative in the courtroom.”370 The right to 
self-represent in the civil courts may have arisen from, or been conflated with, 
the right to self-represent in criminal courts,371 where direct participation in the 
proceedings is again viewed as an assertion of the rights of the individual against 
the state. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  367	  Genn	  2014	  at	  page	  423.	  368	  Ibid.	  	  369	  Landsman	  2012	  at	  page	  233.	  370	  Referring	  here	  to	  criminal	  cases;	  see	  Cerruti	  E,	  “Self-­‐representation	  in	  the	  International	  Arena:	  Removing	  a	  False	  Right	  of	  Spectacle”	  (2009)	  Georgetown	  University	  of	  International	  Law	  40.3,	  919	  at	  Part	  I.	  371	  Where	  early	  courts	  emphasized	  a	  right	  for	  the	  accused	  to	  confront	  his	  accuser	  personally;	  see	  Landsman	  2012	  at	  page	  233.	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Genn argues, however, that more often self-representation is seen as part of the 
individual’s right to access to justice and access to courts.372 While the argument 
that self-representation promotes individual autonomy is principled, this view 
represents a more practical understanding of access to justice. Here self-
representation must be allowed because otherwise those who cannot afford 
lawyers will simply be unable to access to the courts and enforce or defend their 
legal rights. Viewed through this lens, self-representation is also a necessary 
protection for the poor and vulnerable in particular, as they are likely to be shut 
out of the courts due to their inability to afford a lawyer.373 While self-
representation is intended here to provide access to the courts in the most 
literal sense, there is also a distinction made between access to the court 
process and true access to justice. While a self-representing litigant may be able 
to engage in the process in the most rudimentary sense, in the absence of legal 
procedural knowledge he is not necessarily able to participate meaningfully or 
properly vindicate his rights in law. Genn suggests that the right of access to the 
courts by way of self-representation “offers theoretical access to the courts that 
may be illusory,” arguing that more scrutiny is required to consider the potential 
negative effects of self-representation on the litigant, his opponent and the 
court.374  
 
The most significant, and perhaps most critical, consideration of these 
justifications for the right of self-representation is found in Rabeea Assy’s 
Injustice in Person: The Right of Self-Representation.375 This work is worth 
considering in some detail because it offers a rare examination of the 
theoretical underpinnings of self-representation. Assy’s model inverts a common 
narrative regarding self-representation, which is that an overcomplicated court 
system is failing SRLs.376 Instead, Assy posits, the system is not failing SRLs, nor 
must it be adjusted to meet their needs. The real problem is the unqualified 
right to self-representation, which is not worthy of the fierce protection it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  372	  Genn	  2013.	  373	  Assy	  R,	  Injustice	  in	  Person:	  The	  Right	  of	  Self-­‐Representation	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2015)	  at	  page	  21	  (hereafter	  “Assy”);	  See	  also	  Painter	  R,	  “Pro	  Se	  Litigation	  in	  Times	  of	  Financial	  Hardship”	  (2011)	  Family	  Law	  Quarterly	  Vol	  45	  No	  1,	  45.	  374	  Genn	  2014	  at	  page	  423—424.	  375	  Supra	  note	  373.	  376	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lord	  Woolf’s	  comments	  as	  quoted	  above.	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currently receives.377 Assy argues against an automatic and unfettered right to 
self-representation, suggesting that SRLs “strain court resources”378 and disrupt 
the administration of justice.379 The existing justifications for self-
representation are said to be unfounded or based in fallacy.380 Self-
representation, Assy suggests, is not a necessity nor a natural extension of the 
right of access to the courts—this notion is instead the result of the conceptual 
bias that rights are personal and should thus be available to the individual to 
exercise. Assy argues that this is another fallacy: “It is a mistake to suppose that 
the primary form of access to court is self-representation and that legal 
representation is derivative from it. Neither is specifically warranted by the 
right of access to court—and in practice legal representation is usually the more 
effective way to exercise that right.”381  
 
The idea that self-representation is necessary to respect the individual’s 
personal autonomy is also rebutted. Litigation always entails some form of 
limitation to the litigant’s choices.382 Forbidding self-representation as long as 
there are reasonable alternatives does not affront the individual’s autonomy.383 
Instead, “a litigant’s control over the process is enhanced rather than 
diminished by legal representation, which renders her participation more 
meaningful, regardless of whether one views such participation as outcome-
oriented or not”.384 Menashe and Gruner385 adopt Assy’s conclusions in relation 
to self-representation and propose a further argument in relation to autonomy, 
the risk of error. SRLs increase their chances of an incorrect verdict or inferior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	  Ibid	  at	  page	  11.	  378	  Ibid	  at	  page	  22.	  379	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  SRLs	  in	  the	  courts	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  a	  number	  of	  the	  complaints	  often	  made	  about	  SRLs—such	  as	  the	  extra	  time	  their	  cases	  are	  said	  to	  take—are	  not	  all	  supported	  by	  the	  available	  empirical	  evidence.	  380	  Although	  not	  discussed	  here,	  Assy	  also	  argues	  for	  a	  distinction	  between	  criminal	  and	  civil	  self-­‐representation.	  381	  Ibid	  at	  page	  18.	  382	  Such	  as	  rules	  of	  procedure.	  383	  Ibid	  at	  page	  168.	  384	  Ibid.	  This	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  Assy’s	  conclusions,	  but	  he	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  autonomy	  in	  more	  detail;	  see	  Chapter	  7	  of	  Injustice	  in	  Person,	  “Litigants	  as	  Authors	  of	  Their	  Lives”.	  385	  Menashe	  D	  and	  Gruner	  E,	  “Litigants	  in	  Person	  and	  the	  Risk	  of	  Error—a	  New	  Perspective	  in	  Rabeea	  Assy’s	  ‘Injustice	  in	  Person:	  The	  Right	  of	  Self	  Representation”	  (2016)	  CJQ	  2016,	  35(3)	  237.	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litigation by foregoing legal representation. However, “we cannot say that the 
litigant consents to risks of error, because this consent is based on a 
misapprehension of the legal world, and thus his consent is vitiated.”386 
Disallowing self-representation thus does not interfere with the individual’s right 
to self-determination, but instead prevents the SRL from making a choice he 
would not make himself if he were better informed.387 
 
3.4.2 The Role of Lawyers 
 
Views of self-representation bring the role of the lawyer into focus. Again there 
are opposing views, with some viewing lawyers as a necessary part of the 
process; access to justice inevitably requires access to lawyers and legal advice. 
However, another strand of thought rejects the idea that access to a lawyer is 
the only way to deliver access to the courts. 
 
Particularly for those who view lawyers as a necessity, perhaps the most 
fundamental conception of lawyers is as intermediaries between laypeople and 
the law or and courts. Lawyers have thus been described as “gatekeepers of 
justice through law, particularly through formal legal procedures such as 
litigation.”388 Not only do lawyers provide access to the justice system, they also 
have a role in identifying and framing the issues that result in court actions. In 
Felstiner et al’s “naming, blaming and claiming” model noted above, lawyers 
are the key agent in transforming PIEs into claims and disputes.389 Lawyers 
influence what cases do or do not come to the civil courts by either encouraging 
or discouraging potential litigants.390 Sandefur describes the lawyer using their 
“substantive expertise” to translate the individual’s lived circumstances into a 
case in law: the lawyer evaluates the individual’s experience and separates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  386	  Ibid	  at	  page	  255.	  387	  As	  noted	  above,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  this	  argument,	  like	  some	  of	  Assy’s,	  makes	  assumptions	  about	  SRLs	  that	  are	  either	  generalizations	  or	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  available	  empirical	  evidence.	  This	  can	  be	  said	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  difficulty	  of	  conceptualizing	  self-­‐representation	  and	  SRLs.	  388	  Sandefur	  2015	  at	  page	  909.	  389	  Felstiner	  et	  al	  1980	  at	  pages	  645—646.	  390	  Kritzer	  H,	  “Contingency	  Fee	  Lawyers	  as	  Gatekeepers	  in	  the	  Civil	  Justice	  System”	  (1997)	  81	  Judicature	  22	  1997-­‐1998,	  22.	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aspects that do not offer recourse in law (such as emotional elements like anger 
and hostility) from those that can be placed in legal terms (such as adultery).391 
 
Much of the role of the lawyer involves similar forms of translating legal 
principles and procedures into concepts that their client can understand and 
utilize. The lawyer provides advice and guidance to enable the litigant to make 
informed decisions392 and advises and explains the law and legal processes, and 
how they may be used.393 Sarat et al suggest that “Practicing lawyers thus play 
an important role in shaping mass legal consciousness and in promoting or 
undermining the sense of legitimacy that the public attaches to legal 
institutions.”394 Often the services that a lawyer provides are conceptualized as 
empowering his client. Engler suggests that the lawyer’s knowledge of the court 
procedures is one of many sources of power that offers represented litigants an 
advantage.395 Power imbalances can occur outside of the court process as well, 
such as during negotiation or settlement discussions, where the represented 
party is placed at an advantage. Opponent lawyers are thus cautioned to avoid 
intimidating or unduly influencing SRLs.396 At times the power imbalance may be 
more subtle; for example, it has also been suggested that access to a lawyer, or 
to a particularly well-known or well-regarded lawyer, may increase the 
appearance of legitimacy of the litigant, and thus perhaps increase their chance 
of success.397  
 
Another line of thought posits that lawyers are an unqualified necessity to 
provide a genuine right of access to the courts. This idea has perhaps been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  391	  Sandefur	  2015	  at	  page	  911.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  the	  lawyer	  offers	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  legal	  relevance	  and	  how	  it	  applies	  to	  the	  individual’s	  circumstances.	  392	  Mather	  L,“	  What	  Do	  Clients	  Want	  What	  Do	  Lawyers	  Do”	  (2003)	  Emory	  Law	  Journal	  52(Special	  Edition)	  1065.	  Mather	  explores	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  lawyers,	  or	  their	  clients,	  are	  in	  control	  of	  a	  case	  and	  finds	  that	  is	  often	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  lawyer	  and	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  case	  as	  well	  as	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  lawyer/client	  dynamic.	  393	  Sarat	  A	  and	  Felstiner	  W,	  “Lawyers	  and	  Legal	  Consciousness:	  Law	  Talk	  in	  the	  Divorce	  Lawyer's	  Office”	  (1989)	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  98(8)	  1663	  at	  page	  1663.	  394	  Ibid.	  395	  Engler	  2010	  at	  section	  B	  1.	  396	  See	  for	  example	  Engler	  2014	  at	  page	  562.	  397	  Hanretty	  C,	  “Haves	  and	  Have-­‐Nots	  before	  the	  Law	  Lords”	  (2014)	  Polit	  Stud,	  62:	  686.	  This	  is	  just	  one	  element	  of	  the	  application	  of	  Galanter’s	  oft-­‐repeated	  “have”	  and	  “have	  nots”	  model;	  see	  Galanter	  M,	  “Why	  the	  Haves	  Come	  Out	  Ahead:	  Speculations	  on	  the	  Limits	  of	  Legal	  Change”	  (1974)	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review,	  9	  (1),	  95. 
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examined most thoroughly in relation to the “civil Gideon” movement in the 
United States. The Gideon398 case concerned the constitutional right to a fair 
trial on a criminal charge, which was found to lead to a requirement that the 
accused has access to legal (and if necessary, state-funded) counsel. The civil 
Gideon movement posits that parties should also have a right to be legally 
represented in civil matters. The civil Gideon movement is based on two 
premises: first, that many of the rights exercised in civil courts399 are often as 
important to individuals as those adjudicated in the criminal courts; and second, 
that individuals are not able to receive a fair trial in civil matters without legal 
representation.400 A right to counsel is thus necessary to avoid injustice and 
inequality, particularly for the poor. Those who oppose the notion of the civil 
Gideon movement generally accept the first premise, but consider that a right 
to counsel is not the only, or best, way to achieve fair outcomes. Barton 
suggests that, in addition to the practical difficulties (such as cost and the 
potential for increased caseloads causing less effective representation) the civil 
Gideon movement is “inherently conservative and backwards-looking.”401 The 
civil Gideon movement assumes that lawyers are the only solution, rather than a 
reform of the court structures that could widen access for SRLs.402 Aviel argues 
against extending the right to counsel while maintaining adversarial court 
processes in family actions; what these cases need is a more collaborative 
approach for parties, not more lawyers.403  
 
There are others who also believe that lawyers are not the solution to access to 
justice, but rather that they are contributing to the problem. Goldschmidt 
argues against the idea that lawyers are a necessity, suggesting to the contrary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  398	  Gideon	  v	  Wainwright	  372	  US	  335	  (1963).	  399	  Engler	  suggests	  that	  a	  right	  to	  counsel	  should	  apply	  when	  “basic	  needs	  are	  at	  stake”	  (such	  as	  housing);	  Engler	  R,	  “The	  Twin	  Imperatives	  of	  Providing	  Access	  to	  Justice	  and	  Establishing	  a	  Civil	  Gideon”	  (20110	  93	  Mass	  L	  Rev	  214	  at	  page	  219.	  400	  See	  for	  example	  Gardner	  D,	  “Justice	  Delayed	  is,	  Once	  Again,	  Justice	  Denied:	  The	  Overdue	  Right	  to	  Counsel	  in	  Civil	  Cases”	  (2007)	  University	  of	  Baltimore	  Law	  Review	  37(1),	  59.	  401	  Barton	  B,	  “Against	  Civil	  Gideon	  (And	  for	  Pro	  Se	  Court	  Reform)”	  (2010)	  Florida	  Law	  Review	  62(5),	  1227	  at	  page	  1274.	  402	  Ibid.	  403	  Aviel	  R,	  “Why	  Civil	  Gideon	  Won’t	  Fix	  Family	  Law”	  (2013)	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  122.8	  (June)	  2106.	  Many	  of	  the	  arguments	  relating	  to	  the	  civil	  Gideon	  can,	  of	  course,	  also	  be	  related	  to	  the	  question	  of	  provision	  of	  civil	  legal	  aid.	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that the real problem is the “lawyerization” of the courts.404 Lawyers’ interests 
have made the court processes needlessly complex, even secretive. As a result 
litigants are not able to control their own cases. The solution Goldschmidt 
proposes is not strengthening the grip that lawyers have on the courts, but 
instead simplifying or “delegalizing” the process. “Delegalization,” Goldschmidt 
suggests, “consists of eliminating the secrecy regarding basic legal information, 
such as the elements of causes of action, and relaxing the rules of procedure 
and evidence. These do not effect changes in substantive law, only in the 
fairness of the proceedings for all litigants.”405  
 
A similar strand of thought examines the influence of lawyers’ professional and 
economic interests and their potential impact. The most glaring of these is the 
idea that lawyers view self-representation as a threat to their profession and 
livelihood.406 If self-representation becomes commonplace, there will be less 
work for legal professionals or the profession could even become obsolete. Some 
suggest that lawyers may therefore wish to keep SRLs out of the courts, and to 
keep the court processes too complex for laypeople to understand so as to 
discourage self-representation. 407 Zuckerman suggests that lawyers’ business 
interests influence court processes as whole. Because most lawyers are paid by 
the “billable hour” they have an interest in making litigation more prolonged 
and complex.408 For example, it is a challenge to keep pleadings clear, concise 
and brief—and while the courts may encourage brevity, lawyers have little 
incentive to meet the challenge.409 In a wider study of the relationship between 
fee structure and lawyer behaviour, Kritzer explores the possibility that lawyers’ 
fees and how they operate may have a larger impact. For example, he explores 
whether American lawyers being more “aggressive” than their English 
counterparts, leading in turn to American society becoming more litigious, can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  Goldschmidt	  J,	  	  “Meeting	  the	  Challenge:	  The	  Pro	  Se	  Litigant’s	  Struggle	  for	  Access	  to	  Justice”	  (2002)	  Family	  Court	  Review,	  vol	  40	  no.	  1,	  36	  at	  page	  53.	  405	  Ibid.	  406	  See	  for	  example	  Greacen	  J,	  	  “Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants,	  The	  Courts,	  and	  the	  Legal	  Profession:	  Myths	  and	  Realities”	  (2014)	  Family	  Court	  Review,	  52:	  662	  at	  pages	  663-­‐664.	  407	  See	  for	  example	  Goldschmidt	  2002	  at	  page	  53.	  408	  Zuckerman	  AA	  et	  al	  eds	  Reform	  of	  Civil	  Procedure:	  Essays	  on	  “Access	  to	  Justice”	  Chapter	  3,“Reform	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Lawyers’	  Interests”	  Clarendon	  Press:	  Oxford,	  1995	  at	  pages	  64-­‐67.	  409	  Ibid	  at	  page	  69.	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be attributed to American lawyers being permitted to charge percentage fees.410 
Ultimately, however, Kritzer concludes that the evidence does not support 
relating professional behaviour entirely to a particular business model.411  
3.5 SRLs: The Way Forward? 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
While most agree that the current state of affairs in respect of SRLs is in need of 
change, there is no consensus as to how this can best be accomplished. Most of 
the measures currently in place or proposed can be divided into two broad 
categories: firstly, advice, self-help and other forms of assistance short of full 
legally qualified representation for SRLs, and secondly, institutional changes to 
the courts to make it possible for SRLs to conduct their own cases more 
effectively. Because this thesis is concerned with SRLs who are already engaged 
in the civil court process, this section considers addressing the needs of these 
SRLs under the assumption that, for whatever reason, they are unwilling or 
unable to obtain full representation. Measures such as expanding access to legal 
aid or a “civil Gideon” have the potential to reduce the number of SRLs in the 
courts rather than to address existing SRLs, and thus are not considered here.412 
Some of the measures discussed below have already been implemented, or 
considered, in the Scottish courts. As noted above, styles of judging and judicial 
discretion are a key issue in relation to how the Scottish courts currently 
approach party litigants, and approaches to judging cases involving SRLs are 
considered in some detail below. A number of the other measures discussed 
below as implemented in Scotland, particularly lay representation, are discussed 
later in the thesis and attempts to understand the feasibility and potential 
effectiveness of these measures in Scotland informed the collection of a portion 
of the empirical data. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  Kritzer	  H,	  “Lawyer	  fees	  and	  Lawyer	  Behaviour	  in	  Litigation:	  What	  does	  the	  Empirical	  Literature	  Really	  Say?”	  (2001)	  80	  Tex.	  L.	  Rev.	  1943	  at	  page	  1982.	  411	  Ibid	  at	  page	  1983.	  412	  Much	  of	  the	  benefit	  of	  access	  to	  legal	  representation	  has	  been	  addressed	  above.	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3.5.2 Self Help, Information and Lay Assistance 
 
3.5.2.1 “In Court” Advice Services 
 
As they typically start with little or no knowledge of the law and court 
procedures, one of most pressing needs of SRLs is for information or advice. Self-
help information and advice may be available in a number of venues. In some 
jurisdictions, information may be provided in the court by dedicated court staff 
or volunteers.413 Due to the requirement for the court itself to remain neutral, 
the courts are restricted to providing information only. While this may be 
tailored to the SRL’s particular needs, it cannot amount to advice.414 As noted 
above, Graecen argues that the “legal/procedural” information model makes 
court staff hesitant to provide SRLs even with appropriate information—court 
staff could in fact be far more helpful.415 Graecen suggests that “paralegals and 
court staff are fully capable of providing sophisticated and adequate legal 
information services to self-represented litigants,” although “legal advice, of 
course, can only be given by lawyers.”416 However, as the line between advice 
and information is not always entirely clear even for lawyers, there is some 
question as to how well SRLs understand this distinction. Others have also called 
for court staff to be better trained to know what advice they can and should 
dispense to SRLs,417 although it is also noted that court staff are also subject to 
a workload and time constraints that make it difficult to find time to assist 
SRLs.418 Hough describes the efforts in California to assist SRLs in the family 
courts, which include, in additions to forms and self-help websites, court-based 
“self-help centres” staffed or supervised by lawyers where litigants can receive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  413	  See	  Graecen	  J,	  “Resources	  to	  Assist	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants:	  A	  Fifty	  State	  Review	  of	  the	  ‘State	  of	  the	  Art’”	  (2011).	  414	  Zorza	  R,	  “An	  Overview	  of	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigation	  Innovation,	  Its	  Impact,	  and	  an	  Approach	  for	  the	  Future:	  An	  Invitation	  to	  Dialogue”	  (2009)	  Family	  Law	  Quarterly	  Vol.	  43,	  No.	  3	  (Fall	  2009)	  519	  at	  page	  523.	  415	  Greacen	  1989.	  416	  Graecen	  J,	  “Self-­‐represented	  Litigants:	  Learning	  from	  Ten	  years	  Experience	  in	  the	  Family	  Courts”	  (2005)	  The	  Judge’s	  Journal	  28.	  417	  See	  for	  example	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton	  at	  page	  218.	  418	  Ibid.	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assistance with forms and ask questions.419 Assistance may be offered to SRLS 
through classes or workshops or one-on-one and may also be combined with the 
services of a qualified family law facilitator.420  
 
In-court advice and advice on court matters may also be available from advice 
agencies (such as Citizen’s Advice Bureaux in the UK). Advice providers may be 
solicitors, paid employees of the advice agency, or volunteers.421 The services 
that advice agencies are able to provide tends to vary, but can include anything 
from advice on the merits of a case to guidance on the court process to written 
information.422 Research in Scotland has shown that litigants were “almost 
universally positive” about in-court advice services and advisors, 423 but advice 
services were also perceived as being “very busy and the advisors stretched to 
capacity.”424 Research in England paints a similar picture; many reported that 
they were unable to access advice agencies, 425 with many therefore left to solve 
their legal problem on their own.426  In-court advice and advice agencies are also 
limited to an extent in the type of services they are able to provide, particularly 
as many advice providers are not legally qualified. SRLs with cases outwith the 
simpler and most common forms of procedure may not be able to get 
assistance.427 
 
3.5.2.2 Self-Help, Guidance and Information 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  419	  Hough	  B,	  "Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants	  in	  Family	  Law:	  the	  Response	  of	  California’s	  Courts"	  (2010)	  The	  Circuit	  Paper	  52	  at	  pages	  19-­‐21;	  other	  programs	  in	  California	  include	  “JusticeCorps,”	  which	  recruits	  university	  students	  to	  assist	  court	  staff	  in	  self-­‐held	  centres	  (pages	  21-­‐22.)	  420	  Ibid.	  421	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Literature	  Review	  at	  page	  38.	  422	  Civil	  Justice	  Council	  2011	  at	  page	  49.	  423	  Ipsos	  2009	  at	  page	  21.	  424	  Ibid	  at	  page	  22.	  	  425	  Pleasance	  P,	  Causes	  of	  Action:	  Civil	  Law	  and	  Social	  Justice	  (TSO	  2006)	  at	  page	  98.	  426	  Ibid	  at	  page	  102.	  2/3	  of	  those	  who	  could	  not	  access	  advice	  agencies	  went	  on	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  legal	  issue	  on	  their	  own.	  427	  Morris	  S	  et	  al,	  “Uniquely	  Placed:	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  In	  Court	  Advice	  Pilots”	  (2005)	  http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2006/01/24132154/1	  found	  that	  2/3	  of	  advisees	  were	  involved	  in	  summary	  procedure,	  with	  1/5	  in	  small	  claims.	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Guidance and information may also be available for SRLs to access directly, 
often online.428 Forms and other documents may also be available online or on 
paper to assist SRLs.429 In Scotland, official guidance and forms are available 
from the courts for lower-value procedures only.430 There is no guidance 
available for all other forms of procedure, and it appears that what is available 
is insufficient. In one Scottish study, respondents indicated that they would have 
liked more information on their options in the process and what to expect. Many 
said that guidance on the practicalities of the process of appearing in court 
would have avoided unnecessary apprehension.431 The Report of the SCCR 
recognised the need for information for party litigants, and for more information 
than currently available, but focuses on those involved in lower-value claims.432 
There is little in the Report to address the lack of guidance for litigants involved 
in other types of cases, such as ordinary and family actions. Courts in other 
jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, offer sophisticated forms of self-
help on their websites, such as guidance, tips for SRLs, FAQs, and even 
instructive video content.433  Self-help information for SRLs may also be found 
from other sources, both on- and off-line, but the quality of the information, 
and the ability of the SRL to find what he needs, can be inconsistent.434  The 
format of information may also be difficult for laypeople to follow and digest. 
The Civil Justice Council notes that some of the information available can be 
hard to follow with “long text based sections of advice.” They suggest that 
instead “videos, magazine type visual formats, templates, checklists and 
interactive tools”435 should be available as more layperson-friendly forms of 
assistance. 
 
While more and better information for SRLs is widely acknowledged as a 
necessity, it is worth noting that it has limitations, particularly for litigants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  428	  Macfarlane’s	  2013	  study	  found	  that	  most	  information	  from	  the	  courts	  was	  conveyed	  online;	  see	  page	  114.	  429	  Zorza	  2009	  at	  527.	  430	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Literature	  Review	  at	  page	  27.	  431	  Ipsos	  2009	  at	  page	  19—20.	  432	  SCCR	  at	  page	  14.	  433	  Flaherty	  M,	  “How	  Courts	  Help	  you	  Help	  Yourself:	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  Pro	  Se	  Divorce	  Litigant”	  (2002)	  Family	  Court	  Review	  Vol	  40,	  91	  at	  page	  93.	  434	  Civil	  Justice	  Council	  at	  page	  58.	  435	  Ibid.	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involved in more complex matters and procedures.436  Moorhead and Pleasance, 
quoting Mather’s often-repeated view on self-help, observe that “In the legal aid 
context, self-help cannot therefore be regarded as a universal panacea. As 
Mather concludes, for some people and some problems, self-help suggests 
‘abandonment, not empowerment’.”437 Landsman echoes this notion, suggesting 
that courts have placed an emphasis on providing information in the hope that 
SRLs will help themselves rather than addressing the real and pressing need for 
more systemic change.438 At present most agree that forms of self-help do not 
eliminate the need for lawyers entirely, except in the simplest and most routine 
matters.439  
 
Others, of course, have a more positive view of the potential for self-help, 
particularly with the continued growth in the capability of technology. Susskind 
argues that, in future, technology and access to information will reduce the 
need for lawyers and alter how legal services are delivered.440  In England and 
Wales, this is seen most notably the Briggs Report’s441 proposals for online courts 
for matters up to £25,000. While online courts have been developed in other 
jurisdictions, such as Canada and the Netherlands, the online courts envisioned 
by Briggs represent “the first court ever to be designed in this country, from 
start to finish, for use by litigants without lawyers.”442 The report suggests that 
the system will allow litigants to answer a series of questions that will provide 
the court with the essential details of their case and their evidence from the 
outset, as well as providing the litigant with simple advice. The next stage of 
the process would attempt conciliation, and if this fails there are a number of 
options for determining the case, including a decision on the papers, by 
telephone or a traditional hearing.443 Although the online courts represent an 
unprecedented effort to make the civil process in England and Wales accessible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  436	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  SCCR	  at	  page	  15.	  437	  Moorhead	  and	  Pleasance	  at	  page	  8.	  438	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  page	  447.	  439	  See	  for	  example	  Kritzer	  H,	  “The	  Professions	  are	  Dead,	  Long	  Live	  the	  Professions”	  (1999)	  33	  Law	  &	  Soc'y	  Rev.	  713.	  440	  Susskind	  R,	  The	  End	  of	  Lawyers?	  Rethinking	  the	  Nature	  of	  Legal	  Services	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008).	  441	  Lord	  Justice	  Briggs,	  Civil	  Court	  Structure	  Review:	  Interim	  Report	  (2015)	  and	  Final	  Report	  (2016)	  Judiciary	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  442	  Ibid,	  Interim	  Report	  at	  para	  6.5.	  443	  Ibid;	  the	  judge	  will	  also	  adopt	  a	  more	  investigative	  approach.	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to SRLs, some have met these proposals with scepticism.444 One broad concern 
relates to the feasibility of the proposals, both in terms of the technology and 
the actual usability of the end product for SRLs.445Assy offers an interesting take 
on another issue raised around the online courts, the idea that they offer 
“second-class” justice as compared to traditional courts. Assy suggests that, at 
present, “first-class justice”—and what Assy describes as “the sanctification of 
correct judgments”446—are in practice available only to the wealthy at present. 
The value in the Briggs reform thus lies in offering a compromise between the 
correctness of a judgment and a quicker and less expensive process: “when the 
choice is between inaccessible first-class justice and accessible second-class 
justice,”447 the latter is preferable.  
 
 
3.5.2.3 “Unbundled” Services 
 
SRLs who cannot afford full representation may wish to opt for “unbundled” 
assistance instead. “Unbundling”448 refers to the practice of an individual 
receiving services from a lawyer short of full representation: the client may use 
any part of the lawyer’s services in virtually any combination, including 
researching the law, advice, drafting pleadings and court paperwork, and 
representation at court hearings.449 Although the lawyer thus assists the client to 
some extent, they are never the lawyer of record in the case.450 Proponents of 
unbundling argue that it allows lawyers to provide access to legal services to 
those who are unable to afford full representation.451 Some, however, also note 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  444	  See	  the	  Final	  Report,	  pages	  36—64.	  445	  See,	  for	  example,	  Ibid	  and	  McCloud	  V,	  “The	  online	  court:	  suing	  in	  cyberspace-­‐how	  the	  court	  challenges	  us	  to	  raise	  our	  legal	  and	  technological	  game	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  access	  to	  justice”	  (2017)	  CJQ	  36(1)	  34.	  446	  Assy	  R,	  “Briggs’	  online	  court	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  paradigm	  shift”	  (2017)	  CJQ	  36(1)	  70	  at	  page	  70.	  447	  Ibid	  at	  page	  85-­‐86.	  448	  The	  term	  “unbundling”	  is	  used	  here,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  “discrete	  task	  representation”.	  449	  Mosten	  F,	  “Coaching	  the	  Pro	  Se	  Litigant:	  Unbundling	  Services	  of	  the	  Family	  Lawyer”	  (1995)	  The	  Compleat	  Lawyer	  Vol.	  12,	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1995)	  1	  at	  page	  8;	  Mosten	  is	  usually	  credited	  with	  devising	  the	  term	  “unbundling”.	  450	  Ibid.	  451	  Mosten	  F,	  “Unbundling	  Legal	  Services	  in	  2014;	  Recommendations	  for	  the	  Courts”	  (2014)	  Judges'	  Journal	  53(1),	  10.	  In	  turn,	  unbundling	  also	  creates	  a	  new	  avenue	  of	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that unbundling raises ethical issues in the relationship between lawyer and 
client.452 One key point is the issue of whether a “lawyer-client” relationship is 
created when unbundled services are used; this can be difficult to determine.453 
It has been suggested that, unlike “full service” representation, where the 
expectations are clear, the nature of the service the client is contracting for 
have to be set out very clearly.454 The lawyer should also consider whether the 
case, and client, is suited to an unbundled approach.455  
 
One form of unbundling is sometimes referred to as “ghostwriting.” Here the 
client employs a lawyer to draft pleadings or other court documents, but the 
client represents himself in court and otherwise appears to be a SRL.456 
Ghostwriting is sometimes said to raise the additional concern of unfairness. This 
is primarily based on the idea that, because the litigant appears to be 
unrepresented, he is accorded leniency from the courts (including a more liberal 
construction of his pleadings) to compensate for the lack of counsel, when in 
fact he has had the advantage of legal assistance.457 Rotherham argues that, 
because of the danger that the litigant will receive undue leniency, the 
ghostwriting of pleadings should be disclosed to the court.458 Goldschmidt, 
however, suggests that the concerns about ghostwriting have not materialised 
into any real evidence of detriment to litigants and their opponents.459 
Furthermore, imposing a requirement that the litigant discloses any assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  potential	  business	  for	  lawyers;	  Hudson	  Jr	  D,	  "A	  Boost	  for	  Unbundling:	  Lawyers	  Offering	  Unbundled	  Legal	  Services	  Must	  Consider	  the	  Ethics	  Issues."(2013)	  ABA	  Journal	  22.	  452	  See	  for	  example	  Hornsby	  W,	  “Unbundling	  and	  the	  Lawyer’s	  Duty	  of	  Care”	  (2012)	  Family	  Advocate,	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  2,	  26.	  453	  Engler	  2014	  at	  page	  559.	  454	  See	  for	  example	  Kimbro	  S,	  “The	  ethics	  of	  unbundling”	  (2010)	  Family	  Advocate	  Vol.	  33,	  No.	  2,	  27.	  455	  Ibid.	  456	  See	  for	  example	  Engler	  2014	  at	  page	  559.	  457	  Fisher-­‐Brandveen	  F	  and	  Klempner	  R,	  ”Unbundled	  Legal	  Services:	  Untying	  the	  Bundle	  in	  New	  York	  State”	  (2002)	  Fordham	  Urban	  Law	  Journal	  29.3	  (Feb)	  1107.	  458	  Rothermich	  J,	  	  “Ethical	  and	  Procedural	  Implications	  of	  Ghostwriting	  for	  Pro	  Se	  Litigants:	  Toward	  Increased	  Access	  to	  Civil	  Justice”	  (1999)	  Fordham	  Law	  Review	  67,	  2687	  at	  page	  2711—2712.	  459	  Goldschmidt,	  J,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  Ghostwriting	  Decisions:	  Still	  Searching	  for	  the	  Elusive	  Harm”	  (2011)	  Judicature	  95(2)	  78;	  see	  also	  Mincieli	  T,	  “Let	  Ghosts	  Be	  Ghosts”	  (2014)	  St.	  John's	  Law	  Review	  88(3)	  763.	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they receive would, Goldschmidt argues, violate the litigant’s right to 
confidentiality.460 
 
3.5.2.4 Lay Representation 
 
Lay representation, or representation of an SRL by another individual who is not 
legally qualified, is perhaps one of the more controversial forms of assistance for 
SRLs. As with SRLs generally, lay representatives (often called “McKenzie 
Friends” in the United Kingdom) are a diverse group and lay representation may 
take a number of forms. The Legal Services Consumer Panel (LSCP) offers a 
typology of lay representatives: they may be “the family member or friend who 
gives one-off assistance; volunteer McKenzie Friends attached to an 
institution/charity; fee-charging McKenzie Friends offering the conventional 
limited service understood by this role; or fee-charging McKenzie Friends 
offering a wider range of services including general legal advice and speaking on 
behalf of clients in court.”461 As this description suggests, the skill levels and 
legal knowledge of lay representatives are variable and a number of concerns 
have been raised about how effectively they are able to act for SRLs, or for their 
potential to be disruptive to the proceedings.462 The LSCP notes a number of 
other “risks” of lay representation, including agenda-driven McKenzie friends, 
poor quality advice, overcharging of fees, and breach of the client’s privacy.463 
However, the LSCP ultimately concludes that lay representatives can widen 
access to justice and provide litigants with more choice in accessing legal 
services, and the courts should thus be more permissive of lay 
representatives.464  A survey of lay representatives in Scotland took a similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  460	  Goldschmidt	  J,	  “In	  Defence	  of	  Ghostwriting”	  (2002)	  Fordham	  Urban	  Law	  Journal	  29.3,	  1145.	  461	  Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  “Fee-­‐Charging	  McKenzie	  Friends”	  April	  2014	  http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_reports/documents/2014%2004%2017%20MKF_Final.pdf	  at	  1.4;	  see	  also	  3.19.	  (“LSCP”).	  462	  Judicial	  Working	  Group	  at	  6.8.	  463	  LSCP	  at	  11.1.	  464	  Ibid	  at	  Part	  4.	  The	  LSCP	  considers	  the	  first	  three	  categories	  of	  lay	  representatives	  listed	  here	  to	  be	  low	  risk	  or	  relatively	  low	  risk,	  while	  full-­‐service	  fee	  charging	  lay	  representatives	  are	  the	  highest	  risk.	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view, that courts should offer more access to lay representatives as well as 
training judges on the role of the lay representative.465 
 
Trinder et al argue that the positive view taken by the LSCP study can be 
attributed to its methodology, as the LSCP primarily gathered the views of fee-
charging lay representatives who naturally wished to promote their position.466 
Trinder et al instead express the concern that “problematic behaviour” by lay 
representatives typically occurs out of sight of the court. The court therefore 
cannot monitor the position and protect the litigant.467 Trinder notes that while 
in their study one case was observed in which a litigant had a justifiably positive 
view of the lay assistance they received, in two other cases the litigants had a 
positive view of a lay representative who appeared to have damaged their 
case.468 At minimum, Trinder suggests, some form of regulatory framework for 
lay representatives is needed.469 Smith et al’s study of fee-charging McKenzie 
friends found that, while there is often a focus on McKenzie friends in the 
courtroom setting, most of their work is in fact done out of court, in the form of 
assistance with paperwork and providing legal advice.470 While there were some 
problems caused by McKenzie friends, others made a positive contribution and 
Smith et al concluded that “the case for excluding fee-charging McKenzie friends 
from the courts has not yet been made out.”471 However, like Trinder, Smith et 
al suggest that there should be better consumer protections for the clients of 
McKenzie friends and identify a “regulatory gap” particularly in relation to the 
ability of McKenzie friends to provide legal advice, but not conduct litigation.472  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  465	  Citizen’s	  Advice	  Scotland	  and	  Shelter,	  “Lay	  Representation	  in	  Scotland’s	  Civil	  Courts”	  June	  2015	  https://www.cas.org.uk/publications/lay-­‐representation-­‐scotlands-­‐civil-­‐courts.	  466	  Trinder	  at	  el	  at	  page	  111;	  the	  same	  can	  of	  course	  be	  said	  of	  the	  above	  noted	  report	  in	  Scotland.	  467	  Trinder	  et	  at	  at	  page	  112.	  468	  Ibid.	  469	  Ibid.	  470	  Smith	  L	  at	  et,	  “A	  study	  of	  fee-­‐charging	  McKenzie	  Friends	  and	  their	  work	  in	  private	  family	  law	  cases”(2017)	  The	  Bar	  Council	  https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/573023/a_study_of_fee-­‐charging_mckenzie_friends.pdf	  471	  Ibid	  at	  page	  85;	  however,	  it	  is	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  data	  in	  this	  study	  may	  have	  tended	  to	  skew	  towards	  a	  positive	  view	  of	  McKenzie	  friends	  and	  more	  research	  is	  needed.	  472	  Ibid	  at	  pages	  86-­‐87;	  the	  conduct	  of	  litigation	  is	  a	  reserved	  activity	  while	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  advice	  is	  not.	  For	  the	  position	  in	  Scotland,	  see	  section	  4.4.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   110	  
 
Zuckerman suggests a different solution: consideration should be given to 
developing an “intermediate profession of litigation assistants who could provide 
more meaningful assistance than at present at affordable rates.”473 Reform 
relating to the provision of lay representation, he suggests, has been slow and 
ineffective, due in part to a hesitation on the part of the legal profession to give 
up a monopoly on the services they provide.474 Zuckerman also notes that lay 
representatives are generally acknowledged to be beneficial in tribunals and 
suggests that this should be examined to determine how litigants in courts may 
also be assisted.475 In the United Kingdom, there are no restrictions on access to 
lay representation in tribunals and lay representation is thus more common.476 
Supporting Zuckerman’s view that further research may hold promise, as noted 
above, Genn and Genn found that in certain types of tribunal cases, specialist 
lay representatives could be as effective as lawyers,477 although Alder’s later 
research found that pre-hearing advice had a greater effect than 
representation.478 
 
3.5.3 Institutional Change 
 
3.5.3.1 Simplification of Procedures and Plain Language 
 
Rules of civil procedure are necessary to provide structure to the process and 
provide a framework to resolve legal disputes.479 However, civil procedure is 
often complex and intricate480 and, because it is learned primarily through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  473	  Zuckerman	  A,	  “The	  Court’s	  Approach	  to	  McKenzie	  Friends—No	  Improvement	  in	  Assistance	  to	  Unrepresented	  Litigants”	  (2016)	  CJQ	  35	  (4)	  268	  at	  278.	  474	  Ibid.	  Moorhead	  makes	  a	  similar	  suggestion	  and	  argues	  that	  courts	  have	  been	  too	  hasty	  to	  refuse	  lay	  representation,	  but	  this	  observation	  was	  made	  pre-­‐LAPSO	  and	  the	  position	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  changed	  since	  then;	  Moorhead	  R,	  “Access	  or	  Aggravation?	  Litigants	  in	  Person,	  McKenzie	  Friends	  and	  Lay	  Representation”	  (2003)	  CJQ	  22(Mar)	  133.	  475	  Ibid	  at	  page	  277.	  476	  See	  for	  example	  the	  Judicial	  Working	  Group	  at	  6.10.	  477	  Genn	  and	  Genn	  1989.	  478	  Discussed	  in	  Section	  3.3.7.	  479	  See,	  for	  example,	  Hennessy	  C,	  Civil	  Practice	  and	  Procedure	  at	  1-­‐02	  and	  1-­‐03.	  480	  Ibid.	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experience and repetition, it is virtually inaccessible to the layperson.481 This is 
particularly problematic in light of Genn’s finding that procedural barriers lead 
individuals to feel a sense that their rights are unenforceable.482 Many thus 
argue that procedural reform is a key element in providing SRLs with meaningful 
access to the courts.483 Moorhead and Pleasance argue that procedural rules 
should be included in our conception of access to justice, and that rules should 
be simplified rather than becoming increasingly obscure. Adaption of the rules 
should provide access rather than “seek[ing] to perfect, through increasing 
complexity, notions of procedural and substantive ‘justice’” to improve access 
to the courts.484 Zorza suggests a number of principles to guide reform of court 
procedures: information should be collected from litigants only when needed 
and at a convenient and early stage; procedural steps should not be required 
unless truly necessary and a triage system should be used to determine which 
steps are needed; parties should be required to attend court only when 
absolutely necessary; and courts should play a larger role in the enforcement of 
their decisions.485 
 
However, others suggest that simplification of court procedure is not necessarily 
a straightforward process. Rules of court must still be capable of providing order 
to the process and promoting underlying principles such as fair notice—a task 
often not compatible with the simplicity SRLs would prefer. As noted above, 
even in tribunals, where procedures are designed to be as straightforward and 
informal as possible, SRLs still often feel overwhelmed by the legalistic nature of 
the process.486 In addition, Zorza argues that a number of existing forces, 
including lawyers and special interests, create an environment in which 
procedures are driven into increasing complexity.487 The idea that rules tend to 
“creep” into more complicated forms also appears elsewhere in the literature. 
Crompton argues in favour of more informal and user-friendly court processes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  481	  Leith	  P,	  “Re-­‐engineering	  Sources	  of	  Law	  for	  Unaided	  Litigants”	  (2010)	  European	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Technology	  Vol	  1	  at	  3.3.	  482	  Genn	  Paths	  to	  Justice	  Scotland	  at	  page	  264.	  483	  See,	  for	  example,	  Engler	  1999	  at	  page	  2069.	  484	  	  Moorhead	  R	  and	  Pleasance	  P,	  “Access	  to	  Justice	  after	  Universalism:	  an	  Introduction”	  (2003)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  Vol	  30	  No	  1,	  1	  at	  page	  9.	  485	  Zorza	  R,	  “Some	  First	  Thoughts	  on	  Court	  Simplification:	  the	  Key	  to	  Civil	  Access	  to	  justice	  Transformation”	  (2012)	  61	  Drake	  L.	  Rev.	  845.	  486	  Section	  3.3.6.1.	  487	  Zorza,	  Ibid.	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but notes that even the small claims procedure that was designed with SRLs in 
mind does not operate as informally as was intended. 488 This may be due in part 
to the fact that lawyers still appear in lower-value and small claims court, and in 
behaving like lawyers they drive up the complexity of the proceedings. It has 
also been suggested that the small claims courts, although ostensibly intended 
for the self-representing individual, have instead been “hijacked” by business 
interests, although Lewis’s study of the “hijack thesis” found that while business 
interests dominated the court, SRLs did not often face represented opponents.489  
Swank argues against excessive adjustment for SRLs entirely, suggesting that 
while rules should be in clear language and information should be provided to 
SRLs, efforts to accommodate SRLs are a “slippery slope.” The existing rules 
serve a purpose and must be applied equally to all litigants.490 
 
Calls for reform typically include encouraging the use of plain language in court 
proceedings and paperwork and avoiding legal terminology and jargon.491 
However, Assy argues that the ability of plain language to provide individuals 
with direct access to the law has been exaggerated. While plain language can 
increase the ability of represented parties to engage in the process along with 
their lawyers, and make the law more intelligible for professionals, proponents 
of plain language focus too narrowly on language and style, rather than the 
underlying complexity of the law and legal concepts.492 Many of the technical 
terms used in law require legal knowledge to comprehend, not just simpler 
language.493  
 
3.5.3.2 Adversarial, Inquisitorial, Interventionist: Judging SRLs 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  488	  Crompton	  G,	  “Making	  civil	  justice	  work	  for	  consumers:	  The	  consumer	  perspective	  on	  making	  the	  civil	  justice	  system	  in	  Scotland	  fit	  for	  the	  21st	  century”	  (2010)	  at	  page	  24.	  489	  Lewis	  P,	  “The	  Consumer’s	  Court?	  Revisiting	  the	  Theory	  of	  the	  Small	  Claims	  Procedure”	  (2006)	  CJQ	  25	  (Jan)	  52.	  490	  Swank	  D,	  “In	  Defence	  of	  Rules	  and	  Roles:	  the	  Need	  to	  Curb	  Extreme	  Forms	  of	  Pro	  
Se	  Assistance	  and	  Accommodation	  in	  Litigation”	  (2004)	  54	  Am.	  U.	  L.	  Rev.	  1537.	  491	  See,	  for	  example	  Macfarlane	  2013	  at	  page	  113.	  492	  Assy	  R,	  “Can	  the	  Law	  Speak	  Directly	  to	  its	  Subjects?	  The	  Limitation	  of	  Plain	  Language”	  (2011)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  Vol	  38	  No	  3,	  376.	  493	  Such	  as	  “piercing	  the	  corporate	  veil”	  and	  “due	  care”;	  ibid	  at	  page	  400.	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The adversarial nature of most processes within common law legal systems is 
often blamed for many of the difficulties that SRLs face.494 Because an 
adversarial process is led by the parties, there is an inherent imbalance of power 
when a party is not represented and lacks legal knowledge. Accordingly, Cerruti 
suggests that “an adversarial proceeding cannot proceed as such when the 
adversaries are not capable of behaving as such.” 495 Judicial intervention or 
assistance to SRLs has the potential to balance the scales to some extent. 
However, there is an inherent conflict between the need to provide fairness to 
SRLs and the need to avoid the appearance of bias in an adversarial system, 
wherein the judge is meant not to intervene but instead to remain neutral or 
passive.496 If the judge does not assist, the SRL is disadvantaged; if the judge 
does assist the SRL, this can be perceived as unfair to a represented 
opponent.497 The presence of SRLs in the courts is thus often conceptualised as a 
threat to judicial impartiality or neutrality.498 However, Zorza argues that the 
notion that SRLs threaten judicial neutrality is ill-founded and based on a false 
equivalence. Neutrality has become linked with passivity, when in fact a judge 
can be both engaged in the process and truly neutral.499  
 
Moorhead takes a similar approach, arguing that “the traditional role of judges 
as passive arbiters is no longer accepted as the dominant paradigm.”500 Judges 
should instead adopt an “interventionist” approach, relaxing rules of relevance 
and procedure and hearing the dispute in the parties’ own terms.501 An 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  494	  See,	  for	  example,	  Landsman	  2009	  at	  page	  447;	  Dewar	  2000.	  495	  Cerruti,	  supra	  note	  370	  at	  part	  III.B.	  496	  Snukals	  B	  and	  Sturtevant	  G,	  “Pro	  Se	  Litigation:	  Best	  Practices	  from	  a	  Judge’s	  Perspective”(2007)	  42	  U	  Rich	  L	  Rev	  93.	  497However,	  one	  study	  found	  that	  lawyers	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  perceive	  that	  a	  judge	  was	  being	  unfair	  towards	  an	  SRL	  when	  he	  did	  not	  assist	  him,	  rather	  than	  being	  unfair	  to	  his	  opponent	  when	  he	  did:	  see	  Goldschmidt	  J	  and	  Stalans	  L,	  “Lawyers’	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  Fairness	  of	  Judicial	  Assistance	  to	  Self-­‐represented	  Litigants”	  (2012)	  30	  Windsor	  YB	  Access	  Just	  139.	  498	  See,	  for	  example,	  Goldschmidt	  J,	  “Judicial	  ethics	  and	  assistance	  to	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants”	  (2007)	  28	  Just	  Sys	  J	  324.	  499	  Zorza	  R,	  “The	  Disconnect	  between	  the	  Requirements	  of	  Judicial	  Neutrality	  and	  Those	  of	  the	  Appearance	  of	  Neutrality	  When	  Parties	  Appear	  Pro	  Se:	  Causes,	  Solutions,	  Recommendations,	  and	  Implications”	  (2004)	  Georgetown	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Ethics	  17(3)	  423.	  500	  Moorhead	  R,	  “The	  Passive	  Arbiter:	  Litigants	  in	  Person	  and	  the	  Challenge	  to	  Judicial	  Neutrality”	  (2007)	  Social	  &	  Legal	  Studies	  16:	  405	  at	  page	  422.	  501	  Ibid.	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interventionist approach is often called for in small claims and other low-value 
claims courts.502 While the adversarial or inquisitorial nature of the proceedings 
is always a matter of degree, the interventionist judge occupies his own place 
on the spectrum that cannot be classified as either entirely adversarial or 
inquisitorial. While the process itself remains adversarial, the interventionist 
judge takes on the role of a “manager” of the process rather than acting as an 
“umpire”503 as he would in an adversarial process.  The judge may thus inform 
parties of court protocol and rules or advise them on what is required to make 
their case, explain the structure of the proceedings, and ask questions of the 
litigant or witnesses.504 Baldwin suggests that an interventionist approach is 
often adopted (and required) in small claims court, but found that judges more 
accustomed to adversarial settings found this difficult and often did not play the 
role consistently.505 In addition, Williams notes that there is little evidence that 
an interventionist approach is more effective than the traditional adversarial 
approach.506 
 
Another strand of thought advocates for a more inquisitorial approach to cases 
involving SRLs. Inquisitorial systems are often thought to promote the ability of 
SRLs to achieve more just outcomes. Trinder et al recommend that judges 
should take a fully inquisitorial role in cases where both parties are 
unrepresented.507 The Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person suggest 
adaptation of the system for SRLs, proposing that court rules could include 
provisions allowing the judge to conduct more inquisitorial proceedings when at 
least one party is an SRL.508 Zuckerman takes a firm stance against the latter 
proposal, arguing that the adversarial approach is essential: “An adversarial 
process is central to any enlightened system of justice because it is the only 
procedure capable of providing a rational, objective and even-handed dispute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  502	  Baldwin	  J,	  “Small	  Claims	  hearings:	  the	  ‘Interventionist’	  Role	  Played	  by	  District	  Judges”	  (1998)	  CJQ	  17	  (Jan)	  20.	  503	  Johnston	  E,	  “All	  Rise	  for	  the	  Interventionist”	  (2016)	  The	  Journal	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  Vol	  80,	  Issue	  3,	  201.	  504	  Albrecht	  R	  et	  al,	  “Judicial	  Techniques	  for	  Cases	  Involving	  Self-­‐Represented	  Litigants”(2003)	  42	  Judges	  J	  16.	  505	  Baldwin,	  supra	  note	  502.	  506	  Williams	  2011	  at	  page	  7.	  507	  Trinder	  et	  al	  at	  page	  121.	  508Judicial	  Working	  Group	  at	  5.11.	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resolution process.”509 Furthermore, Zuckerman argues, a truly inquisitorial 
system is a myth. While a number of European systems are more inquisitorial 
than the British systems, representation is also required in all but the lowest 
value cases and the courts have no more power to investigate matters.510 The 
only real solution for SRLs, Zuckerman concludes, is not change to the system, 
but for them to receive competent legal advice-—thus returning us again to the 
“more lawyers” solution to the issue of SRLs in the courts. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Looking at the body of the literature as a whole, there are a handful of gaps and 
unanswered questions to be considered. In the context of this thesis, the most 
glaring gap is of course the lack of literature and research in Scotland. To some 
extent, this research is intended to examine many of the same issues already 
explored in other jurisdictions in the Scottish context. More than that, the thesis 
is also intended to address some of the disparity between the legal aspects of 
self-representation and the operation of self-representation in practice. With 
the exception of Assy’s work,511 which looks at self-representation in more broad 
conceptual terms, there has been little research mapping out the legal basis and 
operation in law of self-representation in the civil courts. This work begins from 
the starting point of establishing the “why” and “how” of self-representation in 
law in Scotland, and then turns to the types of questions that research in other 
jurisdictions has already started to address, as discussed throughout this 
chapter.  
 
Another feature of the literature in this area worth noting is that the empirical 
data often comes from a particular point of view. As will be explored 
throughout, there are a variety of “pro” and “anti” SRL perspectives that inform 
the discourse on self-representation. The Macfarlane and Knowlton et al studies, 
for example, can be said to address the issue of self-representation primarily 
from the SRL’s point of view. The research carried out by Moorhead and Sefton 
and Trinder et al takes a neutral or balanced approach, commenting both on the 
experience of the SRL and how their self-representation affects the other parties 	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  Zuckerman	  2014	  at	  372.	  510	  Ibid	  at	  page	  360—361.	  511	  Section	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involved. The commentary on SRLs often has a similar orientation, being either 
sympathetic to SRLs and encouraging of measures to assist of them, or wary of 
self-representation and the impact it can have on other parties and the courts. 
This thesis seeks, insofar as is possible, to view SRLs from a balanced standpoint 
such as Moorhead and Sefton’s. Much of the empirical work—particularly, for 
example, Trinder et al, as a study carried out in the wake of the LASPO 
changes—considers self-representation in light of the availability (or lack 
thereof) of legal aid. In other words, the data is gathered in large part to look at 
the impact that withdrawal of legal aid or inability to access a lawyer has on the 
SRL. This is less of an issue in Scotland, where access to legal aid is still 
relatively robust and has not been subject to the sort of dramatic cuts seen 
south of the border. This thesis is therefore less concerned with questions that 
are central to Trinder et al and other studies—what is the impact of the 
withdrawal of legal aid? Is there is a need or a right to more free/affordable 
legal representation? Instead this research begins from a point that takes for 
granted that party litigants are and will continue to be in the civil courts, either 
by choice, in low-value procedures, or because they are otherwise unable to use 
a lawyer. The intention is to look in more detail at the processes and procedures 
that regulate party litigants and at the operation of these in practice, 
particularly relating to the important matter of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in relation to these matters.  
 
The existing empirical research has focused to a larger extent on the emotional 
element of self-representation for SRLs—and how this impacts the legal 
professionals around them, such as the issue of aggression discussed above. 
Studies such as Knowlton and Macfarlane in particular look very closely at how 
SRLs about the experience of self-representation and it can be taken as well 
established that this is often negative. However, while this is important in itself, 
it does not necessarily address the question of how well SRLs are in fact able to 
access the courts, and what (short of providing more lawyers) can be done to 
improve their access. This work seeks to address this by looking more closely 
than the existing work at the details of the court processes and how these 
impact SRLs. The focus of this work is thus on how judges perceive party 
litigants, and how this and other factors influence the decisions made about 
them and, ultimately, how their cases progress. Ultimately, it is hoped that this 
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can both provide a clearer picture both of how the law currently operates, and 
how it can be improved in future. 
 
The existing literature relating to the difficult topic of SRLs is also rife with 
unanswered questions, and in fact often raises as many questions as it answers. 
Some information about who SRLs are and why they self-represent is available, 
but the picture is painted only in broad strokes. This is inevitable due to the 
diversity of SRLs and their cases, but more precision is needed to properly 
address the underlying issues. For example, as noted above, ideas about the 
extent of the court’s obligation to cater to SRLs often hinge on the matter of 
whether SRLs have no choice other than to self represent. However, it is not yet 
known with any real accuracy how often SRLs are forced into self-representing 
or choose to self-represent. (Whether this should truly matter, of course, is yet 
another question.) In terms of the operation of self-representation in practice, it 
is worth summarising the points consistent enough to be relied upon. There is a 
clear consensus SRLs are very often disadvantaged in the civil courts as 
compared to represented litigants and that many of the elements of the court 
process are difficult or even impossible for them to navigate effectively. While 
more research is needed on the effect of self-representation on outcome, the 
bulk of the available data also suggests that SRLs are less likely to be successful 
in their cases. Despite a number of on-going efforts to make courts and tribunals 
easier for SRLs to use (and to minimise the disruption that the presence of SRLs 
in the courts can cause) there appears to be universal agreement that problems 
still remain and there is a great deal of work yet to be done. 
 
What is far less clear is how to proceed with addressing these issues, particularly 
given that there is little agreement even as to the nature of the problem itself—
are SRLs vulnerable individuals who should be helped to make their own cases, 
or misguided souls who should be kept out of the courts for their own good? Must 
self-representation be allowed at all costs in the name of autonomy, or should 
the courts take a more paternalistic view and prevent potential SRLs from 
causing problems and delays that can impact both the SRL and their opponent? 
The literature reveals a range of opinions on these issues, which in turn leads to 
a lack of coherence in the suggestions for addressing the problems presented by 
SRLs. Those with a positive view of SRLs are more likely to advocate for systemic 
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change, with inquisitorial judges and simplified procedures; others take the 
more conservative view that the answer is not to change the system, but find 
ways to provide lawyers to those in need and prevent self-representation 
altogether. Perhaps even more crucial than this lack of theoretical consistency is 
the lack of empirical data addressing the question of what measures truly assist 
SRLs. While, as discussed above, there is some data on what SRLs want and how 
they feel about the process, this data is inherently coloured by the SRL’s lack of 
knowledge of the law and the court processes. In other words, what SRLs want 
may not be what they truly need, or what is realistic for the courts, who must 
also consider the needs of the public at large, to deliver. A cynical view would 
suggest that the views of legal professionals working in the courts, whose 
livelihoods depend on lawyers being essential, are equally biased. While the last 
several decades have seen the state of knowledge about self-representation and 
those who self represent continue to grow, there is still a great deal to be 
learned in order to understand and address this incredibly complex issue. 
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Chapter 4: The Law Relating to Self-
Representation in Scotland 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The sources of law that regulate party litigants are diffuse, and at times 
contradictory or unclear. In many respects, the law relating to party litigants is 
the same as the law governing all civil litigants, regardless of whether they are 
represented. However, in some areas there are particular provisions that make 
allowances for the party litigant or restrict their actions within the process of 
litigation. Broadly, these are drawn from statute, rules of court, and when 
necessary, the inherent power of the Scottish courts to regulate their own 
procedure. There is also “soft law” which has some influence on the party 
litigant’s experience in the litigation process. The implications of human rights 
law on the party litigant are also discussed below. Within this context, this 
chapter discusses the basis of the right of self-representations and the 
limitations thereon, the provisions allowing for lay support and lay 
representation, the regulation of the party litigant in the court process and the 
implications of different forms of court procedure on party litigants, and the law 
relating to vexatious litigation. 
4.2 The Right of Self-representation 
 
4.2.1 The Basis of the Right to Self-represent 
 
The right of a party to represent himself in civil court proceedings is so 
fundamental to Scots law that it is often taken for granted. The right to self-
represent today is drawn from the Scots Acts 1532512 which also established the 
basis for the Court of Session.513 Chapter 51 reads: “That na man pley bot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  512	  Attributed	  to	  1537;	  see	  also	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  
Regulatory	  Reform	  v	  UK	  Bankruptcy	  Ltd	  [2011]	  SC	  115.	  513	  See	  Hannay	  R,	  The	  College	  of	  Justice:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Institution	  and	  Development	  of	  
the	  Court	  of	  Session	  (William	  Hodge	  1933).	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parties and their procuratoures514 Item, That na man enter to pley bot parties 
conteined in their summoundes, and their procuratoures, gif they will ony 
have.” In other words, the right to plead a case belongs to the parties to an 
action or an advocate, and no one else. Further provisions of the Act also refer 
to the delivery of bills of continuation515 and the examination of witnesses516 as 
being carried out by “parties or their procuratoures.” Self-representation was 
envisioned in the earliest stages of Scottish civil court system as we know it 
today. Although the Act is now nearly 500 years old, it was observed as recently 
as 2010 that is has not fallen into desuetude.517  
 
Even in the absence of this express authority, self-representation is also part of 
the constitutional right of access518 to the courts.519 The right of access is 
perhaps best expressed as the State’s duty not to create barriers or impede 
access to the courts.520 More recently, with the abolition of employment tribunal 
fees, the Supreme Court has made clear that any serious hindrance can be an 
impediment to access to the courts, even if it does not make access entirely 
impossible.521 It is thus generally taken for granted in the Scottish courts that a 
party litigant is allowed, or indeed “entitled,”522 to act on his own behalf.523 It is 
perhaps because this entitlement has been taken for granted for centuries that 
the precise nature of the right remains nebulous. 
 
4.2.2 Limitations on the Right to Self-represent  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  514	  “Procuratoures”	  refers	  to	  advocates.	  515	  Scots	  Acts	  1532,	  Chapter	  52.	  516	  Ibid,	  Chapter	  53.	  517	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  v	  UK	  Bankruptcy	  
Ltd	  2011	  S.C.	  115	  at	  page	  123.	  518	  See,	  for	  example,	  Bremer	  Vulcan	  Schiffbau	  und	  Maschinenfabrik	  v	  South	  India	  
Shipping	  Corp	  [1981]	  AC	  909.	  519	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lord	  Advocate	  v	  Rizza	  [1962]	  SLT	  (Notes)	  8.	  520	  Per	  Lord	  Justice	  Laws,	  Children's	  Rights	  Alliance	  for	  England	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Justice	  [2013]	  EWCA	  Civ	  34	  at	  para	  37.	  521	  R	  (On	  application	  of	  Unison)	  v	  Lord	  Chancellor	  [2017]	  3	  WLR	  409	  at	  para	  78.	  Any	  such	  hindrance	  must	  be	  authorized	  by	  primary	  legislation.	  522	  Per	  Lord	  Chancellor	  (Viscount	  Simon)	  in	  Equity	  and	  Law	  Life	  Assurance	  Society	  v	  
Tritonia,	  Ltd	  [1943]	  SC	  (HL)	  88	  at	  page	  89.	  523	  “It	  is	  clear	  beyond	  doubt	  that	  an	  individual	  party	  who	  is	  a	  natural	  person	  does	  not	  require	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  lawyer”;	  per	  Lord	  Macfayden,	  Cultural	  and	  Educational	  
Development	  Association	  of	  Scotland	  v	  Glasgow	  City	  Council	  [2008]	  SC	  439	  at	  page	  442.	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The right to self-represent is virtually absolute and there are only a few 
exceptions. One of these is that, unsurprisingly, litigants who lack legal capacity 
may not self-represent. Thus, for example, children524 and adults with 
incapacity525 may not act as party litigants. Those resident in a “hostile 
territory” in wartime are also excluded.526 This is the full extent on the 
limitations placed on self-representation for individuals. The most far-reaching 
exception, however, is non-natural or “artificial” persons, such as limited 
companies, trusts or partnerships. The default rule is that artificial persons may 
not self-represent in any forms of action other than the simple procedure.527 
 
To understand the bar on self-representation for non-natural persons, it is 
helpful first to consider how such litigants are conceptualised in Scots law. An 
artificial entity is incapable of being a “party litigant.” Sheriff Principal Dick 
observed in Bargeport Ltd v Adam, “A limited company is not a party litigant 
and has no right of audience in the Sheriff Court…A limited company is a 
‘person’ in law but not a party litigant”.528 When a non-natural person is 
unrepresented, neither the entity nor anyone purporting to represent the entity, 
such as a director or employee, can be considered a party litigant. An 
unqualified person who appears can only do so as a lay representative. Lay 
representation for artificial entities is allowed in some low-value claims 
procedures.529 The general rule, however, is that non-natural persons must be 
represented by a solicitor or advocate to ensure that the representative is able 
to serve the court, is aware of the law and procedure and is subject to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  524	  A	  parent	  has	  the	  right	  to	  act	  as	  the	  child’s	  legal	  representative	  (Children	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1995	  s1(1).	  A	  child	  may	  instruct	  a	  solicitor	  to	  carry	  out	  civil	  proceedings	  on	  his	  behalf	  provided	  he	  has	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  do	  so	  (Age	  of	  Legal	  Capacity	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1991	  s2(4A)).	  525	  Adults	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  an	  order	  under	  the	  Adults	  with	  Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2000.	  	  The	  capacity	  of	  a	  litigant	  may	  also	  be	  challenged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  an	  action.	  526	  They	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  the	  courts;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Sovfracht	  
(V/O)	  Appellants;	  v	  Van	  Udens	  Scheepvaart	  en	  Agentuur	  Maatschappij	  (N.V.	  Gebr.)	  
Respondents	  [1943]	  AC	  203.	  527	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules	  Part	  2.	  Prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  simple	  procedure,	  lay	  representatives	  could	  appear	  for	  companies	  only	  at	  certain	  types	  of	  hearings.	  528	  Bargeport	  Ltd	  v	  Adam,	  unreported,	  Glasgow	  Sheriff	  Court,	  15	  February	  1985,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Dana	  Ltd	  v	  Stevenson	  [1989]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  43	  at	  page	  44.	  529For	  an	  example	  of	  how	  lay	  representation	  for	  a	  company	  can	  go	  wrong,	  see	  Libby	  
Dale	  v	  Lets	  Glasgow	  Ltd,	  [2007]	  Civ	  PB	  73(Feb),	  8.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   122	  
professional rules and disciplinary codes.530 This has been upheld despite no 
shortage of challenges, including those from a company,531 a partnership,532 a 
club,533 a voluntary association534 and the Scottish Gas Board.535 A representative 
of the entity may not sign documents such as an initial writ commencing an 
action on its behalf.536  
 
It is only very recently that this has begun to change. In Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v UK Bankruptcy Ltd,537 the court 
noted that, under certain conditions, an absolute bar on lay representation 
could lead to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.538 However, the court declined to change the rule using either its 
inherent power or by making an act of sederunt, considering it a matter to be 
legislated. The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 introduced new provisions 
allowing for lay representation of non-natural persons,539 subject to a number of 
qualifications. The representative must hold a relevant office, such as director 
or secretary in the case of a company.540 The court must be satisfied that the 
representative is suitable and that allowing them to act is in the interests of 
justice.541 Unlike the rules for lay representation of an individual, the court must 
also find that the non-natural person is unable to pay for the services of a legal 
representative542 and must have regard for the complexity of the proceedings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  530	  Equity	  Law	  and	  Life	  Assurance	  Society	  v	  Tritonia	  Ltd	  1943	  SC	  (HL)	  88.	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  this	  rationale	  could	  equally	  be	  applied	  to	  cases	  involving	  party	  litigants	  who	  are	  natural	  persons;	  see	  Clark	  Advertising	  Ltd	  v	  Scottish	  Enterprise	  
Dunbartonshire	  [2004]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  85	  at	  pages	  87-­‐88.	  531	  Apollo	  Engineering	  Ltd	  (in	  liquidation)	  v	  James	  Scott	  Ltd	  [2012]	  SC	  282.	  532	  Clark	  Advertising	  Ltd	  v	  Scottish	  Enterprise	  Dunbartonshire	  [2004]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  85.	  533	  Strathclyde	  RC	  v	  Sheriff	  Clerk,	  Glasgow	  [1992]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  79.	  534	  Cultural	  and	  Educational	  Development	  Association	  of	  Scotland	  v	  Glasgow	  City	  
Council	  [2008]	  SC	  439.	  535	  Scottish	  Gas	  Board	  v	  Alexander	  [1963]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  27.	  In	  this	  case	  an	  employee	  who	  also	  happened	  to	  be	  an	  advocate	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  represent	  the	  pursuer,	  as	  she	  was	  not	  appearing	  in	  her	  capacity	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Faculty.	  536	  Cultural	  and	  Educational	  Development	  Association	  of	  Scotland	  v	  Glasgow	  City	  
Council	  [2008]	  SC	  439.	  537	  [2011]	  SC	  115.	  538	  Article	  6	  is	  discussed	  further	  below.	  539	  Courts	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2014	  s97;	  lay	  representation	  in	  simple	  procedure,	  which	  replaces	  the	  current	  low-­‐value	  claims	  procedures,	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  s96.	  540	  Ibid,	  s95(5)(a).	  541	  Ibid,	  s97(3)(b-­‐c).	  542	  Ibid,	  s97(3)(a).	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and the non-natural person’s prospects of success.543 Rules of court and forms 
have now been introduced to implement these provisions, 544 but to date there 
has not been any reported case law on its application. The terms of the statute 
and the rules, however, suggest that lay representation for companies is 
intended to be the exception, rather than the rule.  
 
4.3 The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) is the 
most relevant to the party litigant. Article 6(1) states: “In the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations…everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law.” Article 6(1) encompasses the right of access to the civil courts.545 
Unreasonable impediments, such as excessive court fees, may constitute a 
breach of Article 6,546 although (as with most Convention rights) reasonable 
measures prescribed by law, such as orders for caution, do not violate the 
litigant’s rights under Article 6.547  
 
While Scots law provides for a right to self-represent in civil matters, there is no 
such right in Convention law.548 In fact, many European countries forbid or 
restrict self-representation in their civil courts.549 When civil self-representation 
has been addressed within the context of Article 6, it is usually not in relation to 
access to the courts or equality of arms, but rather the question of the State’s 
obligations to provide legal advice and legal aid. This occurred most famously in 
Airey v Ireland,550 when a lack of provision for legal aid in complex judicial 
separation proceedings was held to have breached Article 6(1). In Airey, the 
state’s argument that legal aid was not necessary because self-representation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  543	  Ibid,	  s97(6).	  544	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Lay	  Representation	  for	  Non-­‐Natural	  Persons)	  2016/243.	  545	  Golder	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  [1979-­‐1980]	  1	  EHRR	  524.	  546	  Kreuz	  v	  Poland	  [2001]	  11	  B.H.R.C.	  456.	  547	  Miloslavsky	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  442.	  548	  In	  criminal	  cases,	  the	  accused	  has	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐representation	  in	  terms	  of	  Article	  6(3)(c).	  549	  Zuckerman	  A	  and	  Coester-­‐Waltjen	  D,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Lawyers	  in	  German	  Civil	  Litigation”	  (1999)	  18(Oct),	  291.	  550	  (1979-­‐1980)	  2	  EHRR	  305.	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was available was rejected. This argument was also rejected when the litigant 
lacked the mental capacity to self-represent.551 However, there is no absolute 
right to legal assistance and parties are not guaranteed complete equality of 
arms, only that there is no substantial disadvantage.552 Where the complexity of 
law and procedures or capacity impede access to the courts, Convention law 
provides an “escape valve” in the right to legal aid and representation, but not 
adjustment of the process for unrepresented parties. Article 6 thus does little to 
advance the rights of the party litigant in civil matters over and above the right 
to self-represent already present in domestic law.  
 
However, there are other ways that self-representation can intersect with 
Convention rights. Issues have recently been raised in England in respect of 
incompatibilities with Article 6 which may arise in family actions where a party 
litigant may have to question a witness he stands accused of abusing. In Q v Q,553 
it was observed that, due to the bar on a litigant personally questioning a 
witness in cases concerned with sexual offences,554 the litigant cannot do this 
himself. However, to comply with Article 6, the litigant must be able to examine 
the witness. With legal aid no longer available in these cases, it was held that 
the court might have to bear the cost of counsel to examine the witness on the 
litigant’s behalf.555 In fact, where the litigant also faces criminal charges, the 
court may also have to bear the cost of legal advice to ensure that he does not 
incriminate himself in the course of the family matter.556 
 
4.4 Lay support and Lay Representation 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  551	  Stewart-­‐Brady	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  [1997]	  24	  EHRR	  38;	  however,	  a	  breach	  of	  Article	  6	  had	  not	  occurred	  in	  this	  case	  because	  the	  applicant	  had	  no	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  success.	  552	  Steel	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2005)	  EMLR	  15.	  553	  [2014]	  EWFC	  31.	  554	  Youth	  Justice	  and	  Criminal	  Evidence	  Act	  1999	  s34.	  555	  Both	  the	  litigants’	  rights	  under	  Article	  6	  and	  the	  witnesses’	  rights	  under	  Article	  8	  are	  potentially	  engaged	  in	  these	  cases.	  556	  Q	  v	  Q	  [2014]	  EWFC	  31	  at	  para	  58	  onwards.	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The question of whether a layperson may assist a party litigant in the Scottish 
courts, and to what extent, has historically been answered in a surprisingly 
complex area of law, full of conflicting and overlapping provisions.557 It is only 
recently that the rules have been rationalised. It is worth noting, however, that 
while a description of the law suggests a more strict approach to the regulation 
of lay assistance and representation, there is some evidence that lay 
assistants558 and lay representatives559 have at times been permitted to appear 
outwith the scope of the rules in place at the time. 
 
The English term “McKenzie friend”560 is often used in Scotland to refer to any 
person who assists a party litigant. However, there is a significant difference 
between a “lay assistant” (or “lay support”) and a “lay representative,” 
although both are often referred to on either side of the border as “McKenzie 
friends.” “McKenzie friend” is a colloquial and not legal term, but remains 
commonly used.561 Essentially, the role of the lay assistant is to sit beside the 
party litigant in court, helping him to manage documents, taking notes or quietly 
providing advice. A lay representative also addresses the court on the litigant’s 
behalf and may be allowed to do whatever the party litigant could do on his own 
behalf. Lay support or assistance may come from a variety of sources. In some 
cases, it is a friend or family member with no more legal knowledge than the 
party litigant himself. However, a potential lay representative may be legally 
qualified in another jurisdiction, or may be an experienced volunteer or 
employee of an agency like the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, Money Advice Scotland 
or Shelter. Some agenda-based groups, such as Families Need Fathers, may also 
facilitate lay support.562 The law and rules do not make any distinctions between 
these different sources of lay representation or support. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  557	  McIntosh	  A,	  “Fifty	  shades	  of	  lay?”	  (2013)	  JLSS	  15	  April	  http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/58-­‐4/1012423.aspx.	  558	  Frost	  and	  Parkes	  v	  Cintec	  International	  Limited	  [2005]	  CSOH	  119.	  559	  See,	  for	  example,	  McClure	  Naismith	  v	  Stephen,	  unreported,	  Edinburgh	  Sheriff	  Court,	  21	  October	  2011;	  Citizens	  Advice	  Scotland,	  “Ensuring	  Effective	  and	  Affordable	  Access	  to	  Appropriate	  Dispute	  Resolution”	  24	  September	  2010,	  page	  6.	  	  560	  Sometimes	  spelled	  “Mackenzie.”	  	  561	  Stephenson	  LJ	  suggests	  that	  courts	  “Let	  the	  ‘McKenzie	  friend’	  join	  the	  ‘Piltdown	  man’	  in	  decent	  obscurity”	  in	  R	  v	  Leicester	  City	  Justices	  and	  Another	  [1991]	  QB	  260.	  562	  Families	  Need	  Fathers:	  McKenzie	  Friends	  Listing,	  http://www.fnf.org.uk/law-­‐information-­‐2/courts/mckenzie-­‐friends/mckenzie-­‐friend-­‐listings.	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4.4.2 Lay Assistance/Lay Support 
 
The Scottish approach to lay assistance represents one example of a theme often 
repeated in the law of the party litigant: a cautious adoption of a pre-existing 
English principle. While the genesis of the “McKenzie friend” in England is often 
attributed to McKenzie v McKenzie563 in 1971, McKenzie affirmed what was 
already regarded as a pre-existing right to lay assistance. Over 100 years earlier, 
the following was noted in Collier v Hicks564: “Any person, whether he be 
professional man or not, may attend as friend of either party, may take notes, 
may quietly make suggestions, and give advice.”565 This dictum shows two 
fundamental differences between English and Scots law on this point: firstly, lay 
support is available in England in terms of the common law. Secondly, in English 
law lay support is a right or “entitlement”.566 In Scotland, lay assistance is not a 
common law principle and was not formally introduced into Sheriff Courts567 and 
the Court of Session568 until 2010. Lay support is now allowed by rules of court 
made under the general powers of the courts to regulate civil procedure.569 The 
rules are in virtually the same terms for both the Sheriff Courts and Court of 
Session. In contrast to the position in England, in Scotland lay assistance is not 
an entitlement and must be applied for and approved by the court.570  
 
The role of the lay assistant is prescribed by the rules. He may provide moral 
support; help manage documents; take notes; and quietly advise on points of 
law and procedure, issues which the litigant may wish to raise with the court, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  563	  [1971]	  P	  33.	  564	  [1831]	  2	  B	  &	  Ad	  663.	  565	  Ibid,	  per	  Lord	  Tenterden	  CJ	  at	  page	  669.	  566	  Per	  Sachs	  LJ	  in	  McKenzie	  v	  McKenzie	  1971	  P.	  33	  at	  page	  41.	  567	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Sheriff	  Court	  Rules)	  (Miscellaneous	  Amendments)	  (No.	  2)	  2010/416,	  Rules	  2-­‐5.	  There	  is	  a	  rule	  inserting	  provision	  for	  lay	  support	  into	  the	  rules	  for	  each	  of	  the	  procedures	  (Ordinary	  Cause,	  Summary	  Applications,	  Small	  Claims	  and	  Summary	  Cause).	  568	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  Amendment	  No.4)	  (Miscellaneous)	  2010/205,	  Chapter	  12A	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  1994.	  569	  The	  Sheriff	  Courts	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1971	  s32	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  Act	  1988	  s5	  respectively.	  When	  lay	  representation	  was	  later	  introduced,	  statutory	  provisions	  were	  required.	  570	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session,	  Rule	  12.A.1(1);	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  rules	  hereafter,	  but	  the	  Sheriff	  Court	  procedure	  is	  in	  very	  similar	  terms.	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and questions which the litigant may wish to pose to witnesses.571 The lay 
assistant may not receive any remuneration.572 An application for assistance is 
made by motion and a form is provided573 for the party litigant to complete. The 
prospective lay assistant must also sign the form, declaring any financial interest 
in the cause, that they are receiving no financial remuneration, and that they 
will keep any documents and information provided by the party litigant 
confidential.574 While lay support is not automatically allowed in Scotland, the 
court may refuse an application only if it considers the named person to be 
unsuitable, or is of the opinion that it would be contrary to the efficient 
administration of justice to grant it.575 The court thus retains a degree of 
discretion, but cannot arbitrarily refuse to allow lay support. However, it is also 
quite clear that the wording of the rules is careful not to create a “right” to lay 
assistance. 
 
As the lay assistant plays a relatively passive role in the proceedings, his 
presence is likely to be uncontroversial and there has not been any reported 
case in Scotland addressing the application of these rules. However, a handful of 
English cases illustrate that difficulties can possibly occur. One area of concern 
is the presence of lay support in confidential hearings. In England, a judge 
appears to have some discretion to exclude a lay assistant from a private hearing 
held in chambers.576 Generally, however, there is a presumption in favour of 
allowing lay support even for private proceedings.577 The rules in Scotland also 
provide for lay assistance in chambers,578 but the judge may withdraw 
permission if he considers that the presence of the lay assistant either in court 
or in chambers is contrary to the efficient administration of justice.579 In at least 
one case, it has been necessary for an English court to make a “banning order” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  571	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.A.1(1).	  572	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.A.1(2);	  any	  expenses	  are	  not	  recoverable	  in	  the	  proceedings	  in	  terms	  of	  Rule	  12A.1(8).	  573	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  Amendment	  No.4)	  (Miscellaneous)	  2010/205,	  Schedule	  1.	  574	  The	  lay	  assistant	  may	  access	  court	  documents	  and	  information;	  Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session,	  Rule	  12.A.1(7).	  575	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12A.1(3);	  emphasis	  added.	  576	  R	  v	  Bow	  County	  Court	  Ex	  p	  Barrow	  [1991]	  2	  QB	  260.	  577	  Re:	  H	  (McKenzie	  Friend:	  Pretrial	  Determination)	  [2001]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1444.	  578	  Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session,	  Rule	  12.A.1(1).	  579	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.A.1(5).	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barring a difficult lay assistant from acting in future cases.580 Because lay 
support is not an automatic right in Scotland, an unsuitable lay assistant could 
simply be denied permission to act.581 Due to the fundamental difference 
between the English and Scottish law, English authorities are unlikely to be very 
helpful when, and if, the limit of the Scottish judge’s discretion on the matter of 
lay assistance is tested. 
 
4.4.3 Lay Representation 
 
Turning to lay representation, the basic rule in Scots law is that no one but a 
party litigant, solicitor or advocate may address the court on a litigant’s 
behalf.582 The regulation of the legal profession is also relevant to the question 
of lay representation. Rights of audience in the courts and the right to conduct 
litigation are regulated by statute,583 but the court retains the power to grant or 
refuse rights of audience as necessary.584 It is an offence for an unqualified 
person to pretend to be a solicitor585 or to prepare documents including writs 
relating to a court action586 unless they are unremunerated or paid only under a 
contract of employment.587 A layperson could therefore assist a party litigant by 
drafting court documents, as long as they did so gratuitously.588 In principle, 
courts have strictly upheld these restrictions on lay representation. It has been 
held that a man could not represent his wife,589nor a son his 88-year old 
father,590 and a paralegal could not appear in immigration proceedings.591(It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  580	  Paragon	  Finance	  plc	  v	  Noueiri	  (Practice	  Note),	  [2001]	  1	  WLR	  2357.	  581	  Assuming,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  lay	  assistant	  was	  known	  to	  the	  court.	  A	  blanket	  ban	  in	  future	  attempts	  to	  act	  as	  a	  lay	  assistant	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  making	  a	  “vexatious	  behavior	  order”	  under	  the	  Courts	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2014,	  once	  this	  has	  come	  into	  force;	  see	  below.	  582	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  Scots	  Acts	  1532	  and	  at	  common	  law;	  see	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  v	  UK	  Bankruptcy	  Ltd	  2011	  S.C.	  115.	  583	  Law	  Reform	  (Miscellaneous	  Provisions)	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1990	  s27;	  Solicitors	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1980	  s25A.	  584	  Law	  Reform	  (Miscellaneous	  Provisions)	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1990	  s27(3).	  585	  Solicitors	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1980	  s31.	  586	  Solicitors	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1980	  s32(1)(a).	  587	  Ibid,	  s	  2(a).	  588	  The	  document	  must	  be	  signed	  by	  the	  party	  litigant	  and	  not	  a	  representative.	  589	  Gordon	  v	  Nakeski-­‐Cumming	  [1924]	  SC	  939,	  which	  remains	  the	  leading	  case	  today.	  590	  Rush	  v	  Fife	  Regional	  Council	  [1984]	  SLT	  391;	  see	  also	  Anderson,	  petitioner	  [2008]	  SCLR	  59.	  	  591	  Mushtaq	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  The	  Home	  Department	  [2006]	  SLT	  476.	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interesting to note, however, that in the latter case the petitioner’s brother-in-
law was allowed to address the court on her behalf as an “informal 
interpreter”.)592 Although a wife was effectively permitted to represent her 
husband in one Outer House decision,593 the court’s approach in that case has 
since been disapproved.594  
 
However, while the default position is that lay representation is not allowed, 
rules are now in place that allow a party litigant to have a lay representative. In 
the simple procedure, a lay representative may act for a party litigant on 
submission of a form.595The lay representative may do anything in the conduct of 
the case that the litigant could do for himself.596 The court’s approval is not 
required, but the lay representative can be removed if they are found to be 
unsuitable. The lay representative may not be remunerated for appearing, 
unless they are representing a company or partnership.597 In other forms of 
procedure, the court must receive a form from a lay representative and then 
grant permission for him to appear if the judge considers it to be “in the 
interests of justice”.598 As in the simple procedure, the lay representative can 
do anything the litigant could do in the conduct of the case599 and may not be 
remunerated.600 Any expenses incurred by the litigant in connection with the lay 
representation are not recoverable in the case.601 
 
A handful of statutory actions also include provision for lay representation. The 
Home Owner and Debtor Protection Act 2010 allows lay representation602 in 
actions relating to repossession of heritable property.603 There are similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  592	  Ibid,	  at	  pages	  477-­‐478.	  593	  Kenneil	  v	  Kenneil	  [2006]	  SLT	  449.	  594	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  v	  UK	  Bankruptcy	  
Ltd	  2011	  S.C.	  115.	  595	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules,	  Rule	  2.4	  (1).	  596	  Ibid,	  Rule	  2.3.	  597	  Ibid,	  Rule	  2.4(6).	  598	  Ordinary	  Cause	  Rules	  1993	  (“OCR”)	  Rule	  1A.2(3).	  599	  Ibid,	  Rule	  1A.2(6A)	  600	  Ibid,	  Rule	  1A.2(4).	  601	  Ibid,	  Rule1A.2(8).	  602	  Section	  7(2).	  603	  Heritable	  Securities	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1894	  s5F	  and	  the	  Conveyancing	  and	  Feudal	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1970	  s24E.	  The	  lay	  representative	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Ministers.	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provisions relating other actions including sequestrations,604 some forms of 
diligence,605 and Children’s Hearings.606 In these cases, a lay representative may 
again do what the litigant could do for himself. These rules allow agencies such 
as the Citizen’s Advice Bureau to assist litigants in court.607 While previously 
these provisions overlapped with the provisions in the rules of court, effectively 
requiring the litigant to choose which set of rules to apply608, after amendment 
of the rules the statutory provisions now take precedence.609 
 
4.4.4 Discussion 
 
Lay representation engages the question of rights of audience, which in turn 
challenges the established body of law ensuring that only solicitors and 
advocates enjoy these rights.  As already noted, in principle the courts were 
quite firm prior to the introduction of the new rules on lay representation610 that 
only a solicitor or advocate could represent a litigant in court. Although the right 
of the court to grant rights of audience as necessary has been preserved in 
statute,611 doubt has been expressed as to whether the court can in fact exercise 
its discretion to extend rights of audience to lay representatives.612 This is the 
crux of the UK Bankruptcy613 case: it was not for the court to extend rights of 
audience to lay representatives, but rather (as indeed occurred) for Parliament 
to introduce legislation if the position was to be altered. When courts have been 
asked to make a decision on lay representation in principle, a clear line of 
authority has been established rejecting the notion that the court should, or 
even can, exercise its discretion to allow lay representatives into the courts.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  604	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Rules	  2016,	  Chapter	  4.	  605	  Bankruptcy	  and	  Diligence	  etc	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2007	  ,	  s33.	  606	  Childrens	  Hearings	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2011	  s185(2)(b).	  607	  Citizens	  Advice	  Scotland,	  “Ensuring	  Effective	  Access	  to	  Appropriate	  and	  Affordable	  Dispute	  Resolution”;	  see	  also	  City	  of	  Edinburgh	  Council	  v	  John	  Stevens	  2011	  WL	  5903076.	  608	  See	  McIntosh,	  supra	  at	  note	  577.	  609	  OCR,	  Rules	  1A.1(1)	  and	  1A.2(1).	  610	  And	  subject	  to	  specific	  statutory	  provisions	  allowing	  lay	  representation	  in	  certain	  cases.	  611	  Law	  Reform	  (Miscellaneous	  Provisions)	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1990	  s27(3).	  612	  Gordon	  v	  Nakeski-­‐Cumming	  [1924]	  SC	  939;	  Anderson,	  petitioner	  2008	  SCLR	  59.	  613	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  v	  UK	  Bankruptcy	  
Ltd	  2011	  S.C.	  115.	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With this in mind, it is all the more surprising that examples of lay 
representation in the courts can be found prior to the new rules coming into 
force in 2013. As noted, one of these cases, Kenneil v Kenneil,614 has since been 
disapproved. Prior to Kenneil, however, a husband was allowed to represent his 
wife and co-pursuer in the Court of Session in Frost v Unity Bank plc.615 Even 
more significantly, he was allowed to represent his wife in her absence.616 It is 
unfortunate that the judgment in this case does not note on what basis or the 
reasoning behind why the husband was permitted to represent his wife, but only 
that the husband sought permission to represent her and that the defender did 
not object. An English barrister was permitted to represent a party litigant in 
the Sheriff Court as a “lay representative” after giving the court assurance that 
he would not be remunerated for his services.617 Again the reasons for allowing 
this are not entirely clear. It would be particularly interesting to know whether 
the representative’s status as a barrister in another jurisdiction618 influenced the 
decision to allow him to appear. In another case, a judge observed that a party 
litigant’s mother could have appeared when the party herself was too ill to 
attend, despite the fact the mother would not, of course, have a right of 
audience unless it had previously been granted.619 Despite what would appear to 
be a number of instructive authorities excluding the use of lay representatives, 
the courts still retained, and sometimes exercised, discretion to grant rights of 
audience. This perhaps indicates that the recent expansion in the rules allowing 
lay representation was necessary. 
 
4.5 Regulation of the Party Litigant in the Court Process 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  614	  [2006]	  SLT	  449.	  615	  Unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session,	  2	  February	  1999.	  616	  The	  suggestion	  that	  a	  husband	  can	  represent	  his	  wife	  in	  court	  was	  rejected	  in	  
Gordon	  v	  Nakeski-­‐Cumming	  1924	  SC	  939.	  617	  McClure	  Naismith	  LLP	  v	  Stephen,	  unreported,	  31	  October	  2011,	  Edinburgh	  Sheriff	  Court;	  this	  case	  was	  an	  Ordinary	  Action	  not	  covered	  by	  any	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  rules	  allowing	  lay	  representation.	  618	  A	  solicitor	  or	  barrister	  qualified	  in	  England	  does	  not	  have	  rights	  of	  audience	  or	  indeed	  any	  special	  status	  above	  a	  layperson	  in	  the	  Scottish	  courts.	  	  619	  Clark	  v	  Hope	  and	  anr	  [2006]	  SCLR	  98.	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This section considers how the law and rules of court regulate the party litigant 
as he progresses through the process of civil litigation. Variations in civil 
procedure, some of which are far more “party litigant friendly” than others, and 
how these affect the party litigant are also discussed. However, it is important 
to note that litigants, and particularly defenders, do not choose the procedure 
their case will be heard under. This is instead dictated by the crave (often the 
amount of money sued for) of the action and its legal underpinnings. Within the 
possible exception of a pursuer who may undervalue his case to bring it under 
the small claims or summary cause procedures, the party litigant cannot opt-in 
to a more “party litigant friendly” procedure. This section will discuss the simple 
procedure, ordinary cause procedure, the issue of expenses, family actions, 
personal injury actions and the role of guidance and “soft law.” Finally the 
potential implications of policy in court procedure are noted.  
 
4.5.2 The Simple Procedure 
 
The simple procedure has recently replaced the small claims and summary cause 
procedures620 for low-value claims, currently claims under £5,000.621 The simple 
procedure is intended to be accessible to party litigants, and is described in the 
rules as a “court process designed to provide a speedy, inexpensive and informal 
way to resolve disputes.”622 While parties can be represented, this is 
discouraged by the rules on expenses.623The simple procedure rules make a 
number of allowances for party litigants to make the procedure more 
manageable for party litigants. The rules are written in a “question and answer” 
format and legal terminology has been eliminated whenever possible; for 
example, the word “pause” is used instead of “sist”.624 The sheriff clerk is 
tasked with serving the claim form when a party is unrepresented, saving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  620	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  many	  of	  the	  features	  of	  the	  simple	  procedure	  were	  also	  present	  in	  the	  small	  claims	  and	  summary	  cause	  rules.	  621	  At	  this	  time,	  plans	  to	  implement	  the	  simple	  procedure	  for	  “Special	  Claims”	  such	  as	  heritable	  actions	  and	  personal	  injury	  actions,	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  implemented.	  The	  smalls	  claims	  and	  summary	  cause	  rules	  remain	  in	  effect	  for	  these	  certain	  types	  of	  claims,	  but	  will	  eventually	  be	  shifted	  to	  the	  simple	  procedure.	  622	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules,	  Rule	  1.1(1).	  623	  Ibid,	  Part	  12.	  624	  Ibid,	  Part	  9.	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expense of a solicitor or sheriff officer.625 The sheriff has an expanded role to 
play in the simple procedure, as he is tasked with helping parties negotiate a 
settlement if possible.626 If the case cannot be settled and proceeds to a 
hearing, the sheriff must establish the factual and legal basis of the claim and 
response and the matters genuinely in dispute.627 This departs from a fully 
adversarial approach, easing the burden on the party litigant to know the law in 
his case. Rules of evidence are also relaxed and the sheriff has a wide discretion 
to determine how evidence is to be led and heard.628  
 
The simplicity of the procedure is not suitable for cases that are complex629 and 
complicated actions may be remitted to the Ordinary Cause.630 While the simple 
procedure is still relatively new, remitting low value claims to Ordinary Cause 
has generated a degree of controversy in the past. It has been argued, albeit 
unsuccessfully, that remitting a low-value claim may infringe the rights of the 
party litigant, as they will find it much more difficult to navigate the Ordinary 
Cause procedures without the advice of a solicitor.631 However, it is worth noting 
that remitting a low-value claim to the Ordinary Cause affects not only how 
easily a litigant can navigate the more complex procedures, but also raises the 
more tactical issue of his exposure to an adverse award of expenses.632  
 
While the simple procedure is certainly more accessible to party litigants than 
the Ordinary Cause and others that will be discussed below, it is perhaps best 
described as “simpler” rather than “simple” procedure. The rules are lengthy, 
running to 21 parts with two additional schedules. The sections dealing with the 
fundamentals of the procedure are easy enough to follow, but others are more 
convoluted. The section dealing with “provisional orders” (diligence on the 
dependence) is particularly difficult to follow and is littered with references to 
the legislation without explanation in plain language. This is surely not 
intentional, as the rules were subject to an extensive consultation as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  625	  Ibid,	  Rule	  6.11.	  626	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.3(2).	  627	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.4(2-­‐3).	  628	  Ibid,	  Rule	  12.6.	  629	  Alternately,	  the	  sum	  sued	  for	  may	  be	  amended	  or	  a	  counterclaim	  may	  be	  introduced.	  630	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules,	  Rule	  17.2.	  631	  Walls	  v	  Santander	  UK	  plc,	  unreported,	  Glasgow	  Sheriff	  Court,	  12	  July	  2010.	  632	  Hamilton	  v	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  plc	  [2009]	  GWD	  9-­‐144.	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focus groups.633 Instead, it demonstrates just how difficult it is to simplify the 
complex process of dispute resolution. In addition to being easy to understand, 
an accessible process also has to be flexible enough to ensure that it can 
accommodate as many cases as possible—otherwise, too many actions will end 
up being remitted to the Ordinary cause courts. In addition to being easy to 
read, the rules also have to be utilised and interpreted by sheriffs in the courts 
like any other rules of court. 
 
4.5.3 Ordinary Procedure 
 
The Ordinary Cause procedures in the Sheriff Court and Court of Session are 
similar and will be discussed together with any differences noted. The Ordinary 
Cause encompasses rights of action including debt, damages, or delivery valued 
at over £5,000, actions of declarator, family actions and personal injury cases. In 
the most general terms, these actions involve submitting a writ or summons to 
the court seeking authority to serve the document on the defender, the lodging 
of a notice of intention to defend or entering appearance, the lodging of 
defences and adjustment of pleadings by both parties, and a procedural or 
“options” hearing, followed by the leading of evidence in a proof. However, 
there is scope for a number of incidental procedures,634 including the hearing of 
preliminary pleas in debate or proof before answer.635 The procedure is 
considerably more complicated than the low value claims process.  
 
Initiating an action is likely to be more difficult for the party litigant in the 
Ordinary Cause than it is in the low-value procedures, as the initial writ or 
summons must be drafted in its entirety. Very basic styles dictate what the writ 
must contain,636 such as the Condescendence and Pleas-in-law, but there is no 
formal guidance available for this or any other aspect of the procedure. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  633	  http://www.scottishciviljusticecouncil.gov.uk/docs/librariesprovider4/scjc-­‐pubilcations/report-­‐on-­‐the-­‐consultation-­‐on-­‐the-­‐draft-­‐simple-­‐procedure-­‐rules.pdf?sfvrsn=2.	  634	  Some	  of	  which	  are	  also	  used	  in	  the	  summary	  cause	  and	  even	  small	  claims	  procedures,	  albeit	  less	  commonly.	  	  635	  OCR	  Chapter	  21.	  636	  Style	  Form	  G1	  of	  the	  OCR	  1993;	  summons	  Form	  13.2-­‐A	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules.	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rules are prescriptive but not instructive or illustrative of the procedures the 
litigant will be expected to know.  
 
In the Court of Session, a series of rules places limitations on the party litigant 
commencing an action and the documents he may lodge by regulating what he 
may sign.637 To initiate an action, an agent must sign the summons.638 This 
requirement may be dispensed with only with the permission of the Lord 
Ordinary.639 If this is granted, a party litigant may then sign on his own behalf. 
There is no provision in the rules for party litigants to be heard and no route of 
appeal if the judge refuses to grant permission.640 The rules are silent as to what 
criteria are to be applied by the Lord Ordinary, and as the summons is 
considered in chambers there is an unfortunate lack of information as to 
precisely how these decisions are made. Permission should not be granted if the 
writ is patently incompetent or appears to amount to an abuse of process.641 
Permission for the party litigant to sign on his own behalf does not guarantee 
that the action is relevant, sufficiently specific642 or indeed has merit.643 It also 
doe not guarantee that the action is not vexatious and or that it is based on 
reasonable grounds.644 There appears to be some variation in the approach to 
these decisions, as permission to sign may be granted based on whether the 
summons is the in proper form,645 or refused for legal deficiencies.646 
 
The rule requiring an agent’s signature also applies to other parts of process 
after an action has commenced, including petitions, notes, applications and 
minutes.647 The party litigant does not require permission to sign certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  637	  With	  the	  recent	  changes	  to	  the	  privative	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Sheriff	  Court,	  these	  rules	  will	  become	  less	  significant	  as	  far	  more	  cases	  will	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  Court	  of	  Session.	  It	  is	  not	  yet	  known	  whether	  new	  rules	  for	  raising	  actions	  will	  be	  put	  in	  place	  in	  the	  Sheriff	  Court.	  638	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules,	  Rule	  4.2(1).	  639	  Ibid,	  Rule	  4.2(5).	  640	  Ibid.	  641	  The	  petition	  of	  Gordon	  Graham	  to	  the	  nobile	  officium,	  [2015]	  CSIH	  51.	  642	  Kiani	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  [2013]	  CSOH	  121.	  643	  Carew-­‐Reid	  v	  Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	  [2013]	  CSOH	  5.	  644	  HM	  Advocate	  v	  Frost	  [2007]	  SLT	  345.	  645	  Ibid,	  para	  42.	  646	  Carew-­‐Reid	  v	  Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	  [2013]	  CSOH	  5.	  647	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules,	  Rule	  4.2(3).	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documents, including defences and answers.648 In the Sheriff Court, a party 
litigant is entitled to sign all documents and parts of process in the case on his 
own behalf, but a Sheriff may refuse to grant a warrant for service for a writ 
drafted by an unqualified person.649  
 
There are also restrictions on how party litigants may serve documents, 
including writs and motions. In the Sheriff Courts, a solicitor may serve these 
documents by recorded delivery,650 but a party litigant cannot and must engage 
either a solicitor or Sheriff Officer to effect service on his behalf. Despite the 
practical impact and the additional cost to the party litigant, this restriction 
does not explicitly appear in the rules. In Duff v George Wimpey West of 
Scotland Ltd,651 a party litigant served a motion himself by recorded delivery. It 
was held by the Sheriff that this attempt at service was ineffectual. As the 
Ordinary Cause Rules are silent on this point, this conclusion required a tortuous 
journey through authorities beginning with the Citation Act 1540 and arriving at 
the current form of citation for a motion,652 which says only “solicitor or Sheriff 
Officer” under the line for signature.653 It was also observed that the party 
litigant’s opponent had not repaired the defect in service654 by writing to the 
court to advise that the motion hadn’t been properly served and by appearing at 
the resulting hearing on the motion. The Sheriff declined to make any order on 
the motion or allow it to be argued because it had not been effectively served, 
even though it was not in dispute that the opponent had received it. This is 
understandable from a purely legal standpoint, but surely a baffling and 
artificial decision from the perspective of a layperson. It is unsatisfactory to 
have a lack of clarity and transparency for what should be a simple matter. In 
the Court of Session, the rules are more clear, but again do not state that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  648	  Ibid,	  Rule	  4.2(4).	  649	  See,	  for	  example,	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  v	  Mitchell	  [2002]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct	  )	  55	  (in	  that	  case,	  the	  unqualified	  persons	  were	  English-­‐qualified	  solicitors)	  and	  Duff	  v	  The	  Law	  Society	  
of	  Scotland,	  unreported,	  8	  August	  2012,	  referred	  to	  in	  HM	  Advocate	  v	  James	  Duff	  [2013]	  CSIH	  50	  at	  para	  29.	  650	  OCR	  1993,	  Rule	  15.2.	  651	  [2012]	  WL	  3062548.	  652	  Form	  G8	  of	  the	  OCR	  1993.	  653	  See	  also	  McKechnie	  v	  Murray	  [2016]	  CSIH	  4.	  654	  OCR	  1993,	  Rule	  5.10.	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outright the party litigant cannot serve documents himself.655 Instead, the 
several rules must be read together to understand that documents can only be 
served by a solicitor656 or messenger at arms.657 
 
While solicitors or their clerks may borrow parts of process and productions in a 
case, the party litigant in the Sheriff Court requires the permission of a Sheriff 
to do so.658 There is no analogous rule in the Court of Session.659 When an order 
for commission and diligence for the recovery of documents has been granted, 
documents may be sent directly from the haver to a solicitor, but a party litigant 
must have the documents sent to the court in the first instance for collection.660 
Perhaps the most important restriction on the party litigant relates to the 
citation of witnesses. A party litigant must apply by motion at least four weeks 
in advance of any proof for the Sheriff to fix a sum of caution for the expenses 
of the witnesses he intends to call.661 Caution must be found before the 
witnesses can be cited.662 This adds additional expense, and a degree of 
procedural complexity, for a party litigant who wishes to conduct his own proof. 
There is no need for represented parties to find caution, although a solicitor 
may be personally liable for the expenses of a witness.663All of these rules 
appear to reflect a degree of distrust in the party litigant, although equally they 
may result from the special status of officers of the court and the privileges that 
this entails.  
 
4.5.4 Expenses 
 
The civil courts have the inherent power to award expenses and in most cases 
“expenses follow success.”664 The successful party will usually be able to claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  655	  This	  was	  recently	  affirmed	  in	  AB	  v	  CD	  [2015]	  CSOH	  24;	  in	  this	  case,	  postal	  service	  by	  a	  party	  litigant	  (and	  former	  solicitor)	  was	  held	  to	  have	  been	  ineffective.	  656	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules,	  Rule	  16.1	  and	  16.4.	  657	  Ibid,	  Rules	  16.1,	  16.3	  and	  16.4.	  658	  OCR	  1993	  Rule	  11.3;	  see	  also	  Levison	  v	  The	  Jewish	  Chronicle	  Limited	  [1924]	  SLT	  755.	  659	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules,	  Rule	  4.12.	  660	  OCR	  1993,	  Chapter	  28.	  661	  Ibid,	  Rule	  29.8(1)(a).	  662	  Ibid,	  Rule	  29.8(1)(b).	  663	  Ibid,	  Rule	  29.7(5).	  664Thomson	  v	  Edinburgh	  Tramway	  Co	  Ltd	  [1901]	  8	  SLT	  352.	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all or part of his expenses, including solicitor’s fees, from the opposing party.665 
Depending on the length and complexity of the case, the amount of expense can 
be substantial and may even exceed the value of the principle sum sued for.666 
While solicitors and advocates who work in litigation are inevitably familiar with 
the importance of expenses in civil actions, party litigants are less likely to 
understand how significant expenses may be. There is a danger that a party 
litigant, who has no solicitor’s fees of his own to pay, may carry on with a case 
either unaware that he may face decree for expenses at the end of the action, 
or so misguidedly certain of victory that he does not fully take the possibility 
into account. A party litigant is also unlikely to be able to make any sort of 
accurate assessment of risk in relation to the amount of potential expenses. 
Uplift in the amount of expenses awarded may be granted to represented 
litigants if a case is particularly complex or raises novel points of law.667 There 
has been at least one unsuccessful attempt by a represented litigant to gain such 
an uplift based in part on his opponent’s unrepresented status, and the related 
issue of the protracted proceedings and voluminous amount of written material 
lodged by the party litigant.668 In a similar case, it was held that fees for extra 
preparation time should not form part of an award of expenses simply because 
the opponent was a party litigant.669 However, the court did acknowledge that, 
in cases where party litigants present with vague pleadings, his opponent’s 
representative may have to spend additional time preparing to address the court 
on the wider range of points that may arise.  
 
On the other side of the question of expenses, there are special rules in place to 
govern the recovery of a party litigant’s expenses when an award has been made 
in his favour.670 A party litigant may recover outlays and costs for work on his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  665	  The	  law	  relating	  to	  recovery	  of	  expenses	  in	  civil	  matters	  is	  complex	  and	  cannot	  be	  rehearsed	  in	  any	  detail	  here.	  Generally	  a	  party’s	  account	  of	  expenses	  will	  be	  reviewed	  or	  “taxed”	  by	  the	  auditor	  of	  court	  before	  the	  court	  formally	  grants	  decree	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  expenses,	  but	  as	  taxation	  is	  an	  additional	  expense	  it	  is	  often	  in	  the	  paying	  party’s	  interest	  to	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  account.	  666	  Expenses	  and	  funding	  in	  civil	  litigation	  were	  recently	  reviewed;	  see	  the	  Taylor	  Review	  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Review/taylor-­‐review.	  667	  An	  application	  for	  additional	  fees	  may	  be	  made	  by	  represented	  litigants	  in	  terms	  of	  Rule	  42.14	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Session.	  668	  Singh	  v	  Biotechnology	  Sciences	  Research	  Council,	  The	  Roslin	  Institute	  [2013]	  CSIH	  2.	  669	  Frost	  v	  Unity	  Trust	  Bank	  plc	  [2000]	  SLT	  952.	  670	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Expenses	  of	  Party	  Litigants)	  1976/1606.	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own behalf up to a maximum of two-thirds671 the sum allowed for solicitors.672 
An auditor of Court assesses a party litigant’s account and must consider that 
the sums claimed are reasonable with regards to the circumstances, particularly 
time taken and time reasonably required, any loss of earnings, the importance 
of the cause to the party litigant and complexity of the cause.673 It is interesting 
to note that prior to an amendment in 1983,674 these conditions were absent 
from the rules and party litigants were simply allowed “such sums in respect of 
any work done”. The amendment thus introduced a further requirement of 
reasonableness for the sums claimed, and gave the auditor of court wider 
discretion in awarding expenses. The restriction to two-thirds of the sum 
allowed to solicitors has been challenged unsuccessfully as discriminatory,675 but 
it has also been suggested that the rules place a successful party litigant in a 
favourable position, as unlike a represented litigant, the party litigant can claim 
reasonable expenses for his own time.676 A litigant who is represented will 
inevitably expend his own time as well, but has no recourse for recovery. Unlike 
represented litigants, party litigants cannot apply for an additional award of 
expenses due to the complexity or importance of the case.677  
 
4.5.5 Family Actions 
 
Family cases have become a highly specialised area and are subject to a number 
of special rules and procedures.678 Divorce/dissolution of civil partnership,679 a 
common form of family action, provides a study in contrasts in terms of 
accessibility for the party litigant. The simplified or “DIY” divorce procedure680 
is intended for unrepresented parties, although a solicitor may act as well. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  671	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Expenses	  of	  Party	  Litigants)	  1976/1606	  art	  2(1).	  672	  In	  the	  tables	  of	  judicial	  fees;	  Ibid,	  art	  2(3)(d).	  673	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Expenses	  of	  Party	  Litigants)	  1976/1606	  art	  2(2).	  674	  Act	  of	  Sederunt	  (Expenses	  of	  Party	  Litigants)	  (Amendment)	  1983/1438.	  675	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  plc	  v	  Forbes	  [2012]	  CSIH	  76.	  676	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  29.	  677	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  v	  Brown,	  unreported,	  21	  January	  2004,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House).	  678	  As	  these	  cases	  are	  most	  common	  in	  the	  Sheriff	  Courts,	  the	  Sheriff	  Court	  rules	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  section;	  again	  rules	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Session	  are	  in	  similar	  terms.	  679	  Referred	  to	  hereafter	  as	  “divorce”,	  but	  the	  same	  general	  rules	  apply	  for	  dissolution	  of	  civil	  partnership	  as	  well.	  680	  Divorce	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1976.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   140	  
simplified procedure is available for certain grounds for divorce681 only, and 
there must be no children of the marriage under the age of 16,682 no mental 
disorder in either party,683 and no financial provision sought.684 An application 
form is provided,685 which allows the applicant to provide much the same 
information as is contained in an initial writ686 via blanks for the applicant to 
complete and boxes to tick. Once lodged, a clerk of court serves the application 
on the applicant’s behalf;687 if service is successful and no objection is received, 
divorce is usually granted after the period of notice expires688. If an objection is 
received, the application must be dismissed unless the reason for objection is 
“frivolous”.689 Like the low-value claims procedures, the “DIY” divorce is made 
accessible to party litigants with the use of forms, shifting the duty of service to 
the clerks of court, and the provision of instructive guidance notes.690  
 
This can be contrasted with an “Ordinary” divorce, which must be sought when 
parties cannot use the grounds allowed in the simplified procedure or are 
seeking any orders. Even when no orders are sought and parties are in 
agreement on all matters, the simplified procedure is not available when there 
are any children of the marriage under the age of 16. A simplified form-based 
procedure is available in England to parties with children,691 but this is 
precluded in Scotland by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, which requires a 
judge to be satisfied as to the arrangements for children of the marriage before 
divorce can be granted.692 Thus, even in an undefended divorce, the full 
Ordinary procedure must be followed and affidavits from the pursuer and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  681	  Such	  as	  one	  year	  of	  separation	  with	  consent	  or	  two	  years	  without	  (OCR	  1993	  Rule	  33.73(1)(a));	  other	  grounds,	  such	  as	  unreasonable	  behavior	  or	  adultery,	  must	  be	  pursued	  in	  an	  “ordinary”	  divorce.	  682	  Ibid,	  Rule	  33.73(1)(d).	  683	  Ibid,	  Rule	  33.73(1)(f).	  684	  Ibid,	  Rule	  33.73(1)(g).	  685	  Ibid,	  Form	  F31	  or	  F33.	  686	  In	  terms	  of	  civil	  procedure,	  a	  simplified	  divorce	  is	  not	  an	  ordinary	  action	  but	  a	  form	  of	  summary	  application.	  687	  OCR	  1993,	  Rule	  33.76(4).	  688	  Ibid,	  Rule	  33.80(1).	  689	  Ibid,	  Rule	  33.78.	  690	  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/rules-­‐and-­‐practice/guidance-­‐notes/simplified-­‐divorce-­‐and-­‐dissolution-­‐of-­‐civil-­‐partnership-­‐guidance-­‐notes.	  	  691	  Get	  a	  Divorce,	  https://www.gov.uk/divorce/file-­‐for-­‐divorce.	  	  692	  Children	  (Scotland)	  Act	  1995	  s12.	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another party must be lodged along with the minute for decree.693 The 
requirement for affidavits makes it virtually impossible for a party litigant to 
divorce without at least some assistance from a solicitor.  
 
With the exception of the simplified divorce, family actions follow a version of 
the Ordinary Cause procedure and commencing an action requires drafting an 
initial writ. However, more active case management is applied to actions in 
relation to children. Many of these cases are not legally complex, and child 
welfare hearings (which all parties are generally required to attend personally, 
even if they are represented) give the litigants an opportunity to discuss matters 
with the judge.694 Matters may be resolved without the need for further 
procedure or a formal proof. Recently introduced rules also provide for quicker 
resolution and close management of actions involving children.695 The additional 
structure provided by judicial case management is likely to benefit party 
litigants, who are unlikely to know how best to steer the cases they are involved 
in. However, any benefit to the party litigant is incidental and not designed to 
make the process more accessible. 
 
4.5.6 Personal Injury 
 
Procedurally, personal injury actions present a particular challenge for party 
litigants. Parties are represented in the vast majority of these cases, and this is 
reflected in the procedure. Personal injury cases follow a streamlined procedure 
that places an emphasis on negotiations between parties and judicial case 
management. A personal injury case need never call in court, unless a proof is 
required.696 However, documentation such as valuations of claim and minutes of 
the required pre-proof conference must be lodged by prescribed dates. If this is 
not done, a hearing will automatically be fixed to explain the party’s default 
and decree by default or dismissal of the case could be granted. The emphasis 
on written pleadings and documentation, rigid deadlines, and the frequent need 
for medical reports or expert evidence in these cases make them particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  693	  OCR	  1993,	  Rule	  33.28(2).	  Many	  other	  forms	  of	  family	  action	  have	  a	  similar	  requirement	  for	  affidavit	  evidence.	  694	  OCR	  1993,	  Rule	  33.22AA.	  695	  Ibid,	  Chapter	  33AA.	  696	  OCR	  1993	  Chapter	  36,	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules	  Chapter	  42A	  -­‐43.	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difficult to undertake without the assistance of a solicitor.697 However, for the 
majority of parties who are represented, a quicker resolution is achieved and 
expenses are minimised. The commercial court procedure operates in a similar 
fashion.698  
 
4.5.7 Guidance and “Soft Law” 
 
 
While not law per se, it is worth noting the available guidance (or lack thereof) 
that affects the experience of the party litigant in the court process. For all 
procedures, as noted above, the rules of court are prescriptive, but not 
instructive; it would difficult for a party litigant to initiate even a small claim 
based on the rules alone. Guidance booklets were produced for the small claims 
and summary cause procedures, but when the simple procedure was introduced 
guidance was incorporated into the structure of the rules, including a glossary of 
terms.699 Guidance is available for the simplified divorce procedure, instructing 
parties on how to complete the forms and what to expect from the process.700 
Guidance is offered to party litigants involved in an Ordinary Action in the Court 
of Session701 but, curiously, not in the Sheriff Courts. There is no guidance for 
any other procedures, such as summary applications or family actions. Scottish 
civil procedure is complex and generally requires practice even for solicitors to 
navigate effectively.702 The lack of guidance for the party litigant could 
represent a real obstacle to pursuing his case. It should be noted, however, that 
the court is permitted to provide procedural advice, but not legal advice,703 so 
any guidance offered from the court must be limited to procedural matters. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  697	  See,	  for	  example,	  McLeod	  v	  Tayside	  Health	  Board	  [2014]	  CSOH	  141,	  JD	  v	  Lothian	  
Health	  Board	  [2017]	  CSIH	  27.	  698	  Court	  of	  Session	  Rules	  Chapter	  47,	  OCR	  1993	  Chapter	  40.	  	  699	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules,	  Part	  21.	  700	  Simplified	  Divorce	  Guidance,	  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/rules-­‐and-­‐practice/guidance-­‐notes/simplified-­‐divorce-­‐and-­‐dissolution-­‐of-­‐civil-­‐partnership-­‐guidance-­‐notes.	  701	  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-­‐source/scs-­‐-­‐-­‐taking-­‐action/raising-­‐and-­‐defending-­‐ordinary-­‐action-­‐in-­‐the-­‐cos100810.pdf?sfvrsn=2	  702	  See,	  for	  example,	  Hennessy	  at	  para	  1-­‐05.	  703	  See	  section	  7.7.1.	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The Law Society of Scotland’s Code of Conduct is also worth noting, as it sets 
out how solicitors should approach party litigants: 
 
“Where you appear against a person who represents him or herself, you must 
avoid taking unfair advantage of that person and must, consistently with your 
duty to your client, co-operate with the court in enabling that person's case to 
be fairly stated and justice to be done. However you must not sacrifice the 
interests of your client to those of the person representing him or herself.”704 
 
This imposes something of a positive duty on solicitors in respect of the party 
litigant, although this is a duty to the court, rather than the party litigant 
himself. On a similar note, the Scottish Civil Justice Council (the “SCJC”) has 
proposed creating additional guidance and a code of conduct for party 
litigants.705 However, this is described as a “medium-term” priority, which may 
take some time materialise as the SCJC copes with more pressing reforms. A 
code of conduct would represent an answer to the common complaint that party 
litigants, unlike solicitors, have no clear guidelines. However, as the SCJC has 
already noted,706 the enforceability of any code of conduct for party litigants is 
dubious at best. Unlike the Law Society’s code of conduct for solicitors, there is 
no threat of professional discipline to ensure compliance with rules. However, if 
a code of conduct is in place the court might feel more confident that party 
litigants are familiar with what is required of them and (perhaps more 
importantly) might consider that they cannot claim to be ignorant of the court’s 
expectations. 
 
4.5.8 Discussion: Policy and Procedure 
 
One point that emerges from the discussion above is that court procedures vary 
in accessibility for party litigants, sometimes by design. Although unsurprising, 
this is a matter that merits further consideration. Low-value claims and divorces 
not involving children are relatively procedurally simple and facilitated by clerks 
of court, while those who wish to pursue higher value claims or orders in respect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  704	  Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  Rule	  B1.13,	  1.13.4.	  705	  Interim	  Report	  on	  the	  ‘Making	  Justice	  Work	  1’	  Rules	  Rewrite	  Project	  by	  The	  Scottish	  Civil	  Justice	  Council	  Rules	  Rewrite	  Working	  Group,	  March	  2014	  at	  para	  62.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  SCJC’s	  most	  recent	  report	  on	  the	  Rules	  Rewrite	  Project,	  “The	  First	  Report”	  May	  2017;	  see	  section	  9.3.	  706	  Ibid.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   144	  
of children must be willing, and able, to educate themselves on the law and 
procedures that solicitors and advocates practice.  It is clear that in some areas, 
a choice has been made to make the civil courts more “party litigant-friendly.”  
 
The impact of public policy on civil procedure is often subtle, but nonetheless 
can have a great impact. The provisions of the Home Owner and Debtor 
Protection (Scotland) Act 2010 provide an illustrative example. The aim of the 
2010 Act is, as the title suggests, offering additional protections to homeowners 
facing repossession of their properties. It is a matter of common sense that 
homeowners already facing difficulties paying their mortgages are unlikely to be 
able to afford legal representation. One solution offered in the 2010 Act is to 
make lay representation available. The Act also changed the procedure for 
repossession under a standard security from an Ordinary Action to a summary 
application. The effect of this is more significant than it may initially appear. 
Previously decree would pass in absence if the homeowner failed to lodge a 
minute707 under section 1 of the Mortgage Rights (Scotland) Act 2001 seeking 
suspension of the standard security (usually seeking additional time to pay the 
arrears or sell the property). It was difficult for a party litigant to learn how to 
draft and serve a competent minute within the time allowed without legal 
assistance. If he managed it, the minute was served and the court usually 
ordered answers and a hearing.708  
 
Following the 2010 Act, the procedure is much simpler: a warrant to serve the 
application is granted only when prescribed pre-action protocols709 have been 
followed. The burden is therefore on the court to ensure that the appropriate 
notices have been served, rather than on the defender,710 who, if 
unrepresented, is unlikely to be familiar with the requirements. A hearing is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  707	  A	  notice	  of	  intention	  to	  defend	  could	  also	  be	  lodged,	  but	  as	  noted	  above	  these	  cases	  are	  usually	  quite	  straightforward	  in	  law	  and	  in	  most	  there	  will	  not	  be	  a	  defense	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  make	  payments	  under	  the	  standard	  security.	  	  708	  OCR	  1993	  Chapter	  14.	  709	  Home	  Owner	  and	  Debtor	  Protection	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2010	  s4.	  710In	  a	  summary	  application,	  the	  pursuer	  and	  defender	  are	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  applicant	  and	  respondent.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   145	  
fixed in the first instance,711 with no requirement for the defender to lodge 
anything in writing at this stage. The Sheriff can make enquiries at the hearing 
and, if appropriate, an order may be made for payment of the arrears in 
instalments, time to sell the property, or for further procedure. A form is also 
provided for any entitled residents of the property who wish to make 
representations.712  
 
Overall, these changes make it easier for party litigants to enter the process and 
make representations in these cases. While this, of course, does not guarantee 
they will be successful,713 it provides a starting point so that potentially 
unnecessary and, in terms of social policy, undesirable home repossessions may 
then be less likely to occur. It is important to add that this comes at the price of 
an increased workload and costs for the court and for the lender. The social 
aims and inherent imbalance of power between pursuer and defender in 
repossession cases perhaps justify the departure from a more “hands off” 
adversarial approach and this example suggests that procedural adjustments in 
targeted areas or certain types of case may be a tool to provide better access to 
the courts for party litigants.714 However, a sharp contrast can be seen between 
the forms of procedure discussed in this section that at least attempt to address 
the difficulties party litigants encounter navigating the court process,715 and the 
other forms (such as ordinary cause procedure) where there is an absence of 
concessions for party litigants in the rules. 
 
4.6 Vexatious Litigation 
 
Some of the ways that courts regulate party litigants in the civil court process 
have been considered above. For the vexatious litigant who habitually abuses of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  711	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  summary	  cause	  heritable	  procedure	  (Chapter	  31)	  that	  is	  raised	  to	  evict	  tenants	  from	  rented	  properties.	  Unlike	  other	  summary	  cause	  procedures,	  decree	  is	  not	  granted	  in	  absence	  and	  all	  cases	  must	  call	  in	  court.	  712	  Home	  Owner	  and	  Debtor	  Protection	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2010	  s5.	  713	  As	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  but	  particularly	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  there	  is	  still	  much	  for	  party	  litigants	  to	  contend	  with	  in	  the	  court	  process.	  714	  See,	  however,	  the	  discussion	  of	  party	  litigants	  and	  compliance	  with	  procedural	  requirements	  in	  section	  7.2.	  715	  Chapters	  8	  and	  9	  will	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  still	  a	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  more	  substantial	  policy	  direction	  on	  self-­‐representation.	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the court process, however, special measures are required. “Vexatious” is a 
term of art in law, referring to a particular species of litigant who raises 
frequent and unfounded claims. These litigants are not merely difficult or 
problematic, but habitually and persistently pursue hopeless cases; it has even 
been suggested “obsessive litigation” is indicative of underlying mental health 
difficulties.716  
 
The first laws addressing vexatious litigation were introduced in England in 
1896717 and, in virtually the same terms,718 two years later in Scotland.719 The 
Vexatious Actions (Scotland) Act 1898 allows the Lord Advocate to petition the 
Court of Session to make an order barring the litigant from instituting legal 
proceedings in any court without leave from the Lord Ordinary.720 Leave will be 
granted if the Lord Ordinary is satisfied that the proposed action is not vexatious 
and has prima facie grounds.721 Once in force, the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 
2014 then expanded the court’s power to make these orders. Under the 2014 
Act, the court is able to consider not only the institution of vexatious actions, 
but also vexatious applications in the course of an action not instituted by the 
litigant722 as well as actions instituted outside Scotland.723 
 
The 2014 Act will also enable the Scottish courts to make “vexatious behaviour” 
orders similar to England’s civil restraint orders. These orders may be sought by 
a vexatious litigant’s opponent or made ex proprio motu by a judge in any 
court.724 Unlike vexatious litigation orders, which can only prevent future 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  716	  International	  Bar	  Association,	  Judges	  Forum	  Session	  Report	  “Obsessed	  litigants—an	  important	  but	  neglected	  subject”	  September	  2005,	  http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=22F47040-­‐65B4-­‐4A82-­‐B4EB-­‐1D414B32E7A1.	  717	  Taggart	  M,	  “Alexander	  Chaffers	  and	  the	  Genesis	  of	  the	  Vexatious	  Actions	  Act	  1896”	  (2004)	  CLJ	  656.	  718	  There	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  overlap	  with	  the	  inherent	  powers	  already	  possessed	  by	  the	  courts;	  see	  the	  English	  case	  Ebert	  v	  Venvil	  [2000]	  Ch	  484.	  719	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  first	  order	  under	  the	  1898	  was	  not	  made	  until	  over	  half	  a	  century	  later,	  in	  1950;	  see	  Lord	  Advocate	  v	  Gracie	  [1951]	  SLT	  116.	  720	  Section	  1.	  	  721	  Ibid.	  722	  Courts	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2014,	  s101(1)(b);	  this	  eliminates	  an	  ambiguity	  which	  the	  defender	  unsuccessfully	  attempted	  to	  rely	  on	  in	  HM	  Advocate	  v	  Frost	  [2007]	  SLT	  345.	  723	  Ibid,	  s101(2).	  724	  Ibid,	  s102(4).	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actions, a vexatious behaviour order is more flexible and the judge dictates its 
terms. The order may require a litigant to seek permission of the court before 
taking a specified step in the litigation before the court or any other litigation, 
or before instituting new proceedings.725 Unlike a “vexatious litigation” order, 
which requires “habitual and persistent” litigation without reasonable grounds, a 
“vexatious behaviour” order can be made if vexatious proceedings are initiated 
or vexatious applications are made.726 The 2014 Act provides for the Scottish 
Ministers to make regulations to include, amongst other important elements, for 
how long these orders can be made.727 
 
Notably, “vexatious” is not defined in the 1898 or 2014 Acts. The Scottish courts 
have generally adopted the view that vexatious proceedings have little or no 
discernible legal basis, subject the opposing party to detriment out of proportion 
with any potential gain, and involve an abuse of the process of the court.728 As 
noted above, a litigant who is only difficult or even obstructive is unlikely to be 
considered vexatious. Judicial interpretation has often distinguished between 
actions that are vexatious, and those that are conducted vexatiously;729 the 2014 
Act now “catches” both.730 As noted above, there a degree of overlap between 
the court’s inherent powers and newer power to make vexatious behavior 
orders. There is no evidence that courts have previously been inclined to use the 
inherent powers to prevent vexatious behavior, so it will be very interesting 
indeed to see if, and how, they make vexatious behavior orders under the 2014 
Act. 
 
At present, there are only 10 individuals in Scotland subject to orders under the 
Vexatious Actions (Scotland) Act 1898. Most are very prolific before an order is 
made preventing any new cases. In one application under the 1898 Act heard in 
2013, a litigant had initiated or attempted to initiate no fewer than 15 
unsuccessful actions, with most of his grievances arising from his sequestration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  725	  Ibid,	  s102(2).	  	  726	  Ibid,	  s102(1)	  and	  (3).	  727	  Ibid,	  s102(4)(e).	  728	  HM	  Advocate	  v	  Frost,	  2007	  SLT	  345	  at	  para	  30,	  citing	  with	  approval	  Attorney	  
General	  v	  Barker	  [2000]	  1	  FLR	  761.	  729	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lord	  Advocate	  v	  McNamara	  [2009]	  CSIH	  45	  at	  para	  34-­‐35.	  730	  Under	  the	  2014	  Act,	  both	  vexatious	  litigation	  and	  vexatious	  behaviour	  orders	  can	  be	  made	  as	  a	  result	  of	  vexatious	  applications	  as	  well	  as	  instituting	  vexatious	  proceedings.	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in 1976.731 He eventually turned to suing public bodies, including the Chief 
Constable.732 In another case, a litigant was involved in only four cases, but each 
of these was prolonged, marked by a series of meritless appeals, and one 
involved arresting the bank account of a defender “to teach him a lesson”.733 A 
review of the reported cases under the 1898 Act reveals that these are common 
patterns. It is also common for the vexatious litigant to be bankrupt (many as 
the result of an earlier adverse award of expenses) ensuring that his opponent 
has no hope of recovering his expenses. Due to their extreme behaviour 
vexatious litigants, although rare, are undoubtedly memorable and thus receive 
what is perhaps a disproportionate amount of attention, compared to the more 
typical “one-off” party litigant.734  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
It is perhaps worthwhile to pause at this point to consider the overall picture of 
“party litigant law”. The provisions discussed above suggest that lawmakers and 
the courts have been careful not to create additional “rights” for party litigants 
beyond the fundamental right to self-represent. Lay assistance and lay 
representation, which are kept firmly within the discretion of the court, are 
examples of this approach. Another example is the rules for party litigants’ 
expenses, which, as noted above, were amended to introduce a test of 
“reasonableness” and widen the discretion of the auditor. Equally, judges are 
permitted to excuse a party litigant’s default or allow them more time to 
comply; a judge may also determine whether to dispose of a case summarily, 
order caution, or allow a case to proceed to proof or debate. The overarching 
theme is that of judicial discretion, rather than “rights” for the party litigant or 
even firm rules. With the exception of low-value claims, the adversarial nature 
of the process is preserved and there are few concessions for the party litigant.       
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  731	  HM	  Advocate	  v	  James	  Duff	  (2013)	  CSIH	  50.	  732	  Suing	  public	  bodies	  and	  the	  courts	  themselves	  when	  previous	  actions	  are	  unsuccessful	  is	  a	  fine	  tradition	  for	  vexatious	  litigants,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  very	  first	  of	  their	  kind;	  see	  Taggart,	  supra	  at	  note	  717.	  733	  Lord	  Advocate	  v	  Cooney	  [1984]	  SLT	  434.	  734	  See,	  for	  example,	  Genn	  2013	  at	  428.	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However, it must also be kept in mind that rules are often a blunt instrument, 
perhaps most of all where the unrepresented litigant is concerned. Each party 
litigant will present with a different level of skill, and each case will turn on its 
own facts and legal foundation. The rights of the party litigant’s opponent must 
also be considered. It is thus perhaps quite correct that the courts should answer 
the question of the party litigant not with an abundance of specific rules and 
procedures, but rather with judicial discretion and close case management. The 
next chapter will consider the case law to gain an insight into how judges use 
their discretion to deal with the issues raised by party litigants in their courts 
and how the interests of party litigants and their opponents are balanced. 
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Chapter 5: The Exercise of 
Discretion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, there is little direct regulation of the party 
litigant in the civil courts in the forms of statutory provisions or rules. Much of 
the treatment of party litigants is thus left to judicial discretion. This chapter 
will consider what the body of existing case law involving party litigants 
(referred to collectively in this chapter as the “case law”) can tell us about 
when and how courts address the exercise of discretion in relation to party 
litigants. It is worth noting that the case law in this area is often illustrative, 
rather than authoritative. As will become apparent by the end of this chapter, 
there is little real authority to guide the exercise of judicial discretion in 
relation to party litigants, particularly when considered in proportion to the 
number of additional decisions judges may be called upon to make due to a 
litigant’s unrepresented status.735 The Equal Treatment Bench Book736 (“ETBB”) 
also provides written guidance to the Scottish judiciary in relation to a variety of 
litigants, including those who are unrepresented. This guidance does not form 
part of the law per se, but provides some insight into what the judiciary views as 
a proper approach to party litigants. 
 
Discretion may be required on fundamental questions such as the standard of 
legal and procedural knowledge required of a party litigant in light of the 
litigant’s lack of legal training and education.737 The same lack of knowledge can 
also create the need for discretion in situational matters, most often in the form 
of extending latitude or assistance to a party litigant when they make errors or 
are unable to comply with the court’s requirements. This chapter will consider 
how courts have considered and addressed the more fundamental matters first. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  735	  Many	  of	  these	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  736	  http://www.scotland-­‐judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/EqualTreatmentBenchBookMay2014.pdf.	  737	  See	  section	  5.2	  below.	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Then the latter question of how courts have made decisions in relation to various 
forms of latitude and assistance, including procedural matters, legal matters and 
relevance, and delay, will be addressed. 
 
5.2 Party Litigants: The General Principles 
 
5.2.1 Legal and Procedural Knowledge  
 
One important question to consider is the standard of legal and procedural 
knowledge that the courts are entitled to expect of party litigants. In the 
Scottish civil courts, all litigants are expected to come to court with the legal 
and procedural knowledge necessary to conduct their case. Because the Scottish 
civil system is adversarial, all litigants are expected to present and prove a 
relevant case in law, as well as comply with the rules of procedure and 
evidence.738 The onus rests entirely on the litigant to prepare his case, and it is 
his responsibility to inform himself where there are gaps in his knowledge.739 The 
typical or “default” litigant is not a layperson, but a solicitor or advocate.740 In 
other words, the level of knowledge expected is likely to be met only by trained 
professionals. Strictly speaking, there is no “right” or entitlement in law to a 
lowering of this standard for a party litigant.  
 
The case of Gemmell v Marleybone Warwick and Balfour Group Plc741 is an 
interesting and illustrative case on the standard that can be required of party 
litigants. This appeal concerned a party litigant pursuer who sought to withdraw 
his minute of abandonment some eighteen months after it had been lodged. In 
terms of the procedure for withdrawing a minute of abandonment, the defender 
is entitled to seek decree of absolvitor if the pursuer cannot demonstrate that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  738	  See,	  for	  example,	  Wilkie	  v	  Direct	  Line	  Insurance	  plc	  [2009]CSIH	  70	  at	  para	  88.	  739	  Wilson	  v	  North	  Lanarkshire	  Council	  [2014]	  CSIH	  26.	  (Hereafter	  “Wilson”.)	  740	  This	  is	  often	  not	  explicitly	  stated,	  but	  implicit	  in	  the	  court’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  standard	  required	  of	  litigant;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Wilson.	  741	  [2012]	  CSIH	  57.	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the withdrawal was in good faith. Absolvitor was granted at first instance.742 On 
appeal, Lady Paton observed:- 
 
“For our part, we are willing to accept that the pursuer may not have been 
in mala fides as such: but if he did not properly understand the law, and if 
he has failed to demonstrate a valid reason for withdrawing his Minute of 
Abandonment, the sheriff was, in our view, entitled to reach the conclusion 
that he did.”743 
 
It is particularly interesting to note that the court considered the pursuer’s 
withdrawal of the minute of abandonment after so much time had elapsed 
bordered on an abuse of process; the question of whether this was deliberate or 
an error caused by his inexperience was irrelevant. Lady Paton’s observation 
that litigants must “properly understand” the law is particularly important, as it 
suggests that the party litigant may have an obligation not only to educate 
himself, but also to interpret the law correctly.744  
 
5.2.2 The Standard of Legal Relevance 
 
Legal relevance represents a perennial problem for the party litigant. Many of 
the difficulties encountered by unrepresented parties relate to relevance in 
some way. It is thus worthwhile to briefly consider what exactly is meant by 
“relevance” in Scottish civil procedure. As noted previously, much of the process 
is centred on written pleadings. Pleadings must contain a relevant case in law. It 
is not sufficient for a litigant to state only that he has been wronged, but he 
must also set out why the wrong gives rise to a cause of action in law. Some 
types of action are formulaic and require certain averments to be successful, 
and party litigants may be unaware of these requirements. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by example. In one case of medical negligence, party litigant pursuers 
failed in their case because they had failed to make averments to establish 
causation.745 To the parties, it perhaps appeared sufficient to plead that the 
medical staff had made errors and that the patient had died. However, without 
proper averments on causation, there was no relevant case in law. As a result, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  742	  Thus	  precluding	  the	  party	  litigant	  from	  re-­‐raising	  the	  action,	  as	  he	  wished	  to	  do.	  743	  Ibid,	  para	  16.	  744	  See	  section	  7.3.2.	  745	  McLeod	  v	  Tayside	  Health	  Board,	  [2014]	  CSOH	  141;	  the	  standard	  is	  as	  famously	  set	  out	  in	  Hunter	  v	  Hanley	  [1955]	  SC	  200.	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the cases of party litigants are often decided not on their merits, but rather on 
the issue of relevance or lack thereof.746  
 
Relevance is also an issue in court, both in submissions and the questioning of 
witnesses. When a case comes to proof, it is confined to what is contained in the 
written pleadings. Any matters outwith the pleadings should not be raised. 
Again, the issue of fair notice arises; litigants cannot introduce new issues or 
evidence at this stage. Party litigants are often unaware of these constraints. 
Lady Clark of Calton provided a particularly helpful summary of the underlying 
principles: 
 
“From the pursuer’s perspective as a layperson, he may find it difficult to 
understand the reasons why we have written pleadings and not merely a 
proof at large about any matter a party wishes to bring to the attention of 
the Court in the course of the proof. There are inevitable constraints as a 
result of legal pleadings and the rules relating to timeous intimation of a 
case. In my opinion, these constraints exist for good reasons. Some party 
litigants may struggle with written pleadings and legal rules in an 
adversarial system…Efforts have been made to assist [the pursuer] but the 
judge cannot act as a legal advisor to one of the parties. Our system is an 
adversarial system and the rules of pleading and the general principles 
cannot be ignored.”747 
 
Although it is perhaps commonplace in practice, strictly speaking any lowering 
of the established standard of knowledge and relevance for party litigants 
requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the judge and represents a 
form of latitude in its own right, albeit one that is particularly likely to be 
invisible to party litigants. The exercise of discretion in the form of latitude and 
assistance in particular aspects of the court process are considered in the next 
section. 
 
5.3 Latitude, Allowance and Assistance 
 
 5.3.1 “Moore” Latitude 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  746	  See	  section	  5.3.3	  below.	  747	  McGregor	  v	  Alpha	  Airports	  Group	  plc,	  [2011]	  CSOH	  81	  at	  para	  15.	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The case of Moore v Secretary of State for Scotland748 provides authority for the 
proposition that party litigants may be afforded a degree of “indulgence” or 
latitude in the presentation of their case.749 As this principle appears frequently, 
the precise nature of this form of indulgence merits further consideration. In 
Moore, a party litigant was permitted to address the court on issues not 
contained in his written pleadings, which were irrelevant and sought 
incompetent remedies.750 The opinion of the court states: 
 
“As the pursuer developed his argument it became apparent that he had 
done a great deal of research…Unfortunately much of this was irrelevant to 
the real legal issues in this case, but, in view of the intensity with which he 
presented his case and his obvious disability as a layman, we allowed him 
to range much wider than counsel would have been allowed to do in his 
presentation. In deciding the case, however, the court must confine itself 
to the appropriate legal issues.”751  
 
The court goes on to state that “indulgence” is often given to a party litigant, 
“so long as it does not result in an injustice to the other party.”752 The court 
thus allows the party litigant to make irrelevant arguments, but these arguments 
are not admitted to probation. The ETBB recognises the type of latitude 
discussed in Moore but adds, “[t]his does not mean that judges will allow 
irrelevant submissions which would not be permitted in the case of counsel or a 
solicitor.”753 (However, it must be noted that this appears to be exactly what 
occurred in Moore.) As any irrelevant arguments made are not factored into the 
court’s decision, this form of latitude does not truly assist the party litigant. A 
court need not even respond to or address irrelevant submissions in its 
judgment;754 the party litigant is thus “spinning his wheels” rather than making 
his case. Moore indulgence for the party litigant thus primarily serves the 
purpose of allowing the litigant to feel that he has been heard or “had his say”.  
 
It must also be considered that the alternative to indulging the party litigant in 
this manner is for the court to curtail his submissions or questioning of a witness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  748	  [1985]	  SLT	  38.	  749	  See,	  for	  example,	  MacPhail	  at	  para	  4.120.	  750	  Including	  what	  the	  court	  interpreted	  as	  a	  crave	  for	  declarator	  that	  he	  had	  been	  wrongly	  convicted	  for	  murder.	  751	  Moore	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland	  1985	  SLT	  38	  at	  page	  39.	  752	  Ibid,	  at	  page	  40.	  753	  ETBB,	  para	  12.11.	  754	  Wilson.	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The ETBB notes that it is often better not to interrupt, as this may make the 
party litigant “more nervous and insecure”.755 However, Moore latitude is still 
discretionary and it is within the judge’s power to regulate the party litigant’s 
conduct in court. This may include confining him to relevant submissions756 or 
limiting the questioning of a witness.757 Indeed, it has been observed that it is 
appropriate, and of assistance to the party litigant, for a judge to interrupt and 
guide him to focus his case on relevant matters.758  
 
However, the distinction between what is relevant and what is irrelevant can be 
a fine one. This is perhaps illustrated best in the cases of Baretdji v Baretdji759 
and Taylor v Taylor.760 In Baretdji, the party litigant defender was directed by 
the judge that he was not permitted to cross-examine his estranged wife with 
further questions concerning religion. On appeal, it was held that this evidence 
was wrongly excluded, as the issue of religion was material to the defender’s 
contention that religious differences were the real cause of the parties’ 
separation and inability to reconcile. It was noted in the appeal judgment that 
the judge at first instance may have been concerned that the witness had 
already been questioned at some length (and a slow pace) and that the judge 
may not have fully understood the point that the defender sought to make.761 
The facts of Taylor are similar, but in this case it was held that the defender 
was correctly curtailed in his questioning of his wife on religious matters (for 
example, on the question of whether God could heal their marriage762) because 
this line of questioning did not truly relate to the grounds for divorce, but 
spiritual matters on which the court could not rule. It is, as the court in Taylor 
notes, “difficult to draw precise boundary lines”763 in these matters. It may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  755	  ETBB,	  para	  12.20.	  756	  See,	  for	  example,	  Unity	  Trust	  Bank	  v	  Frost	  and	  anr,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Inner	  House)	  6	  February	  2011	  at	  para	  13.	  	  757	  Cairns	  v	  Torq	  Partnership	  Limited,	  unreported,	  Glasgow	  Sheriff	  Court,	  23	  March	  2000.	  758	  See,	  for	  example,	  Thomson	  v	  Harris	  and	  anr,	  unreported,	  Edinburgh	  Sheriff	  Court,	  2	  September	  2011.	  759	  [1985]	  SLT	  126.	  760	  [2000]	  SLT	  1419.	  761	  [1985]	  SLT	  126	  at	  page	  127.	  762	  2000	  SLT	  1419	  at	  page	  1424.	  763	  Ibid.	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necessary to hear the party litigant’s arguments in full—even if they ultimately 
prove to be irrelevant—to make a sound determination. 
 
5.3.2 Procedural Latitude and Assistance 
 
5.3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The ETBB acknowledges that party litigants often face difficulty navigating court 
procedures. The guidance suggests that judges should take extra steps to explain 
courtroom matters to party litigants in plain English, 764 as well as their 
judgment and any technical terms.765 It is suggested that clerks of court and 
advice agencies may also offer some assistance on procedural matters.766 
However, the ETBB is largely silent on the thornier issue of how the court should 
respond to procedural errors or default that occur due to the party litigant’s 
lack of knowledge of the procedures.767 There is also little said about if and 
when the court should assist the party litigant in procedural matters. The 
inherent power of the court to regulate procedure is wide-ranging.768 Procedural 
errors by party litigants may lead to adverse findings, including decree by 
default, but it is also within the court’s power to exercise its discretion to 
dispense with the consequences of error or default, or in some cases adjust the 
procedure altogether.  
 
5.3.2.2 Procedural Latitude 
 
Two important principles emerge in the consideration of procedural latitude and 
the party litigant. The first is that rules of court apply equally to party 
litigants.769 Ignorance of the law or procedure is not, in itself, an excuse for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  764	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  ETBB	  at	  para	  12.15.	  765	  Ibid,	  para	  12.22.	  766	  ETBB,	  para	  12.4.	  767	  An	  interesting	  exception	  in	  the	  ETBB	  is	  the	  suggestion	  that	  a	  judge	  may	  advise	  a	  party	  litigant	  of	  the	  need	  to	  seek	  leave	  to	  appeal	  (in	  decisions	  where	  this	  is	  required)	  “there	  and	  then”	  after	  the	  decision	  is	  made;	  see	  para	  12.27.	  768	  Newman	  Shopfitters	  Ltd	  v	  MJ	  Gleeson	  Group	  Plc	  [2003]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  83.	  769	  See,	  for	  example,	  Hamilton	  v	  Glasgow	  Community	  and	  Safety	  Services	  [2016]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  367.	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party litigant’s mistakes or procedural irregularities.770 The role of the judge is 
not to provide procedural advice.771 However, the second principle is that, while 
rules should generally be applied, a lack of legal representation may be a factor 
to excuse a minor failure to comply with a rule that results in little or no 
prejudice to the other party.772 Thus, for example, a relatively unimportant 
technical matter such as failing to properly incorporate documents into 
pleadings may be excused because a litigant is unrepresented.773  
 
However, again, there is no “right” to latitude and it can never be assumed that 
the party litigant’s procedural errors will be excused. It is within a judge’s 
discretion to grant decree against a party litigant on the basis of default 
alone,774 but other factors may be considered. The substance of a party litigant’s 
case may be one such factor. A party litigant may face greater difficulty in 
taking the necessary procedural steps to remedy errors in the legal elements of 
his case. Courts often extend latitude to party litigants in respect of procedural 
matters, but may factor the substance of the case into its decision. For 
example, in one case775 a party pursuer attempted to lodge a minute of 
amendment that was both late and incompetent; the Sheriff excused the 
lateness in respect that the pursuer was a party litigant, but dismissed the 
action because the substance of the minute was incompetent and irrelevant. In a 
similar decision,776 a party litigant lodged “answers” that did not comply with 
the procedural requirements, despite being told what was required by the court. 
It was observed that it could be unfair for the court to grant decree by default 
against a party litigant too quickly, but decree by default was granted after the 
judge was satisfied both that the party pursuer was in default and that there 
was no substance to her arguments. It is perhaps a matter of common sense that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  770	  See,	  for	  example,	  Henderson	  v	  The	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  [2011]	  CSIH	  71.	  771	  Wilson	  at	  para	  13.	  772	  Ibid.	  773	  See,	  for	  example,	  Todd	  v	  Scottish	  Qualification	  Authority,	  unreported,	  29	  June	  2001,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Inner	  House).	  774	  See	  also	  Bennett	  v	  The	  Scottish	  Down’s	  Syndrome	  Association,	  unreported,	  Aberdeen	  Sheriff	  Court,	  4	  November	  2003.	  775	  Moberly	  v	  Strathclyde	  Regional	  Council	  [1992]	  SLT	  799.	  776	  Clark	  v	  Hope	  [2006]	  SCLR	  90.	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amendment of the party litigant’s case will not be allowed if the case or 
amendment itself is fundamentally flawed or irrelevant.777 
 
Unsurprisingly, a party litigant may receive less latitude on a procedural matter 
when the principle of fair notice is engaged. Because party litigants are often 
unaware of the legal and factual requirements for their pleadings, amendment 
may be sought at a late stage of the proceedings, but amendments that come 
too late or seek to introduce a new basis for the case are generally not 
allowed.778 The case law indicates that this often results in something of a 
“catch-22” for the party litigant: as the case progresses, the process of litigation 
makes him aware of the deficiencies in his case,779 but he will not be allowed to 
introduce an amendment that comes too late,780 or introduces a new basis for 
the action in fact781 or in law.782 A strict approach is also taken with the 
requirement for fair notice of a party’s grounds of appeal (in other words, the 
basis of his contention that the judge at first instance erred) when initiating the 
appeal783 or lodging a note of argument.784 Failure to provide valid grounds of 
appeal is another common difficulty for party litigants, who often misunderstand 
the role of the appellate courts and the nature of the appeal process.785 While 
some allowance in form may be made when the appellant is a party litigant, an 
appeal is likely to be held to be incompetent if valid grounds are not 
provided.786 
 
The conduct of the party litigant in the proceedings as a whole has also been 
considered a factor in decisions on latitude in procedural matters, even when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  777	  See,	  for	  example,	  Smith	  v	  The	  Braer	  Corporation	  and	  ors,	  unreported,	  26	  May	  1999,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House);	  Fraser	  Trading	  Company	  and	  ors	  v	  Bank	  of	  Scotland,	  unreported,	  1	  December	  2000,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Inner	  House).	  778	  Pompey’s	  Trustees	  v	  The	  Magistrates	  of	  Edinburgh	  [1942]	  SC	  119.	  779	  See,	  for	  example,	  Laudanska	  v	  The	  University	  of	  Abertay,	  unreported,	  4	  November	  2003,	  Dundee	  Sheriff	  Court.	  780	  Campbell	  v	  The	  University	  of	  Edinburgh,	  unreported,	  14	  May	  2004,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House).	  781	  McGregor	  v	  Alpha	  Airports	  Group	  Plc	  [2011]	  CSOH	  81.	  782	  Crooks	  v	  Haddow	  [2000]	  SCLR	  755.	  783	  In	  Form	  A1	  of	  the	  OCR	  1993	  in	  the	  Sheriff	  Court.	  784	  Smith	  v	  The	  International	  Development	  Company	  (Aberdeen)	  Limited,	  unreported,	  26	  May	  2006,	  Aberdeen	  Sheriff	  Court;	  Percy	  v	  Govan	  Initiative	  Limited	  [2012]	  CSIH	  22.	  785	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  commentary	  of	  Sheriff	  Principal	  Derek	  Pyle	  in	  Krajciova	  v	  
Feroz,	  [2014]	  SCABE	  40	  at	  para	  4.	  786	  S	  v	  S	  [2003]	  SCLR	  261.	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the procedural default itself is relatively minor. In the Inner House decision 
Mullan v Les Brodie Transport Limited,787 it was held that granting decree of 
absolvitor against an unrepresented pursuer for failing to lodge an updated 
record was within the Sheriff’s discretion, although it was noted that this was 
“radical step, particularly in the case of a party litigant…”.788 The Sheriff’s 
decision was informed by his observation that the pursuer had protracted the 
litigation by failing or refusing to be represented, by the “wide-ranging” nature 
of her complaints, and by inconsistent accounts presented to the court, which 
the Sheriff considered amounted overall to an abuse of the court process.789 In 
another case,790 a party litigant’s “dilatory, if not cavalier”791 approach to the 
rules of court was a factor in the decision to uphold the granting of decree by 
default for failure to lodge defences. 
 
5.3.2.3 Procedural Assistance 
 
In some circumstances, particularly where procedural matters are concerned, 
courts have found themselves in a position where allowing latitude to the party 
litigant is the only option to preserve the fairness of the process. This may entail 
shifting procedural burdens to the party litigant’s opponent or the court, thus 
extending into assistance even though, strictly speaking, the court should not be 
seen to assist one party over another. At times, such assistance may be offered 
by a represented opponent; for example, a represented defender may be asked 
or may volunteer to produce the record when the pursuer is unrepresented.792 A 
represented party may take the pragmatic step of advising the party litigant on 
court procedures in the hopes of minimising any future delay.793 While this sort 
of accommodation may be made for convenience, the court may be placed in a 
position where there is little choice but to extend procedural assistance to the 
party litigant to preserve the appearance of fairness. This may occur when a 
party litigant attempts to lodge a document that is not in the correct format. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  787	  [2005]	  CSIH	  9.	  788	  Ibid	  para	  12.	  789	  Mullan	  v	  Les	  Brodie	  Transport	  Limited	  [2005]	  CSIH	  9	  at	  para	  7.	  790	  General	  All	  Purpose	  Plastics	  Ltd	  v	  Young	  [2017]	  SAC	  (Civ)	  30.	  791	  Ibid,	  per	  Sheriff	  Principal	  Stephen.	  792	  See,	  for	  example,	  Thomson	  v	  Rush,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House),	  12	  May	  2000.	  793	  See,	  for	  example,	  McGeever	  v	  Nicol,	  [2012]	  CSOH	  115	  at	  para	  4.	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The court may then accept such a document794 or extend procedural deadline ex 
proprio motu795 to ascertain the party’s true intentions.  
 
In at least one case, it has been suggested that the court may even have a 
positive duty to notify a party litigant of a significant procedural failing. In East 
Lothian Council v Crane,796 Sheriff Principal MacPhail recalled a decree against a 
party litigant defender that had been granted at debate because she did not 
have any pleas-in-law or denial of the pursuer’s averments. The Sheriff Principal 
noted “In my opinion, the formal defects in the defender’s pleadings could with 
advantage have been considered at the options hearing…It would have been 
preferable for the court to encourage the remedying of those formal 
defects…rather than to pronounce decree against the defender on points of 
pleading which the average party litigant could not be expected to meet on his 
or her own initiative.”797 However, it can be said that the basis for the decision 
to interfere with the Sheriff’s exercise of discretion in granting decree at first 
instance is not entirely clear. The Sheriff Principal suggests that it is in the 
“spirit” of the rule798 for the Sheriff to “take an active part in focusing the 
matters truly in dispute” as well as an appropriate exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court to “do justice between parties”.799 However, this 
decision appears to be firmly at odds with the established principle, which has 
been discussed at length above, that the party litigant is responsible for his or 
her own case and that the court is not required to intervene. In light of the 
principles established in more authoritative decisions, there is little basis in law 
for the sort of positive duty on the courts that Crane suggests. 
 
5.3.3 Latitude in Law and Relevance 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  794	  See	  the	  commentary	  of	  Lord	  Hodge	  in	  Service	  Temps	  Inc	  v	  Macleod	  and	  anr,	  [2013]	  CSOH	  162	  at	  para	  17.	  In	  Jamie	  Boyd	  v	  Mark	  Fortune	  [2014]	  CSIH	  93,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  an	  appeal	  which	  had	  not	  been	  marked	  in	  compliance	  with	  OCR	  Rules	  31.3	  was	  nonetheless	  accepted	  by	  the	  Sheriff	  Court.	  795	  Kaur	  or	  Singh	  v	  Singh,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  22	  July	  2005.	  796	  Unreported,	  Haddington	  Sheriff	  Court	  23	  December	  2003.	  797	  Ibid,	  para	  5.	  798	  Referring	  to	  OCR	  Rule	  9.12.	  799	  Crane,	  at	  para	  5.	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5.3.3.1 Introduction 
 
The question of relevance in the conduct of the party litigant’s case, or Moore 
latitude, has been considered above. However, this is only one aspect of the 
issue of relevance. This section considers how the courts address issues of 
relevance in law. The standard of legal relevance required of all litigants has 
been noted above, but it is worthwhile to consider what this means in practice. 
To the layperson, the function of the courts and the civil legal process is often 
difficult to understand. As legal professionals know, the Scottish civil courts do 
not make rulings at large as to who is “right” or “wrong” in a given situation and 
can only make a decision on legal principles. The court also does not have the 
power to make any order it sees fit, but can only offer competent and 
appropriate remedies.800 Judges are not permitted to decide a case on grounds 
not raised in court when the opposing party has not been given fair notice.801 
The courts have been quite clear on the point that the judge cannot act as the 
party litigant’s legal advisor.802 The position is further complicated by the high 
standard of legal relevance expected by the Scottish civil courts, including the 
requirement for sufficient specification in the pleadings.803  
 
5.3.3.2 General Considerations and the ETBB 
 
As noted above,804 the high standard of relevance and restriction of an action to 
its written pleadings applies equally to party litigants and legal professionals.805 
Relevance is essentially the first “hurdle” in an action, but it is also the most 
technical requirement. It is thus unsurprising that the case law reveals that the 
actions of party litigants commonly fail on the issue of relevance, rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  list	  of	  incompetent	  and	  irrelevant	  remedies	  sought	  in	  RK,	  
Petitioner	  [2007]	  CSOH	  104	  (from	  para	  8).	  801	  Kay’s	  Tutor	  v	  Ayrshire	  and	  Arran	  Health	  Board	  [1986]	  SLT	  435	  at	  440;	  see	  MacPhail	  at	  par	  4.112.	  802	  Wilkie	  v	  Direct	  Line	  Insurance	  Plc	  [2009]	  SCLR	  853.	  803	  See,	  for	  example,	  Singh	  v	  Brian	  Napier	  QC,	  unreported,	  Edinburgh	  Sheriff	  Court,	  29	  July	  2011,	  at	  page	  7.	  804	  Section	  5.2.	  805	  This	  section	  refers	  to	  actions	  that	  are	  not	  within	  the	  low-­‐value	  claims	  procedures.	  In	  low-­‐value	  claims,	  the	  requirements	  are	  less	  stringent	  and	  it	  is	  for	  the	  Sheriff	  to	  note	  the	  points	  of	  law	  arising	  in	  the	  claim.	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questions of substantive law or fact.806 Ironically, at the same time, party 
litigants are also often criticised for narrating irrelevant facts and producing 
long and unwieldy pleadings.807 In other words, these party litigants are 
providing a lot of information, but not the “right” information, to the courts. 
 
The ETBB’s observations on this matter highlight these difficulties and offer 
some guidance on the proper approach. It is clear that, again, judicial discretion 
plays a significant, if not necessary, role: 
 
“A much more difficult question arises, however, in circumstances (which 
are not uncommon) where it appears that a party litigant may have some 
sort of stateable case, but has failed to express it in the pleadings. The 
question in such circumstances is whether a judge has a duty, or is even 
entitled, to assist the party litigant to develop and to express his or her 
case. The inevitable, though somewhat unsatisfactory, answer to that 
question is that it will be a matter of degree, and will depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case. It also has to be said that this is an 
area where different judges are likely to hold different views. In a simple 
situation, where a party litigant does not make reference to the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, it may be appropriate for the judge to decide the case by 
reference to that statute notwithstanding that it had not been specifically 
mentioned by the party litigant…On the other hand, if a party litigant has a 
case which appears to be plainly irrelevant, it is thought that there is no 
duty on a judge to offer any suggestions as to how it might be made 
relevant.”808 
 
As these observations suggest, the problem of legal relevance gives rise to two 
questions for the judge: can the judge assist a party litigant in legal matters, 
and must the judge assist? The ETBB answers the first question: the judge can 
assist the party litigant to a degree under some circumstances, when there is no 
ambiguity around the legal point to be made. However, the ETBB notes, but 
does not elaborate on, the second question of whether a judge has a duty to 
assist, apart from the suggestion that intervention “may be appropriate.” This is 
perhaps answered by omission, as the ETBB does not refer to any authority that 
establishes an outright duty to assist. It could be that such a duty could arise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  806	  As	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  examples	  given	  below.	  807	  CMEC	  v	  David	  Roy	  (2013)	  CSIH	  105;	  in	  Ecclesiastical	  Insurance	  Office	  plc	  v	  
Whitehouse-­‐Grant-­‐Christ	  [2015]	  CSOH	  23,	  the	  court	  notes	  that	  a	  party	  litigant	  defender’s	  answer	  on	  the	  point	  of	  prescription	  in	  the	  record	  was	  160	  pages	  long.	  808	  ETBB,	  para	  12.21.	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from general principles809 of fairness810 if a deficiency in the party litigant’s case 
is both minor and patently obvious. The ETBB is clear that there is no duty when 
the party litigant’s case is plainly irrelevant, but does not specify when such a 
duty could arise. 
 
5.3.3.3 Assistance, Allowance and the “Latent Case” 
 
What legal and procedural options do courts have when a party litigant presents 
with a plainly irrelevant case, or a case riddled with deficiencies in the 
pleadings? The first and perhaps most obvious is to adhere to established 
standard and rules of relevance. In other words, the judge looks only at the 
litigant’s pleadings and only as they are stated, inevitably resulting in the failure 
of the litigant’s case. This is, strictly speaking, the “default” position. As the 
ETBB notes, the decision to exercise discretion on this question is a matter of 
degree. The body of party litigant cases suggests that a case that is difficult to 
understand or plainly without merit is likely to attract little or no judicial 
intervention.811 It is sometimes apparent that the party litigant was almost 
entirely unaware of the legal requirements of the case he is seeking to make; 
the eventual judgment in such a case is thus likely to read primarily as a list of 
the averments he has failed to make.812 At other times the party litigant himself 
may realise that his case is ill-founded as the action progresses and his opponent 
makes legal arguments.813  
 
Another possibility is for the judge to step outside the court process itself to 
encourage the party litigant to seek legal advice or undertake further research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  809	  Unlike	  the	  English	  courts,	  the	  Scottish	  courts	  do	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  “over-­‐riding	  objective”,	  although	  the	  Rules	  Committee	  has	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  introducing	  guiding	  principles.	  	  810	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  Crane	  case	  discussed	  above,	  but	  this	  case	  was	  concerned	  with	  a	  procedural	  matter,	  which,	  as	  discussed	  below,	  generally	  attracts	  a	  wider	  degree	  of	  latitude	  from	  the	  courts.	  811	  See,	  for	  example,	  Singh	  v	  Brian	  Napier	  QC,	  unreported,	  Edinburgh	  Sheriff	  Court,	  29	  July	  2011;	  RK,	  Petitioner,	  [2007]	  CSOH	  104;	  Krajciova	  v	  Feroz,	  [2014]	  SCABE	  40;	  CMEC	  
v	  David	  Roy	  [2013]	  CSIH	  105;	  Duff	  v	  Merrick	  Homes	  Limited,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  18	  March	  2003.	  812	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  cases	  cited	  above,	  Dunn	  v	  Roxburgh	  [2013]	  CSOH	  42	  offers	  a	  particularly	  characteristic	  example.	  813	  See,	  for	  example,	  The	  Advocate	  General	  for	  Scotland	  v	  Shepherd,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  10	  July	  2001.	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himself.814 It has been suggested in English research that referring the party 
litigant to a solicitor or Citizen’s Advice Bureau may be viewed as an “escape 
valve” for the courts.815 While the court cannot force the party litigant to take 
legal advice, it is protected from the appearance of outright unfairness to some 
degree by ensuring that the party litigant is aware that legal advice is needed. 
(Of course, whether or not the litigant can get access to and afford legal advice 
is another matter.)  
 
The judge also has the option to exercise his discretion to make some form of 
allowance for the party litigant. For example, the judge may take it upon 
himself to undertake an extra level of scrutiny to a represented opponent’s 
submissions,816 ensuring that the opponent’s submissions do not go unchallenged 
due to the party litigant’s ignorance of the law. Another option for the judge is 
to “look behind” the party litigant’s pleadings. “Looking behind” can take 
several forms, but often essentially means that the judge is looking beyond a 
strict reading of the pleadings. In some cases, the judge may excuse a party 
litigant’s failure to use correct terminology or properly formulate a legal 
principle in his pleadings. Even if the party litigant has not used the correct 
wording to make a legal point, it is accepted as if he did. For example, where 
the relevant legal formula required a party litigant pursuer to aver that her 
condition was “sufficiently serious,” a Sheriff noted “I am satisfied that although 
the pursuer has not used the specific words ‘sufficiently serious’, that was what 
she was in effect saying at pages 21 and 22 of the Record”.817 The judge may go 
further and translate the party litigant’s averments of fact into legal principles. 
Thus, for example, a party litigant’s pleadings were interpreted to amount to a 
case of negligence based on direct and vicarious liability,818 despite the absence 
of the usual supporting pleadings.819 In another example, a defence in an action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  814	  See,	  for	  example,	  RK,	  Petitioner,	  [2007]	  CSOH	  104	  at	  para	  3.	  815	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton.	  816	  See,	  for	  example,	  The	  Right	  Honourable	  Dame	  Elish	  Angioloini	  QC	  v	  Green	  [2013]	  CSOH	  196	  at	  para	  34.	  817	  Per	  Sheriff	  Reith	  QC	  in	  MacKay	  v	  Scottish	  and	  Southern	  Energy,	  unreported,	  Perth	  Sheriff	  Court,	  13	  March	  2000.	  818	  Campbell	  v	  The	  University	  of	  Edinburgh,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  14	  May	  2004.	  819	  See	  also	  Fitchie	  v	  	  Worsnop,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Inner	  House)	  23	  January	  2004.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Sheriff	  identified	  that	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  party	  pursuer’s	  case	  was	  not	  negligence	  as	  pled,	  but	  rather	  defamation.	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of defamation was looked at “in the most favourable way possible” and found to 
amount to the legal concepts of veritas and fair comment,820 despite the 
absence of the necessary pleas-in-law.821 This exercise can also be referred to as 
identifying a “latent” case.822 A “latent” case or defence can be said to exist 
when the pleadings suggest that the litigant may have a relevant case in law, 
but the case is not formally made out in the pleadings. 
 
At times “looking behind” the pleadings may go a step further to identify a legal 
test and then searching the pleadings for averments that may satisfy it. In 
Prentice v Sandeman,823 the party litigant pursuer sought compensation for 
professional negligence after his solicitor had missed the deadline to lodge an 
appeal in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Lord Stewart was “prepared to treat 
the bald averment of professional negligence as satisfying the requirement of 
relevancy”824 due to the particular circumstances of the case. A similar approach 
was taken in Houston, petitioner.825 Here, Lord Menzies wrote, “While I make 
allowance for the fact that the petitioner is a party litigant, nonetheless there 
are no averments whatsoever in the petition which might amount to a relevant 
case of fraud or bad faith”.826 In this context, the notion of “allowance” appears 
to refer to a broad interpretation of the pleadings and thus, to some extent, 
setting aside the requirement of specification. In another case, a sheriff went a 
step further to allow a party defender to introduce a defence not contained in 
the pleadings at proof on the basis that “the defender’s position was plain from 
the history between the parties.”827 
 
As noted above, the party litigant’s inexperience sometimes leads the court to 
shift some of the “work” in the process from the party litigant to represented 
opponents. This may be as simple as counsel for the represented party taking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  820	  The	  Right	  Honourable	  Dame	  Elish	  Angioloini	  QC	  v	  Green	  [2013]	  CSOH	  196	  at	  para	  40.	  821	  Ibid,	  para	  41.	  822	  McLeod,	  below,	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  a	  “latent	  claim”.	  823	  [2012]	  SCLR	  451.	  824	  Ibid,	  para	  34.	  This	  is	  the	  correct	  approach,	  but	  it	  is	  notable	  because	  the	  points	  of	  law	  are	  being	  made	  by	  the	  judge,	  when	  they	  should	  have	  been	  clearly	  set	  out	  in	  the	  pleadings.	  825	  [2007]	  CSOH	  44.	  826	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  17.	  827	  Per	  Sheriff	  Anwar	  in	  McWilliams	  v	  Russell	  [2017]	  SC	  GLA	  64.	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extra care to make their submissions clear and easy for the party litigant to 
follow.828 Represented opponents may also be called upon to explain the party 
litigant’s case to the judge.829 McLeod and Ors v Tayside Health Board830offers a 
particularly striking example. In this case, the pursuers were party litigants and 
counsel represented the defence. Counsel for the defence moved for the court 
to dismiss the action for lack of relevancy, but also offered to examine the 
pursuer’s productions, so that “…if any of these revealed a semblance of a case 
he would draw this to the attention of the court and try to assist the pursuers if 
he could…”.831 It is significant that the defender’s counsel is looking not only at 
the pursuer’s averments, but also the evidence they have presented in the 
productions. One wonders just how matters would have proceeded if counsel for 
the defence had in fact detected a “latent claim” in the pursuer’s productions—
a claim that he would then have to defend.  
 
Mazur v Primrose and Gordon832 presents another aspect of the concept of the 
“latent” claim. In this case, the party litigant was advised by the judge at first 
instance and at each of two appeal stages that, while he had been unsuccessful 
in the current action, the facts of the case suggested that he might have a cause 
of action against another party. This is particularly interesting in light of the 
fact that the court was under no obligation to consider anything other than the 
case before it. It appears that the judges were sympathetic enough to the party 
litigant to advise him that he may have a “latent case” elsewhere. An 
important, but at times subtle point to consider in most cases of “looking 
behind” a party litigant’s case is that it is usually restricted to the pleadings 
already lodged by the litigant. Cases like Mazur and McLeod are significant 
because the judges here have expressed a willingness to interpret not only 
existing pleadings, but also the evidence and circumstances as a whole.  
 
5.3.3.4 Discussion 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  828	  See,	  for	  example,	  The	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  plc	  v	  Hill	  [2012]	  CSOH	  110.	  829	  See,	  for	  example,	  Green	  v	  The	  Lord	  Advocate,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Inner	  House)	  27	  June	  2003	  at	  para	  2.	  830	  [2014]	  CSOH	  41.	  831	  Ibid,	  para	  11.	  832	  [2015]	  CSIH	  8.	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From the layperson’s point of view, restricting the case to the pleadings as 
lodged could make the process appear artificial and overly technical. Drafting 
concise and relevant legal pleadings is a skill that even legal professionals often 
struggle with.833 For the party litigant, another paradox emerges on the question 
of relevance. On one hand, without legal training, the party litigant often does 
not know what facts or legal principles are relevant and essential to his case. He 
thus runs the risk of not providing these in his pleadings, as many of the cases 
discussed above demonstrate. A common theme in many of the cases discussed 
in this section is that many party litigants simply do not understand what is 
expected of them not only in court, but also and perhaps more importantly, in 
the formulation and articulation of their case in law. 
 
What may be most interesting about all the examples from case law provided 
above is that, for all of the varying degrees of allowance or assistance provided 
(or not provided) to the party litigant, the unrepresented litigant was ultimately 
unsuccessful in every one of these actions. There is thus little evidence that 
latitude or “looking behind” offers substantive assistance to the party litigant. 
Or, in a more cynical view, the court is more likely to narrate how it has “looked 
behind” the pleadings when it is clear there is nothing to find. To explain how 
the court has come to decision about the failure of a party litigant’s case—and 
thus justifies its own decision--is one thing, but to advise the litigant on how his 
case should be made is quite another. Again, this form of latitude seems to 
protect the court more than it genuinely assists the litigant. 
 
5.3.4 Rules of Evidence 
 
The ETBB suggests that a litany of problems can occur when party litigants are 
called upon to give evidence. Party litigants may not understand the need to 
have important facts “spoken to” by other witnesses, the need to lodge 
productions into evidence, or for expert testimony:834 “[Party litigants] may be 
surprised when they are told that it is not good enough for them simply to say ‘If 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  833	  See,	  for	  example,	  Zuckerman	  A,	  “Reform	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Lawyers’	  Interests”	  
supra	  at	  page	  69.	  	  834	  ETBB,	  para	  12.5.	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you phone up Mr Smith he will confirm what I have been saying’”.835 The ETBB 
suggests that, when a judge encounters the party litigant at an early stage of 
the proceedings, he may wish to “offer some general information and advice 
regarding the next stage or stages of his case. For example…it is likely to be 
helpful if the judge were to offer some explanation about the need to bring 
witnesses to the proof and to lodge any documentary or other productions which 
are likely to be required at that stage.”836  
 
The ETBB is likely to offer early intervention as an attractive option because, 
when problems do materialise, the issues around extending latitude to party 
litigants on evidential matters are particularly thorny. On some matters, latitude 
may simply not be an option. The court cannot consider evidence that is not 
properly presented. As observed in the Wilson case,837 “…it is not open to a 
judge at first instance to overlook the laws of evidence, which can be complex, 
in order to support or bolster an unrepresented party’s case.”838 The party 
litigant pursuer in Wilson encountered several difficulties in the presentation of 
his case due to his ignorance of the rules of evidence. Perhaps the most 
fundamental is the need to have productions either spoken to by a witness or 
agreed between parties by way of joint minute.839 The pursuer also wished to 
use academic articles to challenge the testimony of the defender’s expert 
witness, but did not appreciate the need to have these articles spoken to by a 
witness.840 Evidence was also excluded because it had not been foreshadowed in 
the litigant’s pleadings.841  
 
However, in some cases judges have allowed party litigants’ evidence to be 
received (or presented under reservation) despite objections that it did not 
comply with rules of evidence. In one such case,842 a party defender sought to 
play a tape recording in an attempt to rebut expert medical testimony that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  835	  Ibid.	  836	  ETBB,	  para	  12.14.	  837	  Wilson.	  838	  Ibid,	  per	  Lord	  Menzies	  at	  para	  14.	  	  839	  Ibid,	  para	  14.	  	  840	  Ibid,	  para	  15.	  841	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  35;	  see	  also	  Duncan	  v	  Duncan,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  7	  June	  2000,	  at	  para	  8	  and	  CR	  or	  D	  v	  ARD	  [2005]	  CSOH	  88	  at	  para	  19.	  842	  Boyle	  and	  anr	  v	  Wilson	  and	  ors,	  unreported,	  Court	  of	  Session	  (Outer	  House)	  12	  March	  1999.	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writer of a will lacked the capacity to test. The tape was heard in court despite 
the pursuer’s objection that it should have been played during their expert’s 
cross-examination, the judge noting that “this omission is perhaps 
understandable given that the defender is a party litigant”.843 As the judge 
ultimately determined that the tape did not cast doubt on the expert’s 
evidence, the question of the pursuer’s objection and the admissibility of the 
tape despite the defender’s “understandable omission” were not addressed. In 
another case, a judge allowed a party pursuer’s set of “accounts” to be lodged 
at the bar, late and not properly presented as productions, despite the 
defender’s objections, but ultimately did not consider the documents because 
they were not relevant to the pursuer’s pleadings.844 This sort of exercise is 
similar to Moore latitude in that it allows the litigant’s evidence to be “heard”, 
but ultimately the court still did not admit or allow evidence outwith the rules 
and there was no impact on the outcome of the case. 
 
Within the context of the law as it relates to the party litigant, the case law 
suggests that rules of evidence occupy a place conceptually between procedure 
and substantive matters. They do not form a part of the party litigant’s case in 
law, and the court thus has some scope, as suggested by the ETBB, to advise the 
party litigant of the procedural necessities. However, as with relevance, it is not 
open to the court simply to dispense with the party litigant’s requirement to 
comply with the formalities of the rules of evidence as it may in purely 
procedural matters. 
 
5.3.5 Latitude and Assistance: Discussion 
 
The question of “latitude” for the party litigant is often presented as a singular 
notion. However, while the case law rarely offers firm legal tests or rules, it 
does indicate that latitude is more properly considered as a spectrum. The 
courts are most free to offer Moore latitude to the party litigant, but this is also 
the form of allowance that offers the least substantive assistance. The scope is 
narrowed considerably for procedural latitude, and further still in respect of 
relevance. Although the rules of evidence are closely observed, the judge is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  843	  Ibid,	  at	  page	  7.	  844	  Duncan	  v	  Duncan,	  unreported,	  at	  paras	  5	  and	  8.	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freer, if he sees fit, to offer the party litigant more useful advice on evidential 
procedure. Overall, there are occasions when a judge may assist the party 
litigant, but there is little in the case law or the ETBB that requires the judge to 
assist. The single exception to this rule is the case of East Lothian Council v 
Patricia Crane, discussed above. However, this case does not sit well with the 
determinations of higher courts and may better reflect a sympathetic approach 
to an individual party litigant rather than the established law in this area.  
 
The case law also discloses that, while positive duties or a “right” to latitude for 
party litigants cannot be found to exist in law, they are very much alive in the 
minds of many party litigants. The Wilson845 case provides a characteristic 
example, as much of the party pursuer’s appeal was concerned with his unmet 
expectations as a party litigant: “Time and again Mr Wilson observed that he was 
unrepresented, while the defenders were represented by senior and junior 
counsel instructed by solicitors, and ‘one would have hoped the court would 
show a little more sympathy in this regard’. He complained that the Lord 
Ordinary did not suggest to him that he might seek to recall a witness, and that 
he failed to give procedural advice to him.”846 This is not, as both the Wilson 
case and the others discussed in this section demonstrate, the role of the court 
or an obligation the court holds towards party litigants. In another particularly 
illustrative example, a party litigant argued that the Sheriff should have 
informed him that he may have had grounds to dispute jurisdiction, even though 
he had marked on his response form that he did not intend to do so.847 There is 
no duty on the court to provide any such advice, and indeed it would usually be 
inappropriate to do so.  
 
5.4 Adjournments and Delay 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  845	  Wilson.	  846	  Ibid,	  per	  Lord	  Menzies	  at	  para	  12.	  847	  Lindsays	  WS	  v	  Senior-­‐Milne	  [2011]	  GWD	  28-­‐625.	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The amount of time required for cases in the civil courts to proceed and 
conclude has been the subject of increased scrutiny over the last several years. 
Perhaps most notably, it was held in Anderson v UK that excessive delay in a 
civil action amounts to a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR.848 In extreme cases, 
prolonging or failing to pursue a case may be considered an abuse of process.849 
Delays often occur, of course, regardless of whether or not parties are 
represented. This section examines delay and requests for adjournment (often 
referred to as “continuation” or “continuing” a case in the Scottish courts) that 
are related directly to the party litigant’s unrepresented status. The ETBB 
recognises that it may be appropriate to offer a short adjournment if 
unanticipated problems arise in the course of a hearing, to allow a party litigant 
time to consider matters or consult with a lay assistant.850 However, more 
significant delays may occur when the party litigant seeks time to obtain legal 
advice, or is unable to attend court for medical reasons. The decision of whether 
to allow a case to be adjourned or delayed is another matter within the judge’s 
discretion.851 
 
5.4.2 Legal Advice 
 
A party litigant may seek additional time to obtain legal advice or 
representation, or apply for legal aid, after a case is well underway. An 
adjournment is usually sought by way of motion, either in court or lodged for 
consideration in chambers. In practice, a continuation for legal advice may be 
granted (or even suggested by the judge) if it is sought at an appropriate 
stage.852 In Terence Connelly v Whitbread plc,853 the court suggested that a 
continuation for legal representation would be considered even at a late stage 
of the appeals process.854 It was noted that the party litigant’s lack of 
representation was “unfortunate” and that his late presentation of evidence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  848	  Anderson	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	  Application	  No.	  19859/04.	  849	  Tonner	  v	  Reiach	  and	  Hall	  [2008]	  SC	  1.	  850	  ETBB	  paras	  12.16	  and	  12.18.	  851	  See,	  for	  example,	  Scottish	  Ministers	  v	  Stirton	  and	  Anderson	  [2014]	  SC	  218.	  852	  See,	  for	  example,	  Clark	  v	  Hope	  and	  anr,	  [2006]	  SCLR	  98	  and	  Young,	  Petitioner	  [2007]	  CSOH	  194.	  	  853	  [2012]	  CSOH	  51.	  854	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  5.	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may have had a bearing on the case.855 This reflects the “escape valve” 
approach noted above; the court has identified that the party litigant may have 
a valid case, but it is unable to advise him how to meet the technical 
requirements.856  
 
In certain cases, the court has a duty to raise the issue of legal advice. When a 
litigant in a civil case is suspected of contempt of court, he should be advised of 
the need for legal advice, as he may face penalties including fines and 
imprisonment.857 On a practical level, legal advice may also ensure that an 
intractable party litigant is aware of the gravity of the need to comply with 
court orders. For example, in F v H858 an unrepresented litigant repeatedly 
refused to comply with a contact order. The case was adjourned a number of 
times for her to receive legal advice before a sentence was finally handed down. 
Even after a custodial sentence was imposed, it was suspended for a period to 
allow the litigant one last chance to obtain legal advice.859 
 
While courts may be inclined to allow or even encourage party litigants to take 
time to secure legal advice or representation, the court is not obliged to allow a 
party litigant time to seek legal advice or representation whenever he sees fit. 
The leading case on this point is Scottish Ministers v Stirton and Anderson.860 
Here, a party litigant appealed the decision at first instance to refuse his motion 
to adjourn the on-going proof in the case to allow him to obtain legal 
representation. It was held that it was the party litigant’s responsibility to 
conduct his own case, inclusive of the decision to seek legal advice at an 
appropriate stage. In the opinion of the court, Lord Carloway stated, “It is, of 
course, generally to be expected that a party litigant will have less of an 
understanding of the law attaching to the proceedings than any legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  855	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  24.	  856	  In	  Francis	  v	  Pertemps	  Recruitment	  Ltd	  [2012]	  CSIH	  25,	  the	  Inner	  House	  held	  that	  an	  Employment	  Tribunal	  should	  have	  offered	  a	  party	  litigant	  an	  adjournment	  when	  his	  opponent	  introduced	  a	  new	  issue.	  The	  case	  law	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  suggests	  that	  this	  would	  not	  constitute	  a	  successful	  point	  of	  appeal	  in	  the	  civil	  courts.	  	  857	  MacPhail	  at	  para	  2.22.	  858	  [2014]	  GWD	  26-­‐515.	  859	  Excessive	  continuations	  will	  not	  be	  allowed	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  contempt	  of	  court;	  a	  delay	  for	  legal	  advice	  was	  denied	  after	  repeated	  and,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  court,	  false	  medical	  delays	  had	  been	  occasioned	  in	  M	  v	  S	  [2011]	  SLT	  912.	  860	  2014	  SC	  218.	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representatives. However, he is not entitled to found on his lack of 
understanding in order to gain the opportunity to gain representation, or funding 
for that purpose, at a stage of the proceedings of his own choosing.”861 The 
party litigant does not have the “right” to additional time to engage legal 
representation or apply for legal aid at any stage of the case.862 Practical 
considerations are engaged when the procedure has advanced to the stage of 
proof and, for example, witnesses have already been cited. In one case863 a 
party litigant defender was denied a continuation to seek legal representation 
on the day her case called for proof before answer. Although the defender 
argued that she had a “right to be represented,”864 the judge considered that 
she had had a year to obtain representation and was unlikely to do so in 
future.865 Lady Dorrian was even more frank in refusing another party litigant 
time to get a solicitor, observing that the request appeared to be “simply 
another effort to have the case delayed further”.866 Unsurprisingly, an attempt 
by another party litigant to adjourn his case on the day of an appeal hearing to 
allow for the attendance of a lay representative was similarly unsuccessful.867 
While there is no definitive “cut off” point for adjournment for legal advice, it is 
unlikely to be granted when sought at the later stages of the case and 
particularly at a substantive hearing, or when the judge suspects that the 
litigant is simply attempting to delay the proceedings. 
 
5.4.3 Medical Delay 
 
Appearing in court for hearings is generally not an issue for represented parties, 
as the litigants generally do not have to attend personally.868 For a party 
litigant, however, personal attendance is compulsory and can be excused only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  861	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  92.	  862	  See	  for	  example	  Mitchell	  v	  Somerville	  and	  anr	  [2017]	  CSIH	  4.	  863	  McGeever	  v	  Nicol,	  [2012]	  CSOH	  115l.	  864	  Ibid,	  at	  para	  3.	  865	  See	  also	  Forrest	  v	  Fleming	  Buildings	  Limited	  and	  Others	  [2014]	  CSOH	  258;	  Connolly	  
v	  	  Connolly	  [2005]	  CSIH	  78.	  866	  Van	  Overwaele,	  Petitioner	  [2009]	  CSOH	  164	  at	  para	  10.	  867	  East	  Lothian	  Council	  v	  Martin	  [2014]	  SC	  EDIN	  42.	  	  868	  There	  are	  exceptions,	  most	  notably	  Child	  Welfare	  Hearings	  in	  family	  actions;	  see	  OCR	  1993	  Rule	  33.22A(5).	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for medical reasons.869 Adjournment for medical reasons is distinct from other 
forms of delay or adjournment in that it is, by its nature, usually sought at short 
notice or even after the fact. When a party litigant is unable to attend, this can 
be excused upon production of a letter or medical certificate indicating that the 
litigant was too unwell to appear. The court must then decide whether to allow 
the case to be continued to a future hearing, to proceed in the party litigant’s 
absence, or to grant decree by default due to the failure to attend.  
 
A small but interesting body of law has developed around the question of 
continuation of a case due to a party litigant’s illness. The ETBB suggests that 
judges may wish to explain to party litigants that all future hearings must be 
attended unless prevented by illness, and that “a ‘soul and conscience’ 
certificate from a doctor must be sent to the court” if the litigant is ill.870 While 
this is likely to be the best advice to offer the party litigant, it is a simplified 
view of a somewhat more complicated position. It is first worth noting that, 
although previously necessary, it is no longer a requirement that a medical 
certificate is certified on “soul and conscience.”871 However, the absence of 
certification can be taken into account by the court.872 More importantly, the 
ETBB’s advice does not make it clear that a medical certificate is not conclusive 
proof that the party litigant should be excused from attending court. It is, in 
fact, only one of the factors that the judge may consider.  
 
In fact a judge exercises a wide discretion, and must decide based on any 
medical certificate tendered and all other relevant circumstances whether the 
party is truly unable to attend and what the consequences of the their non-
attendance will be.873 A medical certificate, whether or not it is certified on 
“soul and conscience”, is only one factor in the judge’s decision. A judge is 
likely to be particularly minded to proceed in the party litigant’s absence if the 
medical certificate does not provide sufficient information about the litigant’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  869	  See,	  for	  example,	  ETBB,	  para	  12.16;	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  hearings	  may	  be	  re-­‐assigned	  or	  continued	  for	  another	  reasons.	  Decree	  by	  default	  may	  be	  granted	  for	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  non-­‐attendance,	  but	  generally	  a	  further	  hearing	  is	  fixed	  before	  decree	  is	  granted;	  Canmore	  Housing	  Association	  v	  Scott	  [2003]	  SLT	  (Sh	  Ct)	  68.	  870	  ETBB,	  para	  12.16.	  871	  Practice	  Note,	  6	  June	  1968.	  872	  The	  Scottish	  Ministers	  v	  Smith	  [2010]	  SLT	  1100;	  Smith	  is	  the	  leading	  case	  on	  this	  principle.	  873	  The	  Scottish	  Ministers	  v	  Smith,	  2010	  SLT	  1100,	  page	  1102.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   175	  
illness and when they can be expected to be well enough to attend court.874 The 
history of the case and any previous delays are also relevant considerations. 
Requests for an indefinite delay or repeated continuations are unlikely to be 
allowed. 875 This is an important point, as GPs and other doctors who are asked 
to produce a medical certificate may be unaware that they are not being asked 
to “excuse” their patients from court, but rather to provide information that 
will enable the court to make a decision on how the case will proceed. Medical 
certificates that provide little information on the diagnosis (although 
understandable in light of concerns for the patient’s privacy876) and prognosis of 
the illness make it more difficult for a judge to form a conclusion on the future 
of the case.  
 
It is worth noting that, despite the right to self-represent, there may be an 
expectation by the court that a party litigant who is unable to attend personally 
should obtain legal representation. Clark v Hope and anr877 illustrates this point. 
In this case, the party litigant pursuer had previously been granted additional 
time for both legal advice and medical reasons. A medical certificate was 
produced to explain her failure to attend a further continued hearing. Lord 
Glennie determined that the hearing should proceed in her absence because she 
had “every opportunity of obtaining representation and had been encouraged on 
more than one occasion to do so”.878 Furthermore, the judge noted that “Even if 
there were difficulties obtaining legal representation…she could have been 
represented by some other person at the hearing. Her mother had frequently 
attended and, indeed, had addressed the court.”879 This case pre-dates the 
current rules formally allowing lay representation. Even now the 
representative’s right of audience is not automatic and must be granted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  874	  Ibid,	  pages	  1101-­‐1102;	  see,	  for	  example	  East	  Lothian	  Council	  v	  Martin	  [2014]	  SCEDIN	  42	  at	  para	  30	  and	  Boyd	  v	  Fortune	  [2014]	  CSIH	  93.	  875	  See	  G	  v	  B,	  	  2011	  S.L.T.	  1253.	  In	  East	  Lothian	  Council	  v	  Martin,	  [2014]	  SCEDIN	  42,	  the	  5th	  attempt	  to	  conduct	  a	  proof	  finally	  proceeded	  despite	  the	  party	  litigant’s	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  medical	  certificate.	  	  876	  A	  medical	  certificate	  may	  be	  made	  available	  to	  the	  party	  litigant’s	  opponent	  despite	  his	  requests	  to	  keep	  it	  private;	  see	  Boyd	  v	  Fortune,	  [2014]	  CSIH	  93.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  opponent	  must	  have	  the	  information	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  make	  submissions	  on	  the	  request	  for	  a	  continuation.	  877	  [2006]	  SCLR	  98.	  878	  Ibid,	  page	  6	  of	  transcript.	  879	  Ibid.	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judge; it cannot be presumed in advance by the party litigant that his 
representative will be permitted to appear on his behalf. As noted at the 
beginning of this section, the only real options open to the party litigant are to 
attend court personally or engage a lawyer. 
 
5.4.4 Deliberate Delay? 
 
It is clear that the courts are placed in a difficult position in these cases. There 
is, perhaps, a degree of scepticism towards the party litigant. It is worth noting 
that failed requests for adjournment for legal advice precede absences for 
illness and the production of medical certificates in several of these cases;880 in 
these circumstances it is unsurprising that a judge may suspect that the litigant 
is not truly unable to attend or is even simply seeking to delay matters.881  At 
times, these suspicions may be well justified. In A Ltd and ors v F,882 a party 
litigant defender was refused more time to prepare for proof and then produced 
a medical certificate the day before the proof was due to commence. The judge 
took the unusual step of instructing his clerk to query a party litigant’s medical 
certificate with the surgery, and the pursuer’s agents later produced affidavits 
confirming that the certificate had not been produced by any of the doctors at 
the surgery. The defender produced a further certificate from a different 
doctor, but the court soon received a letter from this doctor advising that the 
defender had obtained this letter by dishonestly stating the nature of his 
involvement in the case and by exhibiting to him the same (forged) letter 
provided to the court. As a result, decree by default (for his failure to appear at 
the proof) was pronounced against the defender.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall, “party litigant law” is underdeveloped and hindered by a number of 
factors. There are only a handful of Scottish cases that make any type of firm 
pronouncement on the legal position of party litigants. While courts are often 
required to address the issue of a party litigant’s unrepresented status in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  880	  McGeever	  v	  Nicol,	  [2012]	  CSOH	  1151;	  Clark	  v	  Hope	  and	  anr	  [2006]	  SCLR	  98;	  A	  Ltd	  
and	  ors	  v	  F	  [2014]	  CSOH	  169.	  881	  See	  also	  CEC	  v	  MM	  [2017]	  CSIH	  50,	  Campbell	  v	  Lindsays	  [2017]	  SAC	  Civ	  23.	  882	  [2014]	  CSOH	  169.	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judgment, it is most often an ancillary matter. It is thus sometimes difficult to 
gauge how authoritative a court’s statements are, or are intended to be, on 
these matters. In turn, matters such as the question of “latitude” being 
extended to party litigants are often referred to without reference to authority 
and are apparently taken as being within the general knowledge of the court.  
 
The nature of these problems also hinders the development of any sort of legal 
precedent in this area. Party litigants are often ill equipped to argue questions 
of law at appeal and may fail to understand the constraints of the appeal 
process. As a result, a party litigant may, for example, appeal a finding of 
decree by default, but fail to meet the requirement to present grounds that 
justify interfering with the decision of the judge at first instance.883 In the 
absence of relevant submissions, the appeal court has little choice but to dismiss 
the appeal as irrelevant and does not have the opportunity to address the 
substantive issues. Again, the result is a lack of real guidance on how discretion 
can and should be exercised in relation to latitude or assistance when a party is 
unrepresented: looking only at the “law in books” highlighted in this chapter 
begins to reveal some of the shape of the position, but ultimately yields more 
questions than answers. The next three chapters will turn to the “law in action”, 
and the empirical research conducted for this thesis, to examine how party 
litigants navigate the court process in practice and how judges address the 
issues party litigants can present on a daily basis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  883	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mullan	  v	  Les	  Brodies	  Transport	  Limited,	  [2005]	  CSIH	  9	  at	  paras	  8,	  9	  and	  12.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   178	  
Chapter 6: Party Litigants: 
Perceptions and General Principles 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, along with the next two, will consider the empirical data gathered 
for this thesis with a view to understanding how the law operates in relation to 
party litigants in practice, as well as the effect of self-representation on a 
number of aspects of the court process. This chapter will begin by providing 
background information and addressing preliminary matters that will inform 
subsequent chapters. The first section of the chapter will offer a view of party 
litigants—who they are, why they self-represent, and how they are perceived by 
judges, solicitors, and court staff. The perennial problem of the vexatious 
litigant is also considered. The next section of the chapter will look at the judge 
as the decision maker in a party litigant’s case, discussing how dealing with 
unrepresented litigants changes the judge’s role and approach, and outlining the 
general principles that factor in the judge’s decision making process. All of this 
will provide a foundation for the next chapter, which will look at the court 
process in more detail, considering the particular issues or problems that can 
arise in party litigants’ cases, what can be learned about how party litigants 
navigate the process, and how the court addresses these issues. Thereafter, the 
following chapter will look at the wider questions of access to the courts and 
access to justice in relation to party litigants and their opponents and discuss 
how this can potentially be improved. 
 
Before examining the substance of the empirical data, it is important to first re-
iterate the limitations of the qualitative data. As noted in both Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, qualitative data, and interview data in particular, is subject to the 
accuracy of the subject in reporting their experiences and perceptions. Some of 
the data includes interviewees’ observations as what party litigants do and/or 
why they do it; interviewees are of course not able to read minds, but are able 
to give an opinion based on their experience. For example, judges often note 
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that party litigants are unaware of court procedures. They cannot know this for 
a fact, but are able to draw reasonable conclusions from their interactions with 
party litigants in court and, perhaps more importantly, from the types of 
decisions they are asked to make in party litigants’ cases. The data discussed in 
this chapter and (other chapters) is intended to be read in conjunction with the 
caveats noted here and in previous chapters.884  
 
6.2 Understanding the Party Litigant 
 
6.2.1 What Types of Cases do Party Litigants Appear in and Why? 
 
Just how common or prevalent are party litigants in the Scottish civil courts, and 
why do they self-represent? While there are no figures available from the 
Scottish Court and Tribunal Service,885 the data gathered for this thesis indicates 
that party litigants are common in many courts. All interviewees, including court 
staff, reported having regular or even daily contact with party litigants.886 Three 
judges noted that the number of party litigants appears to be increasing.887 
Unsurprisingly, low-value claims (small claims, summary cause and now the 
simple procedure) were consistently named as having the highest volume of 
party litigants.888 Insolvency proceedings889 and actions for recovery of heritable 
property890 were also cited as having a relatively high number of party litigants. 
There was some disagreement as to the prevalence of party litigants in ordinary 
and family cause procedures. Some judges said that there are few party litigants 
in the ordinary cause891 and family procedures.892 Others, however, indicated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  884	  See	  in	  particular	  sections	  2.4.4.1-­‐2.	  885	  Section	  2.4.1.	  886	  For	  court	  staff,	  see	  FG1,	  FG2,	  FG3	  and	  FG4.	  Because	  court	  staff	  work	  in	  dedicated	  areas,	  such	  as	  ordinary	  cause	  or	  small	  claims,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  respond	  only	  on	  how	  common	  party	  litigants	  are	  in	  their	  particular	  area,	  but	  not	  as	  able	  to	  make	  comparisons.	  The	  more	  specific	  observations	  of	  judges	  and	  solicitors	  are	  discussed	  below.	  887	  J2,	  J9,	  J3.	  888	  J2,	  J4,	  J9,	  J5,	  J7,	  J6,	  J10,	  J8,	  S1,	  S4,	  S3,	  S2,	  S5,	  S6,	  S8.	  889	  J10,	  S1,	  S4,	  S5.	  	  890	  J4,	  J7,	  S2,	  S1.	  891	  J2,	  J7,	  J6.	  892	  J6,	  J10,	  J8.	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that they had encountered a significant number of party litigants in the family 
courts.893 One solicitor, who works primarily in the area of ordinary actions and 
mortgage repossession summary applications, indicated that of these “probably 
more than 50% is party litigants representing themselves.”894 Viewing the 
interview data as a whole, it is noteworthy that party litigants are at some point 
cited as appearing in virtually every form of procedure and type of action 
available in the Scottish courts, including summary applications, such as 
Antisocial Behaviour Orders and child support liability orders,895 and more 
uncommon actions, such as judicial review896 and applications for director’s 
disqualification.897 
 
Although party litigants were often cited as being scarce in the ordinary cause 
procedure, it is worth noting that in the course of the court observation carried 
out for this study (which look place in the “ordinary court” in a larger Sheriff 
court) there were party litigants present at each sitting observed, and often 
there were many.898 In a total of sixteen sittings of the court, 89 party litigants 
appeared.899 Party litigants were seen in all of the forms of procedure heard in 
that court, including 27 in sequestrations, 37 in ordinary cause actions, and 25 in 
summary applications.900  In the sequestration hearings, all of the party litigants 
were respondents.901 Most of the party litigants in the other cases were also 
defenders or respondents, but there were 8 pursuers in ordinary cause cases and 
5 in the summary applications.902 This data, of course, provides only a snapshot 
of a particular court at a particular time, but does appear to correlate with the 
interview data suggesting that party litigants appear frequently even in some 
ordinary courts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  893	  J5,	  S8.	  894	  S2.	  895	  J4.	  896	  J3.	  897	  S5.	  898	  See	  Appendix	  B.	  899	  Ibid.	  900	  Ibid.	  901	  Ibid.	  902	  Ibid.	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In terms of why party litigants self-represent, judges tended to have the 
impression that this was due to a lack of available legal aid.903 Some noted that 
legal aid appeared to be getting more difficult to obtain and that more people 
fell into the “gap” between making too much money to qualify for legal aid and 
being able to afford to pay for a solicitor.904 However, the availability of legal 
aid was not the only reason cited. One judge noted that party litigants offer a 
variety of reasons for representing themselves, including a desire to represent 
themselves, being unable to afford a lawyer, and being unable to find a lawyer 
to take the case.905 The same judge observed that some litigants start out with 
lawyers, but after falling out with them are unable to find another firm to take 
on the case.906 A solicitor described a similar pattern in the context of legal aid 
in the family courts: 
 
“…the ones I come across in family law are usually where solicitors have 
tendered advice to particular person, they’ve not taken on board that 
advice, and so they’ve withdrawn from acting. And they’ve been around 
the legal aid solicitors and end up on their own basically.”907 
 
Personality issues were cited by one judge as another reason why a litigant may 
be unrepresented: “their difficulty in expressing things, their hostility, their 
volatility, and perhaps as a result, their difficulties in getting and retaining 
professional help.”908 As discussed in more detail below, personality or 
psychological issues were also associated with those party litigants classed as 
“serial” or “vexatious” litigants,909 suggesting that the reasons these litigants 
self-represent may be different, and more complex, than those of one-off party 
litigants with financial concerns or a lack of legal aid. 
 
6.2.2 General Perceptions of Party Litigants and Self-representation 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  903	  J5,	  J3,	  J1,	  J10;	  see	  also	  S2.	  904	  See	  also	  S8,	  FG1.	  905	  J1.	  	  906	  Ibid.	  907	  S8.	  908	  J5.	  909	  See	  section	  6.2.3.	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As noted earlier, there are conflicting views on SRLs in the existing literature on 
self-representation, representing both positive and negative perspectives.910 For 
this thesis, judges, lawyers and court staff were asked at the beginning of each 
interview to provide the first two or three words that came to their minds when 
thinking about party litigants in the Scottish civil courts. Most of their responses, 
unsurprisingly, related to how party litigants impact the conduct of the 
interviewee’s own role. Overall the most common response was “difficult,” 
“difficulties” or “challenging”.911 In all of the groups interviewed, the single 
most consistent response was from clerks, with six associating party litigants 
with “more time/time intensive”.912 Other clerks used related terms such as 
“hard work”, “needy”, “extra work”913 and “demanding”. Terminology relating 
to issues party litigants may cause in the civil court process was used by 
solicitors and judges, including “delay,” “complication,”914 “problem(s),”915 and 
“disruption.”916 Some judges and court staff opted for words describing the 
perspective or emotional state of party litigants, such as “blinkered,”917 
“awkward,”  “unknowing”, “confused”, or “naïve”. Two judges responded with 
the word “disadvantage”. It is interesting to note that, out of all of the groups, 
a handful of solicitors were the only ones who chose terms relating to their own 
emotions or experience, such as “hassle,” “unfair” “tread with caution” and 
“frustrating.” Unlike judges and court staff, none of the solicitors referred to 
the party litigant’s perspective. 
 
When asked for these first impressions, none of the interviewees chose any form 
of positive sentiment about party litigants or self-representation. This may seem 
to paint a negative picture of party litigants. However, in the course of the 
interviews many also expressed sympathy for party litigants;918 as one clerk said 
in a focus group, with the agreement of colleagues, “You do feel sorry for them, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  910	  See	  section	  3.3.5.2.	  911	  Four	  solicitors,	  four	  judges,	  and	  three	  members	  of	  court	  staff	  used	  these	  terms.	  912	  One	  judge	  also	  said	  “more	  time”.	  913	  One	  solicitor	  and	  one	  judge	  also	  used	  this	  term.	  914	  Solicitors	  used	  these	  first	  two	  terms.	  915	  Two	  solicitors	  and	  one	  judge.	  916	  This	  term	  was	  used	  by	  a	  judge.	  Another	  judge	  replied	  with	  simply	  “oh	  dear”;	  J10.	  917	  Two	  clerks	  and	  one	  judge.	  918	  See,	  for	  example,	  J5.	  The	  sympathetic	  approach	  of	  many	  judges	  in	  particular	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  section	  6.3.4.	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to a certain extent.”919 Other clerks discussed how difficult or daunting the 
experience must be for party litigants.920 Although they noted the difficulties 
and extra work occasioned by party litigants, clerks and judges also 
distinguished between these difficulties and the behaviour or character of party 
litigants as individuals. As one judge said, 
 
“Generally people are very courteous and decent…I generally find that I’m 
quite sometimes surprised, because I generally find that they will behave 
themselves in court perfectly well, and listen to requests and directions 
from the bench.”921 
 
Some party litigants do not behave so well, but judges were careful to draw a 
distinction between the majority of party litigants who may cause problems but 
who do so unknowingly, and those who deliberately or carelessly caused delays 
or disruption.922 As discussed below, the latter tended to be “serial” or repeat 
litigants, consistent with the views noted in the existing literature that 
distinguish between worthy “one-off” litigants who are forced into self-
representation for financial reasons from the more problematic serial litigants 
who choose to self represent.923 One judge underlined this distinction, 
suggesting that party litigants can be separated into two types, one made up of 
party litigants who believe they have a genuine claim or defence, and another 
smaller and more disruptive group who treats coming to court as a hobby.924 The 
latter group are discussed in the next section.  
 
6.2.3 Vexatious and Disruptive Party Litigants 
 
“True” vexatious litigants925—those who are subject to an order under the 
provisions now contained in the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014—are rare. 
However, virtually every interview throughout the project included reference to 
experiences the interviewee had with repeated, difficult, or disruptive party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  919	  FG3;	  see	  also	  S3.	  920	  FG1,	  FG3,	  and	  FG4;	  the	  only	  focus	  group	  that	  did	  not	  express	  a	  similar	  sentiment	  was	  FG2,	  a	  court	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  particularly	  beset	  with	  many	  problematic	  party	  litigants	  (see	  section	  6.2.3).	  921	  J7.	  922	  J10,	  J4,	  J9,	  J3,	  J1,	  J5,	  J7.	  923	  Section	  3.3.5.3.	  924	  J1.	  	  925	  Section	  4.6.	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litigants. Obtaining an order against a vexatious litigant can be a protracted and 
complicated process, and many interviewees described encountering party 
litigants exhibiting “vexatious” qualities who had not (yet) reached this stage. 
Judges sometimes described these as “serial”926 or “quasi-vexatious”927 litigants. 
Another suggested that repeat litigants are those who would take any 
opportunity to mount a “crusade.”928 As discussed above, these litigants are 
distinct from the majority of party litigants. “It’s not that they’re party 
litigants,” another judge said, “they’re vexatious litigants”.929 The same judge 
outlined the characteristic behaviour of these litigants: 
 
“And they can cause enormous delays and procedural difficulties, spurious 
arguments and when you rule against them, appeals…And they will 
inundate you with lengthy written arguments, most of which are spurious, 
but demonstrate a sort of superficial knowledge of the law. It’s as if they 
looked at a textbook and found all sorts of passages which they 
misinterpret, misapply, and they appeal everything.”930  
 
Court staff echoed the judges’ observations regarding repeat litigants, which 
they often referred to a “regulars” in the courts. One clerk, when asked if she 
had encountered any difficult, awkward or abusive party litigants, answered that 
while not common, “we have a few regular civil party pursuers, could be party 
defenders as well, that come to the desk. Also from my experience in [another 
court] we had a vexatious litigant as well. So dealt with quite a few awkward 
and difficult customers.”931 In another court, staff recalled seeing litigants who 
were successful in one case, “and then they come in the following week with 
another ten!”932 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the observations about a vexatious 
litigant’s propensity to appeal, one clerk who works primarily with appeals 
reported encountering vexatious or obsessive litigants “a lot of the time,” 
including one who “threaten[ed] to give me a bunch of fives and punch me in 
the face” as well as another who made a complaint against the clerk when he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  926	  J4,	  J9;	  see	  also	  J3	  and	  J1.	  927	  J10.	  928	  J9.	  929	  J10.	  930	  J10.	  931	  FG4,	  AB.	  932	  FG3	  AB,	  EF.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   185	  
was unable to accept an appeal, “but that’s just par for the course I think when 
dealing with vexatious litigants”.933 
 
“Regulars” presented a particular problem in one court, ranging from 
deliberately making excessive phone calls or requesting copies of documents 
they did not need to cause disruption934 to some being described as “aggressive, 
violent”.935 “Regulars” were also identified as taking up a great deal of staff 
time, with staff suggesting that some might be “playing dumb” to get more 
information than court staff are authorised to provide: 
 
Staff Member 1: “I mean, you’ll get regulars that come to the counter, and 
one of them I spoke to on three different days telling him that I couldn’t 
give him legal advice and he still came in the next time and asked me the 
same questions, came in the next time and he’s a regular that knows the 
procedure probably better than I do, but they just try to push and push.” 
 
Staff Member 2: “And they know what they’re doing. They know.”936 
 
Staff in this court appeared sceptical about the value of Vexatious Litigation 
Orders. One litigant who had been made subject to a Vexatious Litigation order 
was cited as still very much a presence in the court, as the litigant still had a 
case on-going from 2006 prior to the order being made: 
 
Staff Member 1: “There’s loads of other actions that have slowly dropped 
away, and everything will be appealed. Every--all along to the way to the 
Court of Session, to the appeal court. So yeah, it’s the same people for 
years. Generations.” 
 
Staff Member 2: “There was a famous family case, I think the guy was 
attempting to get access to his daughter, and the only way that ended was 
because the daughter eventually turned sixteen.”937 
 
As noted above, a clerk dealing in appeals still had frequent encounters with 
litigants who have been declared vexatious seeking to lodge appeals and noted 
that there is some ambiguity as to whether vexatious litigants can enter into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  933	  CS1.	  934	  FG2,	  AB.	  935	  FG2,	  AB.	  936	  FG2,	  GH	  and	  KL.	  937	  FG2,	  AB	  and	  IJ.	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certain types of actions—for example, whether the litigant could raise an appeal 
if he or she has been made subject to a guardianship order.938 
 
Clerks also noted that, although they had encountered many disruptive repeat 
litigants, there is a degree of confusion as to how a disruptive litigant can be 
formally declared vexatious and thus kept from raising further actions: 
 
“And quite a few times somebody phones and says ‘are they not a vexatious 
litigant?’ and to be honest genuinely I don’t really know what the 
procedure is to get somebody up, because there’s so many of them here. If 
we knew how to do it, we would have them all declared, but nobody really 
knows!”939 
 
The same clerk noted that the Lord Advocate must make an application for a 
Vexatious Behaviour Order and expressed doubt that the Lord Advocate is overly 
concerned with these types of order; solicitors wishing to halt a problem litigant 
would have to go to great difficulty to bring the matter to the court.940 With the 
potential for existing cases to drag on and (as vexatious litigants are wont to do) 
be appealed, the orders are slow to make any real impact. While true “vexatious 
litigants” can rightly be regarded as rare, this may mask the wider category of 
“serial” litigants. Serial litigants, while still very much a minority, appear to be 
more common than the low number of existing Vexatious Litigation Orders would 
suggest. For every litigant who has been formally declared vexatious, there may 
be any number who have managed to thus far fly under the radar, managing not 
to attract the attention of someone willing to go to the trouble of attempting to 
have an order made against them. 
 
It is worth noting that one judge noted an experience with a “serial” litigant in 
relatively positive terms: this litigant raised claims relating to unauthorised use 
of his intellectual property, often successfully, and the judge observed that he 
had become well-versed in that area of law and came to court well prepared to 
present his case. However, the judge regarded this litigant as an exception: “a 
lot of serial litigants are almost by definition ‘cranks’. Or vexatious.”941 This was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  938	  CS1.	  939	  FG2	  AB.	  940	  FG2	  AB;	  more	  precisely,	  the	  clerk	  said	  “I	  don’t	  know	  that	  the	  Lord	  Advocate	  gives	  a	  monkey’s	  about	  it.”	  941	  J4.	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echoed by another judge, who recalled a few litigants who “just always turn up 
on their own”: 
 
“And sometimes there can almost be an advantage, that if they present 
right and appear to have a point, appear fair and reasonable, appear to be 
disadvantaged, then perhaps that will sit with you to their advantage, as it 
were.”942 
 
Other disruptive forms of behaviour were noted from party litigants who may or 
may not be “serial” litigants. Interestingly, some judges associated this 
behaviour, which was considered to be atypical of party litigants in general, 
with the character or personality of the individual. One of these said that party 
litigants generally conduct themselves properly in court, but:  
 
“There are some exceptions, and they are exceptions…it’s a pity that these 
ones are the tail that wags the dog, the aggressive disruptive party litigants 
who are just hell-bent on causing disruption…Almost a nuisance, and 
enjoying it. And it’s a reflection, I think, of just the character of the 
individual.”943  
 
Another judge said that “a very few” people came to court who “want to fly a 
kite” and that these were “masters at deflecting things and trying to get away 
from issues and just being very disruptive. Fortunately these folk are few and far 
between.”944 This type of behaviour was also related to stubbornness and a 
belief that the litigant has been wronged as “almost psychological 
characteristics”945 or to a form of personality disorder.946 
 
Some court staff faced real and worrying issues with difficult party litigants, 
with some being shouted at, having irate litigants approaching the bench in 
court or threatening the sheriff, sometimes to the point of having to call in the 
police.947 Sometimes clerks would ask for a police presence in advance for a 
known problem “repeat” litigant, but others “kick off when you least expect, 
when it doesn’t go their way.”948 Because civil courts, unlike criminal courts, do 
not routinely have a police presence and often do not have a bar officer, clerks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  942	  J5.	  	  943	  J7.	  944	  J5.	  945	  J2.	  946	  J1.	  947	  FG2	  AB,	  CD,	  EF,	  GH.	  948	  FG2	  CD,	  GH.	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were sometimes left alone with the sheriff and a difficult litigant, or even alone 
entirely after the sheriff left the bench.949 For this reason, one clerk said, he 
felt safer clerking a criminal court as compared to a civil court.950  
 
6.2.4 Discussion 
 
The data gathered suggests that party litigants are far from uncommon. 
Although there is little doubt that they appear most commonly in the low-value 
claims procedures, they can be found anywhere in the Scottish civil courts. 
While it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many interviewees viewed going 
to court without a lawyer in negative terms, due either to the problems it can 
cause or a perceived disadvantage to the party litigant, there is also a prevailing 
view that the majority of party litigants are trying their best in a difficult 
situation. These party litigants may be viewed by judges, solicitors and court 
staff as naïve or “blinkered”, but are also regarded with a degree of sympathy. 
The assumption that legal professionals are hostile to self-representing litigants, 
perhaps seeing them as a threat to the livelihood, was not in evidence.951 There 
was also little evidence to suggest that, as one judge put it, disruptive litigants 
are the “tail that wags the dog,” tarring all party litigants with a poor 
reputation. Most interviewees instead recognised “problem” litigants as a 
separate group from the typical party litigant. However, with problems such as 
additional time and work associated with even well-meaning but uninformed 
party litigants, it is hardly surprising that those litigants who are perceived as 
being deliberately disruptive or vexatious do attract a great deal of attention. As 
the previous section suggests, there is in particular a view that litigants who 
choose—or even enjoy—self-representation (especially repeatedly) are more 
likely to be problematic or “cranks” as compared to those who can’t afford a 
lawyer or obtain legal aid. There is something a bit troubling about the idea that 
“good” party litigants are those who are forced into court alone, while those 
who wish to forego a lawyer may be regarded with suspicion. One might ask 
what is so wrong with self-representing by choice, provided that it is done 
without the intention to be vexatious or disruptive?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  949	  FG2	  GH,	  IJ.	  950	  FG2	  GH.	  951	  See	  section	  3.4.2.	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However, the data does suggest that suspicion of party litigants who choose to 
self-represent and/or appear repeatedly may be well-founded in some cases, 
and that often there may very well be a connection between the reason a party 
litigant is self-representing and how likely they are to be a difficult or disruptive 
litigant. As in the examples above, a litigant who is self-representing because he 
refused to take a lawyer’s advice or became too difficult to work with may bring 
the same attitude to court. A litigant who brings his case to court despite being 
told by solicitors that it has no merit may bring the same stubbornness to court. 
Sadly, litigants with mental health difficulties may also be less likely to be able 
to find or keep a lawyer. Some believe that the pursuit of obsessive or vexatious 
litigation is, in itself, a form of mental health problem,952 and indeed a number 
of judges interviewed for this thesis associated serial litigation with personality 
or psychological disorders such as narcissism.  
 
If this is correct, Vexatious Litigation Orders, even when they are granted, may 
at best fix the symptoms, rather than the cause of the problem. As court staff 
noted, even after being declared vexatious, some litigants were willing and able 
to remain in the courts by prolonging actions or raising appeals. While the 
number of “true” vexatious litigants is low, this may be misleading. Because it 
can be slow and cumbersome to have an order granted, or because they “fly 
under the radar” there is also, at any time, a number of one-off or “serial” 
litigants also causing disruption in the courts. It might be argued that, when in 
force, Vexatious Behaviour Orders should be more flexible and easier to obtain, 
but whether this would represent a true improvement might depend on the early 
identification of problem litigants—which may itself depend on judges or parties 
communicating with each other and between different courts. Due to the 
legislation’s wide remit, it may take some time for judges to determine how 
best to fashion orders to prevent problematic behaviour. Again, however, this 
can only address the problem to a limited extent and may not resolve the 
underlying issues.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  952	  Genn	  2013;	  “Obsessed	  Litigants—an	  important	  but	  neglected	  subject”	  https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=22f47040-­‐65b4.	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The impact that abusive and disruptive litigants can have on court staff is one 
concern not adequately addressed by the vexatious litigation legislation. All 
interviewed clerks had dealt with awkward or difficult litigants and many had 
encountered extreme behaviour such as threats of violence and requiring to call 
in police, but treated this as almost commonplace or, as one put it, “par for the 
course.” It seemed that court staff bore much of the brunt of the problematic 
party litigant’s behaviour, being left to deal with the litigant in the sheriff 
clerk’s office or after the judge had left the bench without the benefit of the 
formal confines of court rules and etiquette. While the damage disruptive or 
vexatious litigants can cause to their opponents in court is often referred to,953 
the effect on court staff, both in terms of the additional time they take up and 
the potential for litigants to be abusive, has been somewhat overlooked. Many 
members of staff have unpleasant or even frightening experiences with party 
litigants, but feel that dealing with abusive litigants is just “part of the job.” 
This may in turn affect staff’s view of party litigants. It has been noted above 
that staff in one court had a particular problem with party litigants, including 
issues requiring calls to the police. Of the four court staff focus groups, this 
group was the only one that—perhaps understandably--did not express a degree 
of sympathy for party litigants. 
 
6.3 The Judges’ Role and Decision Making 
 
6.3.1 Active/Passive Models 
 
The Scottish civil courts are adversarial by nature, and adversarial processes are 
often identified as placing SRLs at a greater disadvantage.954 The simple 
procedure can be considered a limited exception to this rule, as its rules place 
an onus on the judge to establish both the facts and relevant law in the case,955 
without altering the fundamentally adversarial nature of the process.956 In light 
of the disadvantages that an adversarial process entails for party litigants and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  953	  See,	  for	  example,	  Genn	  2013.	  954	  Section	  3.7.3.2.	  955	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules	  Rule	  12.4(2-­‐3).	  956	  Section	  4.5.2.	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the consideration that, in a party-led procedure, cases cannot be progressed 
when one or both of the litigants is unaware of the rules and requirements, 
judges in this study were asked how active or passive their approach typically is 
in cases involving party litigants as compared to cases involving only solicitors. 
All responded that they routinely took a more active or interventionist approach 
when presented with a party litigant.957 When asked to provide a number 
describing their approach on a spectrum, with 1 being very passive and 10 being 
very active, there was a significant disparity in the numbers assigned when 
dealing with solicitors as compared to dealing with party litigants.958 Examples 
ranged from “3 to 6-7,”959 “4 to 8,”960 “3 to 8”961 and “2 to 8”.962 However, as 
some of these figures suggest, around half of the judges also noted that they are 
often “proactive” or “interventionist” in cases involving lawyers as well.963 As 
one judge observed: 
 
“ ...we are encouraged in general to be proactive in the civil cases, that’s 
the ways things are at the moment…Proactive—you’re always proactive, 
and you’re inevitably more proactive in a party litigant situation, either if 
one is represented or whether both are party litigants.”964 
 
Solicitors also agreed that most judges tended to be more “proactive” with 
party litigants.965  
 
Party litigants create increased demands on the role of the judge overall, as 
they shift from a more passive to a more active role; the judge has to work 
harder in these cases.966 One judge suggested that (as noted in the quotation 
above) this is an ongoing trend, as judges are increasingly expected to be 
proactive. This judge attributed the move away from more traditional passive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  957	  An	  “active	  role”	  can	  translate	  into	  a	  number	  of	  forms	  of	  intervention	  or	  assistance	  to	  party	  litigants,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  958	  Asking	  for	  a	  number	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  establish	  some	  basis	  for	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models both to changes to the rules and a “change of culture”, suggesting that 
”Old school sheriffs would certainly never have been involved in a discussion, 
that’s something that’s changed.”967 However, as the same judge also noted, 
judges are neither currently trained as inquisitors nor, despite simple procedure 
rules requiring the sheriff to make an effort to ascertain if cases can be 
settled,968 are they trained as mediators. Because these “active” roles are not as 
well defined as the traditional passive role, judges may find it difficult to strike 
a proper balance: 
 
“And it’s an area I think probably that most sheriffs would find very tricky. 
Do you sit mute, and say nothing, you know, the tennis court umpire role, 
or are you active, even if that activity means risking—in fact, nowadays, 
risking a complaint, not just an appeal, but people might also make a 
complaint to the judicial office about you, about judicial misconduct.”969 
 
“I tend to judge a case when it comes before me and see how far I should 
be involved in that sense. But you’ve got to remember what your role is in 
our system, which is—it’s not an inquisitorial system, we have an 
adversarial system. Until that changes, we shouldn’t go too far.”970 
 
There are also limits to how much even the proactive approach can assist party 
litigants. One judge suggested that even when the judge is more active, party 
litigants are still unprepared for the nature of the process: 
 
“I don’t think they appreciate that it’s still an adversarial process. I think 
they think it’s more of an investigative process. That they can just produce 
all this information and you’ll look at it and maybe ask a few questions. I 
think they don’t really appreciate that it’s for them to establish anything, 
other than coming along and saying what you want to say, and being 
believed or not. I think that’s the main difficulty with it.”971 
 
6.3.2 Standards 
 
Another important aspect of the judicial approach to party litigants is the 
baseline standard of legal and procedural knowledge expected of them as 
compared to a solicitor. In an adversarial system, parties are expected to come 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  967	  J6.	  968	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules	  Rule	  12.4(1).	  969	  J2.	  970	  J6.	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to court prepared to present their case in law and conduct the matter in 
accordance with the established court procedures. Most forms of procedure in 
Scotland are designed with trained legal professionals rather than lay people in 
mind. The standard is therefore quite high and unlikely to be met by a lay 
person with no legal education or training. However, it has been noted 
previously that, in law, the court is entitled to hold the party litigant to the 
same high standard as a solicitor or advocate.972 Any latitude or assistance is 
extended at the court’s discretion and there is no requirement to expect 
anything less of the party litigant than the court would expect of a trained legal 
professional. 
 
Common sense, of course, dictates that party litigants will not have anything 
approaching a solicitor or advocate’s procedural and legal knowledge. It is thus 
unsurprising that, in practice, judges reported lowering their requirements 
considerably when dealing with party litigants. While the existing, although 
paltry, authority973 has been careful not to entitle party litigants to an 
automatic lowering of standards (or by extension an entitlement to latitude) 
many judges nonetheless expected the party litigant to bring little or no legal or 
procedural knowledge to court with them. Thereafter many described a process 
of assessing the level of the party litigant’s knowledge about the law or their 
case, or of beginning to assess the basis of the case themselves: 
 
“I start from a low base, I proceed from the basis that they don’t really 
understand the legal principles or have any knowledge of them. What I 
would usually, if I’m having some kind of preliminary discussion with them 
before a hearing starts, then I would usually try to get them to explain, in 
non-legal language what they see the issue as being.”974 
 
“I expect them to know nothing at all. But I wait to see what they’ll show 
me in terms of what they know about the law, but the usual expectation is 
that they’ll know very little.”975 
 
“I think I approach it assuming that they will know little or nothing of the 
law. I approach it from that perspective. That’s why it’s 
challenging…Sometimes one is surprised that there’s some knowledge of 
the legal issues involved and that’s wonderful, that’s great. Often there’s a 	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  Section	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  974	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kernel or a core element of good law in there, and it just needs to be eked 
out, but that can take a lot of work.”976 
 
Another judge reported that they expected the party litigant to know little if 
anything of the law, “other than they feel they have been wronged”. 977 One 
judge did expect party litigants to have researched court procedures before 
coming to court, but noted that typically they did not.978 Others expressed a 
similar scepticism towards the notion that party litigants would or could be 
expected to bring knowledge of the law or procedures to court. One suggested 
that it was “unfair” to expect party litigants to understand the law;979 another 
noted that while there is some information available online, understanding the 
process is overwhelming for party litigants.980 It is worth noting that these views 
were supported by the hearings observed, as it was very often readily apparent 
that the party litigant did not understand or was confused by fundamental issues 
such as the nature of the case against them or the purpose of that day’s hearing. 
While party litigants were also often unaware of matters of court etiquette, such 
as where to stand and how to address the judge, little notice was taken of this 
by the court. If, for example, the party litigant addressed the sheriff as “Judge” 
or “Your Honour,” they were not corrected.   
 
On a similar note, it is taken for granted by judges, legal professionals and court 
staff that they must use plain language, and avoid the use of legal terminology 
or Latin terms, in communications with party litigants. Judges also expect to 
explain matters, such as procedural steps to be taken, to party litigants in court 
in a way that they would not explain to a solicitor. Some also make a point of 
illustrating these explanations with examples in the hope that this will help the 
party litigant better understand.981 As noted above, a judge’s role will almost 
inevitably be more active in party litigants’ cases. In a number of the hearings 
observed, party litigants sought advice from the judge, either about the law or 
simply asking what they should do about their case. In one hearing, a party 
respondent in an action seeking an Exceptional Attachment Order asked the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  976	  J7.	  977	  J9.	  978	  J3.	  979	  J6.	  	  980	  J8.	  981	  See,	  for	  example,	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sheriff to explain the meaning of the order; the judge advised only that this 
could be found in the legislation. Often, however, sheriffs did provide 
information or advice when requested. In one hearing, a party defender asked 
the sheriff how he could respond to a motion finding him liable for the expenses 
of the hearing, and the sheriff advised that he could ask the court to reserve the 
expenses while he sought legal advice, then duly granting this motion. On other 
occasions, judges volunteered advice; in one notable example, the judge, after 
already answering numerous questions for two party defenders who seemed very 
confused about the nature of the action against them, further noted that the 
defenders appeared to believe that, because the writ served on them averred 
that they were in breach of contract, this must be true. The judge thus took 
pains to remind them several times that they should not assume that the 
pursuer’s averments were necessarily correct. 
 
6.3.3 General Principles and Factors in Judicial Decision making 
 
Although party litigants often create the need for judges to make additional 
discretionary decisions on questions such as how much latitude to extend to the 
unrepresented litigant,982 there is little legal authority to guide judges as to how 
these decisions should be made. In fact, judges do not seem to be overly 
concerned with or even aware of the existing authority.983 When asked what 
principles they have in mind when making discretionary decisions about 
extending latitude to party litigants, only one judge referred to the leading case 
of Martin Wilson v North Lanarkshire Council984 and only one judge mentioned 
the Equal Treatment Bench Book and its chapter on party litigants.985 However, 
both of these judges also indicated that their real concern was fairness. This was 
a common theme amongst judges when asked about the exercise of their 
discretion relating to party litigants, with many stating that they make these 
decisions based on the idea of fairness, the interests of justice, and/or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  982	  Chapter	  5.	  983	  See,	  for	  example,	  J6	  and	  J2;	  these	  judges	  stated	  explicitly	  that	  they	  did	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question of prejudice to the other party.986 One judge summarised his approach 
thusly: 
 
“But the general principle I adopt is fairness. Fairness to the party litigant, 
which means extending them latitude, that’s inevitable. But also fairness 
to the other side…And that’s the general principle, if there’s any, it’s 
fairness.”987 
 
Other principles also emerged, either alongside or ancillary to the wider 
question of fairness or the interests of justice. One of these went beyond the 
objective fairness of a decision to extend to the party litigant’s perception or 
feelings about the fairness of the decision or the process: 
 
“So you want to avoid the party litigant being disappointed in some sort of 
lawyer’s technicality. And feeling that they’ve been dealt with unfairly…So 
the—you do have to be extra fair to the party litigant, but not to the extent 
of prejudicing the other side.”988 
 
Another principle is the idea that it is unfair to hold them to legal rules and 
procedures that they do not know or understand: 
 
“I mean, to me, it comes back to really the issues of fairness, and if you 
have a party litigant who genuinely doesn’t understand and who you cannot 
expect to understand the procedural timetable and the procedural rules, 
and they’re simply not ready to proceed then in these circumstances I’d be 
very, very reluctant to find somebody in default.”989  
 
In addition to this broader principle, another judge referred to the actual state 
of knowledge of the individual litigant as a factor: 
 
“I think if I’m being asked to give any kind of latitude, I really want an 
explanation as to why they haven’t thought about that before now…they’ve 
maybe been told this before, given previous indication that they need to 
get that and they still haven’t done it, then I think they just have to pay 
the price for that and say ‘well, I’m sorry, but this either is clear and 
you’ve not done it, or you’ve been explained what to do and you’ve not 
done it’ then that’s, I think the latitude stops then.”990 
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This suggests that party litigants can be held responsible only for what they 
actually know (not just what they should have known). Moreover, the latitude 
stops only when necessary steps have been explained by the court and the party 
litigant has failed to act. There is, strictly speaking, no duty on the court to 
explain the procedure to party litigants or ensure it is clear, although in practice 
most judges do so.991 These ideas suggest that there is little onus placed on the 
party litigant to familiarise himself with the process before he comes to court.  
 
It is interesting to note that the behaviour of the individual litigant was also a 
factor for some judges, echoing again the idea of the two respective groups of 
“good” and “bad” party litigants: 
 
“My own position is if it’s a—if a party litigant is behaving in a particularly 
unreasonable way—would be to take, to give them less slack than the 
normal party litigant. Most party litigants do not behave in an unreasonable 
way.”992  
 
Judges suggested that party litigants are more likely to be extended latitude if 
they appear to be “sincere”993 or to be acting in “good faith.”994 The apparent 
substance of the party litigant’s case was another factor cited, with judges less 
likely to extend latitude to the party litigant on procedural matters, such as the 
late lodging of documents, if they considered that the action was likely to be 
meritless or irrelevant overall.995  
 
The form of procedure that the party litigant is involved in also plays a role. 
Strictly speaking, the rules of the simple procedure afford the judge a wider 
discretion in how to deal with the case, while the ordinary cause rules prescribe 
a set form of procedure to which the party litigant must adhere. Although the 
dispensing power of the judge to relieve parties from failure to comply with the 
rules is explicit within the ordinary cause rules, judges considered that there 
was less latitude to be afforded in these cases or that a stricter approach was 
necessary:996  	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“…I think it’s much more difficult in ordinary cause to give latitude because 
it is a very clear procedure, it’s a much more structured procedure…”997 
 
The preponderance of subjective notions such as fairness and the interests of 
justice in the decision making process, and other factors that appear to vary 
between different judges, naturally raises questions of consistency in the 
process between judges. Both court staff and solicitors observed that different 
judges took differing approaches to party litigants, with some allowing more 
leeway than others.998 There was also a suggestion that the approach to party 
litigants may be changing over time. One solicitor raised the idea that older 
judges and those who had been in office for longer tended to offer less latitude 
to party litigants in general: 
 
“There are some sheriffs that don’t [offer latitude] but I think they’ve 
maybe gone a little bit more…But I think mostly I’ve noticed even in the 
last 5—7 years a change where those sheriffs have perhaps retired and 
certainly sheriffs I’m dealing with give the party litigants more latitude.”999 
 
Other solicitors agreed that judges who had been in office longer may tend to 
have less patience with party litigants,1000 with one suggesting that this may be 
accounted for by new judges receiving more training on how to approach party 
litigants when they take up office.1001 This is particularly interesting in light of 
the suggestion, as discussed above, that there is in general a greater emphasis 
on judges being more involved or “proactive” in civil cases. 
 
6.3.4 Managing Emotion 
 
Party litigants can, of course, often be expected to be emotionally invested in 
their cases and may find representing themselves to be an emotional 
experience. SRLs often feel distressed, vulnerable, or hopeless in the pursuit of 
their cases.1002 Unlike lawyers, who are expected to maintain a professional 
distance from the legal problems that bring them (and their clients) to court, 	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party litigants are personally involved in the issue as well as the case. One 
particularly interesting, and somewhat surprising, aspect of the judicial 
interviews undertaken was how alert judges were to the emotions of party 
litigants--in fact, there was some element of this in each of the interviews. 
Some of these emotions, such as worry or distress, were the effect or result of 
going to court and doing so without a lawyer. Emotion was also recognised as a 
motivation or driver for the party litigant in coming to (or staying in) court or in 
the conduct of the case. Judges were not only aware of the emotional issues for 
party litigants, but also reacted by adjusting their approach or even their 
decision making process to accommodate or mitigate the party litigant’s 
emotional state. 
 
Turning first to the emotional impact of self-representation and the court 
process on party litigants, judges were aware both that the issue bringing the 
party to court was often difficult for the litigant and that litigants were likely to 
feel stressed or intimidated by coming to court:1003  
 
“And I suppose party litigants, the emotion quotient in the case is probably 
higher, that sort of baggage they’re bringing with them inevitably, because 
they’ve invested time and effort in preparing for it. I suppose, if you’re 
trying to prepare yourself for a completely unknown process—I mean, I 
often think, what if somebody said to me ‘right, you’ve got four weeks to 
prepare yourself to carry out some neurosurgery,’ you’d have to work quite 
hard, and you’d be pretty stressed for the time you’re being asked to do 
that! So you’re almost asking somebody to do that, so they’re bound to be 
stressed.”1004 
 
Judges also noted that party litigants are often keen to ensure that they are 
able to tell their side of the story or “have their say” in court.1005 In turn, judges 
adjusted their approach to make them feel comfortable, or ensure that they felt 
that they had a chance to say what they wish to say and be “heard” by the 
court.1006 These are not, of course, concerns for judges when parties are 
represented. Accommodating the party litigant’s desire to “have their say” often 
entails hearing the litigant on matters that are not relevant or related to the 	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case; one judge said his approach to party litigants is thus to be patient, 
tolerant, and understanding.1007 Another noted that he will listen to what party 
litigants have to say until they run out of breath or start repeating themselves: 
 
“When you’ve got to the that point, you can say ‘well I’ve got the point, 
now let’s just recap on what you’ve said so far, and maybe list the things 
you think are relevant’ and in that way hopefully you’re getting across to 
the party litigant that you understood what they say. And if they haven’t 
understood it, no doubt they say. But it’s most important to them to feel 
that they’re being listened to and understood.”1008 
 
 
Although the court observation took place in a primarily procedural court, there 
was still a great deal of irrelevant information provided by party litigants, who 
often persisted even after being advised by the judge that the judge could not 
consider what they were being told. It was particularly common for party 
litigants in hearings relating to applications for liability orders from the Child 
Support Agency to go on at length about family law matters unrelated to the 
application at hand. Although the party litigants were advised by the judge that 
these matters were not relevant and could not be considered, they typically 
stopped short of cutting the litigant off. 
 
Judges use other techniques to put party litigants at ease and minimise their 
discomfort, some of which are quite subtle. For example, the same judge 
quoted immediately above noted that he made a point of ensuring that party 
litigants did not feel self conscious about appearing without a lawyer: 
 
“So I might say, ‘So you’re appearing on your own today,’ something like 
that. Not ‘oh, you’re just here on your own’ or ‘so you don’t have a 
solicitor?’ I think that might set the wrong tone, so I think it’s important at 
the outset to set the right tone.”1009 
 
Another judge used this practice to minimise stress for party litigants giving 
evidence at proof hearings: 
 
“First of all, I don’t put the witness, the party, in the witness box. Simple 
thing, I just think that it’s putting the party litigant at a disadvantage 	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immediately because they are separated from their papers. And it’s just an 
isolating thing, to put them in the witness box, it seems isolating. I’ll 
generally put the party on oath, undoubtedly that’s a given, but I will allow 
the party to simply sit at the table at the well of the court. I think it puts 
the party litigant at ease.”1010 
 
In terms of emotion as a motivating factor for party litigants, judges repeated 
the famous idea that for party litigants coming to court, “it’s not about the 
money, it’s about the principle.”1011 Judges’ observations about the motivations 
of party litigants echoed Moorhead and Sefton’s finding1012 that SRLs 
conceptualise coming to court out of a broader desire to seek “justice”1013 or 
because they felt they had been “wronged”1014 rather than for the legal 
resolution of their dispute. As one judge said, “…they’re coming with a wrong 
that they think has been done to them, in some shape or form, and they think 
somebody’s going to put that right.”1015 The same judge suggested that this 
conception of “justice” may be based on wider social influences: 
 
“…if something bad happens to you or something unfair happens to you, 
you don’t always have a remedy. I think society generally has this feeling 
nowadays that if something wrong happens, they should be able to get 
redress, but it doesn’t always work like that.”1016 
 
Equally, judges were aware that party litigants driven to court by more 
emotional motivations, rather than a valid claim in law, were ultimately unlikely 
to be satisfied by the process. “The problem is that seeking catharsis through 
legal proceedings is not a good idea,” one judge said.1017 However, the judge 
can do little but advise the party litigant of this or attempt to manage their 
expectations of the process and the remit of the court.1018 Another judge even 
recalled once recommending counselling for an aggrieved party rather than 
litigation;1019 the litigant later wrote to him with thanks, saying that she had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1010	  J7.	  1011	  See,	  for	  example,	  J10.	  1012	  Moorhead	  and	  Sefton.	  1013	  J8,	  J10,	  J7.	  1014	  J9,	  J8,	  J1,	  J2.	  1015	  J8.	  1016	  J8.	  1017	  J2.	  	  1018	  J5,	  J8,	  J7,	  J2.	  1019	  Prior	  to	  his	  appointment	  as	  a	  sheriff,	  in	  another	  judicial	  office	  he	  held.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   202	  
taken the advice to get counselling and that it had helped her to get her life 
back on track.1020  
 
Judges also observed that party litigants will often feel animosity or distrust 
towards their opponent or the opponent’s lawyer,1021 and as a result the usual 
discussions between parties—often with a view to settlement—do not occur or 
are not productive:  
 
“…quite often relations between the parties have broken down, they’re 
quite hostile towards each other. So they’re not in the right frame of mind 
to compromise.”1022 
 
Putting aside the possibility of settlement, hostility or fear of the other party 
can also prolong the action, as parties are unable to collaborate to narrow the 
issues: 
 
“And one thing I do want to mention, because it’s struck me so often, is—
the hearings are always more cumbersome, and that is for one very good 
reason and that is that very rarely in cases involving one or more party 
litigants is there even a possibility of agreeing uncontroversial material. 
Because what happens is that the party litigants are fearful that they’re 
being drawn into making a concession. They’re not, but that’s how they see 
that, and I understand how they may see that.”1023 
 
On a similar note, judges suggested that party litigants may be unwilling to 
enter into discussions because they are too firmly entrenched in their view1024 or 
because they are unwilling to compromise.1025 With this in mind, some judges 
attempted to address the unwillingness to communicate or consider settlement 
in court by encouraging parties to communicate, even halting the hearing to do 
so:1026 
 
“…and you say ‘well, have you been for a chat to see if we can resolve 
this?’ and they look at you as if you’ve got two heads and you say ‘right, on 
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you go, go and speak to each other for 10 minutes’. And in quite a lot of 
cases it works.”1027 
 
All of these responses on the part of judges to the emotional nature of the 
process for party litigants form another facet of the “active” approach taken to 
these cases. Even more so than the general decision making principles discussed 
above, the ideas and practices discussed in this section operate outside of the 
“law” and what is traditionally thought of as the judicial role, but nonetheless 
appear to form a notable aspect of the approach to party litigants. 
 
6.3.5 Discussion 
 
Dealing with party litigants in the civil courts requires judges to shift away from 
their traditional role in a number of respects. Although the civil courts remain, 
in principle, primarily adversarial, the data suggested that judges routinely take 
a much more active role in practice, both with represented parties and, to a 
much greater extent, with party litigants. There is thus an uneasy relationship 
between the traditional understanding of the civil courts as a firmly adversarial 
process, and the reality as created by the newer rules of court and practical 
necessity. Judges clearly take a more active approach with party litigants; in 
simple procedure cases, they are required to do so. At the same time judges 
recognise that the system is adversarial and there are limits on how active 
judges can be before this leads to unfairness or prejudice to the party litigant’s 
opponent. This internal incoherence or ambiguity in law is a problem in itself, 
but it also raises concerns about how well support and training for judges can 
keep up with the changing reality in the courts. Judges are in effect required to 
some extent to make enquiries and mediate with party litigants, but most come 
from a background in practice where they have trained and worked as 
adversarial legal practitioners.   
 
Turning to the question of how judges approach the exercise of their discretion 
in relation to party litigants, what is again most striking is the paucity of 
traditional legal principles and how often more vague or subjective ideas such as 
“fairness” are cited. The overall impression created is that judging party 	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litigants is very experiential for judges, and is based to a significant extent on 
individual considerations and views. There are hints that changes in judicial 
culture over time—such as a move towards more “proactive” or party litigant-
friendly approaches—may be another factor shaping how much latitude party 
litigants are allowed. This is intriguing and highlights how unmoored policy and 
practice on self-representation is. It bears repeating again that there is nothing 
in law that requires the judge to show any latitude to the party litigant, or to do 
anything other than treat him just as he would a solicitor or advocate.1028 If 
there is one single conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter—and this 
theme will continue into the next chapter as well—it is that judges clearly do 
feel at least some obligation to allow party litigants leeway or assist them. 
Because the existing law bears so little resemblance to what actually occurs in 
the courts, each judge is left to his own devices to determine how best to deal 
with the numerous challenges party litigants present to the traditional models of 
judging. Rules of court provide some structure—for example, the simple 
procedure rules allow for a more active and informal approach than the more 
prescriptive ordinary cause rules. However, there is something perverse in the 
idea that an ordinary cause party litigant, facing a much more demanding 
procedure, should be allowed less latitude than a litigant in the more 
straightforward simple procedure. While lawyers understand the complexity and 
diversity of Scottish civil procedures, to the layperson there is little to justify a 
significantly different approach to party litigants between a claim for £4,999 in 
the simple procedure and a claim for £5,001 in the ordinary cause. 
 
The emotional element presents further and even more complicated challenges 
to the judicial role. The prevalence of judges sympathising with party litigants 
and how they feel, or adjusting their practices based on their feelings, is a 
reminder that judges are, of course, only human. There is nothing in law that 
requires them to think about the party litigant’s feelings, and in fact a perfect 
“passive arbiter” perhaps should not be thinking about whether the litigant is 
happy with the court process. However, these matters were very clearly on 
many judge’s minds. In fact, one referred to the desire to give sincere party 
litigants a good experience.1029 The ability to put himself in the party litigant’s 	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shoes may be an asset for the judge, for example by settling a case without the 
need for a proof because parties are encouraged to talk matters out. Equally, 
however, this facet of the judicial approach to party litigants raises questions. 
Could this mind set lead judges to be too lenient with party litigants? Is it unfair 
to the represented party if the judge is viewing the party litigant as distressed 
or vulnerable from the outset? Does adopting a tolerant and patient posture to 
irrelevant submissions perpetuate the layperson’s notion that the court is a 
place to come for “justice” or to “have their say” rather than legal dispute 
resolution?  
 
Is it really part of the judge’s role to consider the party litigant’s feelings or 
need for catharsis, rather than dispassionately deciding on the relevant law at 
hand? In many ways this question addresses the wider issue of how we view the 
function of the courts and adjudication. Should the courts process disputes 
quickly and efficiently, or should they provide a service tailored to the needs of 
litigants as “consumers”?1030 Even putting aside any prejudice to the party 
litigant’s opponent, is it really better for the judge to allow a party litigant to 
take up court time—possibly at the party litigant’s own expense—to “have his 
say” on a meritless claim rather than disposing of it quickly? Is it a better 
outcome if the party litigant thus leaves court poorer but more satisfied because 
he has been able to speak his mind—or, as suggested by one judge above, is his 
search for “catharsis” in the court always bound to fail anyway? There are no 
easy answers to these questions. Despite concerns about party litigants coming 
to court for emotional rather than legal reasons, to say that some party litigants 
should be kept out of the courts for their own good smacks unpleasantly of 
paternalism.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Much of what has been discussed in this chapter is consistent with the existing 
literature on SRLs in other jurisdictions. In the absence of clear rules and 
guidance relating to party litigants, the diversity in the general principles that 
judges apply when dealing with party litigants can perhaps also be expected. 	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However, for the most part these principles all add up to the same conclusion: 
that it is unfair to treat party litigants like solicitors and that latitude must be 
extended to them. Perhaps most interesting is the awareness of so many judges 
of the role that emotion plays for the party litigant and how this can influence 
their approach or even decision making. With all of the principles discussed in 
this chapter in mind, the next chapter will examine the challenges and issues 
arising around party litigants in the civil courts, and how the courts deal with 
these challenges. 
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Chapter 7: Navigating the Court 
Process 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The general principles set out in the previous chapter guide the judicial 
approach to party litigants in the court. However, to better understand the 
position of the party litigant, it is necessary to examine the more granular 
aspects of the process. There are many facets to a court action and many 
different stages and elements for a party litigant and for the court to deal with. 
This chapter discusses various stages and aspects of the civil court process—
court procedures, legal matters, evidence—how party litigants approach these 
aspects of their case, the issues arising, and how the courts deal with these 
issues. As will be seen throughout this chapter, and in line with the general 
principles discussed in the last chapter, often the court deals with any problems 
and issues by extending various forms of latitude or assistance to party litigants. 
In the latter part of the chapter, other aspects of the party litigant’s experience 
are considered: expenses, appeals, and the role of court staff in providing 
advice or assistance. 
7.2 Court Procedures 
 
7.2.1 How Well do Party Litigants Cope with Procedural Requirements? 
 
It is clear that party litigants struggled with procedural matters considerably—in 
fact, to the extent that, as noted above, judges simply did not expect the 
majority of party litigants to be capable of understanding or navigating the court 
procedures. As one judge stated,  
 
“But in a very significant number of cases, party litigants don’t seem to 
have much of a grasp of the procedure. I mean, even the basics in terms of 
the lodging of documents or intimating witnesses, or even how to get 
witnesses to court. So I tend to proceed on an assumption that they don’t 
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really know anything about the procedures other than that they’re in 
court.”1031 
 
Judges were thus prepared to offer party litigants a high degree of latitude or 
assistance on purely procedural matters. Generally this took the form of either 
excusing late performance of a procedural requirement, continuing the matter 
to a further hearing to allow the party litigant more time or several chances to 
comply with a procedural requirement or to comply correctly, or again by 
lowering standards to accept, for example, court documents in an incorrect 
format. The judge might also explain in court what the party litigant needs to 
do, a step that would of course not be taken (or needed) for represented 
parties.1032 When the other party was represented, some judges asked the 
opponent’s solicitor to perform procedural requirements that would otherwise 
have been the party litigant’s responsibility. For example, the defender’s 
solicitor may be asked to lodge the record with the court, rather than the 
pursuer as usual.1033 One solicitor even felt that the court expected him to assist 
the party litigant: 
 
“Just based on my experience, it’s especially important to make sure that 
the other party is made aware of what is going on.1034 So I feel there’s 
almost an element of the court will expect me as the legally qualified 
person involved in the dispute to assist to an extent. Sometimes helping—I 
would go so far as to say helping them to comply with the rules.”1035 
 
Most judges also said that they were slow to grant summary disposals, such as 
decree by default or summary decree, against party litigants. As one judge said, 
“So to persuade the court that the person should lose their right either to pursue 
or defend a case for having failed to take some procedural step, then—I’m not 
saying it couldn’t happen, but it would be pretty extreme.”1036 There is some 
suggestion that judges may go a step further by not only refusing to grant a 
motion for a summary disposal, but by discouraging the opponent’s solicitor from 	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making such a motion in the first place. As one judge said, referring to a motion 
for decree by default: “At that stage I would be pointing out quite strongly to 
the other party that actually this could be more inconvenient for you if I granted 
decree today, because the strong likelihood is they’ll come back to court and 
we’ll start all over again, that’s a wasted trip on your part.”1037 Solicitors 
reported hearing these sentiments from judges in court as well. They would 
refrain from seeking orders such as summary decree that they would have sought 
if the party had been represented, because it was unlikely to be granted and 
thus a waste of time. This pre-emption of procedural steps can be viewed as a 
form of latitude in its own right. It is interesting to consider whether this is 
beneficial for the party litigant or not—a motion for summary decree, for 
example, may have the effect of bringing deficiencies in the party’s case to light 
at an earlier stage, which could be helpful for all parties in the long run.1038 
 
Perhaps the most prevalent procedural issue is the additional court time 
required to explain the procedures and requirements to party litigants, an action 
not necessary when parties are represented. However, one judge did note that 
solicitors are often given a degree of latitude on lateness and format of court 
documents.1039 Some judges expressed feeling under pressure to spend sufficient 
time explaining matters to party litigants in courts where a number of other 
parties were in court awaiting their own hearings. Allowing party litigants 
continuations and additional time to comply with the court procedures also 
creates delay for both parties, usually in terms of weeks at least, and the need 
for additional court hearings. Judges were alert to the problem of the 
inconvenience and additional expense incurred by party litigants’ opponents, but 
consistently reported that party litigants would get at least one continuation to 
deal with a procedural failing. One solicitor noted, however, that cases are 
often dealt with by different sheriffs from one hearing to the next, and matters 
became even more protracted when party litigants received latitude from one 
judge and then the same from a different judge at the next hearing:  
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“And then the case is continued and in four week’s time it’s a different 
sheriff, and the sheriff says ‘oh, it’s a party litigant, I’ll give him extra 
latitude just to be fair’ and it gets quite infuriating because you’re thinking 
‘well, actually if it had been the same sheriff dealing with this throughout, 
they’d have realised that actually I’ve given them the chance the first time 
and they’ve not taken it, or they’re deliberately causing us problems”.1040 
 
7.2.3 Procedural vs Substantive Matters 
 
Judges also said that party litigants often did not understand the difference 
between hearings that are procedural in nature, and evidential hearings or 
proofs. Often party litigants appeared at first or procedural hearings with 
evidence or believing that they were there to argue their case in full at that 
hearing: 
 
“And they don’t often appreciate that the first calling of the case is not the 
evidential hearing and they come in armed to the teeth to argue. And they 
want to have their say, and it doesn’t matter how many times you tell 
them ‘I’ll be appointing defences to be lodged, there will be a proof fixed,’ 
they will insist on talking about their case, they will insist on ventilating in 
court their issues with the other party.”1041 
 
These party litigants are confused and therefore unlikely to be prepared to deal 
with the true purpose of the hearing: to direct the progress of the case. As other 
judges noted, they are also likely to be disappointed and dispirited when 
confronted with the reality of the procedural requirements and the fact that 
there will be further stages before their case reaches a final determination. One 
judge described how, to manage party litigants’ expectations, they began 
hearings by informing them that they will not “dig in” to their case or go in to 
detail at this stage.1042 As another said, 
 
“…I think I and my colleagues often feel that at the actual court you’re 
managing disappointment rather in the way that people at the airport make 
Tannoy announcements or at the desk are managing disappointment…and 
all they’re doing is staging the delay, and then you feel cheated at the end 
of it all. I don’t think we’re as bad as that but I do think we’re—you know, 
the paperwork, the initial procedures, they’re all geared to the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1040	  S5.	  1041	  J6.	  1042	  J8.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   211	  
appearance and we’ve then got to explain that it’s going to take longer 
than that.”1043 
 
As the same judge pointed out, party litigants may become discouraged at this 
stage and wonder if the process is worth the effort.1044 Some matters, such as 
contact orders with children, are especially time-sensitive. Without a solicitor to 
manage his expectations, a first hearing can be a rude awakening for a party 
litigant. 
 
7.2.4 Participation in Procedural Matters 
 
A less apparent issue with the party litigant’s lack of knowledge of the court 
rules and practices, particularly in the context of an adversarial, party-led 
system, is that the party litigant is not able to fully participate in court 
hearings, even those which are purely procedural in nature.1045 When parties are 
represented at a typical procedural hearing, either each party makes their own 
motion, or (as often occurs) the procedure has already been agreed by the 
solicitors and a joint motion or motion of consent is made to move the case to 
the next stage procedurally. At an Ordinary Cause options hearing, for example, 
parties will typically ask for a continued options hearing to allow more time to 
adjust their pleadings, or for a debate or proof hearing to determine all or part 
of the matter. Usually the judge will grant one of the orders sought.  
 
Party litigants who are not familiar with the procedures—or, as discussed above, 
are not even aware of the nature of the hearing—are not able to meaningfully 
engage with this process. This was particularly apparent in the court observation 
data. In various forms of procedural hearing, party litigants often asked the 
court to make orders or take procedural steps that were not appropriate to the 
stage of proceedings—for example, asking for dismissal of the case at the options 
hearing, or attempting to dispute the debt at a hearing for their sequestration. 
Frequently party litigants made no motion at all to the court. It was common for 
the party litigant to say nothing at all in terms of how they wished the case to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1043	  J5.	  1044	  See	  also	  J10.	  1045	  Proofs	  and	  evidential	  hearings	  present	  their	  own	  issues	  and	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	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proceed, or to simply oppose their opponent’s motion without requesting an 
order of their own. This undermined the usual structure of the process; while in 
cases involving represented parties the outcome of the hearing was usually one 
of the orders sought by parties, in cases involving party litigants it was often 
something else entirely,1046 either ex proprio motu or a different order agreed 
after the judge had discussed matters with parties from the bench.  
 
7.2.5 Discussion  
 
Unsurprisingly, the data gathered was consistent with the existing literature in 
that it suggested that court procedures are difficult for party litigants to 
understand and navigate.1047 More interesting is the prevailing view among the 
judges and lawyers interviewed that there is little substantive effect resulting 
from purely procedural failings, and there was ample chance for the party 
litigant to correct any problems. However, further data on the question of how 
party litigants feel about procedural matters would be useful. Even if failing to 
understand the procedure does not truly prejudice the party litigant, it may still 
be a considerable source of stress for them. Procedural formalities may also 
hinder the party litigant’s ability to participate meaningfully in the case and 
further the impression that they are “outsiders” in the process. 
 
7.3 Substantive Legal Matters and Merits 
 
7.3.1 Pleadings and Court Documents 
 
Some form of written pleadings or documentation will be required in most cases 
involving party litigants. In the simple procedure, the litigant’s claim or defence 
can be set out in informal terms on the court forms. In other forms of action, 
strictly speaking, litigants must not only plead a relevant case in law, but do so 
in a strictly prescribed fashion. Unsurprisingly, the formal and structured 
requirements of written pleadings and court documents present difficulties for 
party litigants: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1046	  Unsurprisingly,	  this	  was	  a	  very	  often	  some	  form	  of	  continuation.	  1047	  See	  section	  3.3.4.3.	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“I would say quite often in ordinary actions it’s the drafting of documents, 
because that’s something that’s quite difficult to do if you don’t know 
what’s required. And there’s not really anywhere you can find guidance on 
that, if you don’t have the experience…if you’re drafting legal documents 
it’s quite difficult without the resources that solicitors have to actually 
draft them correctly.”1048 
 
“I find that when I am going back to it and I am doing it I feel a bit rusty, 
so I think goodness knows what party litigants must feel like when they’re 
trying to deal with it and you’re trying to make sure that you’re doing it 
correctly, making sure you’re getting your points across, making sure 
you’re responding correctly. If you’re defending an action, that you’re 
responding correctly, you’re laying out your pleadings, all the tactical 
issues that come with pleadings. Making sure that you don’t say anything 
that could lead to a recovery of evidence or a commission and diligence 
being required, or saying anything that could be potentially misconstrued 
or misinterpreted. It must be very difficult for a party litigant to do this 
properly.”1049 
 
Again the court is often placed in the position of offering latitude or assistance 
to the party litigant in the submission of pleadings. As with procedural matters, 
the party litigant may be given more time to provide relevant pleadings.1050 One 
judge described assisting party litigants by setting out the requirements of 
pleadings in court: 
 
“…I’ll hold up a summons at the first calling of the case, and I’ll say ‘This is 
a statement of claim, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. What you must do is 
answer that with a document--I don’t care what you call it, it may be 
answers, it may be something else—what your point is in relation to 1, 2, 3, 
4 and 5.”1051 
 
Another option is to accept pleadings that do not properly express the party 
litigant’s case in law “as is” and to then “look behind” the pleadings as 
presented. One judge noted that he would accept pleadings that do not express 
the case properly as long as he got the point.1052 Written pleadings and court 
documents, and particularly defences, were an issue in a number of the ordinary 
court hearings that were observed. Ordinary cause cases typically call in court 
first for an options hearing, and at this stage parties are expected to have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1048	  S6.	  1049	  S5;	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  also	  S1.	  1050	  J10.	  1051	  J6.	  1052	  J9.	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completed all adjustment of their pleadings (the initial writ and defences) and 
to have produced a record. The following summaries of a number of hearings 
highlight a common problem with different solutions: 
 
Case 1: Options Hearing (Debt Action) 
A party litigant defender had lodged a letter rather than defences in the proper 
form. The pursuer enrolled a motion to continue the case to investigate the 
basis of the party litigant defender’s defence. The sheriff suggested sisting the 
case instead, which was not opposed and the case was sisted. 
 
Case 2: Continued Options Hearing (Debt Action) 
A party litigant defender had been given additional time to lodge defences in 
the correct format. This had now been done, but the defences were received 
late. The pursuer did not object to allowing the defences to be lodged although 
late, but sought further time to adjust to respond to the defences. The sheriff 
granted a further continued options hearing, noting that although this was not 
strictly within the rules,1053 it was the “least worst option.” 
 
Case 3: Options Hearing (Debt Action) 
The party litigant had lodged defences that were not in the correct form. The 
pursuer moved the court for an order for revised defences and a continued 
options hearing, while the party litigant defender moved the court to dismiss the 
action. After a lengthy hearing, the sheriff continued the case to a further 
options hearing but did not make an order for revised defences, advising the 
pursuer that the “gist” of the defender’s case was clear enough. 
 
Case 4: Options Hearing (Division and/or Sale) 
The party litigant defender’s defences were not in the correct form. The pursuer 
advised the court that they were therefore unsure of the defender’s position and 
thus how to determine future procedure. The pursuer moved for a continued 
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options hearing and a new order for defences in the proper format, which was 
granted.1054 
 
Case 5: Continued Options Hearing (Debt) 
The defender had lodged defences, but the pursuer had lodged a Rule 22.1 Note 
on the basis that there was no relevant defence disclosed. A debate was 
assigned. 
 
These examples also illustrate the challenge that the party litigant’s pleadings 
can present to the solicitor acting for the party litigant’s opponent, both in 
terms of how to understand the party litigant’s position and how to progress the 
case with minimal delay.1055 They also illustrate that judges are often not 
prepared to grant summary decree1056 and the typical procedure, such as fixing a 
debate, is not suitable to the situation at hand. A debate is intended to 
determine a point in law, but it is a protracted and complicated procedure to 
establish that a party litigant has been unable to plead a relevant case in law. 
 
7.3.2 Knowing and Understanding the Law 
 
Perhaps the most obvious problem that party litigants face when attempting to 
mount a case or defence in the civil courts is their lack of legal knowledge. As 
noted above, party litigants generally come to court with little understanding of 
the law, and judges generally do not expect them to have an understanding of 
the law.1057 As one solicitor noted, party litigants need not only find or access 
the relevant law, but also interpret the law: 
 
“I think the main reason is that they’re not legally qualified, so they’re not 
really familiar with how it works. So they might be reading legislation but 
they’re not understanding it properly and they’re interpreting incorrectly, 
and that can cause a lot of problems.”1058 
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Knowing the law (for example, by reading a text, statute or case law) and 
understanding the law (having the ability to correctly interpret and apply the 
law) can thus be viewed as two distinct but closely related challenges for party 
litigants. As another solicitor noted, a great deal of time and effort is required 
to acquire these legal skills: 
 
“…the underlying lack of knowledge of the law, and I think that is the 
fundamental problem. Law students go to law school for upwards of three 
years, that’s the minimum they’re going to do, and their substantive 
knowledge is two years, and these are clever, clever students who did well 
enough in school to get in to law school. But the average party litigant isn’t 
as well equipped.”1059 
 
As others also noted, it is simply not realistic to expect party litigants to acquire 
the necessary skills within the timescale of a court action.1060 Without a real 
knowledge or understanding of the law, how do party litigants then begin to 
formulate a case or defence? Often the answer appears to lie in the moral 
notions already discussed. It may be difficult for party litigants to untangle their 
ideas about fairness or “justice”—ideas that, again as discussed in the last 
chapter,1061 may be motivating them to come to court in the first place—from 
the need to present a relevant case in law to the court. As one solicitor said, 
“there’s no point on quoting much case law to a party litigant, because they’ll 
come around and say ‘well I don’t agree with that, that’s not fair.’”1062 Another 
solicitor offered this illustrative example: 
 
“I’ve got a divorce going on right now where—this is a great example of 
party litigant getting it wrong. They think they’re saving money and it’s a 
divorce case and of course he is saying one thing and she believes morally 
and ethically that a property is a family home and it’s matrimonial 
property when it’s not. And she can’t understand the fact that her 
estranged husband bought a property before he was even in a relationship 
with her, she moved in to the property and she thinks that’s a family 
home.”1063 
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As the solicitor went on to explain, the problem can be compounded when the 
party litigant does not understand the relevant law. In this example, the judge 
and opponent solicitor both tried to explain the law to the party litigant: 
 
“She reads the legislation in the 2006 Act, the matrimonial homes act, 
when it’s the 1985 Act that covers it…and she’s made a huge hash bash of 
all this, focused on all the wrong things, researched whatever she’s 
researched and it’s completely wrong. It’s difficult, and every case is 
different and has all its own particular difficulties and issues you need to 
try and resolve with the party litigant, and sometimes that’s easy and 
people get it, but most of the time they don’t get it because emotionally 
they’re too involved in the case.”1064 
 
Even when party litigants are made aware of the relevant law, some may set this 
aside in favour of ideas about what is “right’ or “fair”—while the court, of 
course, can only consider the law. 
 
Another point worth raising about party litigants and their level of knowledge is 
the matter of how well they are able to assess the value or quantum of their 
case. In some matters, such as suing for a debt, this is straightforward. However 
it can be more difficult when the party litigant is seeking damages. Without the 
necessary legal knowledge, the party litigant has no guidance and may seek 
what they consider to be fair (for example, seeking replacement value for a 
damaged item, rather than their actual loss1065) or pluck figures “out of the 
air”.1066 Determining the true value of the action requires, again, the judge to 
intervene. In one case, a judge described having to value the loss on a whole list 
of items for the pursuer in a small claims action—although the pursuer was 
nonetheless ultimately unsuccessful.1067 
 
A lack of basic understanding of the law often caused difficulties in the hearings 
observed as well. Party litigants often seemed to not understand the legal 
aspects of the matter before them, some of which, in fairness, are 
understandably subtle to a lay person. Actions for sequestration or time to pay 
applications (both of which were particularly common to find party litigants in 
during the course of the observation) offer a good example of this. In these 	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hearings, the sheriff is very limited in the decisions that can be made; in 
sequestrations, the legislation provides that the application must be granted 
unless the debt has been made or an application for a Debt Arrangement scheme 
has been made.1068 In relation to a time to pay application, instalment decree or 
open decree are the only potential outcomes. However, it was extremely 
commonplace to observe party litigants attending these hearings—again, perhaps 
understandably—seeking to dispute the underlying debt rather than to seek an 
outcome provided for in the relevant legislation. In law, however, the debt has 
already been constituted and any arguments about the debt itself are irrelevant. 
As discussed above in relation to procedural matters, these misunderstandings 
often left the litigants unprepared to deal with the issues actually at hand and 
unable to participate effectively in the hearing, and left the judge with little 
choice but to either grant the application or a continuation.  
 
7.3.3 Gatekeeping 
 
The most prominent consequence of lack of knowledge or understanding of the 
law is that party litigants are much more likely to bring a case or defence to 
court that is hopeless or meritless in law. As one judge put it, not having a 
lawyer means that party litigants have a problem with “seeing the case that 
isn’t there, so in knowing that you don’t have a case.” At the same time, there 
is very little “gatekeeping” of the cases of party litigants in the Sheriff courts. 
Typically, lawyers are generally thought of as gatekeepers of the law, using their 
expertise to determine if, and how, claims enter the courts.1069 For party 
litigants, this element is removed and there is no one legally qualified vetting 
the case or defence before it is presented to the court. The difficulty with this is 
that Sheriff Courts do not have their own mechanisms to vet or keep out cases 
that are fundamentally misconceived. While litigants in the Court of Session 
must have a judge’s approval before a summons is signetted, there is no 
analogous rule in the Sheriff Court. One judge pointed out this disparity and 
indicated that, as a result, the sheriff courts feel obliged to warrant virtually 
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any writ or application, regardless of how flawed it may be.1070 Another sheriff 
described a writ that had recently reached his desk as “mince”: 
 
“But anyway, I’ve granted a warrant for service on the defender, because 
we’re not supposed to consider the merits of the action. It’s up to the 
defenders to turn up and say ‘look, this action should be dismissed for the 
following reasons.’”1071 
 
Typically initial writs are warranted by court staff, rather than a judge, after 
establishing that basic procedural criteria are met. However, court staff 
reported that writs from party litigants may be presented to a judge for 
approval (as in the example above) if they were uncertain whether to issue a 
warrant.1072 In one staff focus group, a clerk advised that for a writ to be 
warranted, checks would be made for:  
 
“…as a minimum, an instance, pursuer and defender, a crave—at least one, 
what they want—you’re looking for some sort of condescendence, what it’s 
about. I generally wouldn’t be looking for pleas-in-law. But if I wasn’t 
entirely sure, I would send it up to the sheriff to ask if they were willing to 
accept it.”1073 
 
When asked if judges typically agree to have these writs warranted, another 
clerk in the same group added: 
 
“They—well, it depends on the sheriff. But my view…is that we’re not 
really here to check the merits of people’s actions, if people want to raise 
an ordinary action, fine, the sheriff clerk’s office is just sort of an 
administrative office, we’ll take—or to an extent, as long as it conforms to 
the basic requirements—we’ll take anything and it’s up the other side to 
object to it if they think there’s anything that’s not got a sound legal basis. 
But I think some sheriffs, well there’s at least one sheriff here that I think 
is a bit more specific before any—wants things to be right before an action 
is warranted.”1074 
 
As with all types of pleadings, there is little assistance available for party 
litigants seeking to raise an action to draft the writ properly. As one clerk 
observed: 
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“And of course, your other problem is, a lot of party litigants come up with 
the expectation that we have forms for absolutely every type of scenario, 
and of course we don’t. They say they want to raise an initial writ to get 
custody of their child, all we can do is head them in the right direction for 
a very basic style for a writ in a Ordinary Cause Rules, but then I have to 
say to them ‘look, at the end of the day, you have to decide how to frame 
the document, that is legal advice that we’re not able to help you 
with.”1075 
 
7.3.4 Assessing and Dealing with the Case 
 
All of the points discussed above begin to illustrate the complexity that the legal 
aspects of a party litigant’s case present to the court. While lawyers can be 
expected to set out a case in law clearly and in the proper format, the judge is 
far less likely to be able to rely on the party litigant’s pleadings as an accurate 
expression of their case. Due to the party litigant’s lack of knowledge or 
understanding of the law, it may be that the party litigant does not understand 
their own legal position, or they may believe that they have a case when they do 
not. One first step that judges and solicitors turn to is advising party litigants to 
take legal advice.1076 Judges could be seen advising party litigants to take legal 
advice often during the course of court observation as well, including suggesting 
specific agencies, such as Citizen’s Advice Bureaux, that may be able to offer 
help. Of course, it is not always possible for the party litigant to do so, or they 
may not wish to take legal advice.  
 
Judges also described offering a degree of leeway or latitude to party litigants 
on legal matters. When asked about what part of the process challenges party 
litigants the most, one judge said, “The law can be very challenging, but the 
courts do cut them loads of slack in relation to the law, if there’s a colourable 
case hiding in there. That’s more of a challenge for the court.”1077  As this 
suggests, with this latitude the job of formulating the party litigant’s case in law 
can be seen to shift to some degree from the litigant to the judge. The judge 
may thus have to make enquiries to draw out the party litigant’s case: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1075	  FG1;	  see	  section	  7.7.1	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  look	  at	  legal	  and	  procedural	  advice	  from	  the	  clerk’s	  office.	  1076	  See,	  for	  example,	  J1,	  J2,	  S1,	  S3,	  S4,	  S5.	  1077	  J4.	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“…I think you can get them to supplement it, what they think the case is 
about, what’s the problem, what’s the nature of the problem? And what’s 
the solution that they’re looking for?”1078 
 
Another judge described “translating” the position of party litigant respondents 
in mortgage repossession cases into the relevant defence of reasonableness: 
 
“In those cases I encourage the person to just explain to me in very broad 
terms why they say I should not be granting judgment against them, try and 
encourage them to explain. That generally prompts a diversion into 
irrelevancy, I must say. But with a little gentle steering, it’s not difficult to 
get to the issue of reasonableness.”1079 
 
Judges may have to establish fundamental aspects of the case for the party 
litigant: 
 
“Yeah, I think basically I give them quite a bit of leeway with that, because 
they very rarely come and say ‘this is a case of contract’ or ‘this is such-
and-such’. I usually say to them, ‘this comes down to a question of 
contract’ or, you know, somebody comes and starts quoting a statute, 
‘well, you’ve not made a statutory argument in your case so far, so we 
can’t consider that unless it’s put in, do you want to go down that path, or 
are you wanting to rely on the common law in relation to that?”1080 
 
The additional questioning and advising of the party litigant, of course, takes up 
additional time. Party litigants are also likely to address the court on irrelevant 
matters;1081 as one judge put it, “I think inevitably the lay person will want to 
start off at the beginning of time.”1082  Time pressures play a significant role in 
the judge’s ability to deal with the party litigant’s case in law. The typical first 
calling of a case in a procedural court does not allow time for the additional 
enquiries that the judge has to make in these cases: 
 
“…but that’s incredibly challenging because you have a court with 100 
cases, and hours to do it, and a defender let’s say who is emotionally 
involved, no doubt out of his comfort zone, and unable to really articulate 
the nub of the defence. You have to try and just get to it, quickly.”1083 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1078	  J2.	  1079	  J7.	  1080	  J8.	  1081	  Either	  because	  they	  do	  not	  know	  what	  is	  relevant	  or	  because	  they	  wish,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.3.4,	  to	  “have	  their	  say”.	  1082	  J5.	  1083	  J7;	  see	  also	  J3.	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A solicitor suggested that a lack of time may prevent early intervention in cases: 
 
“However I think the fundamental problem is what I used to see with small 
claims and summary cause, which is that a lot of these things can take 
quite a long time for a sheriff to resolve, to fully understand what’s going 
on, for both sides to have their say. And one of the biggest challenges is 
that the courts just don’t have the time or capacity to deal with cases in 
that way, certainly at an early stage. So they send them off to another 
hearing on another day.”1084 
 
7.3.5 Discussion 
 
While it is relatively easy to observe that party litigants lack legal knowledge, 
this really only scratches the surface of the issue. Party litigants must not only 
know the law, but also must understand the law—a skill that can take years to 
acquire. Even those party litigants who are able to conduct their own legal 
research to find the law relevant to their case may misunderstand the meaning 
and may not be able to correctly apply the law. Judges are often prepared to fill 
in some of the gaps for party litigants to “translate” their position into a legal 
position or case in law. However, it is worth noting that, although must judges 
described this as a form of leeway or latitude, it is perhaps more properly 
considered a form of assistance. Because the courts are adversarial, the judge 
need only consider the case pleaded before him. If the litigant does not, for 
example, plead a case in contract law, the judge strictly speaking need not ask 
himself whether the litigant has such a case. Looking for the “latent case”,1085 
again, requires an active approach on the part of the judge to draw out the 
party litigant’s position and the relevant facts. Although judges often take a 
more active approach, the design of the rules and procedures anticipate the 
more streamlined process of solicitors presenting their cases in law fully formed 
to the court. To be “fair” to the party litigant, judges thus both have to work 
outside this process and do so without the proper time the task requires. 
 
A similar disruption to the typical running of the process occurs when party 
litigants are unable to correctly produce formal written pleadings. Due to the 
stringent requirements, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect party litigants to draft 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1084	  S6.	  1085	  Section	  5.3.3.3.	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pleadings that comply with the requirements in both form and law. As one 
solicitor pointed out above, legal professionals have resources such as styles 
available to them, and even then they can still find written pleadings to be 
challenging. Even basic guidance, such as a style for defences, is not available in 
the rules, nor do the rules set out the need for admissions and denials. It seems 
only natural that many party litigants lodge letters or other incorrect forms of 
defences and other pleadings, and one hearing after another is wasted as the 
judge must allow the party litigant time to fix the problem. However, if the 
party litigant is allowed to simply lodge insufficient pleadings, their opponent is 
not getting fair notice of the case and is unable to answer it properly. Without 
pleadings to focus the action, it remains “at large”. The opponent may also not 
have relevant procedural tools at their disposal. For example, if the party 
litigant’s defences do not contain the typical admissions and denials, even 
uncontentious matters must be addressed at proof; if pleas in law are missing or 
not articulated properly, issues that could have been considered preliminary 
pleas, to be either insisted upon or repelled, remain in limbo.  
 
While interviewees considered that written pleadings are difficult for party 
litigants, it is worth noting that this is in the context of formal written 
pleadings—it is not necessarily that party litigants find it more challenging to 
express themselves in writing, but that they must also conform to the technical 
and legal requirements in formal pleadings. Even if the requirements for written 
pleadings were loosened, court hearings giving the judge the opportunity to 
discuss matters with the party litigant would still play an important role in the 
judge’s ability to “look behind” the party litigant’s case or question the party 
litigant to get at what the matter is “really” about.  
 
There is also the question of party litigants’ lack of legal knowledge leading to 
meritless cases. With little institutionalised gatekeeping, the question of 
whether or not a flawed writ or claim is kept out of the sheriff courts depends 
on court practice and the individual clerk or judge. Again, this is a decision that 
must be made in the absence of rules or guidance. It is worth noting that, at a 
minimum, a defender will be required to lodge a notice of intention to defend, 
defences, and a motion for summary decree (if indeed this is granted) to dispose 
of an action, even if the writ is “mince”. There is also a problem of fair notice. 
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If, for example, the writ does not contain pleas-in-law, it will be difficult for the 
defender to establish and answer the pursuer’s claim. At the same time, without 
knowledge of the court process, receiving a warrant to commence an action 
from the court could reinforce a party litigant’s view that they have a legitimate 
case where there is none. The warranting stage may also currently be a missed 
opportunity to focus the party litigant’s mind on their case in law, or whether 
they have a case in law at all. 
 
This last issue, the question of whether the party litigant has a case in law at 
all, gets at the wider conceptual difficulties party litigants have understanding 
the workings of the law and the remit of the courts. The latter problem, 
perhaps, is not for the court itself to solve—if lay people develop a belief in the 
courts as a place to seek “justice” in moral terms rather than legal terms, it is 
difficult to see what the courts can do to disabuse them of this notion, short of 
earlier intervention or “gatekeeping” to keep legally meritless cases from 
progressing too far.  
 
7.4 Evidence 
 
7.4.1 Evidence:  General Principles and Procedure 
 
Judges consistently identified evidence and the conduct of a proof hearing as 
difficult for party litigants, more so than any other single element of the 
process.1086 Before looking at the particular aspects of the process of conducting 
a proof and providing evidence, it is important to first note that party litigants 
may have fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of proof hearings 
and the court’s need for evidence. One judge noted that party litigants often 
simply fail to understand that they need to bring relevant evidence to court with 
them at all: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1086	  J1,	  J3,	  J7,	  J4,	  J6,	  J8,	  J10.	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“You do continually encounter this ‘oh, I could have brought these letters’. 
So turning up at the proof without actually having ingathered all the 
evidence that might help them.”1087 
 
This judge suggested that this was due to misconceptions about the process: 
 
“…I think it’s just that they think they should just turn up and tell their 
story…I think there’s just a sort of general assumption that they are 
themselves—know all about it, know exactly what happened and know why 
they should either succeed in their action or succeed in defending it.”1088 
 
Another judge had similar experiences: 
 
“And I think the majority of people that come before the court think that if 
they’ve written out on a bit of paper all of the aspect of it reflecting their 
position, they’ve done it. And we’re still trying to fit that into rules of 
evidence and proof and productions and witnesses, and they don’t seem 
to—I think it’s a big gulf from them setting out on a piece of paper what 
they think, all the things they want to say, and then bringing evidence 
either in the form of witnesses or productions to back that up. I think 
there’s a gap there that they don’t really understand what’s 
happening.”1089 
 
Party litigants may misunderstand that the court can only make an evidence-
based decision: 
 
“Often, often the party litigant will say ‘well, I didn’t know I had to bring 
witnesses today’ for example. That will often be said. ‘I didn’t know I had 
to bring witnesses today’ or ‘I didn’t know I had to lodge that, I’ve got it at 
home, I’ve got all that, I didn’t know I had to bring all that’…But I think it 
is probably more fundamental, I think it is a lack of awareness or an 
ignorance of the need to prove your case. It’s almost as if the party thinks 
that just by turning up and saying their piece, that will be it.”1090 
  
Another judge made the point that party litigants may be confused by the 
advertised “informality” of the low-value claims procedures, noting that he had 
seen parties arriving at a small claims proof express surprised that they were in 
a court, or that witnesses were expected to give evidence on oath.1091 Another 
problem noted was the need for expert evidence as another area that party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1087	  J10.	  1088	  J10.	  1089	  J8;	  see	  also	  FG4	  for	  a	  clerk’s	  perspective.	  1090	  J7.	  1091	  J4.	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litigants particularly struggle to grasp; litigants often expect to be able to give 
their own opinion on a matter when expertise is required.1092 
 
Judges may thus advise party litigants at earlier stages (such as a procedural 
hearing) about the need for evidence and when they should ensure that they 
bring evidence to court,1093 although one noted that this is not always 
effective.1094  
 
For party litigants who are prepared to fulfil the evidential requirements 
necessary to present their case, there are also procedural requirements and 
rules of evidence to be complied with: 
 
“They can run into difficulties pretty quickly if for example a party litigant 
simply has not understood that they have to lodge documentary 
productions, or that they haven’t understood that they’ve got to intimate 
them or make copies available both to their opponent and to the court, or 
sometimes bring witnesses to speak to these documents if they’re not 
agreed. All of these kind of nuts and bolts issues mean that very quickly 
you can run into difficulties and these are, in my experience, significant 
impediments to making progress in cases involving party litigants.”1095 
 
Late lodging of productions was a reccurring theme. One solicitor identified “the 
little black folder” of documents as the first thing that came to mind when 
thinking about party litigants, “because they always come to court with lots of 
documents that they haven’t lodged.”1096 Another solicitor noted, as noted 
above, that those who do lodge productions often don’t appreciate the need for 
a witness to speak to productions that haven’t been agreed: 
 
“…but sometimes they don’t even appreciate that, if you’re defending an 
action, and you’re at proof for example, they are required to give 
evidence. And they don’t understand what it means if you refuse to do 
that. They don’t understand what it means when the sheriff is then trying 
to explain to them that if they refuse to give evidence, then they can’t rely 
on any of the productions, because they haven’t led evidence on them. And 
they don’t understand why they can’t rely upon the productions if they’re 
refusing to give evidence.”1097 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1092	  J7,	  J10,	  J4.	  1093	  J8,	  J7,	  J3,	  J4,	  J9.	  1094	  See,	  for	  example,	  J3.	  1095	  J2;	  see	  also	  J7,	  J6,	  J8.	  1096	  S1.	  1097	  S2.	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As with other procedural matters, there is some scope for latitude or assistance 
from the courts in respect of failings relating to the rules of evidence. On 
practical matters, such the requirement to produce copies of productions, the 
sheriff clerk’s office is often called on to assist by making the copies, often on 
the morning of the hearing.1098 Court officers may also assist by helping to 
organise or set out productions at the proof.1099 On procedural matters, judges 
can extend latitude to the party litigant by allowing the late lodging of 
productions; one judge noted that he would frequently allow productions lodged 
even on the morning of a proof.1100 Another judge’s approach was to allow late 
evidence at the proof under reservation of its competency.1101 However, when 
the party litigant fails to come to proof with witnesses or productions entirely, 
there is little the court can do to assist: 
 
“There’s nothing to be done. There’s nothing the sheriff can do. The sheriff 
can’t conduct or create evidence, we can only decide the case on the 
evidence in front of us.”1102 
 
This creates a dilemma for the judge. Allowing the party litigant more time to 
ingather evidence at the proof stage—the latest stage of the case, when the 
other party will have prepared his own evidence and witnesses (often at some 
expense)—is undesirable, but if the proof proceeds the party litigant’s case is 
likely to be doomed to fail.1103 Clerks in one court noted that when party 
litigants come to a proof hearing unprepared the judges “just have to deal with 
it on the basis they’ve got it really.”1104  
 
7.4.2 Examination of Witnesses 
 
The examination of witnesses presents another huge challenge for party 
litigants. Party litigants may be called upon to examine their own witnesses, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1098	  FG1,	  FG4.	  1099	  FG4.	  1100	  J7;	  see	  also	  J10.	  1101	  J2.	  1102	  J7.	  1103	  See	  section	  5.4,	  J7,	  J4.	  1104	  FG4;	  the	  clerks	  also	  noted	  that	  many	  party	  litigants	  were	  unaware	  of	  what	  a	  “proof	  hearing”	  is	  even	  after	  it	  had	  been	  assigned	  in	  their	  case.	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cross-examine their opponent’s witnesses, or to be a witness themselves. The 
latter places the party litigant in an unusual position of playing the role of both 
“lawyer” and witness. Although one judge observed that party litigants giving 
their own evidence often do not know where to start or how to provide basic 
information,1105 another judge noted that, with some questioning, “…generally 
I’m pretty impressed by the way in which the story often just comes out, and 
you can just take a pretty full note of everything.”1106 Judges were more likely 
to single out examination and cross-examination of witnesses as a problem, and 
agreed that party litigants are rarely able to do this correctly: 
 
“The rules of examination, the rules of cross-examination, the rules of re-
examination. They have incredible difficulty with that. Dealing with 
witnesses is probably the worst, in the sense that they have the greatest 
difficulty dealing with witnesses. The taking of evidence is a very, very 
skilled task.”1107 
 
One judge described examination of witnesses by party litigants as “totally 
chaotic”: 
 
“…because they just don’t know what they are doing. They just make 
statements. And you don’t really know what the purpose—how to lead 
evidence from a witness, how to cross examine.”1108 
 
Another judge had a similar view: 
 
“Party litigants are also very poor at leading evidence from their own 
witnesses. Generally very poor at it, because of course the concept of the 
non-leading question is a difficult one to grasp at the best of times for 
lawyers. And also the party litigant will generally fall into the trap of 
making submissions or statements, either to the sheriff or just by 
declaiming in general or making statements to the witness, really putting 
submissions to the witness, rather than asking questions. And I can’t think 
of how many times I’ve had to just intervene, to say ‘Remember, what you 
have to do now is you ask questions of this witness, now is not the time for 
you to be making submissions to me or statements.’ But it’s a difficult 
distinction to draw. I think that’s very difficult to understand for a non-
legally qualified person.”1109 
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  J6.	  1106	  J7.	  1107	  J6.	  1108	  J8.	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  J7.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   229	  
It is perhaps a testament to the universally gloomy view that judges expressed of 
party litigants’ examination skills that their response to the problem was the 
most consistent of any issue considered in this chapter, and indeed the thesis as 
a whole. All ten of the judge interviewed indicated that they actively assist with 
questioning of witnesses in cases involving party litigants. This assistance can 
take a number of different forms, including questioning the party litigant to 
draw out their case1110 or questioning both parties to get a better understanding 
of the dispute:1111 
 
“So what I’ve tended to do more is just sort of take that over a bit and 
maybe put the pursuer or defender on oath, if they want to be on oath, 
and then just ask questions to get to what they want to—you know, to focus 
it. And what I did yesterday with one, once we’d had a chapter, then we’d 
have a break, and I’d ask the defender if he had anything arising out of 
that particular chapter and try and get—but even then it’s difficult, 
because they just rant.”1112 
 
The judge may also question the witnesses for the party litigant: 
 
“My practice is to almost take over the questioning. I always tell the party 
litigant what they are supposed to be doing, but in my experience they’re 
almost incapable of asking questions. They just start giving evidence. So it 
depends, obviously some are better than others. So I tell them what 
they’re supposed to be doing, and let them have a shot at it. But if they’re 
not succeeding, then I tend to take over.”1113 
 
One judge described asking their own questions of party litigants or witnesses as 
well as “translating” what the party litigant wishes to ask into an admissible 
question: 
 
“So I will often then say something like ‘well, I think what you want to ask 
the witness is this’ and I will try to translate the issue into a question or 
series of questions. Well, that is very difficult, it’s really very difficult. And 
exhausting! But it’s often difficult to translate in effect a big blurb of 
emotion-laden accusation into some kind of sensible question. So that’s 
what I would try to do. That’s another form of latitude. I would never think 
of rephrasing a represented party’s question.”1114 
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  J1,	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  1111	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Although noting that cross-examination by party litigants is “very poorly done 
often,” the same judge drew an interesting distinction between assisting in 
examination and cross-examination that was not noted by any of the other 
judges: 
 
“…I think cross examination of a witness by a judge can too easily be 
misinterpreted as partisanship. If I start questioning and challenging the 
reliability of one party’s witnesses, I just suddenly look partial, I think. I’ll 
ask some questions, invariably will ask some questions, but it’s not a full 
cross-examination though by any means.”1115 
 
There is also the issue of relevance within the party litigant’s evidence and 
examination of witnesses. As noted earlier, party litigants tend to raise 
irrelevant matters in court and judges often allow them to “have their say” to at 
least some extent.1116 This form of latitude can extend to the giving of evidence 
as well; one judge said, “…in terms of relevance of questioning, for example, I 
would be pretty relaxed about that.”1117  Another judge described a similar 
approach: “I think I would treat things as pretty much at large, and say let’s 
gather the evidence and then we can worry about what’s relevant after 
that.”1118 The party litigant will thus be allowed to raise irrelevant matters--
which, in the context of a proof hearing, could include matters that have not 
been introduced in the pleadings, or matters that are entirely irrelevant to the 
case in any event--or may ask leading questions, which are otherwise not 
permitted.1119 However, as one solicitor described, this creates challenges for 
the opponent of a party litigant, for example when a party litigant cross-
examines their client’s witness: 
 
“I had originally intended to make, anticipating that he would ask 
questions that he was not allowed to ask or in a way that he was not 
allowed to ask them—I would object the first couple times just to make the 
point to the sheriff that I was taking objection but I would not continue to 
do that. And I think the sheriff in the instance knew what it was that I was 
doing and did make a comment that I didn’t require to intervene on too 
many occasions and he would record or not record the evidence as 
appropriate.”1120 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1115	  J7.	  1116	  See	  section	  5.3.1.,	  6.3.4.	  1117	  J4.	  1118	  J2.	  1119	  J4.	  1120	  S4.	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7.4.3 Discussion 
 
What makes the topic of proof hearings and the giving of evidence for party 
litigants interesting is that it is, in a sense, very simple. Interviewees were very 
clear that most party litigants find it very difficult (or, according to some, 
impossible) to comply with the court’s requirements. Perhaps more importantly, 
many do not comprehend the court’s need for evidence in the first place. While 
the court can and does offer latitude or help to some extent, particularly in the 
questioning process, there are definite limits on how far this can go. The judge 
cannot create evidence out of thin air or bring witnesses to court if the party 
litigant does not. Thus evidence both presents some of the biggest conceptual or 
practical impediments for the party litigant and is the hardest issue for the court 
to address. It is little wonder that so many judges recognized evidence as the 
biggest obstacle for party litigants.  
 
“Chaotic” is perhaps the most apt term to describe the giving of evidence when 
party litigants are involved, as it frequently represents a complete disruption of 
how an adversarial system is intended to function. Typically, of course, a 
solicitor chooses, often strategically, which questions to ask, or not to ask, of 
the witnesses. Improper or leading questions are not allowed, and a solicitor 
knows not to introduce irrelevant matters, or objection will be made if he steps 
outside the rules. Only relevant evidence, provided to each party with fair 
notice, is ultimately heard by the judge. If, as in many party litigant cases, the 
judge asks all or some of the questions, he shapes the evidence he will later 
consider. Unlike a solicitor examining his own witnesses, the judge does not 
have prior knowledge of the facts and how the questions will be answered. If the 
party litigant is allowed to give their evidence “at large” or on irrelevant 
matters, the resulting body of evidence is not restricted, as it usually is, by the 
rules of evidence and principles of fair notice. The judge must instead self-filter 
the evidence to ensure that he considers only relevant and admissible evidence. 
While this is something that judges are perfectly capable of doing, it may also 
create an element of confusion, particularly for the party litigant, who may not 
understand whether particular parts of their evidence or submissions were or 
were not a factor in the judge’s decision.  
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7.5 Expenses 
 
7.5.1 The Indemnity System 
 
The Scottish civil courts operate on an indemnity system for expenses, where 
the successful party in the action will usually have expenses paid by the 
opponent. In principle, it is thus in each party’s interest not to raise a specious 
action or defence and to progress through the case as quickly as possible, thus 
curtailing both their own lawyer’s fees and their potential liability for the other 
party’s expenses.1121 Expenses play an important role as a deterrent to 
unnecessary or prolonged procedure in the courts, or alternately as a remedy for 
prejudice caused by one party to another: 
 
“…sometimes where a party litigant appears against a represented party, 
and the represented party is being severely prejudiced by this delay or 
whatever it is on the part of the party litigant, or by the procedure that 
has been adopted, you can obviously make an award of expenses against 
the party litigant, and that will be sufficient to deal with the prejudice, if I 
could put it that way.”1122 
 
However, as the judge quoted above went on to say, “where party litigants are 
involved, the question of expenses seems to fade into the background, because 
they’re not relevant”.1123 When asked about remedying prejudice to a 
represented party by awarding expenses due to a failing or delay on a party 
litigant’s part, one judge did reply that he would apply the same criteria to 
party litigant as to represented parties, but others indicated that awarding 
expenses would be uncommon.1124 Another judge indicated he would be unlikely 
to “punish” a party litigant with an adverse award of expenses.1125  Although a 
number of hearings observed during the court observation for this thesis were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1121	  See	  section	  4.5.4.	  1122	  J6;	  see	  also	  J1,	  J4,	  J2.	  1123	  J6.	  1124	  J3.	  1125	  J2.	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continued or discharged due to errors by party litigants, including one proof,1126 
no award of expenses was made, even when expenses were sought by the 
represented party.1127  
 
Solicitors, however, expressed a keen awareness of the expenses and costs 
involved in actions with party litigants. All those interviewed indicated that 
expenses for their clients are always or often higher in actions involving party 
litigants as compared to represented parties.1128 This could be because 
additional time is required to explain matters and communicate with a party 
litigant,1129 because of delays or wasted hearings when a party litigant was 
unprepared,1130 or even because a case that would typically be settled or 
abandoned entirely if the party was represented instead proceeds to a full 
hearing.1131 The solicitor himself may even bear some of the additional cost; one 
solicitor noted that some of the extra time needed to deal with a party litigant 
could fairly not be charged to their client, and so the time was “written off” 
without payment for the solicitor.1132 Expenses thus create an “inherent 
difficulty” when party litigants are involved: 
 
“But again why should party litigants have to bear the additional costs that 
they incur? Why should my client, on one view, be able to recover all that 
additional cost from them because they were confused and they didn’t 
realise what the law was.”1133 
 
In more practical terms, an award of expenses may not ultimately lead to 
recovery of the costs to the represented client. In ordinary cause cases, this 
could be because the actual cost to the client exceeds what is allowed in terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1126	  Typically	  when	  parties	  are	  represented	  the	  party	  occasioning	  a	  late	  discharge	  of	  a	  proof	  would	  be	  found	  liable	  in	  the	  expenses	  occasioned	  by	  the	  discharge,	  or	  would	  agree	  to	  pay	  the	  expenses.	  1127	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  party	  litigant	  will	  not	  ultimately	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  expenses,	  assuming	  that	  they	  are	  unsuccessful	  and	  are	  found	  liable	  for	  the	  expenses	  of	  the	  cause	  as	  a	  whole.	  1128	  S1,	  S2,	  S3,	  S4,	  S5,	  S6,	  S7.	  (Another	  solicitor,	  S8,	  was	  primarily	  involved	  in	  forms	  of	  action	  where	  parties	  are	  legally	  aided.)	  1129	  See,	  for	  example,	  S6,	  S7.	  1130	  S5.	  1131	  S4.	  1132	  S7.	  1133	  S7.	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of judicial expenses.1134 One solicitor estimated that what could be awarded by 
the court typically covered only a third of the actual cost.1135 In the simple 
procedure, the represented party will not be able to recover their expenses 
because costs are either not awarded or are capped at a low level to discourage 
representation.1136 This can create a real disparity when one party is 
represented (and thus running up costs that cannot be recovered) and the other 
is not. One solicitor recalled thus advising a client with a party litigant as an 
opponent to represent himself in the proof, “because it made them more 
equal.” On a similar note, another solicitor suggested that some party litigants 
could even try to use the represented party’s costs to their advantage: 
 
“But I would say that there have definitely been occasions where I’ve 
thought—in particular, there has been a case or two when I’ve wondered if 
the party litigant had an eye on the fact that further delays, more 
hearings, more procedure, is simply to increase the bill for the party on the 
other side. And that’s where you can get into real—you’d be really 
concerned because there could be real prejudice for a party if the party 
litigant was as cynical as that.”1137 
 
An even more fundamental problem in the recovery of expenses is the party 
litigant’s means to pay. As one solicitor said: 
 
“My advice [to the client] is that when we’ve got a party litigant on the 
other side, unless we’ve got a reason to think that they’re doing it for some 
other reason, my advice to my client would be that there’s a pretty good 
chance that the reason that they’re acting for themselves is that they can’t 
afford representation, so it’s likely to be difficult to enforce an award of 
expenses… You could also end up in a situation where you might say, 
actually, I guess that could start to impact on whether my client thinks it’s 
worth pursuing a case if they were the pursuer or defending the case if 
they were the defender. Because if, ultimately, win or lose, they’re going 
to be out of pocket, they need to think carefully about…whether or not 
actually the financial cost is going to be worthwhile.”1138 
 
One option for the court, at least in principle, would be to make an order for 
caution against the party litigant. With an order for caution, a litigant is 
required to consign a sum of money with the court to ensure that he will be able 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1134	  S1,	  S6.	  1135	  S1.	  1136	  With	  certain	  exceptions;	  see	  section	  4.5.2.,	  Simple	  Procedure	  Rules	  Part	  14.	  1137	  S3.	  1138	  S3;	  see	  also	  S2,	  J9.	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to meet an award of expenses for his opponent if he is unsuccessful. However, 
the judges interviewed indicated that they had not done so and/or would be 
hesitant to make such an order.1139 
 
7.5.2 Discussion 
 
The indemnity system of expenses is another aspect of the process that is 
disrupted when party litigants enter the fray. The data collected for this thesis 
did not examine questions of expenses in depth, but still a number of interesting 
points were raised. While further research involving party litigants is needed to 
properly understand the position, there was little to suggest that expenses act 
as a deterrent for party litigants in the way they do for represented parties. This 
could perhaps be because party litigants do not have their own legal expenses, 
are not aware of their potential liability for their opponent’s expenses, or are 
simply convinced that they will certainly be successful. It is worth noting that 
the indemnity system takes the place, to some extent, of the “gatekeeping” of 
claims. For the most part, as discussed above, any claim or defence can be 
raised with the understanding that, if it is groundless, it will be repelled by the 
other party who can then claim his expenses. In practice, any potential liability 
for expenses may not deter a party litigant for the reasons noted above and the 
costs are left with the represented party. 
 
There is then the difficulty that, even when successful, a represented opponent 
of a party litigant—who has perhaps incurred even greater costs than usual 
because of the extra time needed to deal with the party litigant—is often unable 
to collect all or part of the expenses. This is a real problem, because at least in 
principle the courts still proceed on the assumption that expenses follow 
success, and that prejudice experienced by the represented opponent will 
ultimately be remedied by an award of expenses. Instead, it seems, the 
opponent (or even his solicitor) may well end up bearing the extra costs, 
effectively subsidising the extra time and effort occasioned by the party 
litigant’s need or desire to self-represent. It is not hard to see why solicitors, 
and of course their clients, would consider this to be unfair. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1139	  See,	  for	  example,	  J2,	  J4,	  J3.	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7.6 Appeals 
 
7.6.1 The Appeals Process  
 
It has often been suggested that party litigants are over-represented in the 
appeals process.1140 While again there are no figures available to prove or 
disprove this point, the data gathered for this thesis suggests that there may be 
a propensity among lay people to appeal based on misunderstandings and 
misconceptions about the appeal process. A reccurring theme is the idea that 
party litigants very often believe that an appeal is a re-hearing or a chance to 
introduce new evidence that they did not present at first instance. Party 
litigants are also unaware, as one clerk explained, of the fact that appeals are 
restricted to a point of law: 
 
“The difficulty is trying to explain to a party litigant that an appeal has got 
to be on a point of law. And trying to explain to them what a point of law 
is. And if they say ‘well, I was late’ or didn’t turn up, that’s not—and it’s 
trying to get that across to them. And of course they think they’re entitled 
to appeal. And it’s trying to make that clear to them.”1141 
 
A solicitor echoed the idea that party litigants do not understand that appeals 
are limited in scope, and not a “do over” of the case as party litigants expect: 
 
“I mean party litigants are known for, they defend actions and then they’ll 
insist on appealing when they’re unsuccessful. With the grounds of appeal, 
they just don’t understand the reasons that they’re allowed to appeal. 
They think just because they’re not happy with the decision, then that’s it. 
As if they’re wanting a second bite at the cherry, just before the Sheriff 
Principal, now the Sheriff Appeals Court. What they don’t understand is 
that you can only be appealing on a point of law, as opposed to them just 
not being happy with the decision that court may have issued.”1142 
 
One clerk with extensive appeals experience observed that party litigants simply 
failed to grasp the nature of the appeals court: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1140	  See,	  for	  example,	  Sheriff	  Principal	  Stephen	  “The	  Sheriff	  Court—The	  Future”	  2	  December	  2014,	  http://www.ssclibrary.co.uk/pdf/SPStephen_SSClecture_021214.pdf.	  1141	  FG2.	  1142	  S2.	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“The amount of time I spent telling people that it’s not a re-hearing, it’s 
not going back over the evidence, it’s a submission-based court and it’s on 
points of law, you should have authorities, precedent cases and things like 
that. But a lot of the time, I must say, it was lost on them. They didn’t 
understand.”1143 
 
A party litigant may also be more likely to appeal because they do not 
understand the court’s decision and feel it is unfair, and one judge suggested 
that this can perhaps be addressed by better communicating the court’s 
reasoning to the litigant: 
 
“…maybe I’m prone to saying a wee bit more than I strictly need to, but 
then I think you’ve got to explain and show that you’ve been fair, explain 
your reasons. It may stave off an appeal, just a practical thing…”1144 
 
While party litigants are likely to find it difficult to present a case at first 
instance, arguing the legal elements of an appeal is even more challenging. If 
the litigant does not understand the nature of the appeal process, they will be 
ill-equipped to argue the appeal properly: 
 
“I would say, thinking about it, I can’t imagine that even 25% of them were 
successful in their appeals. And I’m not saying that was because their cases 
didn’t have merit, they may have had merit, they just weren’t able to 
competently get across why the sheriff had erred.”1145 
 
A lack of understanding of the appeal process can also lead party litigants to 
make and then abandon an appeal as the true requirements become clear1146 or 
to repeatedly appeal procedural decisions made while the case is still in progress 
at first instance.1147 The latter is considered to be characteristic of difficult or 
“serial” litigants.1148  
 
7.6.2 Discussion 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1143	  CS1.	  1144	  J5.	  1145	  CS1.	  1146	  CS1,	  J3.	  1147	  J1,	  J7;	  typically	  these	  decisions	  require	  leave	  to	  appeal,	  which	  can	  then	  be	  refused	  by	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  appeal	  goes	  no	  further.	  1148	  See	  section	  6.2.3.	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Although only limited data on the subject of appeals was gathered for this 
thesis, it does appear to support the idea that party litigants may be over-
represented in the appeals process. As already noted,1149 existing case law 
suggests that party litigants have difficulty arguing appeal points, an 
unsurprising result when litigants raise appeals with the misconception that they 
will get a “re-hearing” and not because they are prepared to argue that the 
judge at first instance erred in law. Establishing that the judge erred in law will 
be difficult for a party litigant, given that they do not have the necessary legal 
knowledge. 
 
The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 is intended to reform the appeals system 
in the civil courts, creating the new Sheriff Appeal Court and curtailing the 
ability of litigants to appeal directly to the Court of Session. This is intended to 
ensure that appeals are heard at the “right level” and that only cases on a 
genuine point of law are heard at the Court of Session.1150 While this benefits 
the court service as a whole, it does little to improve the position of party 
litigants. (Nor, in fairness, is it is necessarily intended to.) There is still not a 
great deal of “gatekeeping” in the appeal process as a whole. This is perhaps 
unfortunate, as so many party litigants are coming to the appeal court with 
fundamental misconceptions, leading inevitably to disappointment and wasted 
time and expense. 
 
7.7 Court Staff and the Advice Available from the Court 
 
7.7.1 The Role of Court Staff and the Legal/Procedural Divide 
 
Court staff and information from the court are an important resource for party 
litigants. Staff take in and process court documents, act as clerks of court or bar 
officers, and assist court users by telephone, in writing, and at public 
counters.1151 Judges were aware of court staff as a resource for party litigants to 
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  Sections	  5.3.3.2	  and	  5.5.	  1150	  See,	  for	  example,	  Sheriff	  Principal	  Stephen	  “The	  Sheriff	  Court—The	  Future”	  supra	  at	  note	  1140.	  1151	  FG,	  FG2,	  FG3,	  FG4.	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provide procedural advice, particularly on court timetables, but not to provide 
advice on the substantive merits of the litigant’s case or give other forms of 
legal advice.1152 The nebulous nature of this “legal/procedural” distinction 
(sometimes framed as “information” vs “advice”) has been noted in other 
jurisdictions1153 and the court staff interviewed consistently identified this as a 
problem. Some aspects of the distinction are relatively clear: when asked to 
explain their understanding of the difference between legal and procedural 
advice, court staff explained that they could tell a party litigant what procedure 
to use, but not how; they could tell them what form to fill out, but not tell them 
what to write on the form.1154 However, clerks also described the 
legal/procedural distinction as a “fine line”1155 rife with “grey areas”:1156  
 
“I find it difficult to distinguish between procedural and legal advice, and 
I’m writing to [party litigants] quite often. I spend five times as long 
writing the letters as I normally would, because you realise that could be 
legal advice, or procedural advice. But you just spend ages minding your 
p’s and q’s about what you can and can’t tell them.”1157 
 
The grey areas between legal and procedural matters can include relatively 
basic but important aspects of a party litigant’s case, such as jurisdiction,1158 
when and how to serve documents,1159 and the legal identity of the opponent 
being named in the party litigant’s action: 
 
“There’s definitely a grey area, and even with the starting point of 
jurisdiction, you’ll quite often get people at the counter who’ll say—you’ll 
ask them the question, you know, are you raising it against an individual or 
a company and they’ll explain the situation to you and say ‘what do you 
think?.’ You’ve always got to try and kind of put—‘well, it’s your decision, 
if you raise it as such-and such’ but there’s definitely a grey area.”1160 
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  J6,	  J3,	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  J10,	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  See	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  3.5.2.1.	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Advising party litigants on procedure can also require the clerk to interpret 
legislation when the rules are ambiguous or unclear, potentially crossing the line 
into legal advice.1161  
 
Although clerks were very aware that their role is to provide procedural advice 
only, some nonetheless provide assistance to party litigants despite knowing that 
it oversteps the legal/procedural divide. They may feel sorry for the party 
litigant,1162 or wish to prevent the “back and forth”1163 of a party litigant lodging 
documents only to have them returned, which in turn creates more work for 
court staff: 
 
“And sometimes as well, you feel in a way to help yourself and your 
colleagues, you want to give them that bit more of information, because—
to make it easier when something does come in, that is going to have been 
done correctly. If you don’t give that wee bit more of advice, then it’s 
maybe going to get bounced back and forward, sending it back, no it’s not 
right, come back and forth. So sometimes to actually assist ourselves, it 
can be advantageous to go that wee bit of extra mile just to give them a 
wee bit extra information to make sure that what they are going to do next 
will be correct.”1164 
 
Another clerk added: 
 
“Because if we weren’t to give out certain types of legal advice, nothing 
would happen. As far as party litigants are concerned, the whole place 
would grind to a halt.”1165  
 
However, clerks were also keenly aware that there can be consequences for 
proving legal advice or assistance, using terms like “it would come back to bite 
me,”1166 “I can get in trouble,”1167 “feels like you’re covering your back a lot of 
the time,”1168 and “I’m trying to cover myself.”1169 Clerks were concerned that 
advice to the party litigant can be misinterpreted, or that the court staff will be 
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  FG2.	  1162	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  FG1.	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held responsible for any problems with the party litigant’s case,1170 as illustrated 
by this exchange between court staff at one court: 
 
Court Staff 1: “But if I said, ‘but you know’—and it has happened—‘I think 
you should do this’ and it goes all wrong for them---“ 
 
Court Staff 2: “Then it becomes ‘you told me.’” 
 
Court Staff 1: “‘I got told by the sheriff clerk to do this.’ I mean, how many 
times? I see it in court all the time. ‘I was told by the sheriff clerk’. And 
you turn around to the sheriff and go ‘No. No he wasn’t.’” 
 
Court Staff 2: “And it is difficult, because you want to be helpful.1171” 
 
Other clerks also expressed the wish that they could be more helpful to party 
litigants;1172 as one said, “So sometimes you feel as if you are always saying, ‘I 
can’t help you,’ you’re being a wee bit obstructive, but that’s just the way it 
goes.”1173 
 
 
7.7.2 Party Litigants’ Expectations vs Reality 
 
A consistent theme in discussions with court staff was the idea that party 
litigants’ expectations exceed the information and assistance that clerks are 
able to provide them. Party litigants often begin the process expecting that 
clerks can provide them with legal advice or advise them on the merits of their 
case.1174 Instead, clerks are not only not permitted to provide legal advice, but 
are also not trained or qualified to do so: 
 
Court Staff 1: “I personally think that they seem to think that we have all 
the answers, that we are legally qualified, probably, within the office. But 
you’ve got to constantly tell them that. And they just see us as knowing so 
much more and being able to answer all their questions.” 
 
Court Staff 2: “I think they think that we’ll tell them when we see the 
papers if they’ll be successful, for instance, and we can’t really tell them 
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  FG3.	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  FG3.	  1172	  FG1,	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  1173	  FG1.	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anything in that terms, but they seem to think that we’ll be able to provide 
that.” 
 
Court Staff 3: “Seems to be a belief that if you’re on the other side of the 
counter, you have all the answers.”1175 
 
Clerks also reported that party litigants routinely expect court staff to provide 
forms for all types of action,1176 or where forms are available for clerks to 
complete the forms for the party litigant.1177 In addition to expecting legal 
advice,1178 party litigants demonstrate more fundamental misunderstandings of 
the court’s role. The role of the clerk is to administer the courts and provide 
procedural information on request, but party litigants often appear to believe 
that clerks and the court will take an active role to assist them in the 
process.1179 One clerk summarised the “official line” on the respective duties of 
the court and of litigants: 
 
“The official line would be that anybody who raises or defends an action 
should entirely know what their responsibilities are, but in the reality of it 
very little of them do know what their responsibilities are and what the 
responsibility of the court is.”1180 
 
Another clerk expressed a similar view: 
 
“If they’re taking out a small claim, they need to read up on how to take 
out a small claim. And how to deal with that. Because it’s not down to the 
court staff to keep them right.”1181 
 
However, court staff felt that many party litigants do expect clerks to “keep 
them right” in the process, while in fact court staff do not take such an active 
role.1182 This can lead to problems if party litigants believe that they do not 
need to learn the procedures because the court will “keep them right” or tell 
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  staff	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them all they need to know.1183 A clerk illustrated this point using the example 
of timescales: 
 
“It’s on the warrant, but if they don’t adhere to the timescale, 9 times out 
of 10 it will certainly be them turning around and saying ‘well, the court 
never told me of this’ but then, as I said, it’s not our responsibility to do 
so.”1184 
 
Clerks reported that party litigants also expect them to assist in the litigant’s 
decision making about their case or to be “led every step of the way,1185” which 
again exceeds the clerk’s remit and requires them to offer legal advice.1186 A 
clerk suggested that there is a resulting “shock factor” for party litigants “that 
the court doesn’t hold their hand the whole way through.”1187  
 
Another expectation from some party litigants is that the court will provide 
extensive amounts of information that court staff do not have the ability or time 
to provide. One clerk said that party litigants wish to be taken through the “full 
gamut”1188 of possibilities in their case, but this is not possible or practical: 
 
“They just expect to be told everything from A to Z, all the options just 
explained, displayed, but it’s not possible because there are so many 
options, the case can go in many ways, there are so many possibilities and 
explaining that from the outset is just impossible, because it just confuses 
people, especially if someone’s a party litigant, a total layman, it’s not 
going to have any effect on them anyway.”1189 
 
Party litigants may also wish to tell clerks the “whole story” of the case at the 
public counter or on the phone, but clerks often simply do not have the time to 
hear everything the party litigant may wish to say, much of which is irrelevant to 
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the clerk’s job.1190 “The thing is, they want to tell you,” a clerk said, but, as 
another added, “And it’s, at what point do I cut them off?”1191 
 
On a final note, the role—or lack thereof—of the court in the enforcement of a 
decree is also commonly misunderstood by party litigants. It is the responsibility 
of the litigant to enforce a decree, usually by engaging sheriff officers,1192 but 
party litigants often believe that the court will collect any money due on their 
behalf or even pay the litigant directly as soon as decree has been passed.1193 As 
clerks in one court pointed out, the party litigant may therefore not consider the 
question of how likely they are actually recover the sums they are seeking until 
after the process is complete: 
 
Court Staff 1: “And I had one gentleman who’d been at court having been 
successful with his claim, come back down and ask me to give him his £500 
or whatever. He said, ‘The claim was in my favour, so I’m just down to get 
my £500.’” 
 
Court Staff 2: “A lot of them don’t understand it’s not going to happen like 
that. [another agrees] They’re still going to have to carry on to get their 
money.” 
 
Court Staff 1: “Even if you’re successful, that’s not the end of it by any 
means. I would say nearly all party litigants don’t accept that.”  
 
Court Staff 2: “There was someone in here yesterday, and they had got an 
award for money, and I said ‘Do you think you’ll get it?’ and they’re like, ‘I 
don’t think so.’ So even to make people aware of that in the first—to make 
sure that the person has got the funds to pay you, at the end of the 
day.”1194 
  
7.7.3 Written Guidance and Referral 
 
Another issue raised by clerks is that some party litigants do not make use of 
written information and guidance available from the court. Court staff typically 
praised the quality of guidance notes where they are available, for example for 
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  FG1,	  FG3,	  FG4.	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  And	  paying	  the	  sheriff	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  which	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low-value claims.1195 They observed that while some party litigants do make use 
of court guidance and information and come to court at least attempting to be 
prepared, a notable proportion of party litigants do not.1196 As noted above, 
some party litigants expect to be told what do to by court staff, or may prefer 
to speak to court staff rather than reading letters or guidance. One clerk said 
“…they just don’t read anything. Well, I think they prefer to call us rather than 
reading guidance notes or covering letters…”1197 If the litigant does not read 
court guidance or letters, they are likely to make mistakes or miss deadlines: 
 
Court Staff 1: “It’s also the fact of, we get a lot of defenders and that 
saying ‘but you never told me that, I had to do this on the form, I had to 
respond by such-and-such date.’” 
 
Court Staff 2: “Well, yeah, but it says, in black and white.” 
 
Court Staff 1: “Again, it’s because you don’t read, you don’t read the 
letters.” 
 
While not using court guidance and information may be related to the 
expectation that the court will “keep them right” discussed earlier, it is also 
possible that party litigants may find the guidance difficult to use or too 
lengthy.1198 However, it is interesting to note that the resources that court staff 
use to assist litigants are the same guidance and rules that are publicly available 
for party litigants to access themselves.1199 While clerks have the benefit of 
experience and training, they do not have access to additional information that 
party litigants do not. 
 
Because court staff are unable to provide legal advice, another role they play for 
party litigants is referring them on to agencies like Citizen’s Advice Bureaux who 
are able to assist on legal matters. All staff reported that they refer party 
litigants to advice agencies when presented with questions on legal matters, or 
simply when it appears that the litigant is in need of advice.1200 However, there 
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One clerk suggested that advice agencies sometimes provided incorrect 
procedural advice to party litigants, which would then have to be corrected by 
the sheriff clerk’s office.1201 Advice agencies referring party litigants to the 
court, or back to the court, for services that the court cannot provide (such as 
assisting in the completion of forms) was a common complaint:1202  
 
“…but we quite often get folk at the counter ‘yeah, I’ve been to Citizen’s 
Advice and they’ve told me just to come here and you’ll help me do 
everything.’”1203 
 
At times court staff have to refer party litigants back to advice agencies for the 
help they have just been sent to the court for, potentially causing confusion or 
aggravation for the party litigant. Advice agencies also occasionally provide 
procedural advice to party litigants that is incorrect, again leading to frustration 
when the party litigant comes back to the court only to be told that they need 
to correct the mistake.1204 
 
7.7.4 Discussion 
 
Perhaps the most important issue to emerge from discussions with court staff is 
the gulf between what party litigants want and expect from clerks and what 
clerks are actually able to provide to party litigants. These expectations seem to 
have a real impact for party litigants, as they may fail to appreciate the need to 
do their own research or even to read the guidance or information that is 
provided by the court. Others may not read the guidance because they do not 
wish to or are unable to do so. Overall, clerks generally appeared to feel that 
many party litigants seek to rely too heavily on the court in the conduct of their 
cases, and perhaps more importantly that party litigants did not take sufficient 
responsibility for their own cases. There is an interesting contrast here with the 
views of judges, many of whom did not expect party litigants to know the law or 
procedures, or even felt that it was unfair to expect them to know.1205 Court 
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staff, while often sympathetic to party litigants,1206 were more likely to expect 
party litigants to take ownership of their case and educate themselves on the 
court process.1207  
 
However, clerks felt that rather than taking responsibility for their case, many 
party litigants instead do not even make use of the guidance and information 
that is available. The idea that party litigants may not make use of guidance is 
troubling, as even the best guidance that the court can produce is useless if 
party litigants do not read it and the simplest procedures do not assist if the 
litigant does not make an effort to learn them. This is a problem for the court as 
well, because, as seen throughout this chapter, the less the party litigant knows 
the more disruptive it is for all parties, and court then has to respond to the 
gaps in the party litigant’s knowledge.  
 
The problem of referrals between advice agencies and the court appears to 
cause unnecessary grief for all parties. There is the danger that party litigants 
will fall victim to “referral fatigue”1208 and simply stop seeking help at all. A 
better understanding of the role of advice agencies and the court and how they 
can interact could go a long way to fixing this problem. 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter builds on a theme emerging in the previous chapter: many of the 
issues arising around party litigants in the courts are rooted in fundamental 
misconceptions that many lay people have about the role and function of the 
courts. It is not necessarily sufficient to say only that party litigants do not know 
the law, or that they are not legally qualified. The problems run even deeper: 
many do not understand essential aspects of the process such as the need for a 
relevant case in law and that they must provide evidence to prove their case. All 
of this sits alongside their emotional involvement in the case, which can make it 
difficult to objectively analyse their position and their options. 
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  Section	  6.2.2.	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What is also evident from this chapter, however, is that the party litigant is 
afforded a significant degree of latitude in the process, if not assistance. The 
presence of a party litigant in an action completely disrupts the usual flow of 
the process. The judge must either extend latitude or assistance to the party 
litigant, or see the process grind to a standstill. The judge could treat the party 
litigant the same as a solicitor—inevitably leading to failure for the party 
litigant—but, as set out in the last chapter, this is clearly regarded by judges as 
unfair and not in the interests of justice.1209 But how successful are these 
measures at being fair? Do they really provide access to the courts or access to 
justice for party litigants? What about their opponents? These questions are 
considered in the next chapter, along with views of how judges, solicitors and 
court staff believe that the system could be improved. 
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  See	  section	  6.3.2.	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Chapter 8: Access to the Courts for 
Party Litigants and their Opponents 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters in this part of the thesis have demonstrated that party 
litigants can get a great deal of assistance from the court, or even from their 
opponent’s solicitor, in the conduct of their case. There is an emphasis on 
ensuring “fairness” to the party litigant in light of their unrepresented status 
and lack of legal knowledge. But how effective is this assistance? Are party 
litigants still disadvantaged because they do not have a lawyer, and to what 
extent? Do they have effective access to the courts? This chapter begins by 
addressing a particular issue that may affect access to the courts, the “capacity 
gap” that some litigants face when attempting to represent themselves. The 
next section of this chapter will consider how successfully party litigants present 
their cases to the court and the impact of any efforts to assist them. The last 
section of the chapter will consider what judges, solicitors, and court staff think 
can or should be done to provide the best possible access for party litigants, or 
minimise any problems that party litigants can cause to their opponents or the 
courts. All of this, of course, has to be viewed against the wider background of 
access to justice for all parties. It is worth reiterating1210 that this thesis is 
concerned primarily with access to justice in the form of access to the courts, 
although of course there is inevitably overlap between access to the courts and 
access to justice more broadly, and this will be discussed as well. 
8.2 The “Capacity Gap” 
 
8.2.1 The Issue of Capacity 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1210	  See	  section	  1.2.	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Before considering more generally how well party litigants as a group are able to 
access the courts, a preliminary issue to consider is what can be termed the 
“capacity gap” affecting some self-representing litigants in the civil courts. By 
definition, virtually all party litigants lack legal knowledge and training, but 
some have particular issues that further interfere with their ability to present or 
defend a case in the courts. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are few restrictions 
on self-representation in Scots law; one of these is that the litigant must have 
legal capacity.1211 However, “capacity” in legal terms is quite a low bar to meet. 
Individuals are presumed to have legal capacity unless proven otherwise, 
typically after they have been made subject to an order under the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. A litigant may thus be considered to have the 
capacity to self-represent—and, if they are unable to afford a lawyer, effectively 
be forced to self-represent—even if they lack essential capabilities such as the 
ability to read and write or have a learning disability.1212  Party litigants may 
also have mental health difficulties or other disabilities that can hinder their 
ability to represent themselves effectively.1213 The idea that some party litigants 
have mental health or personality problems was a reccurring theme in the 
interviews conducted for this thesis,1214 although of course this is purely 
speculative. What is significant is that judges and solicitors sometimes have to 
proceed in cases despite having real concerns about a party litigant’s mental 
health or ability to understand the process. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in a number of cases observed for this thesis, party 
litigants with various significant capacity issues were represented in their 
hearings by friends or family members acting as lay representatives. These 
included a son representing a disabled father too ill to come to court, a party 
litigant being represented by his carer, a son translating for a parent who did 
not speak English, and a lay representative acting for a party litigant who 
indicated that he could not read or write. However, there is no guarantee that 
all litigants with these issues will be able to find someone willing to assist them. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1211	  See	  section	  4.2.2.	  1212	  J5,	  J2,	  J1,	  J3,	  S5,	  FG1.	  1213	  J1,	  S5,	  J5.	  1214	  J1,	  J2,	  J3,	  J4,	  J5,	  J8.	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8.2.2 Discussion 
 
Party litigants are a varied and diverse group and it is only natural that some will 
be more educated, intelligent or capable than others.1215 However, the idea that 
an individual is allowed—or, again, effectively forced—to self-represent when 
they lack basic skills such as the ability to read and write is troubling. How can 
an illiterate litigant, or a litigant who cannot speak English,1216 fully participate 
in the court process? Equally, when judges or solicitors feel that a litigant is 
clearly suffering from mental health difficulties, does that not suggest that the 
litigant may not be in the right state of mind to make decisions in their case? 
The legal presumption applying today comes from a time when one lacked 
capacity only when they were “insane”,1217 while today our understanding of 
mental health has moved on considerably and is much more nuanced. However, 
while the current capacity threshold for self-representation may be too low, it is 
not easy to determine where exactly to draw the line. And while many party 
litigants would undoubtedly prefer not to have to represent themselves in court 
when they lack basic skills, precluding party litigants who are, for example, 
illiterate or suffering from mental health problems (putting aside for the 
moment the question of how this is to be determined) again raises the problem 
of paternalism and restricting the freedom of the individual to conduct his case 
as he sees fit. 
 
8.3 The Effect of Self-representation  
 
8.3.1 Measuring Success 
 
Putting aside any particular difficulties that a party litigant may have, it seems 
inevitable that not having a lawyer will affect their ability to conduct their case. 
However, pinpointing the impact of self-representation is notoriously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1215	  Although,	  as	  Trinder	  et	  al	  found,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  they	  will	  be	  more	  successful	  as	  SRLs;	  see	  section	  3.3.5.	  1216	  While	  a	  translator	  is	  supplied	  at	  the	  court’s	  expense	  for	  those	  litigants	  who	  know	  to	  ask	  for	  it	  (a	  facility	  that	  some	  clerks	  think	  can	  be	  abused;	  see	  FG2)	  this	  is	  of	  course	  for	  court	  hearings	  only—the	  litigant	  must	  still	  be	  able	  to	  read	  and	  understand	  court	  papers,	  try	  to	  investigate	  the	  law,	  and	  seek	  advice	  without	  speaking	  the	  language.	  1217	  Section	  4.2.2.	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difficult.1218 For this thesis, judges were asked how well they thought party 
litigants were able to present or defend a case, and to what extent the outcome 
of their cases are affected by not having a lawyer. Unsurprisingly, this was not 
easy for many to answer. One judge pointed out the problem of measuring 
success in the outcome of these cases: in housing cases, for example, delaying 
an eviction can be considered a measure of success, while in other actions a 
party litigant may run up his opponent’s cost until the opponent simply gives 
up.1219 This outcome may be considered a success for the party litigant, but not 
justice.1220 Other judges noted that most civil court cases settle, and success is 
often not a matter of  “winning” the case, but rather whether a favourable 
agreement has been reached. Party litigants may not understand the law 
relating to their case and thus may not be able to do negotiate a favourable 
settlement without a lawyer:1221 
 
“But I’m sure there’s cases where a solicitor could have gotten them a 
better deal or a much earlier settlement, because they didn’t know the 
strength or weakness of their own case—the negotiating argument or 
skills.”1222  
 
It is also difficult to measure the impact of self-representation because the 
cases of party litigants may be more likely to be fundamentally misconceived.1223 
This is, of course, itself a result of not having a lawyer or legal advice, but if a 
party litigant’s case is entirely without merit there is never really any question 
of success, and there is no way to properly isolate the effect of self-
representation on the inevitable outcome. 
 
8.3.2 How well do Party Litigants Present or Defend their Cases? 
 
Insofar as judges could speak to how well party litigants can present their cases 
and how outcomes are affected, responses were fairly evenly split between 
those who felt that party litigants fared poorly and that self-representation had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1218	  Section	  3.3.7.	  1219	  J9.	  1220	  J9.	  	  1221	  J2,	  J10.	  1222	  J4.	  1223	  J1,	  J2,	  J3.	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a negative impact1224 and those who considered that some party litigants were 
not always disadvantaged, taking into account assistance from the court.1225 The 
former group, clearly, had a gloomier view how well party litigants can do 
without a lawyer: 
 
“I can’t put a percentage on it, but they are inevitably less successful then 
they would be if they were represented. I suppose I’m speculating to some 
extent, because you don’t know what the lawyer would have done had they 
been represented. But they are less successful, there is no question about 
that. I think it does affect the outcome.” 1226 
 
Other judges spoke of party litigants being at a disadvantage,1227 doing 
themselves a disservice trying to self-represent in complicated cases,1228 or even 
being destined for virtually inevitable failure.1229 While the views of the other 
group of judges were not quite as pessimistic, this does not mean that they 
considered that party litigants were as successful as their represented 
counterparts, but rather that some were capable enough to conduct their case 
effectively or that assistance from the court could lead to a good outcome in 
some cases. Even these views were therefore heavily qualified. One judge noted 
that in some cases the court process itself may not disadvantage party litigants, 
but a party litigant could still have achieved a better outcome (again, such as an 
earlier or more favourable settlement) with the benefit of legal advice.1230 
Another judge had a similar view and also noted the value of legal advice: 
 
“I’d like to think [not having a lawyer] doesn’t affect the outcome, if 
they’ve got a colourable case, that shouldn’t affect the outcome if they’ve 
got a colourable case. Where I think they lose out in particular in not 
having a lawyer is in seeing the case that isn’t there, so in knowing you 
don’t actually have a case. Or knowing that your position is comparatively 
weak or strong in terms of negotiating power…”1231 
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  J6,	  J8,	  J1,	  J7,	  J3.	  1225	  J9,	  J10,	  J5,	  J4,	  J2.	  1226	  J6.	  1227	  J7.	  1228	  J3.	  1229	  J1.	  1230	  J2,	  see	  also	  J4.	  1231	  J4.	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This judge felt that the “right” outcome was reached in most cases, but noted 
that additional pitfalls and concerns arise in party litigant’s cases that could 
influence the result: 
 
“And then you would like to think that, in the majority of cases, you 
reached the right decision, and hopefully there aren’t instances where you 
just fall out, you think they are very disruptive, and in some way the 
judgment’s found wanting because you’ve lost the place, or perhaps been 
unfair and overlooked something, or not been able to—maybe made an 
assumption and not been alert to, I’ve not asked the right question as it 
were.”1232 
 
These observations also reinforce just how active and vigilant the judge feels he 
must be to deal with a party litigant’s case. 
 
It is worth noting that, while they were not asked directly about how well party 
litigants fare without lawyers, solicitors and court staff1233 predominantly 
expressed negative views about how successful party litigants are in most cases. 
Solicitors tended to be particularly focused on the lack of legal merit in the 
cases of many party litigants rather than the process itself.1234 
 
8.3.3 The Impact of Self-representation on the Party Litigant’s 
Opponent 
 
Many of the consequences that facing a party litigant in court can have on a 
represented opponent have been discussed in previous chapters. As noted 
earlier, a represented opponent will often incur additional delays and expenses, 
which they may be unable to recover even if successful, as a result of a party 
litigant’s inexperience and the additional time and effort needed to extend 
latitude to him.1235 Solicitors often expressed a sense that this latitude or special 
treatment afforded to party litigants was unfair to their clients: 
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  J5.	  1233	  Solicitors	  were	  not	  asked	  this	  question	  directly	  because	  they	  have	  experience	  only	  with	  the	  party	  litigants	  they	  have	  acted	  against	  (and,	  of	  course,	  potentially	  a	  natural	  bias	  towards	  the	  need	  for	  a	  lawyer)	  while	  court	  staff’s	  work	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  procedural	  elements	  of	  cases.	  1234	  S1,	  S7,	  S8,	  S3,	  S4,	  S5.	  1235	  See	  sections	  7.2,	  7.3	  and	  7.4.	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“…I certainly have felt in the past that it has been unfair to my client that 
they have had to go to the trouble of incurring costs and spending money, 
sometimes a lot of money, to ensure that they are—obviously they get 
advice on running the case in terms of strategy and a lot of time can be 
spent complying with procedural rules et cetera, it can seem unfair that 
they are effectively penalised, it would seem, for that and they’re not 
treated equally you could say.”1236 
 
“Because it does all add up and I think it’s really unfair. And I don’t think 
there’s a balance. I think—and I appreciate that the courts, they’re not 
allowed to hinder anyone’s access to justice and the rest of it—but I don’t 
think that there is enough there to make a reasonable balance between the 
two.”1237 
 
Another solicitor echoed these sentiments and added an interesting point about 
the businesses and companies as opponents of party litigants: 
 
“But it does create more cost to the client and more inconvenience, 
because they want things resolved just like any litigant does, they want to 
resolve it as soon as possible with minimum expense…Then quite often 
people forget that even in large organisations, it’s a individual who’s 
dealing with it…And there’s still a personal element to that. Quite often 
people forget that, ‘Oh, it’s just X plc and what do they care?’ but 
sometimes there’s a human element too in terms of there’s still someone 
who you have to report it back to and they’ve got to report back to 
somebody else to explain why things are going a certain way. And that can 
often create personal difficulty with that person, which makes it 
tricky.”1238 
 
In the last chapter, it was noted that a solicitor might advise a client to 
represent himself instead to “equalise” their costs against a party litigant.1239 
Another solicitor described giving similar advice, suggesting to a client that they 
would be better off taking advantage of the latitude extended to party litigants: 
 
“…I said to him, ‘Listen, you’re actually better off doing it yourself because 
you’ll get away with a lot more and if you say these certain things in what 
you’re asking for and what you want you will do far better because you’ll 
get more slack from the sheriff.’ It was [Sheriff] who was presiding over 
the case and she bends over backwards for party litigants.”1240 
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  S3.	  1237	  S2.	  1238	  S5.	  1239	  Section7.5.1.	  1240	  S8.	  This	  brings	  to	  mind	  to	  concerns	  about	  “ghostwriting”	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.5.2.3.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   256	  
When party litigants take up additional time in court, that can impact not only 
their opponent, but also others waiting in court for their cases to be heard. This 
includes other solicitors waiting for their cases to call, who in turn must bill 
their own clients for the additional time they have had to spend waiting.1241 A 
solicitor described a case involving multiple party litigants all wishing to “have 
their say” at each hearing and at great length: “And that impacted on me, but it 
also impacts the other agents who are sitting and waiting for their case to call, 
because everything gets held up because of that particular case.”1242  
 
8.3.4 Discussion 
 
The judges interviewed for this thesis found it very difficult to offer an 
assessment of party litigants’ abilities or outcomes. This is unsurprising, because 
again party litigants are a varied group with varied cases. The correct (and 
unsatisfying) answer as to how well party litigants are able to access the civil 
court process is inevitably “it depends”. However, the judges, solicitors and 
court staff interviewed acknowledged that the majority of party litigants face at 
least some level of disadvantage as compared to their represented counterparts; 
the court observation data supported this view as well.1243 It is not so much a 
question of if party litigants are disadvantaged, but rather of degree—and of the 
extent to which this can be overcome with latitude from the court. In the view 
of some, the detriment is quite significant and a party litigant has little chance 
of a good outcome. On the other hand, there is a sense that the process is also 
unfair to a represented opponent, who must deal with additional expense and 
inconvenience for the party litigant’s mistakes while he is himself “playing by 
the rules”. 
 
Even those judges who do think that party litigants have a chance to be 
successful are also aware that self-representation cannot take the place of 
qualified representation and legal advice. Sometimes much of the value of a 
lawyer is in having a trusted advisor to tell you when you do or do not have a 
valid case. What judges know, while many party litigants do not, is that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1241	  S5.	  1242	  S7.	  1243	  See,	  for	  example,	  sections	  7.2.4	  and	  7.3.1.	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services of a lawyer are not just carried out in the courtroom, but also in the 
tactics and negotiation that occur outside of courtroom. This is part of what 
makes the overall disadvantage to the party litigant so difficult to quantify or 
qualify. It is also what blurs the idea of “access to the courts” or “access to 
justice” in relation to party litigants. Taking as an example the two scenarios 
most commonly identified, can it be said that a party litigant who brings a 
meritless case to the courts and inevitably loses, or a litigant who pursues a case 
that could have been more favourably settled, has had access to the courts? 
Particularly with all of the assistance that a party litigant receives from the 
court, it is difficult to say that he has not. If you consider instead the question 
of whether the same litigant has had access to justice, it becomes much harder 
to answer.  
 
8.4 Party Litigants: Improving Access and Preventing 
Disruption 
 
8.4.1 Introduction 
 
On one hand, if party litigants are at a disadvantage, what can be done to 
improve their position? On the other hand, given the delays and extra expense 
that can be incurred by the court and their opponents, what can be done to 
reduce the disruption that party litigants can cause in the courts? The judges 
interviewed for this thesis were asked what could or should be done to provide 
party litigants with the best possible access to the courts, and what can be done 
to minimise the problems that can be caused to other parties. Because their 
perspective is based on acting for their client, the party litigant’s opponent, 
solicitors were asked only the latter question. However, what is interesting 
about the responses given by both judges and solicitors was how often the 
answers to both questions were one and the same: measures that could help 
party litigants would also minimise disruption, and vice versa. It is also 
interesting to note that the body of responses tended to fall neatly into the 
divisions discussed in Chapter 3.1244 For a significant group of respondents, the 
answer (and sometimes the only answer) to the issues encountered by party 	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litigants is to provide them with lawyers. Others took the route of suggesting 
varying degrees of systemic change, both within the court itself and in wider 
public policy matters. 
 
8.4.2 “More Lawyers” 
 
Many suggestions from interviewees centred on methods of making lawyers 
available to party litigants, such as legal aid or requiring individuals to maintain 
legal expense cover insurance.1245 One judge said, 
 
“…purely on a selfish basis I think legal aid should just be made more 
widely available. So that you don’t have to have a party litigant. To the 
extent that it’s legal aid that brings some people to court as party litigants, 
I think that’s unfortunate.”1246 
 
However, as the same judge pointed out, legal aid is not a proportionate option 
for lower-value claims: “…I’m not suggesting that legal aid should be available 
for people who want to sue for £100. It just wouldn’t be justified.”1247 
 
Others suggested that legal representation should not only be available, but 
required for litigants.1248 One judge suggested court-appointed representation in 
certain cases: 
 
“What I would like to be able to do is for the court to direct a solicitor to 
represent parties…in the civil sphere, for the sake of expediency, saving 
money, saving disruption, I’d be all for giving power to the sheriff to 
direct, in appropriate cases, a party litigant to be represented—and for 
that representative to be ‘unsackable.’”1249 
 
A solicitor echoed that suggestion, and added that alternately there should be a 
requirement for party litigants to take some form of legal advice: 
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“Firstly I think there should be a system where party litigants are required 
to take advice, either from solicitors or lay representatives, and 
demonstrate that they have done it.”1250 
 
8.4.3 Other Sources of Advice and Lay Representation 
 
Interviewees also suggested that party litigants could receive more assistance 
from advice agencies such as Shelter and Citizen’s Advice Bureaux, and in-court 
advice from either these advice agencies or the sheriff clerk’s office.1251 Student 
legal clinics were also cited as a potential resource for party litigants that in 
turn provide valuable experience for students.1252  
 
One judge proposed expanding the ability of lay representatives or “McKenzie 
friends” to assist party litigants: 
 
“…that is of some help, I have to say, if there is someone in court that can 
help them like a lay representative or a McKenzie friend, yes, that is 
helpful…And maybe, just maybe there could be some scope for giving them 
greater scope to represent a party litigant—although that’s a matter which 
is difficult, because they’re not trained lawyers, the real answer is to 
provide them with lawyers.”1253  
 
Lay representatives received a decidedly mixed reception from other judges and 
solicitors. Most lay representatives from advice agencies are considered to be 
helpful,1254 while those who are friends or family members of the litigant are 
more likely to be less helpful or even difficult.1255 A solicitor suggested that 
because lay representatives are typically not “legally minded” they may “double 
confuse issues.”1256 Another solicitor had a similar view: 
 
“But I haven’t found in most instances that a lay representative has 
contributed a great deal more than might be the case with a party litigant 
who was relatively confident in their position. If anything a lay 
representative can sometimes be more stalwart in their defence than the 
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individual would, I think because of the personal relationship that might 
exist between them.”1257 
 
This is an interesting observation, as it hints again at the role of emotion and 
how it can hinder the party litigant or even his representative. The best 
representation for a litigant is not only one who has legal knowledge, but who 
can also introduce the emotional distance necessary to best handle the case. 
 
It is worth noting that, while court observation can only provide a snapshot, the 
cases observed for this thesis presented a similar outlook on lay representation. 
These hearings primarily involved the “friends and family” variety of lay 
representatives. As noted above, lay representatives appeared in a number of 
cases with litigants in need of essential forms of assistance, and in those 
circumstances the party litigant would appear to be better off than they would 
have been on their own. In other cases, particularly when the lay representative 
appeared without the party litigant, there were difficulties. In a few cases the 
lay representative appeared confused about the process and fundamental 
aspects of the case, or was unable to provide essential information to the court. 
In one example, it was not entirely clear that the lay representative, a family 
member, had actually been authorised to act on the absent litigant’s behalf. In 
another case, a writ, drafted by the party litigant’s lay representative, was held 
to be incompetent; the case was dismissed with a finding of expenses against 
the party litigant. 
 
8.4.4 Self Help: Simplifying Procedures and Guidance/Education 
 
Simplified or user-friendly court procedures, plain language, and better guidance 
were all popular ideas both to assist party litigants and minimise disruption in 
the courts.1258 Generally interviewees did not make specific suggestions as to 
how this could be achieved, but the recently introduced simple procedure was 
viewed as a step in the right direction. One judge praised the party litigant-
friendly format of the simple procedure rules and recommended that the same 
principles could be applied to other procedures: 
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“So I would hope that some of that work would spill into perhaps 
mainstream actions and family actions. The rules have to be more 
accessible to maintain the myth of access to justice at a time when 
financial strictures sometimes hinder that.”1259 
 
In addition to simplifying procedures, one judge suggested that the threshold for 
the simple procedure should be raised considerably, from £5,000 to £50,000, to 
make more cases accessible to party litigants.1260 Better forms of guidance from 
the court, such as a handbook for party litigants1261 or a letter from the court 
setting out the procedure1262 were identified as potentially helpful. However, a 
clerk in a role dealing with particularly complex matters described his efforts to 
obtain better guidance for party litigants as a challenge: 
 
“I’ve often asked whether I can get some sort of section on the Scottish 
Courts website that could cater to party litigants and just have a little info 
pack…But so far I’ve not had a chance and to do that Communications 
Department want to get involved in that and I think they’re wanting to 
make it into plain English. And it just seems like quite a large undertaking 
for myself, who is operational at the moment. It seems like it would have 
to be heavily involved with the policy and legislation branch and all I 
wanted to do was help the party litigants.”1263 
 
Some ideas about guidance or education for party litigants extended to offering 
information on more practical or even conceptual matters, such as ensuring that 
party litigants are aware of the need to bring evidence to court1264 or teaching 
them not to expect that every wrong can lead to legal remedy.1265 Educating 
party litigants about the law and the legal aspects of making a case, however, 
was generally not recommended or thought to be impractical. One judge 
dismissed the idea by saying that party litigants will not be able to understand 
the law or how to give evidence.1266 Another judge said that while more 
information about procedural matters would help,  
 
“…the problem is that beyond that, even if somebody can read the rules, 
that still leaves issues of the substantive law, that still leaves issues about 	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evidence and leaves issues about practices. So there’s still quite a big gap 
there, I’m not immediately clear how somebody could be given all that 
information in a digestible way, that would really significantly assist.”1267 
 
8.4.5 Other Suggestions 
 
Judges praised in-court mediation services where they are available and 
suggested that better access to these services make dealing with party litigant 
cases easier,1268 or even that mediation should be mandatory before an action 
can be commenced.1269 A screening process for new party litigant cases was also 
floated as a suggestion to keep meritless cases out of the courts.1270 Solicitors 
put forth a handful of other options aimed primarily at minimising disruption or 
additional expense for their client, such as maintaining continuity of the same 
judge in a party litigant’s action to allow for better case management,1271 and 
using orders for caution to ensure that expenses can be paid if the party litigant 
is unsuccessful.1272 Some ideas, such as allowing submissions in writing,1273 or 
conducting court business by e-mail,1274 were recommended to avoid the need 
for costly court appearances.  
 
One solicitor felt that there was little that could be done to minimise the impact 
of party litigants on their opponent: 
 
“...because they are allowed in the court and as long as they are allowed 
in the court there’s going to be prejudice to the party they’re up against. 
So I think there is very little that can be done to minimise the impact, as 
long as they’re allowed to represent themselves.”1275 
 
 
8.4.6 Discussion 
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The ideas put forth by judges and solicitors to improve access for party litigants 
and minimise their impact mirror many of the options discussed in the existing 
literature. As in the existing literature, there are many opinions ranging from 
preventing self-representation in the courts altogether to extending self-help 
assistance to party litigants. The former option, along with similar ideas such as 
forcing litigants to attend mediation, does not necessarily sit well with the open-
door policy the courts have had for party litigants for the entirety of the Scottish 
court’s history, or with our understanding of access to self-representation as an 
exercise of personal autonomy.1276 However, these ideas are also not without 
precedent; representation is required in many continental European courts and 
litigants in the UK employment tribunals are required to at least attempt early 
conciliation of their claims. 
 
The biggest problem with most of these options, of course, is cost. As much as so 
many would like to see legal aid extended to more litigants, they also 
acknowledged that budgetary constraints make it unlikely that this will occur 
anytime soon. Advice agencies are a less costly option, but again expanding their 
offerings to more litigants comes at a cost, and the assistance they can offer is 
limited. It is interesting to note that the two options that are potentially the 
least costly—simplifying procedures and extending access to lay representation—
are also those that have made the most progress in the last few years. The 
simple procedure has been introduced to offer more user-friendly rules to party 
litigants and the rules allowing for lay representation have been steadily 
expanded. It is still unclear just how helpful lay representatives, particularly 
“friends and family” representatives, can be to party litigants and thus 
uncertain whether expanding their powers in court will be beneficial or 
potentially problematic. And while simpler procedures can make for a smoother 
process, in practice there may be less substantive effect for party litigants, 
simply because party litigants already receive so much help with court 
procedures. The main beneficiary of changes in procedure may be the court 
itself, but making for less disruption for the court is also a worthwhile aim. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to address some of the questions around access to 
the courts and access to justice for party litigants, but there are no easy 
answers to these complicated questions. It is clear that self-representation can 
have an often negative impact on many of the parties involved. Mitigating that 
impact comes at its own cost, both financially and potentially ethically. The 
next chapter will summarise the conclusions of the thesis as a whole and, using 
these conclusions, attempt to discern how best to address the issues raised in 
these previous chapters. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
At the heart of the issue of self-representation in civil matters is the notion that 
the Scottish civil court process is simply not intended to be used by self-
representing litigants. As one judge said, 
 
“But it’s that sort of thing, disruption in the process itself, by not 
understanding the process. And that calls into question the whole process 
involving party litigants, actually, and if for example we have cases where 
there are party litigants, it may be that the whole process we’re adopting 
is just not fit for purpose.”1277 
 
This disconnect between the realities of the demands of the process and the 
abilities of most party litigants informs many of the answers to the research 
questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 set out the law 
relating to self-representation in Scotland. Chapter 7 discussed in detail the 
issues arising with party litigants in various aspects of the process, such as 
procedural or legal matters, and found that judges have to use a number of 
techniques and adjustments to the overall process to accommodate party 
litigants. Some of the principles and factors that judges apply were discussed in 
Chapter 6 as well as Chapter 7, although overall most decisions appear to come 
down to questions of “fairness” or the “interests of justice.” This chapter will 
consider many of these issues in more detail, but first some of the most 
fundamental conclusions of the thesis are set out below:  
 
1. There is in law an open-door approach to self-representation in the civil 
courts. 
 
2. However, the process is designed for lawyers and most procedures make no 
accommodation for party litigants. 
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3. In practice, judicial discretion is used to ameliorate this paradox, although 
there is little guidance in legal authority or “soft law” as to how precisely 
discretion should be exercised.   
 
4.  Party litigants often expect more assistance from the courts than the rules 
allow for and often do not take responsibility for their obligations as set out in 
the law and rules. 
 
5. Although the standard of relevance and legal and procedural knowledge that 
can be required of all litigants is high in law, judges almost invariably apply far 
lower standards to party litigants.  
 
6. Many judges feel obligated to take a more active approach and intervene in 
party litigants’ cases. 
 
7. A sense of fairness and justice, but also perceptions of party litigants’ 
emotions and their feelings about the process motivates judges to act. 
 
8. The adversarial nature of the process creates a knowledge gap in the process 
that must be filled, often by the judge or at times by an opponent solicitor. 
 
Many of these conclusions, and other issues discussed below, confirm in the 
Scottish context the findings of prior research on self-representation in other 
jurisdictions that civil courts are inimical to SRLs and that SRLs often disrupt the 
typical function and adversarial nature of the process. As was discussed in 
chapter 3, in terms of party litigants and the “who, why and what” there has 
been a significant amount of research, in comparison to Scotland, carried out in 
England and Wales and other English-speaking common law jurisdictions. In 
particular, it was noted that SRLs may have a number of reasons, often 
financial, for self-representing, that they often encounter difficulties with the 
procedural, legal, and evidential aspects of the process, and that they often find 
the process bewildering and stressful. In the main, the research conducted for 
this study, as much as is possible, appears to generally confirm the conclusions 
reached by those such as Moorhead and Sefton, Trinder et al, Macfarlane and 
Knowlton et al. Establishing that these conclusions apply in Scotland is 
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worthwhile in itself. However, the Scottish civil legal system is unique and 
distinct even from other jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Some of these 
conclusions, although relevant and informed by wider research into self-
representation, are thus particular to the Scottish experience and Scottish civil 
process, and therefore valuable to the legal system, policy makers and 
population of Scotland serviced by the Scottish courts.  
 
Although this particular study asked different questions and adopted in places a 
different methodology, it can be said, with relative confidence, that the data 
gathered for this study does not suggest any significant divergence or 
contradiction emerging in the Scottish experience of party litigants from the 
general experience presented in the existing literature from other jurisdictions 
such as England and Wales. However, this study does not, and was not intended 
to, examine matters such as the feelings and experiences of party litigants 
relating to the process of self-representing. It should be emphasised that there 
would be value in conducting research in Scotland similar to that carried out in 
other jurisdictions with a view to conclusively determining issues such as how 
Scottish SRLs experience self-representation in the civil courts and how this may 
relate to the existing literature elsewhere. 
 
 
9.2	  The	  “Law	  in	  Books”	  
9.2.1	  The	  Substantive	  Law	  
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, Scots law as it relates to the party litigant is a 
study in contrasts. This is seen perhaps most prominently in the two 
fundamental assumptions underlying the treatment of self-representation. First, 
that the law provides an open door for unrepresented litigants to access the 
court directly and make any type of case they wish without legal advice or 
representation; and secondly, that most of the civil court process is designed for 
lawyers and requires a high level of skill and training to navigate. This creates a 
fundamental tension even before the details of the process are considered. 
Furthermore, the law provides that the system is adversarial and that courts are 
thus entitled to hold party litigants to the very same high standards as solicitors. 
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Again, this creates a natural tension, as a party-led process cannot progress 
when one or more of the parties lack the knowledge necessary to take the 
necessary actions and make decisions in his case. However, for the most part, 
these contradicting notions are as far as most of the “law in books” takes us. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, despite the court’s open door policy, the law and 
procedures do little (with only a few exceptions, such as the simple procedure) 
to acknowledge the needs of party litigants or address the difficulties that can 
arise. Where party litigants are mentioned in the law or rules, it is usually 
instead to restrict them—for example, in matters such as serving documents or 
regulating access to lay support or representation. The court procedures, apart 
from the simple procedure and “DIY” divorce, make no concession for 
unrepresented litigants. It is well-known that SRLs require latitude or assistance 
from the courts due to their lack of legal knowledge, but there is no general 
entitlement to be afforded latitude or other “rights” to be found in the law or 
rules, and access to other forms of help such as lay assistance are restricted.  
The sources of law discussed in Chapter 4 are thus notable more for what is not 
there, leading to the ultimate conclusion that the position of the party litigant is 
dictated not by the law and rules, but largely by the operation of judicial 
discretion. 
 
9.2.2	  The	  “Case	  Law”	  
 
With so little set out in the law and rules and so much thus left to judicial 
discretion, one might expect to find a well-developed body of case law on the 
decisions that judges are called upon to make in their handling of party litigants 
and issues that they raise in court. The review of the case law set out in Chapter 
5 demonstrates that, while the available judgments relating to party litigants’ 
cases—which surely represent only the tip of the iceberg—provide a useful 
illustration of the types of decisions judges are called upon to make, there are 
very few firm pronouncements of legal principle and thus little authoritative 
guidance to be found. One of the few guiding principles is that courts are 
entitled to hold party litigants to the same high standards as solicitors and 
advocates.1278 Although Wilson represents the leading case on the question of 
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offer latitude to a party litigant due to their unrepresented status provided it 
does not prejudice the other party. This is a principle that was effectively 
already made out in the case law, which offers a number of examples of judges 
offering party litigants a wide berth to “have their say” in the form of Moore 
latitude as well assistance or latitude on procedural matters, “looking behind” 
pleadings and finding the “latent case.” The case law on the matter of when to 
allow adjournment or continuation of a party litigant’s case is comparatively 
well developed, but still leaves much to the individual judge to determine.  
 
As noted earlier, there are arguments to be made in favour of using judicial 
discretion to manage unrepresented litigants in the courts, as each party litigant 
and case presents a unique challenge and restrictions on how they are dealt with 
could lead to unfairness. But it is perhaps unfortunate that it is not clear 
whether the current emphasis on judicial discretion is deliberate, or just fails to 
acknowledge party litigants and thus leaves it to judges on the “front line” to 
deal with the issues as they encounter them. These are, as the ETBB notes, 
difficult issues and it is no simple task to balance the desire for fairness for the 
party litigant and the need to be fair to his opponent and, in an adversarial 
system, maintain the neutrality of the court. It is thus curious that courts have 
been so hesitant to set out at least some form of guiding principles. Attempts 
elsewhere to provide guidance, such as the ETBB, are hindered by the lack of 
authoritative case law and direction within the law itself; the ETBB is able to 
raise issues, but not provide firm guidance for judges because there is none to 
be found in the law itself.  
 
As with Chapter 4, the ultimate conclusion to be drawn from the case law 
reviewed in Chapter 5 is that it is perhaps most notable for what is missing. 
While it is instructive on the decisions required of the courts and their 
outcomes—the what and how—the why of these decisions is notably elusive. 
There is, as noted earlier, a distinct lack of reference to legal authority or the 
judge’s reasoning in these cases. It has been suggested that this can be 
attributed in part to the difficulty that party litigants will encounter making 
arguments in an adversarial system—judges are often unable to properly 
determine a case on its legal merits because the party litigant is ill-equipped to 
make an argument that they can uphold, and they can only go so far in looking 
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for a “latent case.”1279 The case law, while instructive in some areas, does not 
represent a true line of legal authority on the treatment of party litigants. 
9.3	  The	  “Law	  in	  Action”	  
 
It is worth noting that, while the law and rules set out in Chapter 4 offered little 
real perspective on the operation of the law in practice, the case law in Chapter 
5 did align with some of the empirical findings. For example, the idea raised by 
the case law that judges often feel obliged to offer party litigants numerous 
“chances” to remedy procedural failings or deficiencies in pleadings was borne 
out by both judicial and solicitor interviews, as well as numerous examples in 
the court observation. More subtle themes in the case law, such as the problem 
of party litigants’ expectations that the court will take a more active role in the 
proceedings and the resulting difficulties caused by the common failure of party 
litigants to take responsibility for their case also came through in the empirical 
study. This is particularly interesting because one would not necessarily expect 
to find this sort of information in a judgment, which typically sets out only the 
decision in law. However, if the is no other conclusion to be drawn from this 
thesis, it is that the law and the process do not operate as they usually would in 
cases involving party litigants. 
 
In other areas, the “law in action” proved to bear little resemblance to the “law 
in books.” Perhaps the most glaring contradiction is in the standard party 
litigants are held to: although the law is quite clear that there is no right for a 
party litigant to be treated any differently than a solicitor, judges almost 
invariably lowered the standard and many expected the party litigant to have 
little or no knowledge of the law or process. Others even felt it was 
unreasonable or unfair to expect the party litigant to understand the law.1280 
This may in large part be based on their experiences on the bench: as set out in 
Chapter 7, judges reported that it is commonplace for party litigants to 
encounter difficulties in all aspects of the process, and judges are often making 
adjustments and decisions to account for this. For example, all judges reported 
altering their approach on the bench by using plain language and offering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1279	  Section	  5.5.	  1280	  Section	  6.3.2.	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explanations and advice to party litigants. Equally, while the law is careful not 
to create an entitlement to latitude or allowance for party litigants, it was clear 
that in practice extending latitude was the rule rather than the exception, and 
some judges appeared to feel obligated to extend allowance or even assistance 
to the party litigant. Many judges reported having a set of tactics (such as 
providing early advice on matters such as evidence) designed to minimise the 
difficulties they anticipated encountering with party litigants. While the rules of 
procedure do not make provision for the needs of party litigants, judges—and at 
times opponent solicitors—attempt to fill in the gaps.  
 
As noted earlier, there is little reference to legal authority relating to party 
litigants in the case law, and the empirical research for this thesis suggests that 
the reason for this may be quite straightforward: judges are not considering 
legal authorities (such as there are) or principles when making these decisions, 
but rather relying on their conceptions of “fairness” or the “interests of 
justice.”1281 Slightly more surprising is the influence of the judge’s ideas, about 
the party litigant’s emotions or perceptions of the process, on their conduct of 
the case or their decision making process.1282 As noted earlier, these ideas 
operate outwith the principles traditionally understood to drive the civil court 
process, but appear to nonetheless be a significant consideration for many 
judges. What is less clear is whether this can be attributed to the individual 
judge, developments in judicial culture and increased “consumer focus” in the 
courts1283 or whether these principles have developed to fill the vacuum left by 
the substantive law. 
 
While the civil court system remains adversarial in principle, it is difficult to 
draw any other conclusion from the empirical research other than that this is not 
the case in practice with party litigants. Again the tensions that party litigants 
bring to the civil court system are highlighted, as judges clearly felt that the 
need to be fair to party litigants was at odds with the desire to remain neutral 
or passive.1284 When party litigants enter the civil court process without the 
knowledge required to navigate it properly, this creates a vacuum that must be 	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  Section	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  1282	  Section	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  Section	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  Sections	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  6.3.3.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   272	  
filled, or the process will grind to a halt. The adversarial court process is a 
“closed system”: the need for expertise does not disappear, but can only be 
shifted or redistributed. The value of the hypothetical lawyer’s expertise does 
not entirely disappear. Currently, for the most part, the knowledge gap is filled 
by judges, sometimes with assistance from a represented opponent’s solicitor. 
Although the case law emphasises that there is no right to assistance or a less 
adversarial process for the party litigant—while also offering numerous examples 
of this occurring-- judges reported that they were inevitably more active or 
interventionist in party litigants’ cases. Overall, one of the most important 
findings of the thesis is that the issues created by self-representation in the 
courts are currently being dealt with not by the law or rules but rather by the 
exercise of judicial discretion at the “front line.” While this may minimise to 
some extent the impact of self-representation in the short term, this approach 
can also ultimately obscure the real questions raised about whether the system 
at present offers real access to the courts or just the appearance of access to 
unrepresented litigants. 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
The paradox of the party litigant in the Scottish civil courts is that 
unrepresented litigants loom so large in the courtroom anecdote, while the law 
and rules continue to largely turn a blind eye to them. At times it seems almost 
as if there is a fear that acknowledging party litigants will increase their 
numbers or attract more to self-represent. Although there are a number of 
potential responses to the issues raised by SRLs in the courts—from “more 
lawyers” solutions, such as expanded access to legal aid, to simplified court 
procedures or online dispute resolution—it is suggested that these must be 
considered alongside the overarching omissions and contradictions in the law 
itself. To some extent, the lack of law or rules relating to party litigants can 
again be accounted for by the lack of clear public policy aims in relation to self-
representation in Scotland. The Report of the Scottish Civil Court Review1285 
reveals opposing viewpoints on how party litigants should be addressed: on the 
one hand, they should have access to justice, while on the other hand they must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1285	  Chapter	  11.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   273	  
be prevented from causing disruption.1286 The Scottish legal system is left with 
conflicting objectives and no real direction.  
 
More recently, the Scottish Civil Justice Council’s “The New Rules: First 
Report”1287 on the reform of Scottish Civil Procedure makes little mention of 
party litigants at all. There appears to be only one reference to unrepresented 
litigants in the entire document, and then just to note that processes should not 
be entirely online because unrepresented litigants may still need access to paper 
forms.1288 In fairness, many of the aims of the rules reform project, such as 
simpler and more streamlined rules, will benefit both party litigants and 
represented parties. However, there is still no clue as to how, or if, the future 
rules intend to address the needs of party litigants. Given that an entire chapter 
in the SCCR was devoted to self-representing litigants, albeit it may have raised 
more questions than answers, this is a strange omission. It does not bode well 
for reform of the civil court rules and the processes that are now often disrupted 
when party litigants enter the courtroom. 1289  It seems that this can only 
continue to happen if the particular problems and needs of party litigants are 
not acknowledged. However, if views about the current rise in self-
representation and predictions that it will continue are to be believed, the 
problem will not stay in the shadows for long. In England and Wales, slashing 
legal aid created a virtual “big bang” of litigants in person in their courts, with 
which the courts are still struggling to come to terms. In Scotland, our relatively 
low, if rising, number of party litigants gives us the luxury of time to first 
fashion a much-needed policy on access to the courts for SRLs, and then find the 
best way to implement it. 
 
A consistent policy would also be beneficial to address some of the issues and 
difficulties raised throughout this thesis. Overall this thesis observes that at 
present judges, court staff and often even opponent solicitors are extending 
themselves beyond the established remit of their respective roles to make the 
process as “fair” as possible for party litigants. The party litigant also finds 	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  Section	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himself making his own efforts in an unfamiliar and often intimidating role. 
However, despite all that is done outwith the usual operation of the process to 
make it fair and accessible for party litigants, most interviewees still consider 
that the party litigant is disadvantaged, if not doomed to fail.1290 It may be that 
that, because the law says so little about the party litigant, these efforts occur 
on the fringes of the process and thus go unseen. It is hoped that this thesis 
brings to light both these issues and the efforts being made to address them, and 
that this contributes to finding ways to move forward in this complex facet of 
the civil justice system in Scotland.  
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Appendices 
	  
Appendix	  A:	  Court	  Observation	  Pro	  forma	  
 
COURT OBSERVATION  
KEYWORDS:  
DATE: 
CASE NAME:  
REF IF KNOWN:  
TYPE OF ACTION:  
PL: DEFENDER  
TODAY’S HEARING:  
PM: 
DM:  
ORDER:  
NOTES/COMMENTS:  
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Appendix	  B:	  Court	  Observation	  Log	  
 
Week One 
10:05am—11:35am (1 hr 30 mins) 
1 sequestration party defender and 3 party defenders in ordinary cause options 
hearings 
 
10:05am—11:10am (1 hr 5 mins) 
2 sequestration cases involving party defenders, both with lay representatives 
1 ordinary cause case with party litigant defender 
 
Week Two 
10:05am—11:00am (55 mins) 
4 sequestrations with party litigant respondents, one with lay rep/support 
1 summary application (banning order) with party respondent 
 
Week Three 
10:10am—11:15am (1 hour, 5 mins) 
1 party pursuer in ordinary action (reduction), 1 party pursuer in summary 
application 
 
10:00am—12:30pm (2 hrs 30 mins, including break) 
1 party litigant respondent in a sequestration, 1 defender in TTPA, 1 defender in 
a minute for committal (summary application),1 defender in ordinary action, 1 
pursuer in a summary application 
 
Week Four 
10:00am—1.05pm (Ordinary Court) 
2:00pm—3:05pm (Additional Afternoon Hearing) (4 hrs 10 mins) 
2 party litigant defenders in ordinary action, 1 party defender in a summary 
application, 1 party pursuer in a summary application, 1 party pursuer in 
ordinary action (lay rep appeared but refused right of audience) 
 
10:00am—1:00pm, 2:00pm—3:00pm (4 hours) 
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1 party defender in a summary application, 1 party defender in sequestrations, 1 
lay rep for defender in a sequestration, 3 party defenders in ordinary actions 
 
Week Five 
10:00am—1:30pm (3 hrs 30 mins) 
1 party pursuer in ordinary action w/lay rep, 3 party defenders in ordinary 
action, 3 party defenders in sequestrations, 1 party defender in summary 
application 
 
10:00am—12:10pm (2 hours, 10 minutes) 
1 party defender in a sequestration, 1 party pursuer in an ordinary action, 5 
party defenders in summary applications, 1 party defender in an ordinary action 
 
Week Six 
10:00am—11:40am (1 hour, 40 mins) 
1 party defender in a sequestration w/lay rep, 2 party defenders in ordinary 
cause actions, 1 party defender in a summary application 
 
10:00am—10:40am (40 mins) 
2 party defenders in sequestrations, 1 party defender in summary application, 1 
party pursuer in ordinary action 
 
Week Seven 
10:00am—12noon (2 hours) 
1 party defender in a sequestration, 1 party pursuer in ordinary action, 1 party 
pursuer in summary application 
 
Week Eight 
10:00am—1:10pm, 2:10pm—3pm (4 hours) 
2 sequestrations with party defenders of which 1 with lay rep, 2 party defenders 
in summary applications, 2 party defenders in same ordinary action 
 
10am—12noon (2 hours) 
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6 party defenders in sequestrations (2 with lay reps, 1 with party present and 
one without), 7 party defenders in ordinary actions (2 of which TTP 
applications), 1 party defender in summary application 
 
Week Nine  
10am—12:50pm (2 hours 50 minutes) 
4 party defenders in summary applications, 1 party defender in ordinary action 
 
10am—12noon (2 hours) 
1 party defender in a sequestration, 3 party defenders in ordinary actions, 1 lay 
rep with party pursuers in a summary application, 2 party pursuers (no 
appearance) in ordinary action, 1 party defender in summary application (no 
appearance) 
 
Totals: 
Party Litigant hearings: 89 
Pursuers: 13 
Defenders: 76 
 
Lay Reps: 12 (+2 not permitted to appear) 
 
Of Which: 
Sequestrations: 27 respondents 
Ordinary Cause Actions: 37; 29 defenders, 8 pursuers 
Summary Applications: 25; 20 defenders, 5 pursuers 
 
Total Court Time: 34 hours 20 mins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   279	  
Appendix	  C:	  Sheriff	  Interview	  Questions	  
 
The core questions asked at each interview, unless already addressed, appear in 
bold; other questions asked if time allowed or according to the content of the 
rest of the interview. Prompts/follow up questions appear in italics. 
  
1. Can you tell me the first 2 or three words that come to your mind when 
you think about party litigants in the civil courts? 
 
2. How often do you encounter party litigants in civil cases?  
a. Are they more often pursuer or defender? 
b. Type of case? 
c. Do you think their numbers are increasing? Why? 
 
3. What standard of legal knowledge do you require of party litigants?  
What about knowledge of the court process/procedures? 
 
4. Do you have a standard approach when dealing with party litigants? How is 
it different from solicitors? (eg, using “plain English”, explaining matters). 
What about if both parties are unrepresented? 
 
5. Latitude or Assistance for Party Litigants: Does the sheriff have a positive 
duty towards the party litigant? What is your typical approach in these 
areas, and where are the lines for too much or too little? 
 
a. Legal Matters and Relevance (eg, “looking behind” pleadings, allowing 
arguments not presented in the correct legal terminology) 
 
b. Procedural Matters (eg allowing documents to be lodged late or in an 
incorrect format) 
 
c. Evidential Matters: (eg questioning witnesses or giving own evidence, 
introducing evidence out of time) 
 
d. Delays (allowing additional time or missing hearing)? 
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e. What factors or principles do you take into account when you are asked to 
exercise discretion in a case involving a party litigant? What about legal 
authorities? 
 
6. In cases where a party litigant is causing difficulties (eg by pursuing a 
meritless case, delays, not following procedures) what can the sheriff do?  
 
7. In your experience with party litigants, have you been asked to grant or 
granted any of the following order? If so, how often/how common are these 
orders? 
 
a. Decree by default? If multiple, what is the most common reason? 
b. Summary decree?  
c. An order for caution? 
d. An award of expenses against a party litigant for a particular hearing? (Eg, 
if a motion is incompetent, or for amendment procedure) 
e. An award of expenses to the party litigant? 
f. A hearing under certification? Not a peremptory diet Eg when a party fails 
to attend a hearing 
 
8. How do you interpret what a party litigant is asking for in court, if they do not 
make a formal motion in the usual way?   
 
9. At what point, if any, should the Sheriff interrupt if a party litigant has 
strayed into irrelevant matters in court? 
 
10. Where 1 is “completely passive” and 10 is “completely [?] active,” how 
would you characterise the role of the Sheriff in the Scottish civil courts? 
Does that number change at all in cases in which one of the parties is 
unrepresented?  
 
11.  Do you typically suggest that party litigants should take legal advice, or 
refer them to advice agencies or other bodies that may be able to help? When is 
it appropriate to suggest that the litigant should take advice?  
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12. What do you expect from opponent solicitors when the other party is 
unrepresented? Should they give procedural advice, guide in court? 
 
13. In your experience, how well do party litigants usually communicate with 
their opponent during the progress of the case?  
 
a. How does communication affect the progress of the case in court?   
 
b. Settlement? (Does this impact the role of the Sheriff, eg taking extra steps to 
see if a case can be settled?) 
 
14. What is the role of court staff when a litigant is not represented? (Should 
they “keep them right?” How far does can this extend? Are they a “go-
between” for the Sheriff and the litigant?) 
 
15. What, if anything, is the role of the capacity of the individual in the decision 
making process? For example, if a litigant appears to be particularly well-
informed and well-spoken, or on the other hand is clearly out of his or her 
depth? 
 
a. How is this assessed?  
 
b. Have you ever encountered a party litigant who you believed may have 
lacked the capacity to self-represent altogether (eg, due to mental health 
issues? How did you deal with this? 
 
16. How well do most laypeople understand the law? Do they usually understand 
issues once they are explained? What is different about the way that legal 
professionals approach legal principles, as compared to lay people?  
 
17. How successfully are most party litigants able to present their case or 
defence? To what extent do you think that not having a lawyer affects the 
ultimate outcome they achieve? 
 
18. What aspects of the process challenge party litigants the most?  
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19. How proportionate is the system currently in place in respect of party 
litigants? Does it reflect a proper balance between the need for fairness and 
efficiency in the court, and the party litigant’s access to justice? 
 
20. What could [should?] be done to provide party litigants with the best 
access to the courts possible? 
 
21. What could [should?] be done to minimise any problems party litigants in 
the civil courts may cause? 
 
22. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or any question that I should 
have asked?  
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Appendix	  D:	  Court	  Staff	  Focus	  Group	  Questions	  
 
1. Who is present, their role and experience  
 
2. Can you give me some of your general impressions of party litigants in the 
civil courts in one or two words? 
 
3. What do you do for party litigants? Are there any additional steps you usually 
take in your job when you know a litigant doesn’t have a solicitor? (Besides what 
is prescribed in the rules/practice)  
 
4. Compared to represented parties, do party litigants take up more of your 
time? How? (in person at the counter, dealing with docs and other matters) 
 
5. What is the difference between procedural and legal advice? 
a. How do you explain this to party litigants? 
b. Do they usually understand once it is explained to them? 
c. What do you do when asked for information or advice you can’t provide? (eg 
refer to CAB?)  
 
6. What do party litigants usually expect from the court and court staff? (Active 
duty? Keeping them right?) Are their expectations usually realistic? 
 
7. How well are party litigants usually able to conduct their own cases? What are 
their biggest challenges? 
 
8. How “joined up” are the court staff and the sheriffs? Do the sheriffs 
know/understand what you do or can do for party litigants?  
 
If time allows 
 
Has a party litigant ever been difficult or abusive towards you? (Show of hands? 
How so/What happened?) Have you ever received thanks or positive comments?  
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 Has a party litigant ever made a complaint about you, or a complaint to you 
about a colleague? (Show of hands? What was the complaint and how was it 
resolved?) 
 
How do you usually communicate with party litigants?  (eg phone, mail, email, 
in person?) Follow up on face to face vs remote communication?  
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Appendix	  E:	  Solicitor	  Interview	  Questions	  
 
1. Can you tell me your name and a little bit about your experience? 
 
2. What are the first three words that come to your mind when you are thinking 
about party litigants in the civil courts? 
 
3. In addition to small claims/now simple procedure, where do you encounter 
party litigants most often? 
 
4. Do party litigants conduct cases in a different way from solicitors? Are there 
aspects of conducting litigation that they find particularly difficult? 
 
5. What, if anything, do you do differently with a party litigant on the other side 
as compared to a solicitor? How do you approach matters when they are 
misguided about the law or make procedural errors? (Procedurally and/or 
between parties?) 
 
6. How do the courts approach party litigants, as compared to represented 
litigants and their solicitors? What are your perceptions of any latitude or 
assistance they may be offered? 
 
7. If and when courts extend latitude or assistance to party litigants, they often 
have to weigh this against the question of fairness or prejudice to their 
opponents. (Is this correct?) What are your thoughts on how courts tend to 
consider this?  
 
8. Is/how is communication with party litigants different? How do you deal with 
this or what is the impact? 
 
9. Do you find that your clients incur extra expense in cases involving party 
litigants? Where there has been a decree and/or award of expenses, are they 
usually able to recover the money in practice? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   286	  
10. What do you think could be done to minimise the impact PLs can have on 
their opponents or the court? 
 
11.  Any other questions I should have asked? 
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Appendix	  F:	  Ethics	  Committee	  Approval	  Form	  
 
 
Application Approved 
Ethics Committee for Non-Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects 
 
Staff Research Ethics Application ☐     Postgraduate Student Research 
Ethics Application x 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________
__________________ 
Application Details 
Application Number:   400150054  
Applicant’s Name:  Halle Turner  
Project Title:   Party Litigants in the Scottish Civil Courts   
      
 
Application Status:     Approved 
Start Date of Approval:     05/12/15 
End Date of Approval of Research Project:  01/10/17 
___________________________________________________________________________________
________________ 
 
Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any enquiries please email socsci-
ethics@glasgow.ac.uk.  
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Appendix	  G:	  Consent	  Form	  for	  Interviewees	  
 
  Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Project:  Party Litigants in the Scottish Civil Courts 
 
Name of Researcher:  Halle Turner 
Supervisors: Professor Tom Mullen and Mr Stephen Bogle 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement/Participant Information 
Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
 
I consent / do not consent (delete as applicable) to interviews being audio-recorded.  I 
acknowledge that copies of transcripts will be returned to participants for verification and that 
no direct quotes will be used without my express permission. 
 
I acknowledge that participants will remain anonymous and will not be referred to by name in 
the finished work. 
 
I understand that the data collected from this research will be stored securely with my personal 
details removed and agree for it to be held as set out in the Plain Language Statement. 
 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in this research study    
 
I do not agree to take part in this research study   
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant  ………………………………………… Signature   …………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher  ………………………………………………… Signature   
…………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
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Appendix	  H:	  Participant	  Information	  Sheet	  
 
 
 
 
Party Litigants in the Scottish Civil Courts 
Researcher: Halle Turner, PhD Candidate at the University of Glasgow 
(h.turner.1@research.gla.ac.uk) 
Supervisors: Professor Tom Mullen and Mr Stephen Bogle 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. You have been asked to 
participate in this study because you hold office as a Sheriff [/because of your 
professional as a solicitor/because you are a member of staff in the Sheriff Clerk’s 
office]. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part. 
Thank you for reading this.  
 
The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of unrepresented or 
“party” litigants in the Scottish civil courts. Participation in the study is voluntary and 
will entail an interview of approximately one hour [half an hour/attending a focus 
group from approximately half and hour]. [Focus group only: Up to five other 
members of staff in similar roles (including civil counter staff and clerks of court) 
will also be present at the focus group.] You may withdraw from participating in this 
study at any time. With your permission, the interview will be recorded.  
 
Your name and any personal details will not appear in the study once it has been 
completed. Identifying details for each participant will be stored electronically with 
password protection. 
 
Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless 
evidence of wrongdoing or potential harm is uncovered. In such cases the University 
may be obliged to contact relevant statutory bodies/agencies. 
 
The data collected will appear in a PhD thesis. Any direct quotes from participants will 
be used only with express permission. The personal information of participants, 
including names and any identifying information, will be destroyed upon completion of 
the project. The research data itself will be held for 10 years after the completion of 
the project. 
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This research is funded in part by a grant from the Clark Foundation for Legal 
Education. 
 
This project has been considered and approved by the College of Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee 
 
Further information and to make any complaint, please contact the College of Social 
Sciences Ethics Officer, Dr Muir Houston, email: Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk 
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Appendix	  I:	  Interview	  Coding	  
 
Sheriffs/Solicitors 
Adversarial/Inquisitorial  
Appeals 
Assistance 
Communication 
Court Staff/Assistance 
Disruption/Aggression 
Emotional Needs of PLs 
Expectations 
Expenses 
Evidence 
Formality 
Gatekeeping 
Knowledge Level of PLs 
Language/Plain Language 
Latitude—Legal/Relevance 
Latitude--Principles 
Latitude—Procedural 
Latitude—Evidential 
Relevance 
Relevance/Procedural 
Role of Court 
Serial or Vexatious Litigants  
Settlement 
Solicitors 
Suggestions 
Summary Disposal/Caution 
Time Issues/Lack of Time 
Typologies 
Typologies—“Good” and “Bad” PLs 
 
Court Staff 
Active vs Passive/Expectations 
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Advice--Accountability 
Advice Uptake (or lack thereof) 
Appeals 
Availability/Accessibility of Advice 
Difficult or Aggressive Litigants 
Fees 
Language/Plain Language 
Legal Procedural Divide 
L-P Deviations 
Points of Access and Gatekeeping 
Post Decree 
Referral [to other agencies] 
Serial or Vexatious Litigants  
Solicitors 
Time/Lack of Time 
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